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The purpose of this thesis is to present a study of the aims, contexts, philosophical basis, and 
intended praxis of the system of virtue politics in Cristoforo Landino’s Disputationes Camaldulenses, a 
philosophical dialogue completed in 1474 whose stated aim is to investigate what a republican 
politician can learn from Plato. Landino presents a programme for the ascent of the soul which 
involves both the moral virtues, which involve political activity and the purgation of the soul, and 
the intellectual virtues, which are concerned with the cognition of God and from which one can 
gain the wisdom to guide and direct the state. Since the best way of life involves the use of each 
kind of virtue as far as is necessary, Landino grants the statesman the capacity to move between 
government and detachment from direct civic intervention as desired. I show how Landino’s 
purpose is, therefore, to justify the exercise of political power in a republic by an individual who 
does not occupy a governmental role, and in doing so legitimise the position of Lorenzo de’ Medici.  
My thesis consists of three parts. In the first I outline the political-historical and intellectual 
contexts for the composition of the Disputationes, situating the work within contemporary 
humanistic debates about political virtue and the Florentine political currents of the late 
Quattrocento. The second part of the thesis analyses Landino’s system of virtue politics, its 
philosophical and psychological underpinning, and how it reconciles Ciceronian republicanism with 
Platonic perfectionism. In the third part of the thesis I show how the allegory of the Aeneid in the 
third and fourth books of the Disputationes describes a course of practical ethics which the statesman 
must undertake if he is to purify himself of vice, attain knowledge of the divine, and impart this 
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Until quite recently, traditionalists saw Cristoforo Landino (1425-1498) as exhibiting mere brilliance 
in an age of genius. He was a thinker eclipsed entirely by his peers. Scholars tended to view his 
work as little more than a footnote to that of his pupil and colleague Marsilio Ficino, regarding the 
older humanist as a rhetorically refined but intellectually ponderous imitator whose contribution to 
philosophy consisted of little more than superimpositions of Ficinian thought onto an already well-
established tradition of allegorical criticism.1 Over the last forty years, however, Landino’s 
reputation has undergone something of a rehabilitation. This has been prompted at least in part by 
primary sources being more readily available. In the early 1970s, Roberto Cardini and Manfred 
Lentzen each edited a number of Landino’s shorter texts such as letters, proems, and academic 
prolusions, and these efforts were accompanied by critical editions of longer works, most notably 
the De vera nobilitate, edited by Maria Teresa Liaci in 1970, the Disputationes Camaldulenses, edited by 
Peter Lohe in 1980 and, eventually, the Comento sopra la Comedia, edited by Paolo Procaccioli in 
2001.2 What followed was a surge of scholarly activity that has illuminated aspects of Landino and 
his work that had hitherto gone underappreciated. Craig Kallendorf and Jane Chance have 
identified the originality of his contribution to the tradition of Virgil criticism, Simon Gilson to that 
of Dante.3 Christoph Pieper, Simone Fellina and Mario Di Cesare have discussed the value of 
poetry to Landino’s thought, Bruce McNair and Eberhard Muller-Bochat have offered insights on 
his intellectual influences, and Ute Rüsch and Ursula Rombach have undertaken detailed studies of 
his moral psychology.4 Most recently, Jill Kraye has been working on a translation of the 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 
pp. 84-88; James B. Wadsworth, ‘Landino’s “Disputationes Camaldulenses”, Ficino’s “De Felicitate”, and 
“L’Altercazione” of Lorenzo de’ Medici’, Modern Philology, 50.1 (August 1952), 23-31. 
2 Manfred Lentzen, ed., Studien zur Dante-Exegese Cristoforo Landinos (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau, 1971); 
Lentzen, ed., Reden Cristoforo Landinos, (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1974); Cristoforo Landino, Scritti critici e teorici, 
ed. by Roberto Cardini, 2 vols (Rome: Bulzoni, 1974); Landino, De Vera Nobilitate, ed. by Maria Teresa Liaci 
(Florence: Olschki, 1970) (hereafter DVN); Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses, ed. by Peter Lohe (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1980) (hereafter DC); Landino, Comento sopra la Comedia, ed. by Paolo Procaccioli, 4 vols (Rome: 
Salerno, 2001). 
3 Craig Kallendorf, ‘The Rhetorical Criticism of Literature in Early Italian Humanism from Boccaccio to 
Landino’, Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, 1.2 (Autumn 1983), 33-59; Kallendorf, ‘Cristoforo 
Landino’s Aeneid and the Humanist Critical Tradition’, Renaissance Quarterly, 36.4 (Winter, 1983), 519-46; 
Kallendorf, ‘Virgil, Dante and Empire in Italian Thought, 1300-1500’, Vergilius 34 (1988), 44-69; Kallendorf, 
In Praise of Aeneas: Virgil and Epideictic Rhetoric in the Early Renaissance (Hanover and London: University Press of 
New England, 1989); Jane Chance, Medieval Mythography Volume 3: The Emergence of Italian Humanism, 1321-1475 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015); Chance, ‘The Medieval Sources of Cristoforo Landino’s 
Allegorization of the Judgment of Paris’, Studies in Philology, 81.2 (Spring 1984), 145-60; Simon Gilson, Dante 
and Renaissance Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gilson, ‘Notes on the Presence of 
Boccaccio in Cristoforo Landino’s Comento sopra la Comedia di Danthe Alighieri’, Italian Culture, 23 (2005), 1-30; 
Gilson, ‘Plato, the platonici, and Marsilio Ficino in Cristoforo Landino’s Comento sopra la Comedia’, The Italianist, 
23 (2003), 5-53; Gilson, ‘Science in and between Dante and his Commentators: The Case of Cristoforo 
Landino’s Comento sopra la Comedia di Danthe Alighieri’, Annali d'Italianistica, 23 (2005), 31-54. 
4 Christoph Pieper, Elegos redolere Vergiliosque sapere: Cristoforo Landinos ‘Xandra’ zwischen Liebe und Gesellschaft 
(Hildesheim: Olms, 2008); Simone Fellina, ‘Cristoforo Landino e le ragioni della poesia: il dissenso con 
Marsilio Ficino sull’origine della pia philosopha’, in Nuovi maestri e antichi testi: umanesimo e Rinascimento alle origini 
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Disputationes for Harvard’s I Tatti imprint and, in the last year, Bruce McNair has published a work 
on Landino’s life and thought (although, regrettably, I became aware of it too late to incorporate its 
findings in the present text).5  
Nowhere is Landino’s philosophy more different from that of Ficino, however, than in its focus 
on ethical and political matters, and it has been the work of Arthur Field and Riccardo Fubini that 
has been instrumental in emphasising these aspects of Landino’s thought.6 In a 1996 paper Fubini 
claims that: 
 
[Landino’s] point of reference was not direct Platonic doctrine – and much less in the ideological and 
emblematic sense in which Ficino assumes it – but it was instead the eclectic Academism of Cicero... 
[Platonic] philosophy did not interest Landino as a revelation of absolute and primordial truth, nor did it 
interest him as ‘theology’, but rather for its capacity for elaboration and rational persuasion in the cultured 
ages.7 
 
Rather, he continues, the Platonism that Landino endorses is of a distinctly humanistic flavour: 
 
‘Platonism’, as recent research has increasingly been clarifying, was not introduced into Florence by Ficino. It 
corresponded with the common needs of the cultured citizen to elevate the tone of teaching, inspiring him to 
noble and sound principles that together amounted to defending, if not directly renewing, the good, old 
traditions.8 
                                                          
del pensiero moderno. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi in onore di Cesare Vasoli, Mantova, 1-3 dicembre 2010, ed. 
by Stefano Caroti and Vittoria Perrone Compagni (Florence: Olschki, 2012), pp. 191-222; Mario Di Cesare, 
‘Cristoforo Landino on the Name and Nature of Poetry: The Critic as Hero’, The Chaucer Review, 21.2 (Fall 
1986), 155-81;  Bruce McNair, Cristoforo Landino on the Human Soul (Ph.D. Dissertation: Duke University, 
1991); McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s De anima and his Platonic Sources’, Renaissance Quarterly, 32 (1992), 227-
45; McNair, ‘Albert the Great in the Renaissance: Cristoforo Landino’s Use of Albert on the Soul’, The Modern 
Schoolman, 70 (1993), 115-29; McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino, Coluccio Salutati and the Best Life’, Renaissance 
Quarterly, 47.4 (Winter 1994), 747-69; McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino, Poetry, and Divine Illumination’, Fides et 
Historia, 31.1 (Winter/Spring 1999), 82-93; Eberhard Muller-Bochat, Leon Battista Alberti und die Vergil-Deutung 
der Disputationes Camaldulenses: Zur allegorischen Dichter-Erklärung bei Cristoforo Landino, Schriften und Vorträge des 
Petrarca-Instituts Köln, 21 (Krefeld: Scherpe-Verlag, 1968); Ute Rüsch gen. Klaas, Untersuchungen zu Cristoforo 
Landino: De anima (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1993); and Ursula Rombach, Vita Activa und Vita Contemplativa bei 
Cristoforo Landino (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1991). 
5 Bruce McNair, Cristoforo Landino: His Works and Thought (Leiden: Brill, 2018). A German translation of the 
first and second books of the Disputationes can be found in Eugen Wolf, Cristoforo Landino: Camaldolensische 
Gespräche (Jena: Diederichs, 1927); an Italian translation of the first book in Eugenio Garin, Prosatori latini del 
quattrocento (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1952), pp. 715-794; and an English translation of the third and 
fourth books in Thomas H. Stahel, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s Allegorization of the Aeneid: Books III and IV of 
the Camaldolese Disputations’ (PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1968). 
6 Arthur Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence (Guildford, Surrey: Princeton, 1988); Riccardo 
Fubini, ‘Cristoforo Landino, questioni di cronologia e di interpretazione’, in Studi in onore di Arnaldo d’Addario, 
ed. by Luigi Borgia, Francesco de Luca, Paolo Viti and Raffaella Maria Zaccaria, 5 vols (Lecce: Conte, 1995), 
II, pp. 535-57. 
7 ‘Suo punto di riferimento non era la retta dottrina platonica – e tanto meno nel senso ideologico ed 
emblematico in cui l’assumeva Ficino – ma l’accademismo eclettico di Cicerone... La filosofia non interessava 
Landino come rivelazione di verità assolute e primordali, non lo interessava cioè in quanto “teologia”, ma per 
le sue capacità di elaborazione e razionale persuasione nelle età colte’, Fubini, ‘Cristoforo Landino’, p. 551. 




Foremost among the ‘good, old, traditions’ of which Fubini writes are those of Roman and 
Florentine republicanism, and the work in which Landino grapples with the implementation of 
Platonic principles within a republican setting is the Disputationes Camaldulenses of 1474. The 
Disputationes is a dialogue set over the course of four days near the Camaldoli monastery in the 
mountains east of Florence, in which a group of notables including Lorenzo de’ Medici, Leon 
Battista Alberti, Ficino, and Landino himself discuss what it is in Plato that ‘a governor of the 
republic should adopt from those who are devoted to the investigation of the truth’.9 It is a 
singularly rich, allusive, and complex text that comprises four books, in which the main disputants 
are Alberti and Lorenzo. In the first book, they debate the best way of life, with Alberti taking up 
the cause of otium and Lorenzo that of negotium. The second book contains a discussion on the 
different categories of goods in order to ascertain the highest good or summum bonum. Finally, in the 
third and fourth books Alberti illustrates the ethical system that has been adumbrated so far with an 
allegory of Virgil’s Aeneid, in which the journey of Aeneas from Troy, through Carthage, to Italy 
represents the journey of the soul from pleasure, through civic action, to contemplation. Central to 
this system is the concept of moral and intellectual virtues adopted from Latin Platonism and 
Aristotelianism, which play their respective roles in purging the vices of the corporeal world and 
directing the soul to the cognition of the divine.10 By making the cultivation of these virtues the 
yardstick of our ethical progress, Landino is advocating a form of virtue ethics, setting aside codes 
of behaviour or considerations of the outcome of actions for an emphasis on the development of a 
moral agent. Yet there is also another aspect to this fusion of Platonism and republicanism. 
Landino’s avowed interest is the contribution of virtue to republican governance. He is convinced 
that both the moral and intellectual virtues can be employed to benefit the state. He views virtue in 
Sallustian terms, as being crucial for the maintenance of the commonwealth. He understands its 
rhetorical importance in affording political legitimacy. He believes that the impulse to form natural 
social bonds is as embedded in our psychology as that which drives us to purify our souls through 
virtue. Landino is not only proposing a system of virtue ethics, but also a system of virtue politics.11 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an extensive study of the virtue politics in the 
Disputationes Camaldulenses, encompassing its aims, its contexts, its philosophical basis, and its 
                                                          
Esso corrispose ad istanze condivise della cultura cittadina ad elevare il tono dell’insegnamento, ispirandolo a 
nobili e saldi principi, che insieme valessero a tutelare, se non addirittura a riallacciare, le buone, vecchie 
tradizioni’, Fubini, ‘Cristoforo Landino’, p. 553. 
9 ‘Quid id sit, quod tu illo auctore ab iis, qui in veri investigatione versantur, rei publicae gubernatori 
mutuandum esse censebas’, DC, p. 12.14-15. 
10 On the moral and intellectual virtues, see Michael S. Brady, ‘Moral and Intellectual Virtues’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Virtue, ed. by Nancy E. Snow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 783-99. 
11 The term ‘virtue politics’ has gained a great deal of salience from the recent work of James Hankins in 
outlining a theory which argues that political legitimacy was afforded to Quattrocento statesmen through the 
rhetorical and educational exaltation of virtue by humanists. The forthcoming investigation owes much to his 




intended application. I will show that the programme Landino espouses for the soul’s perfection is 
one which is intended to prepare the statesman for the guidance of the republic while at the same 
time liberating him from the need for direct participation in government. In doing so I will address 
the questions that the Disputationes raises. What kind of intervention was the text making into the 
contemporary intellectual and political contexts? How is it possible to translate the perfection of the 
embodied soul to that of the state? How can the citizen and the statesman best contribute to a 
republic? In what ways can allegory offer practical moral guidance? We shall see that Landino’s 
work was as innovative as it was possible to be within a humanistic framework that favoured 
precedent over originality. His was an associative, combinational creativity which could produce a 
rigorous and coherent philosophical system through a process of intellectual bricolage: in the 
Disputationes he devises a structure which incorporates the psychology and perfectionist virtue ethics 
of Latin Platonism, an Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of the categories of goods and divisions 
of the soul, a theory of the emotions derived from Augustine and the Stoics, the moral allegories of 
Virgil criticism, and the republican political traditions of Rome and Florence. Rather than being a 
figure who offers a watered-down ethical derivate of Ficino’s theological Platonism, Landino is 
better understood alongside Matteo Palmieri as a ‘civic Platonist’ whose work bridges humanism, 
republicanism and Platonic psychology. 
It is necessary to lay out the particular research objectives that I seek to achieve with this thesis. 
For the most part, I have adopted a contextualist methodology, exemplified by scholars of the 
‘Cambridge School’ such as Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, that attempts to discern as far as 
possible what an author is trying to do by writing a text. Two research objectives are corollaries to 
this approach. The first of these is that I seek to establish precisely what Landino was trying to 
achieve by writing the Disputationes. Of course, this objective requires caveats about the avoidance 
of reductionism. Any such text is laden with a multiplicity of literary, social, political, philosophical, 
and personal reasons for its production that it would be futile to attempt to unravel. It is 
nonetheless clear, though, that the Disputationes stands in some sense as an intervention into the 
contemporary humanistic and political environment. As we shall see, Landino’s aim is to justify the 
exercise of extra-political power in a republic (rather than, as is a common scholarly view, to 
advocate the rule of a philosopher-king) and thereby provide intellectual ballast for Lorenzo’s 
political position in Florence. 
The second research objective which proceeds from my contextualist approach is to situate the 
text in both its intellectual and political-historical contexts. As far as the former is concerned, my 
approach tends towards the philological because Landino’s attempts to consolidate the various 
authorities on which he depends – in particular his efforts to convey Platonic ideas in the language 
of republicanism – rely on terminological devices which are not immediately obvious but become 
significant on close reading. Yet when analysing a work with as rich an array of intellectual 
influences as the Disputationes there is a danger of reducing the text to a ragbag of literary and 
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philosophical signifiers shorn of any contemporary relevance outside humanistic debate. I therefore 
attempt to interpret its aims and moral guidance within the framework of contemporary events, in 
particular the political situation in Florence under the early rule of Lorenzo de’ Medici.  
My third research objective is to establish a theoretical underpinning for the system of virtue 
politics that Landino advances. Such is the holistic nature of Landino’s virtue politics that it 
demands to be understood on its own terms. For all his humanistic reliance on classical precedent, 
Landino was an enthusiastic systematiser who sought in his works to describe a philosophy that was 
internally coherent and self-supporting. All of the elements of his virtue politics – his understanding 
of the nature of political engagement, his approach to moral reasoning, his theory of vice, his 
practical ethics, his view of interpersonal association – proceed from one central premise: that the 
soul is immured within the body and seeks to return to God. Hence, if we are properly to 
understand Landinian ‘civic Platonism’ on its own philosophical terms rather than on those of the 
‘theological Platonism’ of Ficino, we must approach it from first principles.  
At the same time, it should be remembered that Landino’s objective was that his philosophical 
recommendations ought to be applied practically. The Disputationes is a text which offers concrete 
advice for how to live in the real world, with the allegorisation of the Aeneid in its second half 
presenting an ethical programme which comprises both guidance for moral purgation and the tools 
to develop therapeutic self-insight. My fourth research objective in this thesis is, therefore, to 
interpret the Disputationes as a manual for ethical and political praxis and to ascertain, as far as 
possible, the specific behaviours it prescribes. 
With this methodology in mind, the thesis is structured in the following manner. I begin with a 
chapter consisting of three sections that provide context for the production of the Disputationes. The 
first section consists of a brief biography of Landino which outlines his professional and intellectual 
development throughout the course of his life. This is followed by a section on the political context 
of the Disputationes in which, after examining evidence in his Xandra poems concerning Landino’s 
early relationship with the Medici and the genesis of themes which would concern him in his later 
work, I trace the course of Medicean involvement in Florentine politics in the mid-Quattrocento, 
paying particular attention to events between the years of 1469 and 1474, which mark the early 
years of Lorenzo de’ Medici’s rule and coincide with the composition of the Disputationes. By so 
doing, I present evidence that it is likely that the moral language and instruction of the Disputationes 
was influenced by Lorenzo’s handling of the Volterra uprising of 1472, and explain the complexities 
of Landino’s choice to dedicate the work to Federico da Montefeltro (rather than to Lorenzo, to 
whom the advice in the text is clearly directed) amid growing tensions between Florence and Sixtus 
IV. In the third section I turn to the intellectual context of Landino’s work and examine the 
treatment of virtue in the political and ethical thought of Quattrocento humanism. Developing 
some themes identified by James Hankins in his recent work Virtue Politics, I identify some 
principles of humanist virtue politics that are especially applicable to the Disputationes: that there is 
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an assumption of interdependence on the part of the members of a community; that power can 
only be exercised legitimately by the virtuous; and that rhetoric which regulates political behaviour 
often does so through subtle and codified language which demands close reading. 
The second chapter of the thesis contains ten sections which deal with Landino’s thought on 
virtue in all its psychological, philosophical, ethical and political aspects. In the first four sections of 
this chapter I describe Landino’s philosophical system in the Disputationes. I analyse the opening 
remarks of the dialogue and show how the stated aim of discovering what Plato can teach one who 
wishes to manage a republic (administrare rem publicam) marks a subversion of conventional Platonic 
language for republican ends. I then cover the Platonic conceit central to Landino’s virtue ethics of 
how the perfection of a soul trapped in a body demands the exercise of both moral and dianoetic 
virtues, whose purpose is to purge vice and investigate the truth respectively. For Landino, if a 
statesman is to administrare rem publicam properly, he must purge himself of vice with the moral 
virtues in order that he might exercise the dianoetic virtues in the service of intellectual inquiry. The 
ensuing discussion is predicated on principles that are either scattered throughout both the 
Disputationes and the De anima or remain unstated, so I continue with an explanation of the system 
of moral psychology that underpins Landino’s thought, describing how his view of the human 
condition necessarily emerges from his understanding of the structure and faculties of the soul. 
Since the soul is imprisoned in the body, the power of the appetite compels us to obtain or reject 
things based on sense data rather than reason, causing psychological disturbances, or perturbationes 
animi, which impede the soul’s progress to God. I continue with an analysis of Landino’s theory of 
virtue in which I explain how the grades of moral virtue quell perturbationes animi and bring the 
appetite under control of reason, while investigating how he integrates a system derived from 
Macrobius with his fundamentally Aristotelian view of the soul’s composition.  
In the next three sections I address the arguments made in the first book of the Disputationes by 
the characters of Leon Battista Alberti and Lorenzo de’ Medici which concern otium and negotium. 
First I follow on from the preceding chapter by showing how, in Landino’s philosophical system, 
the moral and dianoetic virtues in the soul are exercised through mental operations or munera which 
consist in action and intellectual inquiry respectively. Negotium and otium are the ways of life devoted 
to these munera but are not coterminous with them: following Augustine, Landino claims that one 
can exercise either munus in either way of life. I argue that, since both characters share a common 
understanding of the nature of the soul and agree that its perfection lies in exercising the moral and 
dianoetic virtues to one extent or another, their debate concerns the relative merit of each way of 
life in delivering self-improvement rather than exploring any differences in central assumptions. 
They each therefore address the question of precisely how the munera of action and intellectual 
inquiry – and their associated virtues – are employed within each way of life in order to best 
manage the republic. Alberti’s first speech advocates otium on the grounds of its instrumental value, 
in that it offers the opportunity to dedicate oneself to uninterrupted intellectual inquiry. The life 
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devoted to action is valuable in that it cultivates moral responsibility for oneself, one’s affairs and 
the business of the state and offers a purificatory path to contemplation, but is unquestionably 
inferior to an otium that perfects the mind, which is particular to human beings. Lorenzo responds 
with a speech devoted to the superiority of negotium that is also phrased in instrumental terms, 
arguing that we ought to prefer a way of life which perfects both body and mind, prioritises action 
in the civic society to which we are naturally inclined, and maximises the public utility of wisdom. I 
take some time to show that these arguments, and Landino’s views of republicanism more 
generally, owe a debt to the Stoic concept of oikeiosis, in which political associations emerge from a 
natural human predisposition towards forming interpersonal bonds.  
Having now explained both the central issues with which Landino was wrangling and their 
intellectual and political context, I continue in the eighth section of this chapter to offer an outline 
of his virtue politics as it is illustrated in Alberti’s concluding speech, which responds to each of 
Lorenzo’s points and concludes that, while the munus of intellectual inquiry is superior, the best way 
of life is that in which one devotes oneself to each of the munera as far as is necessary. I show that 
the idea that one can move between otium and negotium as one sees fit allows a statesman to be 
perceived as virtuous regardless of the extent of any direct involvement in governance, and can 
therefore be understood as a legitimisation of Lorenzo de’ Medici’s behaviour. In the Disputationes, 
Landino is presenting a justification for the exercise of political power in a republic by someone 
who does not themselves occupy any governmental role, while at the same time remaining true to 
the tradition of republicanism in both its Florentine and Ciceronian forms. His philosophical, 
pragmatic and oikeiotic arguments for the integration of action and intellectual inquiry in the first 
book endorse the extra-political exercise of power while remaining wholly republican. When 
someone purifies himself such that he can exercise the dianoetic virtues in order to attain 
knowledge of the truth, he acquires in turn the skills needed to administer the republic, and can 
return from otium to impart his wisdom to the state. Yet in order to attain this knowledge one must 
first suppress vice by proceeding through the grades of moral virtue which begin with political 
engagement. Hence the system of perfectionist morality he describes is one which has implications 
for political behaviour at all points in the purificatory process. I go on to show that Landino’s 
allegorisation of the Aeneid in the third and fourth books is intended as a programme of applied 
moral philosophy that seeks to offer practical and strategic guidance to its readers about moral and 
political conduct. 
In the ninth and tenth sections of this chapter, my attention turns to investigating how, in the 
second book of the Disputationes, Landino begins to define the manner in which his virtue ethics 
might be applied in practice. While the main focus of the second book is ostensibly the summum 
bonum, the highest good towards which we strive and which Landino identifies as God, much of his 
analysis is devoted to how we ought to choose between the different categories of goods defined by 
Aristotle. These choices define our moral progress because the goods of the body and fortune are 
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situated in the material world, and hence anathema for a Platonic view of the soul. I go on to show 
how Landino’s taxonomy of vice arises from these Aristotelian goods. Following Sallust, he 
considers three vices to be the greatest obstacles to individual moral progress and the continued 
well-being of the republic: sensual desire (luxuria), avarice (avaritia) and the desire for social 
recognition (ambitio or superbia). It is the disturbances of the soul caused by these vices of which one 
must purge oneself with the moral virtues, a task which at the same time prevents the moral 
dissipation of the state. 
The third chapter of the thesis consists of seven sections which discuss the moral and political 
guidance contained in the allegorisation of the Aeneid which comprises the third and fourth books 
of the Disputationes. In the first four sections of chapter I focus on Landino’s allegorical 
interpretation of the journey of Aeneas from Troy, to Carthage, and then to Italy, which concerns 
the recognition and purgation of vice through the first two grades of moral virtue. With reference 
to the contemporary political context and the philosophical system he has already laid out, I 
concentrate on how he depicts each of the three vices of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio, teases out their 
ethico-political implications, and offers advice on how to resist them. The fifth, sixth, and seventh 
sections contain an analysis of Landino’s allegorisation of Aeneas’ descent into the underworld, the 
descensus ad inferos, which involves the third grade of moral virtue: the virtues of the purged soul. I 
show how he makes an ‘inward turn’ with regard to his methodology of moral instruction, moving 
from the didactic approach with which he addressed the soul’s purgation to advocating a 
therapeutic method of self-analysis which encourages one to reflect on the psychological origins of 
vice. Instead of emphasising Sallustian practical advice for maintaining the moral hygiene of the 
state as he has done hitherto, Landino hopes that, by changing his approach in this way, he can 
inculcate qualities of mental discipline and moral judgment in the reader that will enable him to 
impart strategic and advisory advice without occupying any official role. 
All translations are my own unless otherwise specified, and I include a translation of the first 
two books of the Disputationes as an appendix. A couple of minor emendations aside, this is based 
entirely on Lohe’s critical edition of 1980. When referring to the Disputationes I state both page and 
line numbers from the Lohe edition. References to Landino’s other works, like those to medieval 
and Renaissance primary sources in general, indicate the appropriate subdivision within the text 
rather than a specific page number (so, for instance, references to Thomas Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae are by part, question and article, and those to Landino’s Xandra are by poem and line). 
Classical texts are referenced using their standard abbreviations. Where I have translated a text 
myself I supply the original Latin or Italian text in the footnotes. Latin terms have been left 
untranslated in the main body of the text where supplying an English equivalent would risk 
compromising clarity or accuracy. Since Landino’s work was situated within, and directed to, the 
male-dominated world of republican politics, the language I adopt for the politicians he describes is 
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that of the ‘statesman’ and the ‘prince’, using the pronoun ‘he’. I have endeavoured to use gender-






































Chapter One – Contexts 
 
1.1 Landino’s life 
 
The Landino or Landini family (both names are diminutives of ‘Orlando’) had established 
themselves in Pratovecchio in the Casentino valley by the thirteenth century.12 Cristoforo’s 
keenness to emphasise the accomplishments of his forebears in his poem De suis maioribus of 1443-
44 provides us with some evidence as to the family history.13 According to Cristoforo, an unnamed 
Landino fought for the Florentines at the battle of Campaldino in 1289 and was awarded a stipend 
from the military commander Vieri Cérchi for his bravery.14 Although we might regard Vasari’s 
connection of the painter Jacopo di Casentino to the Landinos with some suspicion, we can be 
reasonably confident of Cristoforo’s relationship with the blind organist and composer Francesco 
Landini (his ‘grandfather’s brother’) and Gabriele Landino, a Camaldolese monk and poet who was 
Cristoforo’s uncle.15 
Sometime before the birth of his eldest son, Bartolomeo, Cristoforo’s father, moved from 
Pratovecchio to a humble home in Florence’s Santo Spirito quartiere in an area known as the Pozzo 
Toscanelli (Puteus Tuscus).16 In this house Cristoforo Landino was born on the 18th of February 1425 
and was followed by at least two brothers, the younger being named Piero, and a sister.17 At the age 
                                                          
12 Useful sources on Landino’s life are Angelo Maria Bandini, Specimen literaturae Florentinae saeculi XV in quo 
dum Christophori Landini gesta enarrantur virorum ea aetate doctissimorum in literariam remp. merita, status gymnasii 
Florentini a Landino instaurati, et acta Academiae platonicae ... recensentur et illustrantur, 2 vols (Florence: Rigaccius, 
1747-1751); Francesco Pasetto, I Landino, una famiglia di artisti vissuti fra Pratovecchio e Firenze nei secoli d’oro della 
storia toscana (Cortona: Calosci, 1998); and Lorenz Böninger, ‘Minima Landiniana’, in Il laboratorio del 
Rinascimento: studi di storia e cultura per Riccardo Fubini, ed. by Lorenzo Tanzini, Bibliotheca 58 (Florence: Le 
Lettere, 2015). Summaries of his life, thought and work can be found in Jill Kraye, ‘Cristoforo Landino’, in 
Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, ed. by Henrik Lagerlund, 2 vols (New York: 
Springer, 2011), I, pp. 240-43; Craig Kallendorf, ‘Landino, Cristoforo’, in Centuriae Latinae: Cent une figures 
humanistes de la Renaissance aux Lumières offertes à Jacques Chomarat, ed. by Colette Nativel (Geneva: Droz, 1997), 
pp. 477-83; and Simona Foà, ‘Landino, Cristoforo’, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, ed. by Alberto Maria 
Ghisalberti (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1960-), LXIII: Labroca-Laterza (2004), pp. 428-33. 
13 Cristoforo Landino, Carmina omnia, ed. by Alessandro Perosa (Florence: Olschki, 1939) (hereafter ‘Xandra’), 
I.24. Perosa’s is the standard critical edition of Landino’s poetry. It has recently been supplemented by 
Cristoforo Landino, Cristoforo Landino: Poems, trans. by Mary Chatfield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008). 
14 Xandra, I.24.19-24. 
15 Xandra I.24.25; I.24.95; I.24.123-4; Comento, Proem V.7-15. Correspondence between Gabriele Landino and 
Ambrogio Traversari can be found in Giovanni Benedetto Mittarelli and Anselmo Costadoni, Annales 
Camaldulenses Ordinis sancti Benedicti, 9 vols (Venice, 1755-1773), VII, p. 167. See also Michael Scott Cuthbert, 
‘Trecento Fragments and Polyphony Beyond the Codex’ (PhD thesis, Harvard University, 2006), pp. 492-95 
and Helene Nolthenius, ‘Een autobiografisch Madrigaal van Francesco Landini’, Tijdschrift der Vereeniging voor 
Noord-Nederlands Muziekgeschiedenis, 17.4 (1955), 237-38. 
16 Xandra I.24.9-12. The name ‘Pozzo Toscanelli’ refers to a well near what is now the Palazzo Pitti, on which 
see Pasetto, p. 59, figure 11 and pp. 163-66. The mathematician Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli appears in DC, 
pp. 38.1-40.19 and throughout the De anima. 
17 Xandra III.4 is a eulogy on the death in around 1452 of an unnamed brother in the Aragonese war. In this 
poem, Landino mentions his sister in lines 70 and 103. Piero, who appears as a character in the Disputationes, 
is registered in the Florentine Catasto of 1470 as having been born in 1449. It is worth mentioning that the 
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of ten Cristoforo was sponsored by a papal scribe named Angelo da Todi to study in Volterra – the 
boy’s talent was sufficiently precocious to secure a bequest in Angelo’s will to continue his 
education after his benefactor’s death – and by the age of fifteen he had acquired the title of Dottore. 
On his return to Florence in 1439, following possible employment as a scribe at the Council of 
Florence, Cristoforo attended the lectures of Carlo Marsuppini where he began a long friendship 
with his fellow student Bartolomeo Scala and came into the orbit of such prominent humanists as 
Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini. Around this time his father set him to work as a lawyer in 
an attempt to lift the household out of penury, causing the young humanist some frustration. In an 
early poem to his friend Bernardo Nuti, Cristoforo complains that it was ‘harmful poverty’, ‘meagre 
household wealth’, and ‘poor parents’ (mala paupertas, tenuis census domi and inopes parentes) that obliged 
him to abandon poetry for the courts, and hence it was not long before Cristoforo abandoned his 
legal career.18 Poetry was Landino’s main humanistic concern in this period of his life. In the 
certamen coronario of 1441, a competition conceived by Leon Battista Alberti and supported by Piero 
de’ Medici, Landino recited the prizewinning volgare tercets of Francesco di Altobianco Alberti, the 
executor of Angelo da Todi’s will and then Landino’s patron. Three years later he had completed 
the first book of his Latin poetry collection known as the Xandra and would go on to circulate his 
second and third books over the following decade and a half. The Xandra poems are metrically 
varied, consisting for the most part in skilful if somewhat derivative imitations of Propertian elegy, 
Catullan hendecasyllables and Horatian lyric, and chronicle Landino’s personal and intellectual 
development from late adolescence to maturity through prevailing themes of friendship, Florentine 
patriotism, increasing praise for the Medici and, in particular an idealised desire for one Alessandra 
or ‘Xandra’. Its original redaction was dedicated to Leon Battista Alberti but a revised edition, 
rededicated to Piero de’ Medici and omitting some juvenilia, was completed in 1458 and appeared 
in 1460.19 
Towards the end of the 1440’s, the Medici gradually began to replace the Alberti family as 
Landino’s main patrons but it seems that he continued to work for the civil service during this time. 
In 1446, shortly before the death of Eugenius IV, he was part of a delegation to Rome as an 
apprentice of the Florentine Chancellery, a trip which he sought to romanticise in his poetry as the 
quest of an abandoned lover following his muse to the Eternal City.20 Landino was presented with 
an opportunity to establish himself in an educational career, though, when the death of his mentor 
Carlo Marsuppini in 1453 left vacant the humanistic chair in the Florentine Studio. Around this time 
– that is, between 1453 and 1454 – and presumably in the wake of Marsuppini’s death, Landino had 
been giving unsalaried public lectures on Dante and had strong support from the Medici and other 
                                                          
year of Landino’s birth is often given erroneously as 1424 because, under the contemporary Florentine 
calendar, New Year fell on the Feast of the Annunciation on the 25th March. 
18 Xandra I.21 (first redaction). 
19 See Pieper, pp. 90-101. 
20 See Florence, Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Carte di Corredo 51, ‘Ser Christophorus Bartholomei Landini de 
Puppio’. Landino mentions his visit to Rome in Comento, Par. XV.13-24.20-22 and Xandra II.25-27 and 29-30.  
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prominent citizens as the candidate to replace Marsuppini. A group of predominantly aristocratic 
former students of Marsuppini including Donato Acciaiuoli, Alamanno Rinuccini and Marco 
Parenti favoured a rival candidate, the Byzantine scholar John Argyropoulos (though Field argues 
that the anti-Medicean humanist Francesco Filelfo, whose candidacy was barred by the regime, was 
their first choice), pointing to Landino’s modest fame and the fact that, for all his command of 
Latin, his philosophical credentials were limited and he knew little Greek.21 As a compromise 
Marsuppini’s ‘universal’ chair was divided into three professorships, each specialising in a particular 
discipline: Argyropoulos assumed the chair in philosophy in 1455 (lecturing from 1457 onwards) 
and Francesco da Castiglione that in Greek at around the same time, with the remaining empty 
chair in poetry and rhetoric to be contested by Landino, Bernardo Nuti, Antonio Rossi and 
Bartolomeo Scala. In the meantime Landino, funded by the Medici to the tune of forty-five florins 
a year, had been delivering both private tuition and public lectures on the Commedia and counted 
Lorenzo de’ Medici and Marsilio Ficino among his students, being the dedicatee of Ficino’s no 
longer extant Institutiones ad Platonicam disciplinam in 1456 and subsequently encouraging the younger 
scholar to study philosophy in the original Greek.22 In January 1458 Landino, having defeated Nuti, 
Rossi and Scala, finally assumed the chair in poetry and rhetoric at the Studio with a salary of one 
hundred florins per annum and would continue to hold this position, with periodic increases in 
salary, until shortly before his death.23 Later in 1458, Landino failed to attain the chancellorship of 
Florence, just as his earlier attempt to become a Chancellery secretary under Poggio Bracciolini in 
1456 had proved abortive. Instead, given the parlous political climate, the anti-Medicean candidate 
Benedetto Accolti was elected for the sake of expediency, and Landino’s coded irritation that a 
lawyer rather than a humanist had assumed the role is visible in a letter from December.24 His re-
dedicated edition of the Xandra two years later went some way in repaying the Medici for their 
support and, with his status in Florentine society cemented, in 1460 he married Lucrezia, daughter 
of Alberto di Adovardo Alberti, who bore him seven children, the youngest of whom, Bernardo, 
would become a member of the Grand Council of the Florentine Republic in 1494 and the Prior in 
                                                          
21 On this episode, see Arthur Field, ‘The Studium Florentinum Controversy, 1455’, History of Universities, 3 
(1983), 31-59. Any ill will between the Argyropolous-Filelfo faction and Landino was apparently resolved 
over successive years as Acciaiuoli, Rinnucini and Parenti each appear as characters in the Disputationes and 
Landino delivered Donato Acciaiuoli’s funeral oration in 1478. On Landino’s command of Greek, see e.g. 
Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy, pp. 234-35 and Field, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s first lectures on Dante’, 
Renaissance Quarterly, 39.1 (Spring, 1986), 16-48 (pp. 27-8).  
22 In a letter to Lorenzo written in 1464 or 65 which is reproduced in Lentzen, Studien, pp. 203-10, Landino 
asserts that he has been teaching for ten years (p. 207). This is corroborated in a 1455 letter by Donato 
Acciaiuoli in Ferdinando Fossi, Monumenta ad Alamanni Rinuccini vitam contexendam (Florence: Mou ̈cke, 1791), 
pp. 79-82. On Landino’s early lectures on Dante, see Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy, pp. 16-48. 
23 Throughout Elegos, Pieper builds a persuasive argument that Landino’s redaction of the Xandra was an 
attempt at refashioning himself as a specifically Florentine poetic voice in order to secure his position in the 
Studio. 
24 See Landino, Carmina omnia, pp. 187-190 and Robert Black, Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 90-98. Landino’s frustration with this episode is evident 




Extant sources allow us to construct a reasonably detailed schema of Landino’s teaching activity 
between 1458 and 1471.26 An inaugural lecture or praelusio for his first course in 1458 on Cicero’s 
Tusculanae Disputationes shows Landino at pains to justify his selection as Marsuppini’s replacement 
in the chair of rhetoric and poetry. That he chose the Tusculanae Disputationes was itself a statement 
that a rhetorician could make a contribution to moral philosophy of the highest calibre and that 
eloquence was an indispensable component of proper philosophical pedagogy, and so Landino 
disavowed the title of philosopher, maintaining instead that he was a rhetorician in the sense of 
‘those who give the faculty of transmitting learning to another’.27 The Tusculanae Disputationes would 
be the only philosophical text on which Landino lectured. Over the next few years he would 
concentrate on Latin poetry: in either 1459-60 or 1460-61 he lectured on Horace’s Odes; in 1461-62 
he lectured on Persius and Juvenal; and between 1462 and 1464 he led courses on Virgil, covering 
the first seven books of the Aeneid in the first two years and the remainder of the Aeneid together 
with the Eclogues and the Georgics thereafter. In 1464-65 Landino taught a course on the rules of 
poetry and rhetoric which involved him giving a commentary on Horace’s Ars Poetica and then, in 
1465-66, he delivered a series of lectures on letter-writing and an elucidation of Cicero’s Epistulae ad 
Familiares. After two years of innovation between in 1466 and 1467, in which he lectured on volgare 
poetry in the form of Petrarch’s Canzoniere, Landino returned to the Latin classics and taught 
Virgil’s Aeneid and Eclogues once again until 1469 before delivering another course on Horace’s Odes 
in 1470-71. Most of the content of these courses is lost. In 1978 Arthur Field discovered a valuable 
transcription of Landino’s 1462 lectures on Virgil in the Biblioteca Casanatense in Rome, and draft 
commentaries on Persius and Juvenal which accompanied the 1461-62 lectures also exist in 
manuscript form.28 The praelusiones for the courses on Virgil, Petrarch and the aforementioned 
Tusculanae Disputationes are available, as well as for Landino’s early public lectures on Dante, but we 
should be cautious of assuming any commonality between the content of the isolated and 
                                                          
25 Bandini, pp. 207-09. 
26 For these sources, see Scritti I; Lentzen, Studien; Böninger, ‘Minima Landiniana’; and Roberto Cardini, La 
critica del Landino (Sansoni: Florence, 1973). 
27 ‘Qui huic praeceptorum tradendorum facultatem dant’, Scritti, I, pp. 6-7. On Landino’s inaugural speech on 
the Tusculanae Disputationes, see Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy, pp. 242-46 and Field, ‘The Studium 
Florentinum Controversy’, pp. 46-47. Cardini and Field both understand this speech as a pointed jibe at the 
scholaticism of Argyropoulos to which the Byzantine responded in his inaugural lecture later in the same year. 
See Cardini, La critica, pp. 71-84 and Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy, p. 243. In Peter Godman, From 
Poliziano to Machiavelli: Florentine Humanism in the High Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
pp. 117-18, Godman points out how Landino’s efforts to separate the roles of philosopher and rhetorician in 
his inaugural speech foreshadow Poliziano’s distinction between the philosopher and the grammaticus in his 
Lamia. Given that it is likely that Poliziano had Landino in mind as one of the lamiae – on which, see Angelo 
Poliziano, Lamia, Praeelectio in Priora Aristotelis Analytica: Critical Edition, Introduction and Commentary, ed. by Ari 
Wesseling (Leiden: Brill, 1986), p. xviii – his adoption seems intentional, and savagely ironic. 
28 The Virgil lectures can be found in Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, cod. 1368, and see also Florence, 
Biblioteca Laurenziana, Plut. 52. 32. The lectures on Persius and Juvenal are extant in Milan, Biblioteca 
Ambrosiana, I 26 inf.. 
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rhetorically stylised inaugural lectures and that of the courses themselves.29 That Landino’s 
pedagogical method was primarily concerned with exegetical, rhetorical and allegorical techniques 
rather than philological or contextualist ones is apparent from a sharp exchange in 1465 between 
Landino’s student Lorenzo Guidetti and Buonaccorso Massari, a pupil of Giovanni Pietro at 
Lucca.30 
Despite his holding the chair in rhetoric and poetry for another twenty-six years, little 
information on Landino’s teaching duties after 1471 remains, which would suggest that during this 
period he chose to devote his energies to literary production and civic affairs as much as pedagogy. 
The 1470s saw the publication of the three philosophical dialogues which constitute his major 
original works: De anima, Disputationes Camaldulenses and De vera nobilitate. The first of his 
philosophical dialogues, the De anima, was dedicated to Ercole I d’Este in 1471, but a mischievous 
epigram of Gentile de’ Becchi implies that Landino had been working on it for some years.31 
Notwithstanding the profound influence of Bessarion, Macrobius and Albertus Magnus, the 
dialogue seeks to present a clear and comprehensive view of philosophical thought on the soul by 
means of a debate between Carlo Marsuppini, Paolo Toscanelli and Landino himself. The first 
book explains the positions of various philosophical schools on the nature and origin of the soul, 
the second investigates the relationship between the soul and the body (including an elucidation of 
the Aristotelian-Stoic concepts of appetite and perturbationes) and the third discusses the moral 
virtues at some length while also addressing the immortality of the soul and the relationship 
between mind, intellect and reason (mens, intellectus and ratio).32 Three years later, in April 1474, came 
the Disputationes Camaldulenses, which was dedicated to the condottiere and humanist Federico da 
Montefeltro and is the subject of this thesis. Set in 1469 in the monastery of a Camaldolese order 
characterised by its eremitic and cenobitic wings, the Disputationes unifies the Ciceronian moral 
philosophy to which its title alludes with a resurgent Platonism exemplified by Ficino’s then newly-
circulated Platonic Theology.33 
Landino’s third philosophical dialogue, the De vera nobilitate of 1487, was dedicated to Lorenzo 
de’ Medici and takes place during a banquet held by Lorenzo in the wake of the death of his father 
                                                          
29 These lectures are reproduced in Scritti, I, pp. 1-55 and Cardini, La critica, pp. 287-371. On the 
independence of prolusiones from the content of the courses, see Field, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s first lectures on 
Dante’, p. 26 and n. 39. 
30 The exchange itself can be found in Cardini, La critica, pp. 267-86. On the significance of this 
correspondence in the context of a wider debate in humanist scholarship, see Anthony Grafton and Lisa 
Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities (London: Duckworth, 1986), pp. 58-63. 
31 Gentile’s 1469 poem, Cur non ederet de anima Landinus ad Ficinianum excusatio, reads: ‘Edere vis animam 
Landinum, Ficiniane, | et quereris quod non iam videatur opus. | Parce, mori non vult anima properante 
poeta. | Parce, etiam si non videris, hec anima est.’ It can be found in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Lat. 
Misc. e 81 and is cited in Cardini, La critica, p. 80, n. 19. 
32 Valuable recent scholarship on the De anima includes Rüsch and McNair, Cristoforo Landino on the Human 
Soul, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s De anima and his Platonic Sources’, and ‘Albert the Great in the Renaissance’. 
33 On the dating of the Disputationes, see Fubini, ‘Cristoforo Landino’. On the Camaldolese order, see Dennis 
F. Lackner, ‘The Camaldolese Academy: Ambrogio Traversari, Marsilio Ficino and the Christian Platonic 
Tradition’, in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, his Philosophy, his Legacy, ed. by Michael Allen, Valery Rees and Martin 
Davies (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 15-44. 
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Piero (it is therefore set at the end of 1469), with the bulk of the discussion being shared between 
two fictitious visitors, the Athenian philosopher Aretophilus and the Byzantine businessman 
Philotimus. It stands as Landino’s contribution to a longstanding debate in Quattrocento humanism 
on the nature of true nobility: whether it was to be found in virtue alone or in virtue combined with 
lineage, wealth and so on.34 Aretophilus, the ‘lover of virtue’ and Landino’s mouthpiece, is 
unequivocal that true nobility consists in virtue alone and is attained through the same Platonic 
ascent through civic and purgative virtues described in the Disputationes. His patron Philotimus, on 
the other hand, views nobility as a function of wealth and family name and is something of a paper 
tiger, an irritable figure contributing little more than sneers and interjection to Aretophilus’ fluent 
and multifaceted defence of virtue. 
Throughout the 1470’s and 1480’s the scope of Landino’s literary production widened. After the 
completion of his three philosophical dialogues his foremost concern became commenting on the 
canonical works of both the Latin and Italian languages. An enormously influential Comento on 
Dante’s Commedia, presented with much pomp to Lorenzo de’ Medici in a public ceremony in 1482 
and being reprinted fifteen times over the following two centuries, is suffused with civic patriotism 
for Florence and begins with a proemio which consists in an extended panegyric to the city and her 
illustrious citizens.35 As well as allowing him to develop material from his lectures in the Studio over 
a decade earlier, the Comento presented Landino with an opportunity to apply the Platonic-
allegorical interpretive methodology developed in his dialogues to the most celebrated volgare epic. 
By expounding upon the philosophical, structural and theological commonalities of the Commedia 
and Aeneid he could establish an intellectual continuity between his Latin and Florentine 
antecedents. After dedicating to Guidobaldo da Montefeltro a 1482 commentary on Horace’s Ars 
Poetica that was distributed widely but later given short shrift by Erasmus, Landino produced in 
1488 a commentary on all twelve books of the Aeneid (as opposed to the six allegorised in the 
Disputationes) in which he intended to elevate the philological over the philosophical, writing that: 
‘Just as in the Camaldulenses we performed the function of an interpreter of philosophy, so in this 
commentary we will assume the roles of grammarian and rhetorician’.36 This Aeneid commentary 
nonetheless remained replete with the Platonic allegories of the Disputationes and proved very 
                                                          
34 On this debate, see Albert Rabil, ed., Knowledge, Goodness and Power: The Debate over Nobility among Quattrocento 
Humanists (Binghamton, New York: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1991) and Francesco Tateo, 
Tradizione e realtà nell’Umanesimo italiano (Bari: Dedalo Libri, 1967). 
35 On the influence and print editions of the Comento, see Gilson, Dante and Renaissance Florence, pp. 164-66. 
36 ‘Nam quemadmodum in Chamaldulensibus philosophi interpretis munus obivimus, sic in his commentariis 
grammatici rhetorisque vices prestabimus’, quoted in Lentzen, Studien, pp. 156-57. On the differences 
between the Disputationes and the Virgil commentary, see also Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness: 
Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols (London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), II, pp. 
712-21. Erasmus’ dismissal of Landino’s interpretation of Horace can be found in Adagia I.ii.9 and he also 
offers an unfavourable opinion of Landino when comparing him to Ermolao Barbaro in Ciceronianus 124, 
claiming that while Landino is more Ciceronian, the Venetian should be preferred. Again, we might note the 




popular, with more than thirty printings between 1488 and 1536 compared to the five printings of 
the Disputationes over the same period.37 Parallel to this exegetical work, Landino produced two 
translations from Latin into the vernacular, an Italian translation of Pliny’s Naturalis historia which 
was commissioned while he was writing the Disputationes but not completed until 1475, and a 1490 
translation of Giovanni Simonetta’s Sforziad for Ludovico Sforza.38 For a comprehensive 
bibliography of Landino’s works the reader is directed to Lentzen’s Studien zur Dante-Exegese 
Cristoforo Landinos.39 
Concurrent with Landino’s lecturing and writing ran a career in the civil service of Florence. After 
his unsuccessful attempt to join the Florentine secretariat under Poggio in 1456, Landino appears to 
have steered clear of any efforts to attain prominent public office until in a 1464 letter of solicitation 
to Lorenzo he asks to be appointed ‘among the secretaries’ (in secretariorum numerum) of Florence, a 
request which was most probably motivated by the death of the incumbent chancellor, Benedetto 
Accolti, in August 1464.40 Landino advises that he should be preferred over a lawyer or a foreign 
orator (presumably a reference to Argyropoulos), and whether the letter is, as Field interprets it, an 
application for the position of chancellor itself or is instead seeking a more modest position within 
the civil service, it transpired that Landino’s friend Bartolomeo Scala attained the chancellorship in 
1465 and Landino instead succeeded Scala to the lesser but still prestigious position of chancellor of 
the Guelf party in the same year.41 In this capacity Landino drafted a public letter to Paolo Guinigi 
of Lucca in March 1471 which served as a rhetorical defence of Guelf morality and Florentine 
independence, an indication of how, just as his early legal training stood him in good stead for notarial 
tasks and the drafting of civic documents, Landino’s rhetorical skill allowed him to execute the duties 
of public letter-writing and oratory bequeathed by the civic humanist tradition of Salutati and Bruni.42 
Other instances of performative civic humanism on Landino’s part include a sermon on the body of 
Christ which he gave in around 1469 for the Compagnia dei Magi, a lay religious confraternity closely 
linked to the Medici of which he was a member, and funeral orations for Donato Acciaiuoli in 1478 
and the prominent Guelf Giordano Orsini in 1483.43 
In 1483, Landino’s effectiveness in public administration and his loyalty to the Medici (which 
had in the previous year been emphasised by the dedication to Landino of Giovanni di Carlo dei 
Berlinghieri’s De temporibus suis, a defence of Medici rule from Cosimo to Lorenzo) were rewarded 
with the position of secretary of the Signoria, the Florentine government. As one of the higher-
                                                          
37 On the publication history of Landino’s Virgil commentary and the Disputationes, see David Scott Wilson-
Okamura, Virgil in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 35-37 and Appendix A, 
pp. 258-59. 
38 On the dating of the Pliny translation, see Fubini, ‘Cristoforo Landino’. 
39 Lentzen, Studien, pp. 280-87. 
40 The source is available in Lentzen, Studien, pp. 205-10. 
41 Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy, p. 239. 
42 An analysis of this letter along with the full volgare text can be found in Frank La Brasca, ‘Echos du Moyen 
Age à la Renaissance: une lettre Pro-Guelfe de Cristoforo Landino’, Chroniques Italiennes, 63/64 (2000), 139-60. 
43 See Reden, pp. 46-89 and Lentzen, Studien, pp. 243-54. 
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ranking functionaries in Florence, the secretary of the Signoria was responsible for the composition 
of official documents and letters as well as diplomatic visits and varied executive business in both 
the Signoria and the Otto di Pratica, or ministry for foreign affairs.44 Landino would also have 
deputised for the three secretaries of the Otto di Pratica in their absence. Two years later in 1485, 
Landino drew on his long political and administrative experience to produce the Formulario di epistole 
ed orazioni, a manual on civil service letter-writing in the vernacular dedicated to Ercole I d’Este 
before, in 1489, being one of five legally-trained citizens whom Bartolomeo Scala consulted in 
assessing the merits of eligible nominees for the Guild of Lawyers and Notaries.45 Having 
combined civic negotium and scholarly otium in the service of Florence for four decades, Landino 
























                                                          
44 On Bartolomeo Scala’s reforms to the Florentine civil service at the time of Landino’s appointment, see 
Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala 1430-1497, Chancellor of Florence: The Humanist as Bureaucrat (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 161-92. 
45 The text of the proem to the Formulario is available in Scritti, I, pp. 181-82. On Landino’s involvement in the 
selection process for lawyers, see Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 202. 
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1.2 The political context of the Disputationes 
 
As we have seen, Landino had managed to unite a scholar’s concern for the studia humanitatis with a 
lifelong dedication to public office. When writing the Disputationes he was able to advocate his 
scheme of Platonic moral perfectionism from a position of familiarity with the praxis of 
government. His intimacy with the Medici across several generations would have allowed him to 
observe the impulses, inclinations and flaws of the ruling class, not to mention their methods of 
maintaining power. It is necessary to spend some time examining the prevailing tensions in the 
politics of Laurentian Florence in order to understand the ways in which the Disputationes is a text 
informed by the practical necessities of political behaviour as well as the more abstract theorising of 
moral philosophy.  
For almost all of Landino’s life the political apparatus of Florence was dominated by the Medici. 
Factional loyalties based on client-patron relationships had begun to compromise Florence’s 
communal tradition in the years before Landino’s birth and, while the principles of Florentine 
liberty and republicanism remained uncontested, oligarchic families such as the Medici and Albizzi 
were able to rely on networks of clients and allies to accrue power in the political realm.46 The 
Medici were relative newcomers to such prominence thanks to the huge revenues which their bank 
had begun to accrue from its various operations – the branch in Rome which managed the papal 
finances in particular – over the first couple of decades of the Quattrocento. Throughout Landino’s 
childhood in the 1420s and early 1430s Florence had become increasingly dependent on Medici 
loans for her wars against Milan and Lucca, much to the chagrin of some members of the city’s 
elite, and in 1433, the year before Landino left to study in Volterra, Cosimo de’ Medici was exiled 
from the city by his political rivals on charges of bribery, electoral interference and unnecessarily 
prolonging the war against Lucca for profit.47 A year later a Medicean Signoria engineered Cosimo 
de’ Medici’s return, upon which he banished several dozen citizens including his powerful 
opponents Rinaldo degli Albizzi and Palla Strozzi.  
On his return from exile, Cosimo gradually consolidated power through changes to institutional 
policy that allowed the procedural apparatus of government to perpetuate the appearance of 
democratic norms while at the same time ensuring that key signorial positions would always be 
occupied by Medici loyalists. These methods included extending eligibility for governmental roles to 
non-elite families to increase the proportion of allies in the governing class; the continuance of a 
mano elections in which candidates for the Signoria were selected by Medicean accoppiatori rather 
                                                          
46 Scholarship on Florentine politics in the Quattrocento abounds, but particularly useful for the present 
study have been John M. Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575 (Singapore: Blackwell, 2006); Riccardo 
Fubini, Quattrocento fiorentino: politica diplomatica cultura (Pisa: Pacini, 1996); Fubini, ed., La Toscana al tempo di 
Lorenzo il Magnifico: Politica Economica Cultura Arte, 3 vols (Pisa: Pacini, 1996); Nicolai Rubinstein, The 
Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Robert Black 
and John E. Law, eds., The Medici: Citizens and Masters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
47 On Cosimo’s exile, see Najemy, A History of Florence, pp. 271-74. 
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than by sortition; and the imposition of long term balie, war councils hitherto convened only in 
states of emergency, which allowed the regime some facility to supersede the legislative powers of 
the obdurate statutory councils by, for instance, authorising trusted accoppiatori.48 At the same time, 
opposition amongst the elite was subdued with the abolition of the Catasto, a tax evaluated on 
investments and liquid assets as well as on property wealth and thus unpopular with the ottimati.  
Cosimo’s inability to command any support from the guildsmen of the statutory councils meant 
that his control of government was disputed and at times even parlous. After the 1454 ratification 
of the peace of Lodi, Cosimo’s justification for the balie and a mano elections became untenable and 
in the following year his accoppiatori were removed from their posts. With Cosimo’s enemies in the 
elite and the popolo being emboldened by the perceived return towards the traditions of Florentine 
liberty, the Signoria felt able to reinstate the Catasto in January 1458, and later that year the 
statutory councils rejected proposals for a permanent balia from Luca Pitti, the Medicean 
Gonfaloniere of Justice. Cosimo’s response to the impasse was to stage an effective coup. Milanese 
troops confined his political enemies and, when a communal parlamento of all Florentine citizens 
was held in the Piazza della Signoria, surrounded the crowds to intimidate them into reaching the 
desired conclusion. As a result, the Medici reforms were given the stamp of public approval, and in 
short order they exiled their enemies, reinstituted both the balia and a mano elections and removed 
the obstacles of the statutory councils through the creation of a council called the Cento which 
could elect key magistracies and screen legislation. With supremacy for the regime secured, Cosimo 
withdrew from politics until his death in 1464. 
Any evidence in Landino’s work of his attitudes towards the political climate under Cosimo 
emerges only gradually. Throughout the 1440s, Landino’s intellectual endeavours were devoted to 
love elegy. The initial redaction of the Xandra poems, dedicated to Leon Battista Alberti in 1444 
and which was to remain unpublished for another fifteen years, is for the most part blithely 
indifferent to contemporary politics: a brief elegiac epitaph on the death of Leonardo Bruni in the 
same year praises his humanistic achievements rather than his chancellorship, and the most 
prominent intrusion of the civic realm into the poems consists in Landino expressing his 
dissatisfaction with his legal career.49 Yet, following the death of Carlo Marsuppini in 1453 the 
tenor of Landinian elegy began to change as the poet, eyeing the vacant professorship at the Studio, 
found it necessary to court the favour of a ruling regime which sought to bolster an insecure 
political position by making particular artistic demands of its humanist clients. The Medici 
understood that dominance within the cultural-ideological sphere was an essential complement to 
political power and, moreover, that this dominance depended upon the cultivation of a public 
                                                          
48 On this, see Najemy, A History of Florence, pp. 280-86. 
49 On Bruni, see Xandra I.18 (36 in the first redaction) and on Landino’s legal work, see Xandra I.29 (52 in the 




image of Medicean majesty.50 Cultural dominion was an area in which the Medici could wield a 
power unmitigated by statutory councils or legislative due process and, for all the genuine interest in 
humanistic ideas shown to varying degrees by Cosimo, Piero and Lorenzo, they nonetheless 
considered the management of their image as valuable to their wider strategic goals. So, at the same 
time that Cosimo financed great cultural endeavours to bolster his image – the Council of Florence; 
the church of San Lorenzo; the book-hunting expeditions of Niccolò Niccoli and Poggio 
Bracciolini – he also fostered the careers of humanist intellectuals through patronage, co-opting 
them to perpetuate the glory of his regime through rhetoric.  
In the face of competition for such a distinguished post as the professorship Landino would 
therefore have to present himself as something more than a love poet, and attracting the support of 
the Medici would entail an engagement with civic life hitherto absent from his poetry. The position 
called not only for a humanist, but for a civic humanist. His evolution over this period as he 
produced his second redaction of the Xandra, dedicated to Piero de’ Medici, has been analysed in 
Christoph Pieper’s exemplary study Elegos redolere Vergiliosque sapere. Pieper traces Landino’s 
repurposing of the Xandra from a text consisting in blithely apolitical lyricism into one that sought 
to secure his professorship through its praise of the Medici regime. In order to do so, the poet 
fashioned himself as novus vates, heir to the Florentine humanistic tradition of the recently deceased 
Marsuppini. Nowhere is the schema for Landino’s approach more visible than in his 1458 letter to 
Piero de’ Medici, which he enclosed alongside his Eulogy written for Marsuppini’s funeral.51 After 
emphasising the great loss of Marsuppini, Landino defends himself against accusations that he does 
not duly honour his memory by recognising his teacher’s role as his patron, friend and father-figure 
before speaking ‘frankly’ (plane) to assert that Marsuppini had chosen him as his successor to the 
chair at the Studio. He writes: ‘That most saintly and humane man promised, without my having 
asked for or sought it... that he would make every effort, as far as he were able, that I should be 
given a public lectureship’.52 With his claim to this academic inheritance established, Landino is able 
to make a roundabout and exaggeratedly modest request to Piero for the chair, and the enclosed 
eulogy, outwardly an expression of loyalty and affection on the part of a devoted pupil, offers a 
bravura example of the type of memorial Piero might also expect from his humanistic charge. On 
this Pieper observes: 
 
                                                          
50 Valuable scholarship on the manipulation of ideology and image under the Medici produced over the last 
few decades includes Alison Brown, ‘The Humanist Portrait of Cosimo de’ Medici, Pater Patriae’, Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 24.3/4 (July-December, 1961), 186-221; Mark Jurdjevic, ‘Civic Humanism and 
the Rise of the Medici’, Renaissance Quarterly, 52.4 (Winter 1999), 994-1020; James Hankins, ‘Cosimo de’ 
Medici and the “Platonic Academy”’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 53 (1990), 144-62; and Dale 
Kent, Cosimo de’ Medici and the Florentine Renaissance: The Patron’s Oeuvre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2000). 
51 See ‘Cristoforo Landinos Taktik im Berufungsstreit’ in Pieper, pp. 44-52. 
52 ‘Pollicitus est sanctissimus atque humanissimus ille vir neque roganti neque petenti mihi... se annixe operam 
daturum, ut quantum in se esset, mihi lectio publica mandaretur’, Landino, Carmina omnia, p. 184.  
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In this poem, Landino presents an example of his ability to keep the name of the deceased alive and to make 
his image public, an example, in short, of his ability to ‘fashion’, indirectly promising that he could do similar 
and greater things for the target audience of his letter.53 
 
The Landino who emerges from Pieper’s analysis is a canny and persistent operator, unafraid of 
employing his rhetorical skills in the service of personal advancement. At the same time he brings 
to bear his poetic and epistolary talents for the purpose of self-fashioning (to adopt Pieper’s New 
Historicist terminology) and establishing himself as the latest representative of a line of eminent 
Florentine humanists, he indicates to the Medici that he can be entrusted with the fashioning of 
their own political image as learned and virtuous statesmen. 
Arthur Field observes that Landino’s appointment to the chair of rhetoric on 18 January 1458 
fell exactly one week after the Signoria reintroduced the Catasto in defiance of both the Medici and 
the ottimati, and Cosimo might have hoped that the second redaction of Landino’s Xandra which 
was then forthcoming would offer, in some small way, an improvement in public relations for a 
beleaguered ruler in a precarious political position. An absence of specifics of the conflicts between 
Cosimo and his internal enemies over the previous decade ought therefore to be expected in this 
redaction, and indeed most of the proximate political references in the Xandra refer to Medici 
success in foreign policy, with the family receiving routine praise for ‘hav[ing] often preserved the 
safety of the country’.54 Likewise, Cosimo is depicted as ‘the author of peace [i.e. the peace of Lodi], 
but a peace which could preserve the city’s power without deceit, its honour without stain’, and 
Landino proclaims that ‘with him as a counsellor, [Florence] has repelled great tumults and has the 
otium of gentle peace’.55 Yet the occasional allusion to political unrest still creeps in. In the Eulogium 
in Carolum Arretinum accompanying his letter to Piero de’ Medici Landino mentions how Cosimo 
‘never rejected you [Marsuppini] as a comrade in doubtful matters, when that good man took care 
of his people’, and we may read the studied ambivalence of this phrase as a reference to the internal 
political wranglings of the 1440s.56 Similarly coded is the famous passage in the De laudibus magni 
Cosmi which fashions Cosimo as a successor to Caesar who surpasses the Roman in his concern for 
republican values: 
 
Caesar was great, but his greatness was in arms alone, 
Yours, Cosimo, is greater in the urban toga. 
He oppressed his country with arms and savage tyranny, 
                                                          
53 ‘Landino schickt also durch dieses Gedicht ein Beispiel für seine Fähigkeit, den Namen eines Verstorbenen 
am Leben zu erhalten und sein Bild in der Öffentlichkeit strahlen zu lassen, kurz ein Beispiel seiner Fähigkeit 
zum fashioning, wobei er indirekt verspricht, Ähnliches und Größeres für den Adressaten seines Briefes zu 
tun’, Pieper, p. 51. 
54 ‘Quis servata salus saepe fuit patriae’, Xandra II.6.48. 
55 ‘Auctor erat pacis: sed quae sine fraude tueri | imperium posset, quae sine labe decus’, Xandra III.1.25-6 ; 
‘Ille quidem magnos hoc consultore tumultus | reppulit et mitis ocia pacis habet’, Xandra III.3.127-8. 
56 ‘Nec comitem rebus dubiis te respuit unquam | consuleret populo cum bonus ille suo’, Xandra III.7.143. 
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A unique concern for liberty possesses you. 
The senate of deserted Rome saw [Caesar] as an enemy; 
You drive enemies far away from your city and land. 
This is eminent virtue and great civic constancy, 
Which is rarely found in the human mind. 57 
 
In emphasising the parallel relationships between the statesmen and their city – Caesar with Rome, 
and Cosimo with Florence – and contrasting Cosimo with a ruler he claims to be more oppressive, 
Landino relativises and diminishes Cosimo’s less salubrious political behaviour, offering implicit 
approval that Cosimo’s ‘unique concern for liberty’ should grant him the authority to ‘drive enemies 
far away from [his] city and land’. Such language not only celebrates Medici foreign policy successes 
but also seems to justify banishment of internal enemies such as Rinaldo degli Albizzi and Palla 
Strozzi in the aftermath of Cosimo’s exile in 1434 and presages the banishments of anti-Mediceans 
later in 1458. The fact that Albizzi also makes an appearance in Xandra III.6 as an ‘exiled 
Florentine’ (exul Florentinus) ally of Niccolò Piccinino, the Milanese condottiere defeated by Florence 
in 1440, reinforces the feeling in the Xandra of old scores being settled.58 
As well as illustrating how Landino’s political awareness evolved, the Xandra also contains his 
first contextualised statements on virtue and vice. Ruminations on these subjects are largely absent 
from the first redaction of the Xandra, with the notable exception of Landino’s poem to Francesco 
d’Altobianco Alberti, his first patron, which was excised from the second redaction. Therein, 
Landino elevates Alberti’s virtue in peacetime over the military exploits of Roman leaders and 
emphasises the value of virtue and peril of vice to civic life: 
 
Harsh ambitio for great honours does not disturb you, 
You are not inflamed by love for coin, 
But you protect the wretched with your works and a generous mind, 
One born for your country, your loved ones and friends.59  
 
Here Landino prefigures two themes which would later be prominent in the Disputationes: a 
conception of virtue construed in terms of Cicero’s non nobis solum maxim and intimately linked with 
                                                          
57 ‘Magnus erat Caesar, sed magnus Caesar in armis; | at tu Cosme tua maior in urbe toga es. | Ille armis 
patriam saevaque tyrannide pressit, | Te libertatis unica cura tenet; | illum hostem vidit desertae Curia 
Romae, | hostes e patria tu procul urbe fugas. | Egregia haec virtus magna et constantia civis, | humanis et 
quae rara sit ingeniis’, Xandra III.15.43-50. See also Francesco Bausi, ‘The Medici: Defenders of Liberty in 
Fifteenth-Century Florence’, in Black and Law, The Medici, pp. 239-51 (p. 243). 
58 Xandra III.6.31. 
59 ‘Nec te sollicitat magnorum tristis honorum | ambitio, nummi non inflammaris amore, | sed miseros 
opibusque tuis et mente benigna | protegis, et patriae caris et natus amicis’, Xandra I.48.31-34 [first 
redaction], and cf. ‘non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici’, Cic. Off. 




a devotion to the public good; and a concern with vice which views lust for honours and greed as 
the main characteristics antithetical to proper civic conduct. In the second redaction, frequent if 
occasionally disconnected references to virtue emerge as a matter of course from Landino’s 
tendency to present the Medici as paradigmatic leaders. So, for instance, the Medici possess the 
‘greatest virtue’, Cosimo ‘soars past all Romans in virtue’, and Piero, already born ‘of a great-souled 
and courageous father’, has a virtue which ‘grew daily with increasing years and, having been 
accumulated, carried him to new heights’.60 The Medici are said to bear the array of traditional 
virtues including prudence (prudentia) and courage (fortia); they are most just (iustissima), and possess 
a specifically civic virtue (ducis egregii virtus togati) alongside their military prowess.61 Presenting the 
Medicean ruler as an idealised statesman in this way was a common trope amongst sympathetic 
humanists in the mid-Quattrocento, and Alison Brown has commented that in Cosimo’s case such 
idealisation takes three main forms: depicting him as an inheritor of Roman republican virtue as 
Landino does in the passage above; portraying him as a humanist-statesman unifying the political 
and philosophical lives; or, as Landino is particularly wont to do (and as Pieper has also illustrated 
at length), praising Cosimo as an Augustan ruler and new Maecenas.62 Given the importance of the 
tension between otium and negotium to the theoretical structure of Landino’s later political 
philosophy it is remarkable that the second of these three forms is the least common in the Xandra, 
especially since such praise was a common conceit amongst contemporary humanists.63 Yet 
Landino’s presentation is rarely so phrased, with Cosimo’s civic virtues instead being central to his 
portrayal in the Xandra and his intellectual abilities remaining unmentioned. Any implicit approval 
of detachment from the political sphere on Cosimo’s part is limited to his being a private citizen 
rather than an elected or hereditary ruler, and he is thus celebrated as a figure who, even though a 
privatus, ‘soars past all Romans in virtue and all kings in wealth’.64 Representations of the virtuous 
union of political and philosophical lives are instead provided by other contexts, such as Xandra 
II.8, which extols the pastoral otium of Monte Asinario over the ‘urban toga’s tedium’, and by other 
individuals, such as Marsuppini, whose corpse Landino represents as wearing ‘a scarlet toga and a 
laurel crown’, and Poggio Bracciolini, whose political and humanistic achievements Landino 
celebrates in Xandra III.17.65 Similarly, Landino anticipates the De vera nobilitate by invoking the 
correspondence between virtue and true nobility (as opposed to nobility of lineage) in his eulogy to 
                                                          
60 ‘Maxima virtus’, Xandra III.1.39; ‘Latios privatus transvolat omnes | virtute’, III.16.21; ‘magnanimo genitus 
fortique parente… Inque dies crevit virtus crescentibus annis, | seque tulit gradibus accumulata novis’, 
II.6.35-40. 
61 Xandra III.1.53; III.1.16 and III.3.109; III.18.69; III.1.15 
62 Brown, ‘The Humanist Portrait of Cosimo de’ Medici’, pp. 187-204. 
63 See e.g.  Niccolò Tignosi in the Collectiones Cosmianae, assembled by Bartolomeo Scala and found in 
Biblioteca Laurenziana, Plut. 54. 10 67r.; John Argyropoulos in ibid., f. 52r.; and Flavio Biondo, Italy 
Illuminated, ed. by Jeffrey A. White, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), I, pp. 72-73. 
64 Xandra III.16.20-21 and see above, n. 60. 




Marsuppini, describing the former chancellor as having sung ‘the praises and love of upright virtue, 
and the honor that comes from true nobility’.66 
Alongside treatments of virtue in its positive aspect, we also see in the second redaction of the 
Xandra the first intimations of Landino’s concern with the three vices of avaritia (avarice), luxuria 
(sensual pleasure) and ambitio or superbia (desire for recognition and dominion) upon which, as we 
will see, the practical moral instruction of his later system of virtue ethics was focussed. Landino 
has something of an equivocal attitude towards avaritia in this redaction. Effusive praise of the value 
of Medicean beneficence to civic life saturates his panegyrics, just as humanists such as John 
Argyropoulos and Donato Acciaiuoli had celebrated the merits of material wealth by eulogising 
Cosimo’s financial contribution to Florence.67 In his poem to Antonio Canigiani on the beginnings 
of Florence, Landino contrasts the generosity of Cosimo, like Cato and Aristides a ‘great-souled 
man [who] justly discharges his public duties’, with Crassus who ‘neither shared his wealth with his 
family or needy citizens nor built sacred buildings with holy altars’, praising Cosimo’s benefit to 
Florence in architecture and war.68 For the poet, Medici wealth has ‘stabilised the state’ and, as 
mentioned above, Piero assumes the position of a new Maecenas, who ‘fosters the learned and 
performs great deeds worthy to be sung in verse by learned poets’.69 Yet for all his willingness to 
endorse the accumulation and disbursal of wealth for the public good, Landino’s regard of avaritia 
as an especially pernicious vice is still apparent. In his Contra Avaros he criticises mercantile and 
military expeditions for personal enrichment in comparison to the opportunity to remain in 
Florence and write poetry with a furor inspired by the Muses.70 We also see Landino’s distaste for 
avaritia in his eulogy for his brother, in which he declaims that ‘prosperity, which weakens their 
hearts with desires, emasculates the common crowd’, and in his poem to Piero in praise of Poggio, 
who Landino applauds as ‘confound[ing] foolish misers with a thunderbolt’ with his De avaritia.71 In 
each of these occurrences Landino is bemoaning a violation of civic humanist principles, with 
avaritia either diverting the mind from intellectual pursuits or from civic engagement in the form of 
military duty. For Landino the accumulation of wealth is not in itself an evil. It is instead the 
hoarding of such wealth for private benefit as opposed to the public good which constitutes avaritia, 
contributing to a weakening of intellectual faculties and a softening of one’s mental disposition. 
Attitudes to ambitio or superbia in the Xandra are also ambivalent, not so much because Landino’s 
task of exonerating the Medici from this vice is easier – although it is – as that the lexical elasticity 
                                                          
66 ‘His etiam laudes rectae et virtutis amorem, | quem sequitur vera nobilitate decus’, Xandra III.7.77-78 
(translation from Chatfield, p. 179). 
67 See Brown, ‘The Humanist Portrait of Cosimo de’ Medici’, pp. 193 and 196. 
68 ‘Alter Aristides, alter Cato, publica iusto | munera magnanimus iure gerenda capit… [Crassus] nec partem 
posuitve suis inopesve levavit | cives, nec sacris stant pia tecta focis’, Xandra III.3.98-102. 
69 ‘Publica res… constabilata’, Xandra III.1.47-52; ‘colit doctos, doctorum et carmine vatum | quae sint digna 
cani, maxima facta gerit’, Xandra II.6.33-35. For the presentation of Piero as Maecenas, see also Xandra I.1.8, 
III.2.2, III.17.145 and II.6 passim.  
70 Xandra II.3. 
71 ‘Vulgus enim et vilem demulcent prospera plebem, quae sua denervat corda cupidinibus’, Xandra III.4.63-
64 and ‘stultos conturbat avaros | fulmine’, III.17.57-58. 
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of the words ambitio, superbia and superbus is rather wider than that of avaritia. For instance, Landino 
uses these terms in their positive sense to commend individuals such as Alessandro Sforza and 
achievements such as the Medicean works on the church of San Lorenzo.72 Interpreting superbia and 
ambitio as undesirable traits is, however, more common, and what points to an increased emphasis 
on Landino’s part on the dangers of ambitio for the politically-inclined intellectual is that in the few 
poems newly composed for the first book in Landino’s second redaction, two expressly mention 
ambitio in a negative civic context. In Ad Xandram, the poet declares that if Xandra were to submit 
to him, he ‘would say farewell to the confused ambitio of kings’; and in De suis maioribus he writes 
how ‘No title marks me with the eminent honours that ambitiosa thirst for praise desires’.73 He 
accuses the Milanese condottiere Niccolò Piccinino of similar failings in Xandra III.6: ‘The gods 
restrain arrogance (fastus) and no pride (superbia) lasts for long, | And he who flees equality is forced 
to be lesser’.74 Here superbia is portrayed as characteristic of tyranny, a quality of aggressive 
foreigners which is contrary to Florence’s egalitarian principles and damaging to its republican 
bounds of comity. So, likewise, Alfonso V of Aragon, who had been at war with Florence prior to 
the signing of the peace of Lodi and whom Landino calls a ‘Calabrian tyrant’, is described in Xandra 
III.3 as ‘superbus in arms and wealth’.75 It is precisely this conception of superbia as a signifier of 
autocratic anti-Florentinism which is in Landino’s mind when he excoriates an excessive desire for 
honours on the part of jurists in his De laudibus Poggio, fulminating that the lawyers, ‘garlanded with 
shining gold’, pettifog for a huge price and ‘parade their arrogant (superbos) titles, won through 
colossal ambitio’.76 Robert Black has observed how this poem and its accompanying letter constitute 
an attack on Benedetto Accolti, the lawyer who had beaten Landino to the Chancellorship in 1458, 
and while it may be overstating the case to claim that, by emphasising Accolti’s qualities of ambitio 
and superbia, Landino is implying he is an anti-republican bogeyman comparable to Piccinino and 
Alfonso V, it is nonetheless significant that he employs symbolic terminology linked so closely with 
tyranny elsewhere in the Xandra.77  
By picking the strands of the associations Landino makes in the second redaction of the Xandra, 
then, we can begin to formulate an understanding of his nascent system of virtue ethics. That his 
serious engagement with themes of virtue and vice only begins in the second redaction of the 
Xandra shows how the reciprocity between civic humanism and virtue is established in his mind. 
For Landino, to graduate from love elegy to presenting himself as the heir to Marsuppini and 
                                                          
72 Xandra III.1.44, and III.15.72. 
73 ‘Regum confusa valeto | ambitio’, Xandra I.5.15-16; ‘Nullus et egregios titulus mihi signat honores, | quos 
inhiat laudis ambitiosa satis’, I.24.5-6. 
74 ‘Di reprimunt fastus et nulla superbia longa est, | quique pares refugit, cogitur esse minor’, Xandra III.6.63-
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Poggio is to adopt in his poetry the subjects of proper political discourse, foremost among which 
are virtue and vice. Likewise, in fashioning an image for the Medici as successors to the tradition of 
Florentine republicanism, he phrases their excellence in terms of virtues devoted to the common 
good, the qualities of a paradigmatic statesman in a civic republican context rather than those of the 
Platonic philosopher-king. When Landino writes of Cosimo’s forebear Vieri di Cambio de’ Medici 
that he had a ‘sense of duty’ and thought that ‘public benefit should be preferred to private goods’, 
he summarises the paradigmatic qualities of the virtuous citizen-ruler of the Xandra.78 Landino 
construes his conception of the vices in the Xandra in a similar way. When criticising avaritia and 
luxuria, he lambasts the unwillingness of the wealthy to contribute to the common good, and by 
interpreting superbia, ambitio and fastus as specifically tyrannical qualities he sets the desire for glory as 
inimical to republican principles and thus Florentine patriotism, a characteristic of enemies both 
foreign and internal. As numerous scholars have shown over the last few decades, the Baronian 
view that civic humanism was somehow at odds with the primacy of the Medici, forcing them to 
turn to the isolation of Neoplatonism, is undermined by the deep political engagement of 
contemporary intellectuals.79 Landino’s view of virtue in the Xandra is a case in point, showing that 
his thought was saturated in the tropes and conventions of civic humanism before there was any 
evidence of his later Platonic tendencies. 
In the years after the 1458 coup and Landino’s appointment to the chair of rhetoric, there was a 
period of relative calm in Florentine politics between Cosimo’s withdrawal from public affairs and 
his death in September 1464. On his ascension to power, however, Piero de’ Medici was thrown 
straightaway into a precarious political situation. Shortly after Cosimo’s death, the statutory councils 
began to dismantle institutional controls such as a mano elections, though the ill-judged attempts at 
reform of Niccolò Soderini, the new Gonfaloniere of Justice, benefitted Piero by dividing the anti-
Medicean citizenry into two factions, ottimati and popolo, which favoured an oligarchic political class 
and sortition respectively. Hostility smouldered until the death in March 1466 of Francesco Sforza, 
the Medici’s most powerful external ally, which prompted four hundred citizens including a number 
of former Medici intimates such as Luca Pitti, Agnolo Acciauoli and Dietsalvi Neroni to sign an 
oath in defence of specifically republican liberty. As tensions grew, both Piero and his opponents 
were ready to summon troops – Piero the Milanese forces of the Sforza; the anti-Mediceans the 
troops of Borso d’Este of Ferrara – but Pitti, Acciauoli and Neroni, wary of the danger to the 
nobility from a roused popolo, neglected to march on Piero’s palace. Piero’s dismissal of a Signorial 
summons for talks caused Pitti to lose his nerve and, switching sides, he accepted a secret deal 
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before calling a parlamento of all citizens which, surrounded by Piero’s private forces, approved a 
balia which restored a mano elections for another ten years with accoppiatori appointed by the Cento. 
Many of the four hundred signatories of the oath of defence were exiled or arrested in short order. 
The ottimati’s confrontation with Piero of 1466 would later be propagandised by the Medici as a 
conspiracy but as far as the Medici’s opponents were concerned it was, as John Najemy puts it, ‘an 
open and legal attempt to restore constitutional government’.80 Although Piero’s position as the de 
facto ruler of Florence was now unambiguous, the death of Sforza continued to throw up certain 
external threats, most notably when Florentine support of his son, Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 
provoked Bartolomeo Colleoni and Borso d’Este to lead the combined armies of Venice and 
Ferrara against those of Florence, Milan and Naples under Federico da Montefeltro at the Battle of 
Riccardina in July 1467. The presence of Federico da Montefeltro later prompted Landino to 
include a reference to the battle in the second book of the Disputationes despite an inconclusive 
outcome which resulted in little more than great loss of life and the abandonment of Colleoni’s 
campaign.81 After two years of relative calm, Piero died in 1469. 
Years later, Landino would use the death of Piero as a framing event for his De vera nobilitate, and 
the fictive setting of a banquet attended by the great and good of international humanism presents a 
rather sanitised picture of Lorenzo’s succession, though not without intimating some genuine 
political concerns. As well as assuming all familial burdens, Lorenzo, we are told, also set himself 
the task of ‘safeguarding and growing the good will and authority of his grandfather and father’ and, 
as the mise-en-scene is set out, the friends and advisors of Piero and Cosimo are debating how best to 
maintain Lorenzo in Medicean fama and gloria given his youth and inexperience.82 In fact, Lorenzo 
was the first member of the Medici family who was groomed to rule from birth, and when he 
ascended to power on 2 December 1469, he had already gained considerable experience of public 
affairs through diplomatic missions, political negotiations (including, as Najemy reports, discussions 
with Lucca Pitti during the 1466 crisis) and a position in the Guelf party of which Landino was 
chancellor, making him well aware of the dangers of the world into which he was being 
introduced.83 Nevertheless, the situation which Landino depicts in the De vera nobilitate of a 
Florentine elite questioning the fitness of an untested prince is a genuine one, and his fictitious 
account concurs with Lorenzo’s (private) Ricordi in which he claims that: 
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On the second day after the death of Piero, the principal men of the city and of the regime visited us 
[Lorenzo and Giuliano] to press me to assume the care of the city and the regime, like my grandfather and 
father. As I was not of age and the burdens and dangers were great, I accepted reluctantly, and only to keep 
our friends and our assets safe, because in Florence the rich are at risk if they do not belong to the stato.84 
 
Lorenzo and Landino’s respective images of a nobly-intentioned circle of elite well-wishers helping 
the young statesman find his feet were in fact, as Riccardo Fubini observes, ‘diametrically opposed’ 
to the reality of the situation. A number of former Medici loyalists, foremost among whom was 
Tommaso Soderini, were secretly striving to gain some measure of influence over Lorenzo in order 
to restrict his power and avert the establishment of a dynasty by attempting to debilitate the 
relationship between the Medici and Milan, and it took the warnings of the Milanese ambassador 
Sacramoro Mengozzi to spur Lorenzo out of his vacillation and safeguard the alliance with the 
Sforza.85 This was a turbulent time, but Lorenzo was able to overcome his uncertainty in foreign 
affairs by reference to precedent. Cosimo had impressed into the minds of his children and 
grandchildren that his exile stood as a warning never to lose political control and, having absorbed 
the lessons of 1458 and 1466, Lorenzo understood that he must manufacture an image of 
unassailable authority which would ensure that such events were not to be repeated. It was 
therefore necessary that Lorenzo dispose of any pretence that he was a primus inter pares among the 
Florentine elite.86 As Fubini puts it, he took the view that ‘in order to keep the regime united, it was 
necessary to exert control from a position outside the regime itself’, but the lingering obstacle to the 
free exercise of his power in this way was the composition of Florentine institutions which neither 
Cosimo nor Piero had been able to subjugate entirely.87 In January 1471 Lorenzo managed to 
introduce reforms to the Cento – now containing a substantial anti-Medicean presence – that 
removed the nomination of accoppiatori from its remit and instead appointed candidates based on 
the recommendation of former accoppiatori. Six months later, Lorenzo was able to convene another 
balia whose forty members, hand-picked by him, became permanent and lifelong members of the 
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Cento and thus finally deprived the statutory councils of their remaining power.88 At every level of 
the Florentine political apparatus, he could now appoint his allies as he wished. 
Extant evidence suggests that the relationship between Lorenzo and Landino was close, but 
would be better described as a bond of cordial respect rather than affection.89 Landino had played a 
role in Lorenzo’s education from late childhood and makes a tangential mention of this in the 
Disputationes when he has the character of Lorenzo state that ‘these are the things which I must say 
about the civil life, presented in the declamatory manner in which I am used to exercising myself in 
the presence of Landino rather than in philosophical argument’.90 In his Trivia of 1460 Leon 
Battista Alberti refers to Landino as Lorenzo’s praeceptor alongside Gentile de’ Becchi, Lorenzo’s 
personal tutor, but Andre Rochon has noted that this should not imply to us that the two scholars 
had an equal standing in Lorenzo’s education.91 Rather, given that the young scion had attended 
Landino’s lectures at the Studio from January 1458 and the purpose of the Trivia was that of 
oratorical instruction, the title of praeceptor would have been a natural reference to a specialist in 
rhetoric in that context. Hence much of the correspondence between Landino and Lorenzo has a 
didactic air, particularly pertaining to moral instruction, and the Latin consolation letters of 1463 
and 1464 in which Landino comforts Lorenzo after the deaths of his uncle Giovanni and 
grandfather Cosimo amount to epistolary lessons in proper civic behaviour.92  
Lorenzo conducted relatively little correspondence with Landino compared to other intellectuals 
such as Ficino and Poliziano, but there are nonetheless signs of personal familiarity between the 
humanist and the prince in their letters. Rochon notes that most letters addressed to Lorenzo 
before 1470 conclude with the formulation ‘recommend me to [Gentile] Becchi’ on account of the 
fact that Lorenzo’s youth rendered him a minor under the stewardship of his tutor, and that 
Landino never does so himself can be interpreted as a sign of their intimacy, as can his use of the 
informal second person pronoun in both Latin and Italian.93 Indeed, in a vernacular letter of 1464 
Landino feels able to ask that Lorenzo pardon the wayward behaviour of Francesco Filarete, the 
Araldo of the Signoria, who had been discharged from his role for entertaining a young woman in 
his room for two days.94 Yet for all the genuine intimacy of this early correspondence the power 
imbalance between the young noble and his teacher seldom recedes from view. Landino never 
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misses a chance to praise Lorenzo, and the artful ingratiation and rhetorical self-advancement so 
evident in his correspondence with Piero after the death of Marsuppini is rarely absent. His 
tendency to make requests indirectly by addressing them to the son of the current ruler rather than 
the ruler himself (such as when he wrote to Piero rather than Cosimo in his solicitation for the 
Studio professorship) meant that much of his early correspondence with Lorenzo (such as his 1464 
letter requesting a position in the chancelry when Lorenzo was fifteen years old) carried a note of 
servility from the outset. Nevertheless, the relationship between Landino and Lorenzo was to 
endure, with a celebratory public dedication of the Comento and his appointment as secretary of the 
Signoria serving as notable expressions of Medicean favour in the humanist’s later career. 
In the potted history of the Medici in his proem to the Virgil commentary of 1488, Landino 
concedes that Lorenzo ‘had only just undertaken public affairs when fortuna hurled him from the 
most tranquil harbour into a very turbulent storm’.95 This storm, the defining crisis of Lorenzo’s 
early rule, was the sack of Volterra.96 Lorenzo had been despatched to Rome by his father in 1466 
to secure exclusive rights from Paul II in the trade of alum, and his success in this venture led to a 
monopoly for the Medici who were guaranteed a huge income by artificially inflating its price. Four 
years later, in 1470, significant alum deposits were discovered near Volterra, a town which 
maintained some small degree of autonomy while being subject to Florentine taxation and military 
control. The local authorities awarded the mining concession for the alum to a private company 
whose investors were a group of prominent Medici supporters, a decision which prompted claims 
of corruption given that the council was relinquishing a valuable public resource so that Lorenzo 
could continue his price-fixing racket. In short order, the concession rights were abrogated by a 
reconvened committee and, on 8 June 1471, the Volterrans appropriated the mine and its resources 
for themselves. Lorenzo, suspicious that his domestic opponents were taking advantage of the 
situation given that the timing of the seizure coincided with a stubborn Signoria, ordered several 
Volterrans to be punished and the mine to be returned, but in February of the following year two 
of the most prominent investors in the mining company were killed by a mob on their return to 
Volterra. Subsequent attempts at a compromise by the Volterrans were ignored and, despite the 
disapproval of prominent Florentine anti-Mediceans such as Tommaso Soderini and the 
intercession of Antonio degli Agli, the bishop of Volterra and a close intellectual associate, Lorenzo 
resolved that such a challenge to his authority demanded a military response which would silence 
his internal critics and offer a warning to other cities with thoughts of seceding from Florentine 
power.97 To this end, Lorenzo engaged Federico da Montefeltro and his mercenaries to march on 
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Volterra and conquer it ‘by any means’ with support from Florentine and Milanese troops.98 The 
Volterrans, unable to solicit any support, surrendered on 16 June after a long siege with the 
Florentine government’s explicit guarantee that lives and property would be safeguarded.99 On 18 
June, however, the peaceful occupation by the invading forces devolved into a massacre as 
Federico’s mercenaries sacked the city in a murderous rampage. 
The reason for the massacre is unclear. A letter from the Signoria to the Roman ambassador 
asserts that the poorly-fed and unpaid defending forces rebelled in an attempt to wring some 
personal benefit out of the situation, with the occupiers joining them in plunder in due course.100 In 
the Florentine Histories Machiavelli agrees with this interpretation to the extent that Volterran soldiers 
were involved in the looting alongside Federico’s mercenaries, claiming that the rampage was 
sparked by the robbery of one of the Volterran priori.101 Another account states that some pro-
Medici Volterrans accepted the terms of surrender without the knowledge of the other citizens, 
who would have sacrificed themselves rather than fall under Florentine power, and in doing so 
betrayed their neighbours and consigned the city to the sack.102 In either case, it is telling that 
Federico, a highly experienced commander not known for his tolerance of indiscipline, allowed the 
carnage to continue for hours without sanction, especially in the light of Lorenzo’s instruction that 
the military campaign should be ruthless in its objective. Lorenzo was a young ruler eager to quell 
any challenge to his authority and a punitive approach to the uprising could have seemed a viable 
approach in presenting himself as a formidable force in Italian politics, so it is tempting to read 
Federico’s inattention as tantamount to a tacit approval of the sack. In the immediate aftermath of 
the massacre Lorenzo’s comments tended towards the self-justificatory, though at the same time he 
was keen to forget the grubby affair in order that it should not cause any reputational damage: 
 
Let’s say nothing more about the sack in order to forget about it as soon as possible. Perhaps they deserved 
this through some sin of theirs. Our conscience, and the actions that we and this illustrious lord [Federico] 
took to prevent this evil, should be sufficient for us.103 
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Perhaps therefore aware that, given the risk to his good name, he ought to respond magnanimously 
to the defeated, the note of contrition Lorenzo struck in his offer of recompense to the Volterrans 
seems reasonably genuine, notwithstanding some special pleading: 
 
The Volterrans will not lack Florentine clemency and good will. The sack of the city was as injurious to us 
victors as it was to the conquered Volterrans. Two thousand ducats have been sent immediately by way of 
recompense for the things plundered so far as we are liable. And I, greatly persuaded by your arguments, will 
leave nothing undone which relates to the preservation and the health of Volterran affairs.104 
 
The consequences of this affair for Florentine moral instruction of the 1470s were mixed. Even 
though the Volterra massacre would become a byword for Medicean cruelty over the following 
decades, in the short term the Florentine citizenry approved of this show of force and Federico was 
granted honorary citizenship, with Bartolomeo Scala giving a celebratory oration in his honour.105 
Some intellectuals close to Lorenzo assumed (or perhaps affected) an air of detachment from the 
events at Volterra, with Gentile de’ Becchi, for instance, joking ‘This alum mine seems like the 
Trinity to me: I don’t understand it!’,106 but elsewhere there were humanistic attempts to absolve 
Lorenzo of any blame for the Volterra campaign, with Naldo Naldi’s Volterrais being noteworthy 
for its effusive praise of his actions and the presentation of Federico as a model of Virgilian 
heroism. Never one to criticise the actions of the Medici, Landino would later offer his own 
account of the sack of Volterra in the dedicatory address of his 1488 Virgil commentary directed to 
Lorenzo’s son, Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici: 
 
The defection of the Volterrans arose suddenly and unexpected by anyone, and the opinion was deeply 
implanted in the minds of all the citizens that the Volterrans could not be forced out from the position of the 
city and the security of the walls and defences other than by a long-lasting siege. The Signoria was therefore 
convened and each individual asked for his opinion, at which point almost all of them considered ceding to 
this most steadfast and insolent obstinacy and thought that the Volterrans, provided that they were willing to 
return to [Florentine] protection, should be subjected to all manner of sanctions rather than be forced by 
arms. But Lorenzo, who perceived the insolence of the Volterrans in this matter, who understood that their 
minds were wholly hostile to the Florentine name (for by now the Volterrans had begged a few princes and 
republics for help through their ambassadors and had been promised an alliance), and who thought that it 
would lead to them using impunity, if it were given in any way, as a victory against us and never returning to a 
sound state of mind, ordered that they deserved punishment for violating a treaty and betraying a trust, both 
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to preserve the majesty of the republic and to destroy the obvious seeds of new conflict in Italy as soon as 
possible before they sprang up. And so, since he is a man with the most perspicacious intelligence and with a 
mental agility adaptable to all things, even instantaneous events, he brought together everything that each of 
these arguments raised. Weighing up the difficulty of the campaign and the magnitude of the dangers against 
the detriment to public honour and pondering for a long time what harm and ignominy there would be if he 
were not to march against the Volterrans and, on the other hand, what risks would have to be endured if he 
were to do so, he eventually arrived at the opinion that the love of the nation, which has always been 
implanted and fixed with all steadfastness in a man great-souled and born for the honour of his republic, 
would be victorious. The love of the nation would be victorious, I say, the affection for which every wise man 
always places before everything else. So when he finally converted to his opinion the citizens who had 
hitherto been opposed, he approached the task with much caution and proceeded with an unconquered spirit. 
Eventually, when the city was captured, and contrary to what many people thought, he went to the populace 
(who at that time were under municipal authority), forced them to surrender and ordered that they be subject 
to taxation by the Florentines.107 
 
Even many years after the fact Landino was keen to depict Lorenzo as an example of 
decisiveness and authority in the face of a hesitant Signoria and, although such a favourable image 
might be expected in a proem addressed to Lorenzo’s son, we might nonetheless assume that his 
retrospective view of events in this passage is congruent with that of fourteen years earlier, when a 
more mitigated interpretation of the regime’s actions could have compromised his career. In a very 
similar way to Lorenzo justifying his action against the Volterrans as having been merited through 
‘some sin of theirs’, Landino is unambiguous that their appropriation of the alum mine constituted 
a treaty violation tantamount to betrayal and hence the Florentine reprisal was just. To this end, 
Landino stresses that it was Lorenzo’s magnanimitas (magnanimity or greatness of soul) and love for 
his country which compelled him to wage war, and that the decision arose from a measured and 
                                                          
107 ‘Exorta est subita et a nemine expectata Volateranorum defectio, eratque apud omnes fere cives penitus 
insita mentibus opinio, illos et situ urbis et murorum propugnaculorumque robore expugnari nisi diuturna 
obsidione non posse. Accersitur igitur Senatus, rogantur singuli sententiam: quo quidem tempore censebant 
pene omnes illorum obstinatissimae pervicacitati ac insolentiae cedendum, illosque, modo in fidem redire 
vellent, quibuscunque conditionibus recipiendos potius quam armis cogendos esse. At Laurentius, qui 
hominum ex ea re insolentiam cognosceret quique illorum mentes omnino alienas a Florentino nomine 
intelligeret (iam enim et a principibus nonnullis et rebus publicis auxilia per legationes implorarant et 
societatem polliciti fuerant), qui denique animadverteret illos impunitate, modo ea daretur, pro victoria contra 
nos usuros neque unquam ad sanam mentem redituros, duxit et ad rei publicae maiestatem tuendam et ad 
manifestissima novorum per Italiam tumultuum semina antea quam coalescerent quam primum extinguenda 
vehementer pertinere, ut illi et violati foederis et proditae fidei poenas penderent. Itaque, ut est homo ingenio 
perspicacissimo et ad omnia vel etiam momentanea celeritate versatili, cunctas quae utrinque sese rationes 
efferrent in unum adduxit, ac postremo et rei difficultatem et periculorum magnitudinem cum maiestatis 
publicae iactura componens et quid, nisi contra iretur, damni ignominiaeque, quid rursus, si iretur, discriminis 
subeundum esset diu pensitans, tandem in eam sententiam devenit, ut vinceret in viro magnanimo et ad suae 
rei publicae decus nato id quod in omnibus fortibus insitum semper ac fixum est, vinceret, inquam, amor 
patriae, cuius caritatem omnis sapiens ceteris rebus semper praeposuit. Quapropter cum in sententiam suam 
cives hactenus repugnantes tandem traduxisset, multa circumspectione rem aggressus, invicto animo 
prosecutus, ac postremo, contra quam multi putarent, assecutus, expugnata urbe, populum, qui olim 




proportionate assessment of whether the necessary risks were worth enduring to preserve 
Florence’s honour. For all that this portrait of Lorenzo is unjustifiable, especially in the absence of 
any mention of the sack and massacre, Landino’s approach and terminology give us an insight into 
how his virtue politics meshed with the events in Volterra. The quality of magnanimitas, moral 
courage in the face of uncertainty, has a pedigree which ultimately derives from the Aristotelian 
conception in the Ethics of μεγαλοψυχία, the virtue which consists in a desire to be worthy of the 
external good of honour while remaining indifferent in the face of both good and bad fortune, but 
Landino’s depiction of Lorenzo’s behaviour here seems to cleave more closely to the following 
passage in Cicero’s De officiis:108  
 
If the exaltation of spirit seen in times of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead 
of for the common good, it is a vice... And so we demand that men who are courageous and great-souled 
[magnanimos] shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for 
these qualities are the centre and soul of justice. But what is unpleasant is that from this exaltation and 
greatness of spirit [magnitudo animi] spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for power... But when one 
begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely essential 
to justice. The result is that such men do not allow themselves to be constrained either by argument or by any 
public and lawful authority; but they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators in public life, seeking to 
obtain supreme power and to be superiors through force rather than equals through justice. But the greater 
the difficulty, the greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can excuse a man for being guilty of 
injustice.109 
 
Central to this view is that magnanimous conduct in public office must be truthful, honest and 
subject to argument and correct political procedure, and this is why it is critical that Landino take 
pains to emphasise the extent of Lorenzo’s deliberations. By reinforcing Lorenzo’s mental agility 
and his ‘weighing up’ and ‘pondering’ the benefits and disadvantages of the campaign, Landino 
preemptively rebuts any charges of the war being waged for personal gain or benefit to the 
Florentine coffers. The Ciceronian criterion of magnanimous courage being tempered by justice is 
therefore fulfilled: Lorenzo’s decision has come about from a great-souled desire to preserve the 
majesty of the republic and is justified by careful self-scrutiny.  
That Landino’s moral language evident in the description of the war against Volterra in the 
proem to the Virgil commentary had already been formulated during the composition of the 
Disputationes, less than two years after the fact, is apparent in his reference to greatness of soul in the 
third book during his exegesis of the allegory of the Cyclops:  
 
                                                          
108 Aristot. Nic. Eth. IV.iii.1-38, and see R.-A. Gauthier, Magnanimité: l'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie 
païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne (Paris: Vrin,1951). 
109 Cic. Off. I.xix.62-64, translation from Cicero, On Duties, trans. by Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1913). 
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It is, therefore, not without the greatest wisdom that the divine poet Virgil leads Aeneas to the shore of the 
Cyclops, for he shows that when those who seek great and exalted things do not guide their soul with the 
certainty of reason, they often deceive themselves and sink into terrible brutality on account of their greatness 
of soul [magnitudo animi]... So a man who was desirous of the summum bonum but who, with his greatness of 
soul [animi sui magnitudo] not yet well-established, was trying to achieve honour and power in every way 
possible, would now detest such heinous cruelty [viz. tyranny] as soon as he recognised it. And he recognises 
it from the lean and filthy appearance of Achaemenides, through which the wise poet has subtly illustrated all 
the calamities which come to pass upon the human race because of tyranny.110 
 
Here Landino follows the Ciceronian definition in the De officiis once again. Just as in the proem to 
the Virgil commentary Landino shows that Lorenzo’s magnanimitas is moderated by means of the 
deliberations over whether or not to go to war in Volterra and is therefore right moral action, this 
allegorical interpretation contrasts a rationally-guided magnanimitas with that of the tyrant. 
Magnanimity steers a ruler beyond excessive desire for the Aristotelian external goods of honour 
and empire (that is, ambitio, the avoidance of which, as we shall see, is crucial to Landinian virtue 
ethics) when directed towards the summum bonum, but can lapse into tyranny when not led by 
reason. Such correspondences between the Disputationes, De officiis and the discussion of the Volterra 
massacre in the proem to Landino’s Virgil commentary do not give us an unequivocal reason to 
think that Landino had Volterra in mind when writing the Disputationes in early 1474, but it is 
beyond doubt that the technical vocabulary and conception of the role of the statesman he employs 
are uncanny in their presaging his discussion of events sixteen years later. He would use the 
intellectual framework he articulated shortly after the events in Volterra in their subsequent analysis, 
and that this language obtains in both cases gives us reasonable cause to believe in some theoretical 
continuity between these events and the Disputationes. 
It should be clear by now that the figure of Federico da Montefeltro would be central to any 
understanding of the political context of the Disputationes even if he were not its dedicatee.111 
Federico’s military prowess had been crucial to the success of Florentine foreign policy over the 
preceding decade and had been on friendly terms with the Medici for some years before that, with a 
Montefeltro proxy having been present at Lorenzo’s baptism.112 Yet this relationship began to fray 
after the Volterra massacre and by the time of the composition of the Disputationes had reached a 
                                                          
110 ‘Non igitur sine summa sapientia ad Cyclopum litora Aeneam deducit divinus poeta, ut ostendat, qui 
magna quaedam et excelsa petunt, cum nulla certa ratio animum regat, saepe falli et pro animi magnitudine in 
inmanitatem labi… Quam ob rem vir summi boni cupidus, qui antea non bene instituta animi sui 
magnitudine quacunque via ad honores imperiaque nitebatur, nunc demum tam nefariam crudelitatem, quam 
primum eam novit, detestatur; novit autem ex macilenta squalentique Achaemenidae forma, per quam sapiens 
poeta omnes calamitates, quae ex tyrannide generi humano proveniunt, latenter significavit’, DC, pp. 156.11-
157.16. 
111 On Federico, see Walter Tommasoli, La vita di Federico da Montefeltro (1422-1482) (Urbino: Argalia, 1978) 
and Cecil H. Clough, ‘Federico da Montefeltro and the kings of Naples: a study in fifteenth-century survival’, 
Renaissance Studies, 6.2 (June 1992), 113-72. 
112 Kent, ‘The Young Lorenzo’, p. 6. 
41 
 
breaking point. The backdrop for this deterioration was the increasing discord between Lorenzo 
and the new pope, Sixtus IV. Sixtus, formerly Francesco della Rovere, had become pope in August 
1471 and shortly thereafter appointed two of his nephews, Pietro Riaro and Giuliano della Rovere 
(the future Pope Julius II), as cardinals over Lorenzo’s preferred candidate, his brother Giuliano. 
Mutual distrust between Florence and the papal states grew over the status of a number of border 
towns under Florence’s protection, and when in 1473 Lorenzo sought to purchase the city of Imola 
from his ally Galeazzo Maria Sforza to secure access to the Adriatic, Sixtus thwarted the transaction 
by persuading Sforza (under the implicit threat of excommunication) that Imola be sold to the 
papacy and, to add insult to injury, requested a loan from the Medici bank to fund the purchase. 
Having been put in an impossible position, Lorenzo refused and Sixtus was able to assume control 
of Imola with a loan from Lorenzo’s rivals, the Pazzi family.113 
Shortly after these events, in late 1473 and early 1474, Landino began to write the Disputationes, 
and the dispute over Città di Castello which would sever Lorenzo and Federico’s alliance ran 
concurrently with its composition. Perhaps emboldened by his success in purchasing Imola, Sixtus 
sent Giuliano della Rovere to assert papal authority over the city of Città di Castello, a long-
contested town nominally a part of the Papal States but then under the Florentine sphere of 
influence. Its ruler, Niccolò Vitelli, exercised complete control despite ostensibly being a private 
citizen, and when Giuliano besieged the city with his forces on 24 June 1474 Lorenzo sent troops to 
support his friend, fully aware that this would provoke a furious reaction from Sixtus. By this time, 
Sixtus had been courting Federico for a while – in May 1474 Federico was entertained by Giuliano 
in Rome and had an audience with Sixtus in which they discussed a marriage alliance between 
Federico’s daughter and Giuliano’s brother Giovanni – but Federico was swayed by the pope’s 
burgeoning alliance with Naples, with whom Federico had always been close and against whom had 
never taken military action in his capacity as condottiere.114 So, on 21 August, Federico and his troops 
arrived at Città di Castello alongside those of Giuliano and Naples and Vitelli promptly 
surrendered, leaving a client of the Papal States on Lorenzo’s doorstep. In October, only six 
months after the Disputationes was completed, Federico was rewarded by Sixtus through 
ennoblement as a duke. There were other repercussions for Lorenzo beyond the loss of Federico’s 
military prowess. In July 1474 the Medici lost their status as papal bankers in favour of the Pazzi, a 
reward for their cooperation during the Imola affair. Then, in December 1474, and as an act of 
direct antagonism to Florence, Sixtus appointed Pietro Riario’s close associate Francesco Salviati as 
bishop of Pisa. These events would later set in motion the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478 in which, 
unknown to Lorenzo or Landino, Federico was a silent participant.115 
                                                          
113 Rochon, La Jeunesse, pp. 204-05; Najemy, A History of Florence, p. 353. 
114 Clough, pp. 118-19, and on Sixtus’ courting of Federico, see pp. 133-34. 
115 On Federico’s involvement in the Pazzi conspiracy, see Marcello Simonetta, ‘Federico da Montefeltro 
contro Firenze: Retroscena inediti della congiura dei Pazzi’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 161.2 (April-June 2003), 
261-284. See also Reden, pp. 69.119-70.139. 
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Given that the febrile nature of the relationship between Lorenzo and Federico would not have 
been lost on Landino, what then, if anything, was he seeking to do by dedicating the Disputationes to 
Federico and making him so prominent in its representation of the combination of the active and 
contemplative lives? It is telling that within the Disputationes Federico’s role in contemporary politics 
is discussed both in the fictive setting of 1469 and in non-diegetic sections such as the proem to the 
first book, where Landino refers to the series of battles between Federico and his arch-enemy 
Sigismondo Malatesta in the 1460s.116 Hence, whether hearing the voice of the Camaldoli 
disputants or Landino himself, the reader cannot help but be drawn to associate Federico’s 
presence throughout the dialogue with his political conduct over the preceding years, especially in 
the theatre of war. That Landino emphasises Federico’s politics so explicitly has further 
implications when we consider the condottiere’s wider role in the dialogue. Landino presents Federico 
as nothing less than an exemplar of the union of active and contemplative lives and places this 
description in the mouth of Lorenzo himself: 
 
We have in our time Federico da Montefeltro, Prince of Urbino, who I do not doubt should be compared 
with the greatest commanders of a former age. The virtues of this most distinguished man are many, and 
wholly admirable: an intellect that is sharp and enthusiastic for everything, and so much zeal for literature that 
there is no period of rest from his affairs in which he does not apply himself to leisurely study. He achieves 
much by reading, much by listening, a great deal by debating, so that he is rightly thought to be amongst the 
most learned men. But force him to devote himself wholly to these speculations in such a way that he entirely 
neglects both his realm, which he administers so that it is peaceful and flourishing, and the military matters in 
which, without debate, he surpasses the leaders of his age and contends with all in antiquity? To what sort of 
person will he be reduced, having been such a great man?117 
 
Crucially, the overarching direction of Lorenzo’s argument here in favour of the active life demands 
that he insist that Federico must not neglect his civic or military duties. In the light of Landino’s 
accounts of Federico’s political exploits it is tempting to read this as a coded call for reconciliation 
between the two rulers in the face of the baleful influence of Sixtus IV, celebrating a commitment 
to political action devoted to a common cause. Under this interpretation, Landino’s dedication of 
the text to Federico is nakedly political, a means of securing peace between him and Lorenzo by 
exhorting the two statesmen – one established, one inexperienced – to virtuous political action. 
There is some support for such a view in the fourth book of the Disputationes. In a not-so-subtle 
                                                          
116 See DC, p. 98.17-21 and pp. 5.13-6.33.  
117 ‘Habemus nostra tempestate Federicum Feretranum Urbinatum principem, quem ego maximis superiorum 
aetatum imperatoribus comparandum non dubito. Plurimae sunt ac omnino admirandae in viro 
excellentissimo virtutes, ingenium acerrimum et ad omnia vehemens, tantum autem litterarum studium, ut 
nulla unquam a negotiis cessatio detur, quin otium illud ad litteras non transferat, effecitque multa legendo, 
multa audiendo, plurima disputando ut inter litteratissimos iure censeatur. Sed fac ipsum ita se totum 
huiuscemodi speculationibus tradidisse, ut imperium, quod pacatissimum florentissimumque administrat, 
penitus neglexerit remque militarem, in qua et suae aetatis duces sine controversia superat et cum omni 
antiquitate contendit, nunquam attigerit, ex tanto viro ad quem hominem redibit?’, DC, p. 32.9-21. 
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barb directed at the clergy, Landino first has Alberti extol Federico’s personal conduct, proclaiming 
‘who would not be amazed at the continence and sobriety of such a man?’, and then has him 
contrast Federico’s behaviour with the dissolution of the Church, saying: ‘What a criticism he is of 
the luxury and laxity of those men of ours who in their red and black priestly hats and their white 
veils preach a doctrine of complete sanctity!’118 In the context of the then recent accession of Sixtus 
this is difficult to read as anything other than open hostility towards the notion of an alliance 
between Urbino and the Papal States, and an expression of implicit preference for continued 
cooperation with a truly virtuous ruler, Lorenzo. One more piece of evidence also implies that 
Landino’s dedication to Federico had an eye on his relationship with the Medici, which has also 
been noticed by Gabriele Bugada.119 This is the fact that, since Landino dedicated his commentary 
on Horace’s Ars Poetica to Federico’s son Guidobaldo shortly after the cessation of hostilities with 
the Medici in the spring of 1482, Landino’s dedications to Montefeltro père and fils demarcate the 
boundaries of the enmity between the Florence and Urbino with remarkable accuracy. Whether this 
is by accident or design – Landino never dedicated any other works to the Montefeltro dynasty but 
his only significant output in the years between 1474 and 1482 was the expressly Florentine Comento 
– it still remains that Landino dedicated a work to a Montefeltro immediately upon the relations 
between the two houses being repaired. 
It is nonetheless worth exercising extreme caution in advancing this analysis of Landino’s 
dedication to Federico. Aside from the crudity of such a monocausal explanation, the practical 
concerns of literary dedication such as the desire to foster patronage, the wish to self-publicise and, 
in this case, seek access to an enormously well-appointed library all obtain. Moreover, Landino 
would have been aware that the hectoring of a humble humanist was unlikely to sway the 
relationship of two of the most powerful men on the Italian peninsula. This is not to say, however, 
that elements of political persuasion are absent from Landino’s reasoning. Annabel Patterson, in 
her analysis of the temporality of the Disputationes in her Pastoral and Ideology: Virgil to Valery, has 
identified three potential reasons on the part of Landino for dislocating the setting of the 
disputation from 1474 to the summer of 1469: to permit a didactic relationship between Lorenzo 
and Landino; to recreate a time of prelapsarian innocence before Volterra; or for the purposes of 
political commentary (which is perfectly compatible with the others).120 If Landino had an eye on 
contemporary events at all when formulating the framework of the Disputationes we might expect his 
reasons for the temporal dislocation and his choice of Federico as dedicatee to align closely. Under 
Patterson’s preferred explanation – the third – Landino dedicated the Disputationes to Federico but 
                                                          
118 ‘Quis non obstupescat tanti viri continentiam ac sobrietatem’, DC, p. 243.8-10; ‘quantum nostrorum 
hominum, qui rubris nigrisque galeris ac niveis ricinis totius sanctitatis doctrinam profitentur, luxus 
lasciviaque exagitat’, DC, p. 243.25-27. 
119 Cristoforo Landino, In quinti Horatii Flacci Artem Poeticam ad Pisones Interpretationes, ed. by Gabriele Bugada 
(Florence: Sismel, 2012), pp. 20-21.  
120 Annabel Patterson, Pastoral and Ideology: Virgil to Valery (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1987), pp. 67-68. 
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shifted the date of the setting to 1469 in order to grant himself the opportunity to comment on 
current affairs while maintaining a judicious interpretive distance. In this view, Landino’s dedication 
to Federico satisfies the conventions of patronage and humility while still permitting him to 
construct a virtue politics relating to the contemporary diplomatic situation.  
So, while we should not overestimate the extent to which it supplants the usual channels of 
aristocratic patronage, the decision to dedicate the Disputationes to Federico was in some small part 
an attempt to illustrate the advantages of an alliance with Lorenzo over Sixtus. With the fictive 
events sitting at a temporal and psychological remove from reality, Landino was free to sketch 
complimentary depictions of the two rulers – the warrior-sage to whom the work is explicitly 
dedicated and the young prince whose moral instruction is the work’s true aim – in order that their 
mutual contributions to an ethical framework devoted to a common summum bonum might cement 
the relationship between them. It is likely that the proximity in time between publication and the 
transference of Federico’s allegiance to Sixtus has hitherto obscured Landino’s intentions, given 
that the dating of the Disputationes has been erroneous until relatively recently, but that this attempt 
proved to be futile not long after the completion of the Disputationes nonetheless speaks to the 
urgency of Landino’s endeavour.121 His call to proper moral conduct for these powerful leaders 




















                                                          
121 See Fubini, ‘Cristoforo Landino, questioni di cronologia e di interpretazione’. 
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1.3 Virtue and political legitimacy in the Quattrocento 
 
A theme which has proved consistently useful in understanding the relationship between 
Quattrocento political thought and the studia humanitatis is that of the humanistic cultivation of 
virtue.122 In the tradition of Baron and Garin, the humanistic development of civic virtue towards a 
vita activa of citizen participation in the government and institutions of the republic for the common 
good was conceived in contemporary thought as the proper realisation of human nature, in 
contradistinction to the withdrawn religious contemplation exalted in the preceding centuries. 
Kristeller and his supporters have pointed out how humanist didacticism strives to inculcate 
classical virtues into the scions of the ruling elite, and, more recently, James Hankins has interpreted 
this humanistic programme for the personal development of rulers as a system of virtue ethics and, 
by extension, virtue politics.123 
Hankins’s motivation for prioritising the role of virtue in humanist thought on politics is as 
much a procedural decision as a heuristic one. He is scrupulous in his attention to questions of 
historiography, arguing that the project of seeking foundations in Quattrocento humanism for 
transhistorical concepts (such as, for instance, republican liberty) is intrinsically teleological, and 
thus incapable of providing a truly contextualised account of how humanists thought about 
themselves and their society. In particular, he criticises Skinner’s Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought which, its influence notwithstanding, fails to satisfy the requirements of its own 
contextualising methodology by adopting a framework which focuses on transhistorical explanation 
of the origins of the modern state.124 If we are to avoid pre-empting the answers to our questions 
by superimposing onto the intellectual environment of the time anachronisms to which 
                                                          
122 Choice works from the copious scholarship on humanistic politics include Hans Baron, The Crisis of the 
Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), I; John G. A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought 
and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected 
Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Kristeller, ‘Humanism’, in The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt , Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Keßler (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 113-37; Jerrold Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); John M. Najemy, ‘Civic Humanism and Florentine Politics’, in 
Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. by James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), pp. 75-104; and James Hankins, ‘The “Baron Thesis” after Forty Years and Some Recent 
Studies of Leonardo Bruni’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56.2 (April 1995), 309-38.  
123 James Hankins has recently published his magisterial Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy 
(Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2019), which is the culmination of 
work developed in a number of articles and conference papers over the last ten years. These include 
‘Machiavelli, Civic Humanism, and the Humanist Politics of Virtue’, Italian Culture, 32.2 (September 2014), 
98-109; ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, in Beyond Reception: Renaissance Humanism and the 
Transformation of Classical Antiquity, ed. by Patrick Baker, Johannes Helmrath, and Craig Kallendorf (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2019), pp. 95-114; and ‘Modern Republicanism and the History of Republics’, in Nuovi maestri, antichi 
testi: Umanesimo e Rinascimento alle origini del pensiero moderno. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi in onore di Cesare 
Vasoli, Mantova, 1-3 December 2010, ed. by Stefano Caroti and Vittoria Perrone Compagni (Florence: Olschki, 
2012), pp. 109-26. 
124 Hankins, ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, pp. 63-65. 
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contemporary thinkers were wholly indifferent, we ought instead to ask ourselves precisely what 
themes humanists wrote about when discussing politics. For Hankins the answer, drawn from his 
vast knowledge of their literature and correspondence, is virtue. This subject is so important to 
humanists that Hankins claims their political thought can be said to advocate a form of ‘virtue 
politics’, a term with which he deliberately evokes ‘virtue ethics’, the essentially Aristotelian-
Thomistic approach to normative ethics developed by late twentieth-century moral philosophers 
such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams that centres on the 
cultivation of moral conduct on the part of an agent rather than placing moral value on the content 
of actions (as in deontology) or on their consequences (as in consequentialism).125 
Humanistic virtue politics as defined by Hankins amounts to a collective understanding of the 
moral character of the ruling class as the means of legitimising the exercise of political power within 
a commonwealth. In this interpretation, the explicit connection between virtue and political 
legitimacy is key: 
 
Political legitimacy for [humanists] does not come from divine sanction or from hereditary right or from the 
constitutional form of the polity or from the express consent of the governed. What ultimately makes a 
regime legitimate is power well exercised, what may be called ‘legitimacy of exercise’, a species of moral 
legitimacy.126 
 
In humanist eyes, a legitimate state is a state whose rulers exercise power virtuously; states whose 
rulers exercise power in an immoral or vicious way are to be censured and condemned. This 
understanding developed from what was for the humanists the exemplary role of Rome in political 
history. Hankins argues that a perceived inability for institutions such as the law, the nobility and 
the Church to adequately legitimise political authority gave the question of legitimacy an increasing 
contemporary significance.127 When Quattrocento humanists thought and wrote about Italian city-
states their idealistic point of reference was the Roman res publica and, in the absence of institutional 
continuity with Rome, not to mention anything approaching its political stability and surpassing 
power, they strove to emulate it and to revive its glory through the appropriation of what was seen 
as the only remaining possible means of legitimisation: the great virtue of Rome’s citizens and rulers 
as scrutinised by Sallust, Livy, Tacitus and, especially, Cicero.128 At the same time as these Roman 
ideas of political virtue began to supplant the constitutional and legal concerns of scholastic 
                                                          
125 Hankins, Virtue Politics, p.36. See e.g. Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33.124 
(January 1958), 1-19; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 2007) and Dependent Rational 
Animals (London: Duckworth, 2009); Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 
1985); Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
126 Hankins, Virtue Politics, p. 37; Hankins, ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, p. 97. 
127 Hankins, Virtue Politics, pp. 37-45 and 48-51; Hankins, ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, pp. 
104-09. 
128 See e.g. Sal. Cat. I.6-10, Livy Hist. I.57-60 and Cic. Tusc. V passim.  
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political thought, humanist educational methods were stressing the value of classical literature to 
moral development. For the educated classes, the cultivation of virtue and of the humanities 
became synonymous, and hence the ubiquity of these values and the candour with which they were 
held cannot be emphasised enough. Virtuous legitimacy of exercise was not simply a propagandistic 
matter of fostering public confidence in the authority of the ruling class. It was an attitude ingrained 
in educators, nobility, functionaries and citizens alike which concerned the very nature and function 
of the commonwealth and, crucially, was nurtured and valorised by the prevailing intellectual 
climate of humanism. 
According to Hankins, this socio-intellectual environment was regulated by the use of humanist 
eloquence, which he interprets as a ‘social technology’.129 Even though forms of government and 
criteria for citizenship might vary, and even though the power of certain dynasties may continue, 
the humanist must strive to establish a meritocracy of virtue through the persuasion and education 
of its leaders and citizens. Only then can the state be legitimised and the risk of tyranny reduced. In 
particular, epideictic rhetoric – the rhetoric of praise or blame – was key, replacing legal or 
administrative coercion with a framework in which the ruling class was first exhorted to cultivate 
civic virtue through classical education, then rewarded with the admiration of their peers (and of 
posterity) through the means of panegyrics, public letters, dedications and celebratory histories.130 
Vicious conduct, on the other hand, was to be publicly censured and pilloried with invectives or 
histories of a less flattering kind. This is a political morality lived out in the public sphere and is 
entirely other-related in its conception, with the ruling class motivated to exercise power virtuously 
for the community by the desire for honour and to avoid self-interest by the fear of shame. It 
follows that within the theoretical apparatus underpinning Hankins’ idea of the legitimacy of 
exercise a recurring theme of educated discourse, which in fact he describes as ‘a genre almost 
synonymous with humanism’, is that of true nobility: namely, the position that nobility is conferred 
by virtue rather than wealth or lineage and, as a consequence, the basis of admission to the ruling 
elite should be meritocratic.131 The examples of this genre are extensive, including Poggio 
Bracciolini’s De nobilitate and the second part of his De avaritia, Buonaccorso da Montemagno’s De 
nobilitate and Bartolomeo Platina’s De vera nobilitate but, as we shall see later, of particular interest to 
Hankins – and to us – is Landino’s treatise of the same name.132 In each of these works we find the 
sentiment, implicit or explicit, that virtuous people of humble origins had, in Hankins’s words, an 
‘equality in the capacity for virtue’ to the traditional nobility and, while a permeable political elite is 
                                                          
129 Hankins, Virtue Politics, pp. 52-53; Hankins, ‘Machiavelli, Civic Humanism, and the Humanist Politics of 
Virtue’, p. 102; and Hankins, ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, p. 109. 
130 It is worth pointing out that humanists were far less concerned with the art of oratory than their Roman 
forebears and hence ‘rhetoric’ tended to be understood in its literary sense. 
131 Hankins, ‘Machiavelli, Civic Humanism, and the Humanist Politics of Virtue’, p. 103. 
132 Rabil’s Knowledge, Goodness and Power is a valuable sourcebook of translated texts on true nobility, and 
translations of Montemagno’s and Platina’s texts along with Poggio Bracciolini’s De nobilitate can be found 
therein. The most recent critical edition of De avaritia is Poggio Bracciolini, De avaritia, ed. by Giuseppe 
Germano (Livorno: Belforte, 1994).  
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still an elite conceived in terms which are fundamentally hierarchical and far from egalitarian, this 
way of thinking about politics nevertheless constitutes a radical departure from scholastic 
thought.133 Virtue-centred meritocracy as a justification for political exercise of power would 
doubtless have been as appealing to those Quattrocento rulers who were descendants of merchants 
or condottieri as it would for humanist educators, constituting a manifesto both accessible and 
appealing to the community at large with none of the pedantry and entrenched hierarchies 
attendant in medieval legalism. Indeed, there was certainly evidence of a wider trend towards 
meritocracy in the intellectual life of the time. To one extent or another, the scholarly elite 
surrounding Lorenzo de’ Medici mirrored this new political status quo, with Landino, Ficino and 
Poliziano all being from families of faded or modest reputation. 
This conception of virtue politics provides us with a useful framework for thinking about how 
humanistic ethics was projected into the political realm. It is necessary, nonetheless, to spend some 
time elaborating upon and developing certain themes which are particularly germane to 
understanding Landino’s approach in order to establish some hermeneutic principles for the 
analysis of the political thought of the Disputationes. One essential element of humanist virtue 
politics we need to restate is the tacit acknowledgement that that Quattrocento moral thought of 
every strand – ethical, political and legal – rests on an assumption of interdependence on the part of 
the members of a community which is based on the intellectual legacy of Aristotle, Cicero and St 
Paul.134 While we can trace the historical development of this mode of thought through the various 
manifestations of Florentine republicanism, the assumption of interdependence is broader than 
civic engagement alone. The debate about whether the vita activa or vita contemplativa was the superior 
way of life was of profound importance at this time and so there was no shortage of humanists who 
considered civic engagement a distraction or frustration at best. Rather, what the humanists took as 
axiomatic was a deeper functional interdependence rooted in Stoic oikeiosis and encapsulated in the 
non nobis solum maxim of Ciceronian cosmopolitanism: that since humans join themselves together 
in societies by nature, there is an inescapable and reciprocally influential relationship between the 
individual and the collective.135 This assumption pervades texts of all kinds in the Quattrocento. It 
underpins republican writing throughout the century and is intrinsically linked with libertas in 
Florentine civic self-image.136 Yet, after Petrarch’s advocacy of a secularised solitude, those 
humanists who advocate withdrawal from public affairs also tend to accept that the purpose of any 
                                                          
133 Hankins, ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, p. 41. 
134 See e.g. Aristot. Pol. I.i.1-12; Cic.Off. I.vii.20-23, I.xvi.50-xvii.58 and I.xxv.85; Acts 17:26; and 1 Thess. 4:9. 
135 Cic. Off. I.vii.22 and see above n. 59. For Cicero’s view of oikeiosis, see e.g. Cic. Fin. III.v.16-ix.31, Fin. 
III.xix.62-64 and Cic. Off. I.iv.11-12. 
136 See for instance Leonardo Bruni, Oration for the Funeral of Nanni Strozzi in The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: 
Selected Texts, trans. by Gordon Griffiths and others (Binghamton, New York: Medieval & Renaissance Texts 
& Studies, 1987), pp. 121-27; Matteo Palmieri, Vita civile, ed. by Gino Belloni (Florence: Sansoni, 1982), II.13-
18 and throughout Salutati’s Contra maledicum et obiurgatorem, a reply to an invective of Antonio Loschi which 
can be found in Coluccio Salutati, Political Writings, ed. by Stefano U. Baldassarri, trans. by Rolf Bagemihl 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 174-395. 
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such withdrawal on the part of the individual is to benefit the collective in one way or another such 
as, for instance, a scholarly development whose fruits can improve the moral character of others.137 
Humanist educational treatises often therefore maintain that the development of moral character 
on the part of students through learning ought to be viewed for its collective benefit through its 
cultivation of liberi homines.138 For instance, in his De ingenuis moralibus et liberalibus studiis adulescentiae 
of 1402-03 Pier Paolo Vergerio writes that a knowledge of history and moral philosophy are crucial 
for the common good, the former for establishing precedent and the latter for its normative 
guidance and liberalising power.139 
Advocates of princely rule advance similar assumptions of interdependence, sometimes in a 
corporatist form inspired by Plato, with the prince as the head of a collective body politic, and in 
others through the Aristotelian analogy of the state as being equivalent to a household in which the 
prince assumes the role of the father. Bartolomeo Sacchi places the prince as a republican primus 
inter pares in his De principe of 1471: 
 
Many things belong to fellow citizens in common which, as Cicero says, maintain human society: the forum, 
temples, colonnades, streets, statues, laws, courts, voting-rights, in addition to social circles and intimate 
friends. Moreover, there are marriage ties and neighbourhood connections, which are, one might say, very 
strong knots by means of which the city binds itself together. From here arise the propagation of progeny 
and the origin of cities. Having concern for this is not out of place for the best prince: the more citizens are 
united together by their own accord, the more numerous your people become. There can be no mutual 
goodwill between you and your citizens unless they perceive that you have embraced all of them with the 
same love and that you see to it that everybody lives as happily as possible. Since no society is more 
outstanding or stable than one which is provided with good men, it will be your responsibility to ensure that 
they are instructed in learning as well as good morals and refinement.140 
 
The reason I make an effort to emphasise this widespread assumption of interdependence is that it 
creates a mediated space in which the performance of political practice becomes subject to 
objective standards. In a culture in which the relationship between the collective and the individual 
is based on a naturalistic theory of human socialisation, the shared values of that collective prevail 
                                                          
137 See e.g. letter I.10 in Coluccio Salutati, Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, ed. by Francesco Novati, 4 vols 
(Rome: Forzani, 1891-1911, reprinted Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1968), I, pp. 26-29, and the proem to his De 
seculo et religione in Coluccio Salutati, On the World and Religious Life, trans. by Tina Marshall (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 2-9. On the other hand, Witt, while recognising Petrarch’s ethics as ‘at 
once cosmopolitan and personal’, interprets his isolation as having a less civically-inclined bent. See Ronald 
Witt, In the Footsteps of the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 239-60. 
138 On which, see Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, and Skinner, Visions of Politics, 3 vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), II; Grafton and Jardine; and Paul F. Grendler, Schooling in 
Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning 1300-1600 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
139 Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus studiis adulescentiae in Craig Kallendorf, ed. and trans., 
Humanist Educational Treatises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 2-91 (p. 49). 
140 Bartolomeo Sacchi, On the Prince, trans. by Nicholas Webb, in Jill Kraye, ed., Cambridge Translations of 
Renaissance Philosophical Texts Volume 2: Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 
88-108 (p. 98). 
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upon individual conduct and in so doing take on a normative dimension which is lacking in the 
value pluralism of the liberal tradition. Humanistic teaching inculcated into the citizens of 
Quattrocento city-states that the moral choices available to an actor were limited in a very real sense 
to the standards of the broad social networks which constituted the public sphere in a way which 
contained elements of a proto-Burkean support for tradition, albeit not ruling out the capacity for 
radical action if it conformed to the norms of virtuous conduct. It is, I think, this context that 
Hankins has in mind as providing a normative framework for the ‘legitimacy of exercise’ of virtue 
politics and which we should understand as supplying the standards against which moral 
statements, judgments and decisions were made in the world of the Disputationes. As we shall see, 
the extent to which Landino is able to integrate republican and Platonic ideas rests on ideas that the 
obligations we have to others arise from our shared social bonds, both in terms of how it is 
necessary to involve ourselves in civic life to purify ourselves of vice and why the purified sage, or 
sapiens, must return from contemplation to benefit the state.  
Another principle important to Hankins’ view of humanist virtue politics is the way in which 
rhetoric functions as a ‘social technology’ which regulates and mediates the legitimate exercise of 
political power. If humanist assumptions of civic interdependence meant that the ethical 
deliberation of the political class was conceived in terms of normative communal standards, then 
the framework of moral choices available to this political class would be epiphenomenal, an 
emergent feature of the interaction of citizens in the public space. It follows that the various kinds 
of political language which mediate this interaction must in turn regulate elite modes of personal 
conduct. There is no doubt that prominent individuals educated in the studia humanitatis cared a 
great deal about what others thought of them. A concern with personal riputatione which was 
grounded in the classical ideals of Cicero, Aristotle and Sallust established itself as the modality of 
social control throughout the century, finding its apogee in Machiavelli’s exaltation of princely gloria 
in Il Principe and the Discorsi.141 Scholars – Quentin Skinner foremost among them – have written 
extensively about how it was a signature quality of humanistic political thought to hold the chief 
reward of virtue to be reputational benefit to both community and ruler.142 With elite attitudes 
towards civic approval and disapproval being psychologically embedded in this way, the rhetorical 
power of speeches, public letters, diplomatic missive, panegyrics, invectives, dialogues and histories 
in moulding reputations carried enormous significance and it is this that Hankins describes as the 
prevailing ‘climate of thought’ suffusing contemporary political discourse. 
                                                          
141 See e.g. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. by Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1992), 
chapters 21 and 25, and Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. by Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter 
Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), I.10 and III.40-42. 
142 In particular see Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, I, pp. 118-28; Skinner, Visions of Politics, 
II, pp. 118-26; Russell Price, ‘The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli’, Renaissance Quarterly, 30.4, Studies in the 
Renaissance Issue (Winter 1977), 588-631; Alison Brown, ‘De-masking Renaissance Republicanism’, in 
Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. by James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), pp. 179-99; and Karl R. Alexander, ‘Honor, Reputation and Conflict: George of Trebizond and 
Humanist Acts of Self-Presentation’ (PhD thesis, University of Kentucky, 2013). 
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One must stress, however, that the kind of epideictic rhetoric which Hankins emphasises as an 
instrument of humanistic approval and disapproval is only the most literal and exoteric 
manifestation of the persuasive techniques used in the Quattrocento. It cannot be overstated how 
much humanistic culture, steeped in Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, valued rhetorical excellence in 
all its variegated shades. Humanistic discourse addressed to rulers, directly or indirectly, had a 
tendency towards the euphemistic, the circumlocutory and the baroque, but was no less replete with 
coded moral instruction for all that.143 Over the preceding couple of centuries, the literary method 
of the moral persuasion of princes which had emerged from the ars dictaminis increasingly 
emphasised elocutio, one of the five rhetorical operations in Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria.144 
Quintilian’s orator, like that of Cicero’s De oratore and De inventione, must communicate freely and 
easily, with a full knowledge of the facts, but should adorn his language appropriate to the social 
context. Both the humanists who sought to emulate him and their courtly readers would therefore 
have instinctively understood the science of rhetorical devices in all their nuance. As Melissa 
Meriam Bullard puts it with regard to humanist diplomatic culture, ‘Renaissance diplomatic praxis 
in this context encouraged close attention to words and their possible shades of meaning.’145 An 
indicative example can be found in the dedication to Lorenzo in Bartolomeo Scala’s De legibus et 
iudiciis dialogus of 1483. Scala’s dialogue, whose two interlocutors advance the republican ideal of law 
and Platonic princedom respectively, is of a decidedly didactic bent and seeks to determine whether 
laws are universally applicable or should be tailored to their context in place and time. At the time 
of writing, Lorenzo had just returned from the Congress of Cremona and Scala, then the 
Chancellor of Florence, presented his moral instruction to the prince thus: 
  
In view of your immense and deserved authority in our republic, Lorenzo de’ Medici, and of your clearly 
superior intellect, gravity and wisdom, I would be imprudent and untrue to myself as a citizen and as your 
friend, if I failed to consult you... before undertaking any private project, much less an instructive moral 
treatise that concerns the republic and practically the entire human race. During the few days that you were in 
Cremona as our envoy to the war council, your absence gave me some extra time off from my duties as a 
public secretary. So I wrote down, as faithfully as I could, a brief discussion concerning laws and judgments 
which I had with Bernardo Machiavelli. But I resolved not to publish it without first sending it with greetings 
to you, who are the judge and advisor of all my affairs, so that I might have your valuable opinion on this 
subject.146 
 
                                                          
143 See in particular Melissa Meriam Bullard, ‘The Language of Diplomacy in the Renaissance’, in Lorenzo de’ 
Medici: New Perspectives, ed. by Bernard Toscani (New York: Lang, 1993), pp. 263-78 and Chapters Two 
(‘Anxiety, Image Making and Political Reality’) and Three (‘The Language of Diplomacy’) in Bullard, Lorenzo il 
Magnifico. 
144 See Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, pp. 28-41 and Brian Vickers, ‘Rhetorical and Anti-
Rhetorical Tropes: on Writing the History of Elocutio’, Comparative Criticism, 3 (1981), 105-32. 
145 Bullard, ‘The Language of Diplomacy in the Renaissance’, p. 270. 
146 Bartolomeo Scala, De legibus et iudiciis dialogus in Scala, Essays and Dialogues, trans. by Renée N. Watkins 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 158-231. 
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Scala manages to be perfectly clear about his meaning without being explicit in stating it. He 
indicates that he has written an important work of moral pedagogy concerning the republic, takes 
care to emphasise both his and Lorenzo’s civic duties and encourages Lorenzo to read it soon. 
Although wrapped up in an ornate and periphrastic phraseology merited by the gulf in social 
standing, Scala’s dedication conveys to Lorenzo an implicit exhortation towards the development of 
his civic virtue which will be taken seriously because of this language, not despite it. 
It is this measured professional praxis as much as the magniloquence of the humanist ‘public 
intellectual’ on which Hankins’ conception of rhetorically mediated virtue rests. To fully understand 
humanist rhetoric as a social technology for regulating political virtue requires close reading to 
recognise the subtleties of discursive admonition: the coded disapproval in the form of scholarly 
paraphrase; the diminution of achievements through conspicuous omission; the accentuation of 
personal deficiencies with overblown praise. It is therefore necessary to be alert to the intricacies of 
language in all its forms and to the particularities of each of its modes if we are to interpret the 
political message being delivered in the Disputationes. The literary techniques with which Landino 
conveys his moral instruction – the moral allegory, the disputational dialogue, reference to moral 
and intellectual exemplars – are subtle and allusive, but no less concerned with the language of 
praise and blame for it. Hence, close philological attention to the language he uses and a sensitivity 
to literary and allegorical dynamics will be crucial in understanding how Landino hopes to influence 
the reader and encourage him to the cultivation of virtue. 
The final principle which Hankins deems central to humanist virtue politics is the idea that, in 
theory at least, political power can only be legitimately exercised by the virtuous who possess ‘true 
nobility’. It is therefore necessary to discard other justifications for power such as wealth and status, 
attributes of what I will refer to as ‘conventional nobility’. Crucially, this means that all humans 
must be equal in their capacity for virtue.147 I mentioned earlier that Hankins cites Landino’s De vera 
nobilitate as a salutary example of this mode of thought. Here is the excerpt, which Landino 
supports using the authority of Plato: 
 
Virtue is the only and unique giver of true nobility… [True] nobility [based on virtue] is a kind of health-
bringing planet and the highest support of the state… All the greatest dignities and highest magistracies 
should be handed over and entrusted to those who are more noble; … and because the country itself 
especially belongs to the nobles, it should be committed to their care.148 
 
This is as unambiguous a statement of the primacy of virtue as one could hope for and, as we have 
seen, is indicative of a common sentiment among contemporary humanists. It constitutes an 
unequivocal commitment to the principle of equality in capacity for virtue with the ‘greatest 
                                                          
147 Hankins, Virtue Politics, pp. 54-62. 
148 Hankins, Virtue Politics, p. 39 and ‘The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists’, p. 98, citing DVN, p. 49. 
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dignities’ and ‘highest magistracies’ being assigned to the virtuous for the reason of their virtue 
alone. The key to understanding the broader implications of the primacy of virtue, though, is how 
in this and other political works of the Quattrocento humanists use the distinction between true 
nobility – that is, virtue itself – and the various attributes of conventional nobility such as lineage, 
wealth, and public honours to establish the terms of proper moral conduct.  
Landino had recognised this distinction as early as 1453 when, in his eulogy for Carlo 
Marsuppini, he described the chancellor's poetry as singing ‘the praises and love of upright virtue, 
and the honor that comes from true nobility’ (my emphasis) and he was able to elaborate upon the 
question of the role of nobility in the Disputationes.149 In the third book of the Disputationes Landino 
interprets Dido as an allegorical example of an empire’s decadence, with her psychological fall from 
temperance through continence and incontinence into intemperance being a metaphor for the 
descent from civic diligence into sloth and lust. He adduces the following passage to support his 
case: ‘Often the virtue of the man [Aeneas] returns to her mind, | and often the honour of his 
lineage; his face and words cling fast to her breast.’150 For Landino, the fact that Dido’s love for 
Aeneas was motivated not by virtue alone but also by his prodigious social standing compromises it 
from the outset and reveals a moral unsteadiness which contains the seeds of her own ruin: 
 
From the beginning Dido is moved to love Aeneas not only by [true] virtue... but by those things which in 
social intercourse are regarded not only as goods but as the greatest goods. For who would not enumerate 
among the latter nobility of family, dignity and excellence of appearance, and finally, speech distinguished 
with great eloquence, when in both the forum and the senate these things are not weighed on the scale of the 
wise, but are weighed on the scale of the people?151 
 
Under this interpretation, conventional nobility has been relegated to a second order of personal 
qualities, useful for social intercourse but ultimately superfluous or even dangerous. Landino is 
describing a division common to Quattrocento humanists: the demarcation of goods described in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics which places conventional nobility and its adjuncts among the external 
goods, or ‘goods of fortune’.152 It is in the second book of the Disputationes where Landino first 
makes this separation explicit: 
                                                          
149 ‘Laudes rectae et virtutis amorem quem sequitur vera nobilitate decus’, Xandra III.7.77-78 (translation 
from Chatfield, p. 179). 
150 Verg. Aen. IV.3-4. 
151 ‘Movetur autem a principio Dido, ut Aeneam amet, non solum virtute... sed iis, quae humanis coetibus 
non solum bona, verum etiam summa bona habentur. Quis enim generis nobilitatem, quis formae dignitatem 
atque excellentiam, quis denique multo ornatu insignem orationem inter summa non enumeret, cum in foro, 
cum in senatu haec non sapientum statera, sed populari trutina ponderentur?’, DC, p. 183.6-13. 
152 This categorisation is first made by Aristotle in Arist. Nic. Eth. I.viii.2-x.16 and also Pol. VII.i.2-5, with 
related passages in Nic. Eth. I.v.4-8 and X.vi.2-3. It is repeated and scrutinised by Cicero in, for instance, Cic. 
Tusc. V.xxx.84-85, Cic. Fin. III.xiii.43-44, IV.xii.29-31 and IV.xxi.58-60, and Cic. Ac. I.v.19. Moreover, 
Thomas Aquinas devotes Summa Theologiae I-II Q.2 to the Aristotelian separation of goods. See also Matthew 
Cashen, ‘The Ugly, the Lonely and the Lowly: Aristotle on Happiness and the External Goods’, History of 




I will use the [following] division, which abides in common parlance. All things which were named good are 
either called goods of the body, like toughness, health, pleasure and beauty; or goods of fortune – since they 
were situated by an accident of fortune – in which number are held nobility, wealth, honours and glory; or 
finally goods of the soul, which is virtue itself.153 
 
Aristotle affirms that we achieve eudaimonia through the active exercise of virtue – the good of the 
soul – when this activity extends over a complete lifetime and, crucially, is supplemented with 
sufficient external goods: while he is unattached to such goods, the magnanimous man is made self-
sufficient and can exercise liberality through the virtuous expenditure of his wealth.154 External 
goods have an important instrumental value and it is impossible, or at least not easy, to achieve 
eudaimonia without them. This relationship is not quite at odds with asserting the primacy of virtue 
as true nobility and indeed some humanists were comfortable with excusing excessive affluence on 
the part of their sponsors (the Medici regime in particular) where it was accompanied by liberality, 
but the idea of external goods such as wealth and political connections having an instrumental value 
in performing virtuous action was just as often regarded with suspicion, with humanists instead 
choosing to adopt Aristotle’s terminology without attendant baggage that could be interpreted as 
celebrating the status quo.155 Usually this was accomplished by combining Aristotle’s ethical 
thought within a heterogenous mixture of philosophies such as Christian scripture, Stoicism and 
Platonism. Bartolomeo Scala, for instance, admits that external goods ‘minister greatly to the 
conduct of life’ but has already established through Terence, Chilon, Diogenes and the gospels that 
‘the goods of the mind are lost through material wealth’.156 Matteo Palmieri errs more towards the 
Aristotelian position, but still takes pains to emphasise the superfluity of wealth: 
 
                                                          
Philosophical Review, 94.2 (April 1985), 173-96; and Roger Crisp, ‘Aristotle on Greatness of Soul’, in The 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by Richard Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 158-178. 
153 ‘Utar ea divisione, quae in ore omnium versatur. Nam omnia quae bona appellata sunt aut corporis 
dicuntur bona ut robur, valitudo, voluptas, pulchritudo; aut fortunae, quoniam in eius temeritate posita sunt, 
quo in numero habentur nobilitas, divitiae, honores, gloria; aut postremo animi, quae ipsa virtus est’, DC, p. 
78.5-9. Landino returns to this separation in Comento, Inf. VII.67-96.6-17 and DVN, p. 47. 
154 Aristot. Nic. Eth. I.viii.15-17. 
155 See especially Jill Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles 
B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Keßler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 303-
86. Quentin Skinner also addresses this subject in Skinner, Visions of Politics, II, pp. 224-29, emphasising the 
distinction made by humanists between wealth which is inherited (which is compatible with true nobility) and 
that which is earned (which is most certainly not) and noting that suspicion towards wealth as an external 
good was not accompanied with negative assumptions about property rights. Cicero’s position regarding 
personal wealth in Cic. Off. I.viii.25 is that ‘I do not mean to find fault with the acquisition of property 
provided it hurts nobody, but unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided.’ 
156 Scala, Dialogus de Consolatione, 35 and 32 in Scala, Essays and Dialogues, pp. 119 and 115. 
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He who is willing to die for virtue will easily disdain riches and the goods of fortune, since to place hope in 
them is very much contrary to greatness of spirit. Nothing is more magnificent than to disdain riches if you 
do not have them and, if you do have them, to liberally distribute them with beneficence.157 
 
Other humanists who adopt similar attitudes to Aristotle’s separation of goods include Leonardo 
Bruni, Coluccio Salutati, Lauro Quirini and, in particular, Poggio Bracciolini, whose De nobilitate 
contains a spirited discussion of the Aristotelian distinction of goods and the relationship between 
virtue, wealth and lineage.158 In particular, Stoic ethics appealed to the advocates of true nobility 
because, in stark opposition to Aristotle, the Stoics construed virtue alone as sufficient for 
happiness and placed nobility alongside wealth, honour and glory and other external goods as 
indifferent things (adiaphora). The reason for this appeal was the influence and moral authority of 
Cicero. Cicero had attempted to reconcile Stoicism and Aristotelianism, writing in the De finibus that 
the Stoics had adopted the moral philosophy of the Peripatetics (and Academics, of whom he 
considered the former a subgroup) albeit with different terminology and, in the fifth book of the 
Tusculanae Disputationes, explicitly endorsing the Stoic view of virtue being sufficient for happiness 
while maintaining some consistency with Peripatetic thought.159 Moreover, the Ciceronian 
conception of virtue rested on the Stoic concept of moderation in the face of perturbationes animi 
which could emerge from personal vice and desire as well as from external events.160 In this context 
external goods can be interpreted as a potentially corrupting influence to be further relegated in 
their relative importance. By following Cicero, Landino could, therefore, claim to be an heir of the 
intellectual heft and linguistic precision of the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions while 
maintaining the Stoic primacy of virtue, of true nobility, necessary for his Platonic-republican 
project. 
In humanistic thought, false attachments to transient goods were as inimical to the political 
order as they were to individual flourishing, and hence the ‘true nobility’ of virtue was a necessary 
element in maintaining the health of the republic. As mentioned earlier, the Roman res publica was 
the exemplary commonwealth for humanists and their scholarly zeal for seeking moral lessons from 
its rise and fall gave Roman historians enormous intellectual influence in the Quattrocento. 
Humanists looked especially to Sallust, the great chronicler of lost republican values as a guide for 
the moral language to express sentiments about virtue, vice and civic duty.161 In both the Bellum 
                                                          
157 ‘Chi per virtù è in tal modo disposto alla morte, agevolemente spreza le richeze et beni di fortuna, ne’ quali 
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Catilinae and the Bellum Iugurthinum Sallust is preoccupied with the theme of virtue, extolling 
republican progress through moral excellence and denouncing moral corruption resulting from the 
degradation of the Roman virtus. These sober warnings were embedded in the Latin educational 
tradition, with Sallustian values permeating humanism’s intellectual framework of personal and 
political virtue and saturating its terminology. So, for instance, in the Bellum Catilinae we have ‘For 
while the glory of riches and beauty is fleeting and fragile, virtue is considered illustrious and 
eternal’, a sentiment which is replicated almost verbatim in Pier Paolo Vergerio the Elder’s De 
ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis, composed between 1402 and 1403: ‘For wealth, glory, 
pleasures – these are transitory and fleeting. Character, however, and the fruits of the virtues endure 
undiminished and last forever’.162 
Similarly, Sallust’s summation in the Bellum Iugurthinum of the ephemeral nature of external 
goods in contrast to the incorruptible soul could have been written by Plato himself, and the 
influence on Landino’s thought expressed in the quotations above is clear: 
 
For just as mankind is made up of body and soul, so all our acts and pursuits partake of the nature either of 
the body or of the mind. Therefore notable beauty and great riches, as well as bodily strength and all other 
gifts of that kind, soon pass away, but the splendid achievements of the intellect, like the soul, are everlasting. 
In short, the goods of the body and of fortune have an end as well as a beginning, and they all rise and fall, 
wax and wane; but the mind, incorruptible, eternal, ruler of mankind, animates and controls all things, yet is 
itself not controlled.163 
 
Sallust saw virtus, intellectual and moral excellence, as a necessary condition for perpetuating the 
civic concord and selflessness essential for the republic. It follows from this connection between 
the health of the res publica and civic virtue that, for him, the three vices responsible for the decline 
of the Roman republic are ambitio (or superbia), avaritia and luxuria, wherein the desires for personal 
power, wealth and sensual pleasure respectively become ends in themselves.164 For the 
Quattrocento moralist, these vices coincided with the sins of the world mentioned in the Gospel of 
John – the lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and the pride of life – granting Sallustian moral 
language the authority of Christian catechism, but the continuity with republican tradition was just 
                                                          
Ulery, ‘Sallustius Crispus, Gaius’, in Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum, ed. Virginia Brown (Washington 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), VIII, pp. 183-326. 
162 ‘Nam divitiarum et formae gloria fluxa atque fragilis est, virtus clara aeternaque habetur’, Sal. Cat. 1.4; 
‘Nam opes, gloria, voluptates, fluxae res sunt et caducae; habitus autem fructusque virtutum perstat integer 
atque aeternus manet’, Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus, p. 7. 
163 Sal. Iug. 2.1-3, translation from Sallust, trans. by John C. Rolfe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989). 
164 Among many instances see Sal. Cat. 5.6-9, 10.3-5 and 11.1-3; Jug. 13.5-6 and 31.12-15. This categorisation 
is common in the Roman moralistic tradition: see also e.g. Livy Hist. I.1 and XXXIV.4.2. It is necessary to 
make a distinction between the vices of ambitio, imperium and superbia and the laudable gloria proceeding from 
just rule. On this, see e.g. Skinner, Visions of Politics, II, pp. 121-26 and Skinner, ‘Political Philosophy’, in The 
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Keßler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 389-452 (pp. 412-16). 
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as important a factor for its incorporation into the humanist lexicon.165 Sallust had shown through 
practical case studies (as opposed to the purely theoretical injunctions of Aristotle and Cicero) how 
those who seek political legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry should disdain external goods such as 
wealth and status not just because they are goods of the second order, but because their self-
directedness is also inimical to the concord of a properly-functioning commonwealth. Hence, the 
vices which fetishise externals – ambitio or superbia, avaritia, and luxuria – are those to be most 
strongly discouraged in the political class.166  
Advocacy of true nobility, then, did not just consist in a devaluation of adjuncts of conventional 
nobility such as wealth and status. Such trappings were often scorned outright. In order to assert 
the primacy of virtue some humanists fostered a deep suspicion of external goods and, more 
specifically, the vices devoted to them, to the extent that moral admonitions on the part of 
humanists were often as concerned with avoiding these vices as they were with specifying which 
virtues to cultivate. A common theme which begins to emerge is that virtue is counterposed against 
external goods and their associated vices as a type of freedom: in Sallustian theory, virtue 
perpetuates the republican tradition of libertas; according to the thought of Cicero, it loosens the 
grip of perturbationes animi on one’s moral faculties; in the Platonic tradition, it releases the soul from 
the shackles of the body to begin its ascent to God. Not only are people equal in their capacity for 
the true nobility of virtue, but that virtue is grounded in various forms of individual and collective 
self-actualisation. 
By way of summary, James Hankins has identified a form of Quattrocento virtue politics in 
which the cultivation of virtue is crucial to the conferral of political legitimacy. There are certain 
elements to this theory which bear particular relevance to understanding the system of virtue 
politics Landino lays out in the Disputationes. Virtue was a quality measured and weighed in the 
public space, thanks to an assumption of interdependence which meant that moral conduct was 
subject to objective standards and, in theory at least, political figures had externally-imposed limits 
of action enforced upon them by the collective moral scrutiny of their peers. Political legitimacy or 
‘legitimacy of exercise’ was conferred on the ruling class on account of behaviour which met these 
standards, and the mediating social technology of humanist rhetoric which did so imparted praise 
and blame not only through epideictic but also through subtle and roundabout phrasing which can 
only be teased out through close reading of language, genre and form. True nobility was 
synonymous with virtuous conduct, a radical move away from the hierarchies of medieval thought 
towards political meritocracy, and in the eyes of many humanists the demarcation between the 
                                                          
165 ‘Concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum est et superbia vitae’, I John 2.16. Salutati uses this 
phraseology in On the World and Religious Life, I.21.2 and II.3.9. At II.9.15 he switches to the Sallustian 
terminology, stating that superbia and avaritia are the ‘head and root of all sins’. 
166 See for instance Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus, pp. 28-36; Palmieri, Vita civile, III.23-29 and especially 
Bracciolini, De avaritia (whose full title is Historia convivialis disceptativa de avaricia et luxuria) passim. Bracciolini’s 




goods of the soul and external goods such as wealth and status led to a diminution of the perceived 
value of the latter and a concomitant concern with the vices which arise from them. The world in 
which Landino was devising his schema for of the divinisation of the soul was therefore one in 
which the humanistically-educated elites that constituted his audience read his work with the 
expectation and understanding that moral instruction on virtue was coterminous with moral 
instruction on politics. 
With the biographical, political and intellectual context of the Disputationes having been 
































Chapter Two – Psychology, Virtue and Politics 
 
2.1 The introductory remarks of the Disputationes 
 
The Disputationes begins with Landino and his brother Piero visiting the Camaldoli monastery in the 
Casentino valley to escape the summer heat of Florence. At the monastery they happen upon 
Lorenzo de’ Medici and his friends Alamanno Rinuccini, Piero and Donato Acciaiuoli, Marco 
Parenti and Antonio Canigiani. Shortly thereafter, Leon Battista Alberti and Marsilio Ficino arrive, 
and the next day the company retreat to a mountainous meadow laden with pastoral symbolism. It 
is here that Landino has Alberti set out the subject of the forthcoming disputation. With Piero de’ 
Medici gravely ill, the responsibility for the republic must soon fall to Lorenzo, and the moral 
instruction Alberti prescribes is tantamount to a summary of Landinian virtue ethics in the 
Disputationes, emphasising the centrality of a purificatory cursus virtutum to the ethico-political project 
of governing the self and the state: 
 
For you understand that the entire burden of the republic already rests on your shoulders because of the 
worsening sickness of your father... I think that it is of great importance both for you and the republic that, 
since you will soon undertake the governance of the latter (and, indeed, for the most part you already have), 
you spend any otium here, withdrawn from public business. Distant from urban tumult, you can investigate 
and understand through debate – either by yourself or, preferably, with these learned men who care deeply 
about you – those things through which our souls are led to an understanding of their origin and divinity. For 
no-one will properly manage either himself or a republic [nec se nec rem publicam recte administrabit] unless he has 
first both purged his mind of every bodily fault with those virtues which improve life and morals [virtutes quae 
vitam moresque emendant], and has then illuminated that mind which has been purged with those virtues which 
provide an understanding of supreme things [virtutes quae rerum maximarum cognitionem praebent], so that he will 
have properly understood why he himself and the rest of humankind exist and for what reason they were 
created by the highest God. I think that this pretext motivated the divine Plato, for while he does not venture 
to assert anything outright about almost any other subject, he nonetheless seems to declare this without any 
hesitation: only those republics which are either administered by philosophers [philosophi administraverint] or 
whose administrators have begun to philosophise [qui administrant philosophari coeperint] will ultimately 
prosper.167 
                                                          
167 ‘Videtis enim universam rei publicae molem propter ingravescentem parentis vestri morbum iam vestris 
humeris sustinendam... tamen et tua et rei publicae permulti interesse arbitror, ut, cum tu illam 
administrandam brevi suscepturus sis vel potius magna iam ex parte susceperis, quodcunque otii publico 
negotio subtrahere licuerit, id omne huc conferas et procul ab urbanis tumultibus vel tecum ipse vel potius 
cum huiuscemodi doctissimis iisdemque tui amantissimis viris ea inquiras ac disputando assequaris, quibus 
animi nostri in suae originis ac divinitatis cognitionem inducuntur. Nemo enim nec se nec rem publicam recte 
administrabit, nisi prius et iis virtutibus, quae vitam moresque emendant, animum ab omni corporea labe 
expiaverit et iis, quae rerum maximarum cognitionem praebent, illum iam purgatum ita illustraverit, ut quid 
ipse, quid reliqui homines sint, ad quam rem a summo deo producti recte noverit. Quam quidem causam 




There is much to digest here. Landino, through the figure of Alberti, wishes to make it clear from 
the outset that virtuous self-improvement on the part of the individual is not only essential to the 
right functioning of the state, but also has a synecdochic relationship with the moral health of the 
body politic: intellectual otium is important both for Lorenzo and the republic; without moral 
purgation, no-one can rightly manage himself or the republic. To cultivate proper behaviour in 
citizens – and, specifically, in the individual or individuals who will govern – is to improve the 
republic itself. In thus asserting that personal virtue plays such a constitutive role to the state, 
Landino places the Disputationes squarely in the tradition of Florentine republicanism. He invites the 
reader to acknowledge this intellectual provenance and understand that the philosophical and 
exegetical investigations in the following dialogue will have at their heart a programme of moral 
perfectionism intended to somehow promote virtue.  
Landino’s choice of the formulation rem publicam administrabit is therefore telling. Not for him are 
more emphatic alternative verbs such as dominari, regnare or imperare, which might compromise the 
republican credentials of his moral instruction. Instead, by choosing administrare rem publicam 
Landino invokes a phrase which is common in the works of Cicero and associated with Roman 
republican theory in that it connotes a way of doing civic business that is collegial and devoted to a 
shared interest rather than consisting in commands handed down by a ruler.168 One passage of 
Cicero which would have been particularly prominent in directing Landino’s choice of vocabulary 
here is that in the third book of the De finibus, where he relates the Stoic belief that ‘the sage should 
wish to engage in and manage public affairs [sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam]’.169 I will 
return later to the significance of Cicero’s Stoic sentiments here and elsewhere for Landino’s 
arguments in the Disputationes, but for now it is worth remarking that Landino’s use of this term in 
defining his ethical schema – that is, seeking to manage the self and administrare rem publicam through 
successive purificatory degrees of virtue – should be interpreted as an allusion to Cicero’s desire to 
have the sapiens, the model of philosophical reason and virtue, take part in the management of the 
state through cooperation and collaboration rather than by decree.  
With this in mind, it is striking that Landino uses the same formulation later on in the extract 
above where he has Alberti paraphrase a famous passage from Plato’s Republic, declaring that ‘only 
those republics which are either administered by philosophers or whose administrators have begun 
to philosophize will ultimately prosper’.170 None of the translations of the corresponding passage 
                                                          
tamen hoc sine ulla dubitatione sentire videatur: eas res publicas tum demum beatas futuras, quas aut 
philosophi administraverint aut qui administrant philosophari coeperint’, DC, pp. 10.23-11.24. 
168 A full treatment of this concept of administrare rem publicam can be found in Louise Hodgson, Res Publica 
and the Roman Republic: ‘without Body or Form’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 21-60. Therein, p. 
25, n. 16 supplies an exhaustive list of the classical sources in which administrare is used in its republican sense 
of managing public business. 
169 Cic. Fin. III.xx.68. 
170 Referring to Plat. Rep. V.473c-473d. Landino had used almost identical language to translate the same 
quotation at the end of a consolatory letter to Lorenzo de’ Medici of the death of his uncle Giovanni in 1463: 
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which would have been known to Landino use administrare in either clause of this antimetabole. For 
instance, Ficino’s translation of the Republic runs thus: ‘unless either philosophers rule states 
[dominentur civitatibus] or those called kings and rulers [reges potentesque] justly and adequately become 
philosophers’.171 Furthermore, the earlier Latin translation of the Republic by Manuel Chrysoloras 
and Uberto Decembrio (which stood as a model for that of Uberto’s son, Piero, and Ficino 
himself) uses principari and reges et principes here, and when Boethius quotes the phrase in the 
Consolatio he uses regere and rectores.172 There is, on the other hand, a precedent for such terminology 
with reference to Plato in the first book of De officiis, where Cicero uses the phrase rem publicam 
administraret when he relates Plato’s analogy comparing politicians who compete for control of the 
state to sailors arguing about steering a vessel.173 Landino’s decision to use the loaded term 
administrare at the opening of the Disputationes must therefore have been deliberate. His choice of 
words offers the first indication that in the ensuing dialogue the philosophy of the ‘divine Plato’ will 
be refracted through the prism of Ciceronian political thought and that Platonic authority will be 
brought to bear for republican ends. Lorenzo’s response to Alberti offers his assent to such terms 
with a request that Alberti continue explaining to Lorenzo and his brother the value of Platonic 
investigation as it applies to republican governance: 
 
While everything that Plato has communicated to me on this subject through the mouth of Marsilio (who 
understands the mind of such a great philosopher more than anyone else) seems truer than any oracle, I 
would very much like to know what it is in that author that you think a governor of the republic [rei publicae 
gubernatori] should adopt from those who are devoted to the investigation of the truth.174 
 
Just as Alberti’s introductory words and Lorenzo’s response to them show that the Disputationes has 
its theoretical basis in republican Platonism, so too do they present a prospectus for the 
forthcoming discussion in such terms. In asserting that Lorenzo ought to spend ‘any otium 
                                                          
‘beatas res publicas futuras, cum aut illas philosophi administrabunt, aut ii, a quibus administrant, 
philosophari coeperint’, Lentzen, Studien, pp. 199-200. He does the same in his funeral oration for Donato 
Acciaiuoli (‘res publicas beatas futuras, cum a philosophis administrarentur’) which can be found in Reden, p. 
72.201-02. By way of corroboration, when translating the quotation to the volgare in Comento, Proem XIII.118-
20 he uses the verb governare and the noun reppublica abbreviated as rep. 
171 ‘Nisi vel philosophi civitatibus dominentur, vel hi qui nunc reges potentesque dicuntur, legitime 
sufficienterque philosophentur’, Marsilio Ficino, Divini Platonis Opera omnia (Lyon: Le Preux, 1590), p. 466.  
172 ‘Si non, inquam, vel philosophi in urbibus principentur aut legitime et sufficienter philosophentur qui nunc 
reges et principes nuncupentur’, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. Lat. 1131 23v; ‘si [res 
publicas] vel studiosi sapientiae regerent vel earum rectores studere sapientiae contigisset’, Boe. Cons. I. iv. 20-
21. On this sententia in Guarino and Brandolini, and the similarity of the idea in these authors to that of 
Boethius, see also James Hankins, ‘The Reception of Plato in the Early Renaissance’ in Hankins, Humanism 
and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance (Rome: Edizioni di storia et letteratura, 2004), II, p. 69, n. 47 and p. 283, 
n. 24. 
173 Cic. Off. I.xxv.87 
174 ‘Tamen, cum, quaecunque a Platone dicuntur, ea mihi ex ore Marsilii, qui praeter omnes tanti philosophi 
mentem tenet, iam omni oraculo veriora videantur, ardentissime scire cupio, quid id sit, quod tu illo auctore 
ab iis, qui in veri investigatione versantur, rei publicae gubernatori mutuandum esse censebas’, DC, p. 12.11-
15. The phrase rei publicae gubernator is Ciceronian, appearing in e.g. Cic. Rab. Perd. ix.26. 
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withdrawn from public business’ in contemplation of the soul’s origin, Alberti establishes an 
interdependence between otium and affairs of state, setting out his stall for the debate which will 
occupy the first book. For Alberti, the instrumental value of otium is that of allowing time for the 
analytical and discursive reasoning which permit cognition of the divine nature of the soul and its 
summum bonum, and hence the ensuing discussion rests on the process through which one strives 
towards this position: namely, the relative importance of the moral virtues, the ‘virtues which 
improve life and morals’, and the intellectual or dianoetic virtues, the ‘virtues which provide an 
understanding of supreme things’.  
Notwithstanding the strict regimentation of the philosophical system he has outlined with these 
opening remarks, Landino was guilty, like many of his contemporaries, of avoiding clear statements 
of his premises and making unstated assumptions of knowledge on the part of his readers. His 
decision to tackle the question of action and contemplation in the first book of the Disputationes 
before defining the summum bonum and the nature of the soul in the second is unhelpful in 
unpicking the principles of his philosophy, however much rhetorical sense it might have made to 
have Alberti and Lorenzo first discuss how such ways of life contribute to administrandam rem 
publicam. Before turning to the debate on otium and negotium in the first book of the Disputationes it is 
therefore necessary to adumbrate the principles of the moral psychology which provide a 






















2.2 Landinian moral psychology: the faculties of the soul 
 
Landino’s conception in the Disputationes of the soul’s origin, functions and virtues stands as an 
abridgement of his earlier theoretical systematisation of this subject in the De anima while also 
serving to refine some of these ideas. In the De anima, a work which depends heavily on the Isagoge 
of Albertus Magnus, Landino had attempted – with mixed success – to reconcile Platonic, 
Aristotelian and Stoic thought on the soul, and his doing so illustrates how his theory of virtue is 
integrated into his broader psychology in ways that remain implied but unstated in the 
Disputationes.175 His analysis of the nature of the soul follows Aristotle’s methodology in his De 
anima by proceeding from first principles (as opposed to the more rhetorical and literary-critical 
approach taken in the Disputationes) while at the same time having as its fundamental premise the 
Platonic idea of a soul, immured in the body and confused by the false opinions of the senses, 
which must ascend to a divine summum bonum. In the first book of the De anima, Landino, following 
Platonic tradition, defines the soul as ‘an incorporeal, rational essence which moves itself’ because 
he thinks this aligns best with Christian dogma in authors such as Augustine.176 He continues in 
these terms by giving an account of the soul’s origin that relies on Macrobius and Augustine and in 
which souls created in heaven ex nihilo by God descend into the body, ignorant of their divine 
origin.177 Here he also invokes Virgil, a ‘divine and above all Platonic poet’, as an authority on 
Platonic thought, interpreting the descent into the underworld in the Aeneid as a descent of the soul 
into the body in a manner which would reach its complete fruition in the fourth book of the 
Disputationes.178 A paraphrase of the account of the origin of the soul in the De anima appears early 
in the first book of the Disputationes, near the beginning of Alberti’s first speech:  
 
The divine Plato thinks that our souls have sunk from the lap of God into this extreme filth, or, rather, were 
taken down to adorn this lowest part of the world. They remain stunned for some time by the fall from such 
heights, and stupified, as if drunk, by the confusion of the matter which they entered, until gradually their 
inherent divinity awakens some remembrance in them, though it returns obscured. Inspired by this supreme 
love of divine things, the soul strives to recognise them in justice and religion, as if supported by two wings. 
                                                          
175 On Landino’s debt to Albert’s Isagoge, see Rüsch, Untersuchungen, pp. 129-137, pp. 155-161, and pp. 172-
199. On his debt to the Liber de natura et origine animae, see McNair, ‘Albert the Great in the Renaissance’.  
176 ‘Essentiam incorpoream rationalem, quae se ipsa moveat’, De anima, I, p. 31. The definition of the soul that 
Landino attributes to ‘Divus Augustinus’ can be found in Aug. De quantitate animae xii.22: ‘Nam mihi videtur 
esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata’. The definition of the self-moving 
soul comes from Plat. Phaedrus.245c-246a but cf. Aristot. DA. I.iii. 
177 De anima, I, pp. 38-47, relying on Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.xi-xiii and Augustine’s De anima and De libero 
hominis arbitrio. On the correspondence between the third book of Augustine’s De anima, his Epistola ad 
Hieronymum and Landino’s thought, see Rüsch, Untersuchungen, pp. 109-15. Landino’s defence of creation ex 
nihilo is intended to forestall potential accusations of his supporting Origen’s heretical doctrine of the pre-
existence of the soul, which he mentions in De anima, I, pp. 36-37. 
178 ‘Divinus... et in primis platonicus poeta’, De anima, I, p. 35. 
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It raises itself to the heights and, as far as the keenness of the soul endures the deadening contagion of the 
body, it contemplates the light of God, and not without the highest pleasure.179 
 
This account of the soul’s descent into the body is central to Landino’s thought and is the axiom 
from which the rest of his ethical system proceeds because, for Landino, the problem which 
necessarily follows from this incarceration is to explain ‘how [the soul], in the body, exercises its 
powers’ and how the functions of the soul which govern the soul itself and the body interact with 
each other.180 Hence, at the beginning of the second book of the De anima he describes the four 
faculties of the soul: the vegetative power (vis vegetativa) through which things grow, are nourished 
and reproduce; the sensitive power (vis sensitiva) through which things feel and sense; the motive 
power (vis motiva), through which things move; and the rational power (vis rationalis), through which 
we think and which is unique to human beings, unlike the other three powers which we have in 
common with animals.181 Of the first three base faculties of the soul, the sensitive power and the 
motive power are of the greatest concern to Landino’s moral theory as these are the powers 
through which we perceive and react to the sensible world. The sensitive power governs the 
external and internal senses, which perceive material and non-material things respectively, and the 
motive power contains the appetite (appetitus), the power through which we are moved to 
appropriate or flee things. The appetite itself is stimulated by two internal senses that are parts of 
the sensitive power: the phantasia or imaginatio, which organises sense data, and the vis existimativa, 
which forms judgments on it.182  
It is the unreliability of the sense data upon which the phantasia and vis existimativa make their 
judgments, and the concomitant tendency for the appetite to strive towards bodily – and thus false 
and harmful – ends, which compromise the moral progress of the soul in discovering its true divine 
                                                          
179 ‘Censet enim divinus Plato animos nostros, postquam ex dei sinu in hanc ultimam faecem deciderunt vel 
potius ad hanc infimam mundi partem exornandam detracti sunt, ex tam excelso ac praecipiti casu ad 
longiusculum tempus attonitos et ex silvae, quam ingressi sunt, tumultu stupidos et veluti ebrios persistere, 
donec paulatim divinitas, quae in illis est, sese excitans in aliquam memoriam quanvis obscuratam redeat; a 
qua summo ardore divinarum rerum incensa illas recognoscere nititur iustitiaque ac religione veluti duabus 
alis suffulta se in altum erigit atque dei lucem, quoad animi acies contagione corporis hebetata patitur, non 
sine summa voluptate intuetur’, DC, p. 17.5-15, and cf. Plat. Phaedo 79c; Plat. Phaedrus 247e; and Macrobius, In 
Som. Scip. I.xii.7-11. Ficino used the analogy of ascent on two wings in Platonic Theology XIV.iii.7, but there the 
two wings are intellectus and voluntas. Landino’s analogy cleaves much more closely to another instance of 
Ficino’s use of the metaphor in his letter De divino furore to Peregrino Agli (Lettere I, pp. 19-28), where the two 
wings refer to iustitia and sapientia, the two virtues devoted to action and contemplation. 
180 ‘Quo pacto [anima], in corpore constituta, suas vires exerceat’, De anima, I, p. 9. The questions on the 
nature of the soul’s incarceration in the body with which Landino concerns himself derive ultimately from 
Plato’s Phaedo. 
181 De anima, II, pp. 8-9. 
182 De anima, II, pp. 120-21. This schema of the soul’s faculties and senses is Scholastic-Aristotelian. On 
Landino’s debt to this tradition, see Gilson, Dante and Renaissance Florence, pp. 47-48; McNair, Cristoforo Landino 
on the Human Soul and McNair, ‘Albert the Great in the Renaissance’. Useful secondary literature on these 
psychological topics includes Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 
and Peter King, ‘Aquinas on the Passions’, in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. 




nature. Landino therefore introduces the idea that the appetite is twofold, with one part, desire 
(libido), being guided by the senses and the other, the will (voluntas), being guided by reason (ratio).183 
He expresses this distinction between rational and irrational appetite in emphatically Platonic terms 
by introducing the chariot allegory in the Phaedrus which he would later repeat in the third book of 
the Disputationes, where his description runs thus: 
 
There is a sense and a certain power in our souls they call ‘cogitation’, to which the judgment of goods and 
evils has been entrusted by nature. Sometimes this power judges in such a way that, regarding nothing beyond 
the senses, and as if both attracted by their enticements and corrupted by the reward offered by pleasure, it 
decides that the good of a human being is that which is the good of a beast. But if this same cogitative power 
is illuminated with the healthy light of reason and is directed by its standard, it does not judge that which 
allures the senses to be good, but rather that which is dictated by right reason: a true and simple good which 
can neither die nor become corrupted. So when this cogitative power has decided that this thing is good but 
that thing is bad, some other power is aroused in us which rises up to acquire the good or to reject the bad. 
All call this the appetite. It is necessarily twofold: one appetite which always solely depends on the judgment 
which the senses make, and which does not desire anything on account of reason; and another which pursues 
nothing at all unless reason has first commanded it. We call the first libido and the second voluntas. There is, 
therefore, an appetite by which human souls are moved to acquire the good and to reject the bad: a noble 
appetite if it is from reason, and the opposite if it is from the senses. So when the divine Plato described our 
soul as a charioteer in a most beautiful image, he added two horses to the chariot.... he represents the rational 
appetite with the good horse but the irrational appetite with the bad, and by these the soul is moved.184 
 
Following Aquinas, Landino describes the twofold appetite as being able to move us to obtain 
things we perceive as good through a concupiscible power (vis concupiscibilis) or to move us to flee or 
                                                          
183 De anima, II, pp. 121-22, from Aristot. DA, III.ix. 
184 ‘Est igitur sensus et vis quaedam in animis nostris, quam cogitandi nominant, cui bonorum malorumque 
iudicium a natura demandatum est. Nonnunquam autem ita iudicat huiuscemodi vis, ut nihil praeter sensus 
respiciens et veluti illorum illecebris attracta et voluptatis oblato praemio corrupta, quod pecudis bonum est, 
ipsa hominis bonum decernat. Si autem eadem cogitandi vis salutari rationis lumine illustretur et eius norma 
dirigatur, non id bonum esse iudicat, quo sensus demulcentur, sed quod recta dictat ratio, quod verum 
simplexque bonum cum sit neque interire neque corrumpi possit. Cum igitur huiuscemodi vis hoc bonum, 
illud vero malum esse decreverit, excitatur in nobis alia quaedam vis, quae ad bonum asciscendum malumque 
declinandum insurgat. Hunc autem appetitum omnes appellant. Sed et eum duplicem esse oportet: alterum 
qui ab eo iudicio, quod solus sensus fecit, semper pendeat nihilque cum ratione expetat, alterum qui nihil 
omnino sequatur nisi quod ratio prius praeceperit. Primum illum libidinem, hunc secundum voluntatem 
nuncupamus. Quapropter erit appetitus, quo animi hominum ad bonum asciscendum malumque 
declinandum moveantur, rectus quidem, si a ratione, contra, si a sensu. Quapropter pulcherrimo aenigmate 
divinus Plato, cum animum nostrum veluti currum posuisset, aurigam illi duosque equos adiungit... Expressit 
enim per bonum rationalem, per malum vero irrationalem appetitum, quo animus fertur’, DC, pp. 133.13-
134.14. The first few sentences are almost identical to Landino’s account of the duplex appetitus in De anima, II, 
p. 121; and the chariot allegory from Plat. Phaedrus.246a-254e, which Ficino analysed in his commentary on 
the same text, also appears in De anima, II, pp. 130-31, described as the work of a (fictively) young Ficino. On 
the contribution of this view of the bipartite Platonic soul to Cicero’s thought, see also Cic. Tusc. IV.v.10-11. 
Landino takes the idea of a cogitative or estimative power which can make judgments using either the senses 
or reason from Scholastic sources including Albert, De anima, III.2 and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I 
Q.78 A.4 and II-II Q.47 A.1. 
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repel things we perceive as bad through an irascible power (vis irascibilis).185 When exerting itself in 
either of these ways, the self-reinforcing nature of its primary impulse can become more and more 
vehement until it produces an established habit called an affectio or habitus.186 Those habits which 
emerge in accordance with the reason are called constantiae, or constancies, and those which originate 
from sense data are called perturbationes, or disturbances. As habits which arise from false bodily 
senses, it is these perturbationes ‘by which souls are agitated rashly and restlessly and turbulently’ and 
thus constitute the major obstacles to the soul’s progress in Landinian virtue theory.187  
Having achieved at least some conceptual continuity between the Platonic and Aristotelian 
schemata in the De anima, Landino is now able to return to Cicero and introduce the theory of 
psychological attitudes from Latin Stoicism, taking as his model the fourth book of the Tusculanae 
Disputationes.188 Landino goes into exhaustive detail in adopting Cicero’s taxonomy of perturbationes 
in this work, which he repeats almost verbatim while stating that he prefers the Ciceronian term 
perturbationes to the passiones of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.189 There are four main perturbationes 
because the ‘corrupt judgment’ which causes them to emerge from the appetite can be deceived in 
four ways, with sorrow (aegritudo) the belief in a present evil, fear (metus) in a prospective evil, joy 
(laetitia) in a present good, and desire (libido) in a prospective good.190 Since in the Disputationes 
Landino refines this treatment of the perturbationes in order that he might harmonise it with the 
Aristotelian categories of goods of body and fortune, it is necessary to postpone any further 
discussion of their conceptual framework for now apart from considering Landino’s justification 
for his emphasis on them at the end of the second book in the De anima: 
 
For just as, in Virgil, Neptune could not bring back the sun for the Trojans until he had dispersed the 
collected clouds, so too our sun – for I call the light of reason which is implanted in us by supreme God ‘the 
sun’ – cannot illuminate the mind unless the winds of squabbling perturbationes, by which the clouds of 
ignorance and error are drawn in, are first settled and calmed completely. So let us, the best youths, do this 
and, with our minds set free from such foul and savage tyrants, let us seek true liberty. If the soul, empty of 
every disturbance, returns to its former nature and, having remembered its origins which it had almost 
                                                          
185 De anima, II, pp. 120-26, cf. Summa Theologiae I Q.81 AA.2-3. 
186 De anima, II, p. 133. 
187 ‘Quibus temere tumultuoseque et turbulenter animi concitantur’, De anima, II, p. 134. 
188 Specifically, Cic. Tusc. IV.vi.14-ix.22. 
189 De anima, II, pp. 133-38. On the Stoic-Ciceronian-Augustinian system of the perturbationes and passiones and 
its adoption in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, see Robert, J. Rabel, ‘Diseases of Soul in Stoic Psychology’, 
in Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 22 (1981), 385-93; Johannes Brachtendorf, ‘Cicero and Augustine on the 
Passions’, Revue des Études Augustiniennes, 43 (1997), 289-308; Letizia Panizza, ‘Stoic Psychotherapy in the 
Middle Ages: Petrarch’s De Remediis’, in The Erotics of Consolation: Desire and Distance in the Late Middle Ages, ed. 
by Catherine E. Léglu and Stephen J. Milner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 117-39; and Risto 
Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). On 
the comparable Christian use of passiones, see e.g. Augustine Civ.Dei. IX.4 and XIV 8-9 and Thomas Aquinas 
Summa Theologiae I-II QQ.22-48. 
190 De anima, II, p. 133, and see also Augustine, Civ.Dei IV.8. Landino is apparently unconcerned that, by 
following Stoic doctrine in listing libido as one of the primary perturbationes, he is contradicting his earlier use of 
this name for part of the appetitus. Note that, prefiguring the Disputationes, Landino offers Dido as a case study 
for how Virgil understood the power of newly-formed beliefs in causing perturbationes at De anima, II, p. 135.  
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forgotten, devotes itself to the eternal alone, condemning those things which are fleeting and which leave 
nothing behind apart from regret, we can finally devote ourselves to all our activities in tranquillity and 
speculate in otium on what relates to the knowledge of our souls.191 
 
The reason for Landino’s interest in this Stoic theory of the emotions is that if one hopes to 
cultivate the higher part of the soul by devoting oneself to the contemplation of God, one must 
first quell the perturbationes which distract and disturb the mind from its ascent to the divine. 
Although he mentions the word in neither the Disputationes nor the De anima, Landino is thinking 
here of Cicero’s paraphrase of apatheia in the third book of the Tusculanae Disputationes: ‘But the task 
of the soul is to use reason well, and the soul of the sage is always habituated in such a way that it 
can use reason best. Therefore it is never disordered [perturbatus].’192 For all his devotion to the 
Platonic idea of an incarcerated soul and the Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretation of its faculties, 
the centrality of this apathetic ideal to the necessary progress of the soul towards God – and the 
emphasis on the perturbationes which prevent it – betrays a profound Stoic influence on Landino’s 
moral philosophy from Cicero via Macrobius and Augustine. Moreover, given that Landino has 
expressly linked the soul that is free from perturbationes to contemplative otium, his reason for giving 
such primacy in the first book of the Disputationes to the question of how the states of otium and 
negotium relate to the capability of an individual to administrare rem publicam begins to become clear. 
To summarise, the foundation of Landino’s moral theory is that the soul, trapped within the 
body, is driven to appropriate perceived goods and avoid perceived evils through the appetite, one 
of its base faculties. When confused by the false judgments of the senses rather than being guided 
by reason, the appetite provokes perturbationes which are based on erroneous beliefs about perceived 
goods and evils. If the soul is to recognise its true origin and contemplate God, it is first necessary 
to bring these perturbationes under control. As we have seen in his treatment of the appetite in the 
chariot allegory, Landino is uncompromising in his assertion that the goods arising from sensual 
desire are nothing more than those ‘of a beast’ because they require us to ignore the divine part of 
the soul which is particular to human beings and instead rely on the senses, which we have in 
common with animals.  
Turning to bodily desires and neglecting one’s spiritual nature makes one somewhat less than 
human, and so the essence of moral perfectionism lies in the cultivation of this superior part of the 
                                                          
191 ‘Nam veluti Neptunus apud Virgilium non prius solem Troianis restituere potuit, quam collectas nubes 
fugasset, sic sol noster (solem enim appello rationis lumen, nobis a supremo Deo impressum) mentem 
illustrare non potest, nisi proeliantes inter se perturbationum venti, a quibus inscitiae errorumque nubes 
inducuntur, prius sint omnino sedati atque consopiti. Quapropter agamus hoc optimi adolescentes, 
mentesque a tam foedis immanibusque tyrannis vendicantes veram libertatem assequamur. Tum enim demum 
et in omnibus actionibus nostris tranquille versari, et, quod ad nostrorum animorum cognitionem attinet, 
ociose speculari poterimus, si omni perturbatione vacuus animus in antiquam naturam revertatur et, suae 
originis, cuius paene oblitus fuerat, recordatus, quae momentanea sunt et nihil praeter poenitentiam 
relinquunt contemnens, solis aeternis incumbat’, De anima, II, p. 138. 
192 Cic.Tusc. III.vii.15. cf. Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology XVIII.x.6. 
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soul which Landino defines in the De anima as the vis or anima rationalis, the intellectual cognitive 
faculty which is unique to humans and distinct from the soul’s base faculties, and which he 
identifies as the mens or intellectus of Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition.193 Landino is clear that the mens 
is incorporeal and operates distinctly from the body, but throughout his attempt to describe its 
structure and constituent faculties, he often struggles in his stated aim of reconciling the Platonic 
division of the soul (that is, the inferior reason and superior reason, or ratio inferior and ratio superior) 
with its Aristotelian equivalent (the active intellect and passive intellect, or intellectus agens and 
intellectus possibilis). Rather than attempting to reconcile any difficulties in aligning the two schemata 
he encounters in any cohesive way, he tends instead to simply enumerate the functions of the 
faculty in question in a manner that Ute Rüsch has characterised as a ‘superficial rhetorical 
formalism’.194 The precise way in which the various faculties of the mens fit together is therefore at 
times unclear or even contradictory, but those which Landino lists have certain characteristics in 
common in that they have the capacity for independent knowledge and are able to cogitate a priori 
or from simulacra, rather than deriving cognitive objects from empirical sense data. Broadly 
speaking, the inferior reason (or simply reason, as Landino often paraphrases it) has as its purpose 
the act of ratiocination, in that it derives universals and intelligible species from the simulacra of 
natural bodies without interacting with the senses themselves. The superior reason, unreliant on 
simulacra, comprehends incorporeal but created things in its function as intellect (intellectus), or the 
uncreated and eternal divine essence of God in its function as intelligence (intelligentia).195 Through 
these functions the mens is marked by the simulacra of three categories of object, each governed by 
a particular intellectual faculty: the speculative power (vis speculativa) which has divine and natural 
things as its objects; the active power (vis activa) which has the habits and activities of human 
behaviour as its objects; and the effective power (vis effectiva) which has human works (opera) as its 











                                                          
193 See Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, pp. 41-58 and passim. 
194 ‘Vordergründig rhetorischen Formalismus’, Rüsch, Untersuchungen, p. 134. 
195 De anima, III, pp. 18-22. 
196 De anima, III, pp. 40-41. 
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2.3 Landinian virtue theory 
 
It is in the third book of the De anima where Landino embarks on a full exposition of the virtue 
theory that would figure so prominently in the Disputationes. Just as his exposition of the faculties of 
the soul followed Aristotle closely, so too does he continue in that vein by identifying two kinds of 
virtue: the dianoetic or intellectual virtues, which are intelligence, scientific knowledge, wisdom, 
prudence and skill (intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, prudentia and ars); and the moral virtues, which are 
temperance, fortitude and justice (temperantia, fortitudo and iustitia).197  
The dianoetic virtues are concerned with the perfection of the intellect and the ascent of the 
soul towards God. They emerge from the three intellectual faculties which have just been 
mentioned: intelligence, scientific knowledge, and wisdom are part of the speculative power; 
prudence is part of the active power; and skill belongs to the effective power. As we have seen, this 
higher part of the soul – and thus the virtues which perfect it – can only be exercised in the state of 
apatheia which comes about when any perturbationes affecting the mind have been calmed. 
It is the function of the moral virtues to calm these perturbationes animi by controlling the appetite 
by means of reason. Following Aristotelian convention, the fact that prudence consists in a 
deliberative capacity concerning human action and the ends of good and evil allows Landino to 
include it amongst the moral virtues.198 Marsuppini, Landino’s mouthpiece, articulates the purpose 
of the moral virtues in the third book of the De anima: 
 
But when this is said about the virtues through which the intellect itself is perfected and which consist in the 
discovery of the truth, we also say it about those virtues which are directed to the right and honourable, and 
improve life and morals [vitam moresque]... it is very much the duty of these [latter] virtues that they control the 
appetite and contain it under the command of reason, unless the mind falls into those perturbationes which we 
enumerated in yesterday’s disputation.199 
 
This distinction, like that in Alberti’s opening speech in the Disputationes between ‘virtues which 
improve life and morals’ and ‘virtues which provide an understanding of supreme things’, is 
therefore a distinction between the moral virtues and the dianoetic virtues and, once again, is 
entirely Aristotelian in its provenance. Landino has Ficino recapitulate this position in the second 
book of the Disputationes: 
  
                                                          
197 The dianoetic virtues correspond to the νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, σοφία, φρόνησις, and τέχνη of Aristot. Nic. Eth. 
VI.iii; the moral virtues to σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη of Aristot. Nic. Eth. III.vi-xii and Nic. Eth.V. 
198 De anima, III, pp. 49-50. On the phronetic origins of the concept of prudence, see Aristot. Nic. Eth. VI.v. 
199 ‘Sed quando de virtutibus, quibus intellectus ipse perficitur, et quae circa veri inventionem consistunt 
dictum est, dicamus et de iis, quae ad rectum honestumque dirigunt, et vitam moresque emendant... Estque 
earum munus maxime ut appetitum coerceant atque sub rationis imperio contineant, ne in eas perturbationes, 
quas in hesterna disputatione enumeravimus, cadat animus’, De anima, III, p. 49. 
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So the virtues acquired from the first things of nature can show us what we seek [i.e. the summum bonum]. Not 
those virtues which are devoted to life and morals [de vita et moribus], for they are full of toil and are devoted to 
purging the soul like certain propitiatory rites, but rather those virtues with which we duly speculate.200 
 
It is significant that it is Ficino articulating the distinction here, because while humanists such as 
Argyropoulos and Ficino and scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas used the phrase virtutes morales 
when discussing this genus of Aristotelian virtue, Landino favours either virtutes quae vitam moresque 
emendant or virtutes de vita et moribus both in this quotation and throughout the rest of the 
Disputationes, just as he had in the De anima.201 The phrases vitam moresque and de vita et moribus are 
commonplaces of Ciceronian literature used to signify personal moral character – prior knowledge 
of which Landino could safely assume on the part of his humanistically-inclined audience – and so 
his preference for it over the more conventional Aristotelian alternative forces the reader to 
acknowledge that he situates his ethical instruction within the traditions of Ciceronian 
republicanism.202 Hence, Landino is careful in the Disputationes to have Lorenzo reiterate the phrase 
vitam moresque in his initial response to Alberti: ‘although every kind of human action... is guided by 
the standard of the virtues which we call “pertaining to life and morals” [vitam moresque], we still 
follow these virtues mostly through habit or through custom’.203 He does so again in an interjection 
to Alberti’s first speech: ‘Now I see what you mean, and I notice that you do not in any way situate 
the highest good in the actions which are regulated by the virtues pertaining to life and morals [de 
vita et moribus]’.204 The reader is left in no doubt that in the Disputationes these virtues, whose genesis 
is explained by Aristotle’s moral psychology and which are concerned with the expiation of the 
soul, are the same as those through which the individual participates in civil life and the 
commonwealth in Latin republicanism. 
Both Landino’s description of the two types of virtue corresponding to the higher and lower 
faculties of the soul and his idea that the moral virtues calm perturbationes in order that the dianoetic 
virtues might guide the soul in its ascent to God are ultimately Plotinian, with their origins in the 
                                                          
200 ‘Quapropter virtutes inde acquisitae nobis quod quaerimus praestare poterunt, non tamen illae quae de vita 
et moribus dicuntur – laboriosae enim sunt et ad animos purgandos veluti piacula quaedam adhibentur –, sed 
eae quibus recte speculamur’, DC, p. 71.2-6. 
201 Thomas Aquinas uses virtutes morales both in his discussion of their relationship to the intellectual virtues in 
Summa Theologiae I-II Q.58 and when he describes the virtues themselves in I-II Q.61. Ficino uses virtutes 
morales in his explanation of the two genera virtuti in Platonic Theology XIII.iii.3 and XV.vi.3 and Argyropoulos 
used it throughout his Latin translation of Aristotle’s Ethics: for instance, ‘Cum autem virtus sit duplex, 
intellectiva inquam atque moralis’ in Aristotle, Ethicorum Aristotelis philosophi clarissimi libri decem ad Nicomachum, 
trans. by John Argyropoulos, ed. by Jacques Lefe ̀vre d'Étaples (Lyon, 1535), p. 99. The many mentions of 
virtutes de vita et moribus in the Disputationes include DC p. 6.7; p. 24.24; p. 26.25-26; p. 56.2; p. 85.19-20; p. 
86.12; p. 100.13; p. 106.8; p. 108.11; p. 114.14; p. 119.9; p. 221.2 and 21; p. 253.15. 
202 See e.g. Cic.Tusc III.iv.8, IV.xv.34 and V.iv.10-11; Cic. Off. I.xxxi.112; Cic. De orat. I.xv.68-69, II.liii.213 and 
III.liii.204; Sal. Jug. 85. 
203 ‘Quamvis omnis ratio humanarum actionum… ad normam earum virtutum dirigatur, quas de vita et 
moribus nominamus, illas autem usu et consuetudine maxime assequamur’, DC, p. 12.6-11. 
204 ‘Video iam, quid agas, inquit Laurentius, et te summum bonum in iis actionibus, quas ad earum virtutum, 
quae de vita et moribus nuncupantur, normam dirigimus, nullo pacto ponere animadverto’, DC, p. 18.25-28. 
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third book of the first Ennead and the latter concept being developed further by Porphyry in his 
Sententiae.205 In Landino’s case, though, these ideas were arrived at through Thomas Aquinas and, 
above all, Macrobius.206 In the Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis, Macrobius describes freedom 
from the passions (passiones) as a ‘second death’ in that it releases the soul from its corporeal 
constraints: ‘[the human being] is also said to die when the soul, still established in the body, 
condemns all corporeal enticements through the instruction of philosophy and is freed from the 
seductive snares of the lusts and all other passions’.207 The task of liberating the soul from these 
passions falls on the moral virtues, and Macrobius’ account of how this is achieved pervades 
Landino’s thought throughout the Disputationes. In this system, the soul ascends towards the 
cognition of divine things through four successive grades, each of which contains the four moral 
virtues – prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice – in increasingly sublimated forms: the first 
grade of virtue consists of the civic or political virtues (virtutes politicae), with which one learns to 
control passions; the second the purgative virtues (virtutes purgatoriae), with which one eliminates 
them; the third the virtues of the soul already purged (virtutes animi iam purgati), through which one 
forgets their influence altogether; and the fourth the exemplary virtues (virtutes exemplares), which 
exist in the mind of God and are beyond all corporeal taint. Macrobius makes plain the relationship 
between his fourfold gradation of moral virtues and the four primary Stoic perturbationes of fear, 
desire, sorrow and joy in the eighth chapter of his commentary: 
 
The passions, as we know, are stimulated because people ‘fear and desire, suffer and rejoice’. The first type of 
virtues moderates the passions, the second takes them away, the third has forgotten them, and it is impious to 
speak of them in the fourth.208  
  
In Landino’s body of work, his first mentions of this scale of virtues appear in drafts of both his 
Juvenal lectures of 1462 and his lectures on the first seven books of the Aeneid, composed between 
1462 and 1463 and rediscovered by Arthur Field in Rome’s Biblioteca Casanatense.209 Given that 
Marsilio Ficino first described this schema in his argumentum to the translation of Alcibiades II in 
1464 and that his translation of the Sententiae was not completed until 1488, it would be safe to 
                                                          
205 Plotinus, Enneads I.3 section 6 and I.2 section 2; Porphyry, Sententiae 32.89-140. At the time that the 
Disputationes was written, Ficino had not yet begun his translation of the Enneads. 
206 Aquinas’ treatment of this topic can be found in e.g. Summa Theologiae I-II Q.61 A.5. 
207 ‘Mori etiam dicitur cum anima adhuc in corpore constituta corporeas inlecebras philosophia docente 
contemnit et cupiditatum dulces insidias reliquasque omnes exuitur passiones’, Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. 
I.xiii.6. 
208 ‘Passiones autem ut scimus uocantur quod homines metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. Has primae 
molliunt, secundae auferunt, tertiae obliuiscuntur, in quartis nefas est nominari’, Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. 
I.viii.11. The quotation is from Aeneid vi.733. In Comento, Inf. I.37-43.103-10, Landino makes it clear that this 
process of purification is necessary before contemplating the divine because Plato says (in Plat. Phaedo 67b) 
that ‘purum impuro attingere nefas est’. 
209 Field’s rediscovery of Casanatense cod. 1368 is described in Arthur Field, ‘A Manuscript of Cristoforo 
Landino's First Lectures on Virgil, 1462-63 (Codex 1368, Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome)’, Renaissance 
Quarterly, 31.1 (Spring 1978), 17-20, and see n. 27 above. 
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assume that its initial adoption by Landino was probably not on account of any Ficinian 
influence.210 Rather, given that his Greek was no more than passable, Landino relied on Macrobius 
and his Latin successors for this doctrine, as has been noted by many Landino scholars.211 Thanks 
to the ubiquity of the Macrobian scale of virtue in the ethical thought of both scholastics and 
humanists in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance it is difficult to reconstruct the precise 
constituents of Landino’s intellectual matrix but we can nevertheless be sure that he encountered 
the system in at least four different authors besides Macrobius himself – that is, Thomas Aquinas; 
Petrarch; Coluccio Salutati; and Matteo Palmieri.212 That he read Thomas is evident from the 
influence of the Summa Theologiae and Summa contra Gentiles on the second book of the Disputationes 
(not to mention on the De anima), and Landino also relies heavily on Salutati’s De laboribus Herculis 
throughout the entire text.213 He knew the works of Petrarch intimately, having lectured on them in 
the late 1460s, and, as well as it being likely from his political involvement that he knew Palmieri 
personally, he was also familiar with his literary oeuvre, praising the Vita civile (or, as he calls it, the 
‘Dialogi’) in the prolusion to his Petrarch course and the De temporibus and Città della vita in the 
proem to the Comento.214 Moreover, given that Bruce McNair has shown how Landino’s theory of 
the soul in the De anima is dependent upon Albertus Magnus, another likely source for the fourfold 
scale of virtue is Albert’s Ethica, which presents a revised schema of political, purgative, intellectual 
and exemplary virtues drawn from the Stoics.215 As for the Stoics themselves, Seneca, whom 
Landino cites in his early lectures on the Aeneid of 1462 and 63 as a source for this scale alongside 
Plotinus and Macrobius, discusses in his Epistulae Morales three classes of humanity which represent 
the successive stages of escape from the passions and, since they align directly with the first three 
stages of the scale, were a possible influence on Porphyry’s initial formulation of it.216 
For the most part, Landino’s definitions of the grades of virtue in the Disputationes cleave closely 
to Macrobius. As we have seen in his opening speech above, Alberti states that an individual who 
                                                          
210 Ficino, Opera omnia, 2 vols (Basel, 1576; rept. Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1959), p. 1134. See also Field, The 
Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence, p. 192. 
211 See n. 20 above and Stéphanie Lecompte, La Chaîne d'or des poètes: Présence de Macrobe dans l'Europe humaniste 
(Geneva: Droz, 2009), pp. 164-72. 
212 The works in which these authors discuss the fourfold scale of virtue are Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae I-II Q.61 A.5; Petrarch, De vita solitaria II.12.9 and Familiares III.12; Coluccio Salutati, De laboribus 
Herculis, ed. by Berthold L. Ullman, 2 vols (Padua: Antenore, 1951), IV.vii.9 and prima editio II.5; and 
Palmieri, Vita civile I.184-203. 
213 For Landino’s references to Thomas Aquinas in the Disputationes, see Lohe’s addenda to the index auctorum 
therein. 
214 The prolusion to the Petrarch course can be found in Scritti, I, pp. 33-40 and Landino quotes Petrarch 
liberally throughout the Comento. On the chronology of the Petrarch lectures, see Cardini, La critica, pp. 334-
41. On Palmieri, see Scritti, I, p. 36 and Comento, Proem. IV.78-82. 
215 Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. by Bernhard Geyer (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951-), XIII.1.1.7, 
XIII.1.5.7, XIII.1.7.14, and XIII.1.9.1. On Landino’s reliance on Albert for the De anima see McNair, ‘Albert 
the Great in the Renaissance’, pp. 115-29. 
216 See the reference in Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence, p. 260 n. 90 to Casanatense cod. 
1368, fol. 151 and Laurenziana Plut. 52. 32, fol. 109v. Both Field and Kallendorf state that Landino used 
Seneca, Epist. Mor. 64 as his source here but I can see no description in that letter of the grades of virtue, with 
the correct source in fact being Epist. Mor. 75. For the latter reference see Kallendorf, ‘Virgil, Dante and 
Empire in Italian Thought’, pp. 44-69, n. 50. 
73 
 
seeks to administrare rem publicam must first purge his mind with the ‘virtues which improve life and 
morals’ and then illuminate the purged mind with the ‘virtues which provide an understanding of 
supreme things’, which we now know to be the dianoetic virtues. Notwithstanding its Aristotelian 
classification as a dianoetic virtue, prudence is included among the moral virtues whenever Landino 
mentions them in the Disputationes and, a fortiori, throughout the Macrobian scale of virtues, as was 
the case in the De anima and in accordance with the Platonic tradition.217 In an explicit treatment in 
the third book of the Macrobian schema – which is nominally that expounded by ‘Plato’ – Alberti 
elaborates upon this rough introductory sketch to describe precisely how the ‘virtues pertaining to 
life and morals’ are involved in the purgation of the mind:  
 
The divine Plato set out the same virtues pertaining to life and morals as others. He ultimately distinguished 
them into different ranks or classes in such a way that with one line of reasoning he shows which virtues are 
cultivated by those who love association and citizenship; with another argument he shows which virtues are 
cultivated by those who, wanting to forget all mortal things and being moved by a hatred for human affairs, 
are aroused to an understanding of divine things alone; and finally he shows which virtues are cultivated by 
those who, having already been purged of all contagion, devote themselves solely to divine things. He called 
the first kind civic virtues, the second kind purgative virtues, and the third kind virtues of the soul already 
purged. For there is a triple order of people living rightly and according to reason. The lowest rank of these 
three is of those who live a social and civic life and who undertake the administration of the republic. Next to 
them, but established in a higher grade, are those who withdraw themselves from public activities, as if 
retreating into a tranquil port from things which are stormy and tempestuous and in which the whim of 
fortune rules absolutely. Withdrawing themselves from the crowd into otium, they lead a peaceful life, but not 
in such a way that there is not something that still remains against which they must struggle. And in the 
highest rank you will see those who, completely removed from the concourse and tumult of human affairs, 
do nothing of which they must repent.218 
 
The most distinctive feature of Landino’s treatment of the Macrobian ethical schema here is that he 
omits the fourth, exemplary, grade of virtue from the course of individual advancement, as he had 
done in the De anima three years beforehand.219 Landino gives his reason for his truncating the 
                                                          
217 Landino goes so far as to state that ‘[prudentia] non in veri investigatione, sed in civilibus actionibus 
regendis versatur’ , DC, p. 86.3-5. 
218 ‘Divinus enim Plato, cum virtutes de vita et moribus easdem quas ceteri posuisset, ita ad postremum illas 
diversis sive ordinibus sive generibus distinguit, ut alia quadam ratione ab iis illas coli ostendat, qui coetus ac 
civitates adamant, alia ab iis, qui omnem mortalitatem dediscere cupientes et humanarum rerum odio moti ad 
sola divina cognoscenda eriguntur, alia postremo ab iis, qui ab omni iam contagione expiati in solis divinis 
versantur. Primas igitur civiles dixit, secundas purgatorias ac tertias animi iam purgati. Est enim triplex 
hominum recte et ex ratione viventium ordo. Horum trium inferior est eorum, qui in sociali ac civili vita 
degentes rerum publicarum administrationem suscipiunt. His proximi, sed tamen erectiori gradu constituti ii 
sunt, qui a publicis actionibus veluti tempestuosis ac procellosis et in quibus fortunae temeritas omnino 
dominetur se in portum tranquillitatis transferunt et a turba in otium se recipientes quietam vitam degunt, 
non ita tamen, ut non aliquid adhuc restet, adversus quod luctandum sit. Supremo autem loco eos cernes, qui 
penitus a rerum humanarum concursatione ac tumultu remoti nihil cuius paenitendum sit conmittunt’, DC, 
pp. 153.16-154.3. 
219 De anima, III, pp. 52-59. 
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schema in the earlier work, stating that the fourth grade of virtues ‘which they call “exemplary”, 
[do] not pertain to the present disputation for they are not found in human souls, which are now 
being discussed, but in the mind of God’.220 It is likely that this decision was influenced by Seneca’s 
Epistulae Morales, given how much of the Aeneid allegory in the Disputationes – and, as we shall see, 
Landino’s virtue ethics in general – is devoted to illustrating how the various grades of virtue can be 
employed in calming the perturbationes of vice.221 Likewise, Petrarch was probably also significant in 
this respect, as in the De vita solitaria he emphasises that the exemplary virtues cannot possibly be 
achieved, and in a letter to Marco Genovese in the Familiares he uses the first three stages of the 
scale of virtue to show how his friend might balance an active political life with the life of morality 
and piety.222 Both Landino’s stated and implicit reasons for the excision serve to emphasise that his 
interpretation of the grades of virtue in the Disputationes is quite different from that of Ficino in the 
Platonic Theology, in which the exemplary virtues – those in God Himself – are essential for 
implanting in human beings the seeds of the other grades of virtue, for recognising the divine, for 
ascending to the divine, and for inspiring us to move towards the divine.223  
Like Macrobius, Landino goes into some detail about the precise function of the four moral 
virtues at each of the grades in his schema. The civic virtues are inchoate rather than absolute on 
account of their possessors being engaged in civil life, which is a flux of desires and passions, and 
hence these virtues are concerned with the direct management of such perturbationes.224 At this 
degree, Landino follows Macrobius in stating that prudence ‘ensures that nothing is done which 
cannot be considered to be at least likely to concur with reason’; fortitude ‘brings the mind through 
danger and fear, teaching it to fear nothing save the dishonourable’; temperance ‘shows that only 
what is proper should be sought after, that the law of moderation should in no way be transgressed, 
and that all desires should be submitted to the yoke of reason; and justice ‘sees that each is given his 
due, to see that all enjoy equal rights’.225 Those who display the purgative virtues are stronger than 
the perturbationes they fight, winning easily and thus gradually cleansing themselves.226 At this level 
prudence ‘turns its every care and thought to the divine, with all mortal things having been put 
aside and regarded as nothing when compared to those celestial’; temperance ‘allows us only those 
                                                          
220 ‘Nam quartum quod ponunt earum, quas vocant exemplares, nihil ad praesentem disputationem pertinet. 
Non enim in hominum animis, de quibus nunc agitur, reperiuntur; sed in mente Dei’, De anima, III, p. 59. 
221 Field, The Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence, p. 260, n. 90, notes that in the Laurentian MS of the 
Virgil lectures, Landino mentions that Seneca’s thought comes ex sententia Plotini. Whether a simple error or an 
honestly-held belief, it is nonetheless illustrative of Seneca’s place in the ethical tradition for Landino. 
222 Petrarch, De vita solitaria IV.15; Familiares III.12. 
223 Ficino, Platonic Theology, XIV.vi.6 
224 ‘Verum quia in vita civili cupiditatibus ac perturbationibus omnia tumultuantur hisque non nisi aegre 
resistitur, dicunt in eo hominum genere virtutes incohatas potius quam absolutas’, DC, p. 154.5-8. 
225 ‘Quapropter id in in illis prudentia contendit, ut nihil agatur, cuius non possit ratio saltem probabilis reddi. 
Fortitudo vero animum supra omne periculum atque metum effert et nihil nisi turpia timendum admonet. 
Temperantia autem ostendit sola honesta appetenda, nulla in re moderationis legem excedendam, omnes 
cupiditates iugo rationis subiciendas. Iustitiae postremo partes sunt, ut unicuique suum reddatur, ut aequo 
iure omnes vivant’, DC, p. 154.8-15, cf. Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.viii.6-8. 
226 Ibid., lines 16-18 and 27-31. 
75 
 
things without which life cannot be sustained, it will declare with the severest judgment that all else 
should be disdained and fled’; fortitude ‘teaches assiduously that we fear no inconvenience, no 
effort, no danger through which the soul strives in a true and uninterrupted course, so to speak, to 
the heavens and its origin.’; and justice ‘directs the consensus of the other virtues in such a way of 
life’.227 Finally, at the level of the virtues of the soul already purged, one becomes free from any 
taint of the vices. Those who have attained this grade of virtue exercise prudence ‘not in order that 
they prefer divine things to earthly, but because they know only those divine things and 
contemplate them alone as if there were nothing else’; they employ temperance ‘not so that they 
restrain desires but so that they ignore them entirely.’ Likewise, at this level fortitude ‘does not 
conquer perturbationes but is ignorant of them. It desires that hard and terrible things are inflicted 
upon it not so that it achieves victory, but rather so that it remains firmly and perpetually oblivious 
of them’.228 
In order to further intertwine the Macrobian system with the Aristotelian elements of his virtue 
theory, Landino subdivided each of the moral virtues into an intricate system of constituent parts in 
the De anima just as Macrobius had done in the Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis, though their 
taxonomies are not identical.229 Both Landino’s faithfulness in reproducing the Macrobian schema 
and the intricacy with which he integrates its complexities with his own wider theory and turns 
them to his own purposes point to the fact that his foremost intention is to devise a system which 
can accommodate a naturalistic and compelling account of practical ethics at the level of the moral 
virtues. He perceives the Macrobian gradations as the answer to the question of precisely how the 
moral virtues might go about purging the influence of the appetite and bring it under the control of 
reason. For Landino, the progress of the soul towards God through the exercise of the dianoetic 
virtues has as its necessary precursor a kind of dissociative equilibrium at the level of the virtues of 
the purged soul, a state of apatheia removed from the power of the appetite which can only be 
reached through the management and expiation of disruptive emotional states at the lower levels of 
moral virtue. With this in mind, we can now return to the first book of the Disputationes, in which 
                                                          
227 ‘Prudentia... spretis omnibus mortalibus rebus et caelestium collatione pro nihilo habitis omni cura 
omnique cogitatione ad divina convertatur. Temperantia autem, cum ea solum nobis concesserit, sine quibus 
servari vita non possit, cetera omnia severissimo iudicio contemnenda fugiendaque pronuntiabit. Sed nec 
aberit fortitudo, quae assiduo praecipiat, ut mullum incommodum, nullum laborem, nullum periculum 
horrescamus, quo minus recto et perpetuo, ut ita loquar, cursu ad caelestia et ad originem suam tendat 
animus. Dices: quid iustitia? Hoc profecto munus sibi imponet, ut reliquarum virtutum consensum in 
huiuscemodi propositum flectat’, DC, p. 154.18-29. 
228 ‘Hi igitur in eo prudentiam exercent non, ut delectu quodam habito divina terrenis praeferant, sed ut illa 
sola noscant solaque, veluti nihil aliud sit, intueantur. Adhibent autem temperantiam non, ut cupiditates 
coerceant, sed illas penitus ignorent. Eadem ratio erit fortitudinis. Illa enim perturbationes non vincit, sed 
ignorat. Quin optabit dura atque horrenda sibi offerri non, ut victoriam assequatur, sed ut in eorum oblivione 
perpetua firmitate perduret’, DC, pp. 154.33-155.7. 
229 De anima, III, p. 48 and pp. 53-56 and cf. Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.viii.7. Rüsch, Untersuchungen, p. 205, 
argues that Landino adds an extra subsidiary virtue to prudentia because of the Thomistic distinction between 
partes integrales, subiectivae and potentiales, on which see Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae II-II. QQ.47-51. 
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Landino wrangles with the question of the relative priority of the moral and dianoetic virtues in 






































2.4 Action and contemplation as genera vitae and munera 
 
To recapitulate, Alberti begins the first book of the Disputationes by observing that, if Lorenzo is to 
govern Florence well and develop the qualities of self-mastery necessary for a politician to properly 
administrare rem publicam, he must purge himself of vice with the moral virtues (or ‘virtues pertaining 
to life and morals’) and then turn his purged mind to exercising the dianoetic virtues. In order that 
Lorenzo might devote himself to the intellectual contemplation through which the latter virtues are 
cultivated, Alberti suggests that he spend time free from the affairs of state in otium speculating on 
the nature of the soul. Lorenzo answers that he is already quite familiar with the value of the moral 
virtues to human activity, though he concedes that such virtues tend to be practised unexamined 
and without a second thought: 
 
I ask of you that, since you have mentioned this practice of life which is occupied in the investigation of lofty 
matters, you continue and explain the whole subject in detail to my brother and me, as we would very much 
like to know about it. For although every kind of human action – whether you provide for yourself, or you 
take care of your personal affairs and family, or you ultimately undertake public office – is guided by the 
standard of the virtues which we call ‘virtues pertaining to life and morals’, we still follow these virtues mostly 
through habit or through custom.230 
 
He therefore desires to know more about the way of life which involves contemplation on the 
grounds that he is interested in the value of philosophical investigation for a governor of a republic. 
Alberti declares that he will proceed in a disputation on the two ways of life by assessing each of 
them, then comparing them both. It is this analysis which forms the substance of the first of the 
three extended speeches which comprise this book of the Disputationes. 
What this initial exchange shows is not only how the ensuing debate takes as axiomatic the 
principle that the two ways of life under discussion – otium and negotium – consist in exercising the 
dianoetic virtues and moral virtues respectively, but also that the very question of how far one 
should follow each way of living emerges from the tensions inherent within this idea of virtue 
ethics in the first place. To put it another way, the debate on the relative merits of otium and negotium 
is epiphenomenal to the real, underlying concern of how best to cultivate the moral and dianoetic 
virtues to achieve perfection. Landino’s purpose is to explore the implications for life and 
behaviour which emerge from what is for him the crucial struggle of the human condition: how the 
incarcerated soul might negotiate the snares of the appetite and the sensible world to return to its 
source. So, when referring to the life which exercises the dianoetic virtues through contemplation, 
                                                          
230 ‘Petam a te, ut, postquam de hoc vitae instituto, quae in rerum magnarum inquisitione collocata est, 
mentionem fecisti, pergas quaeso et mihi fratrique sciendi cupidissimis rem universam latius explices. Nam 
quanvis omnis ratio humanarum actionum, sive te ipsum instruas sive rem familiamque cures, sive postremo 
publica munera attingas, ad normam earum virtutum dirigatur, quas de vita et moribus nominamus, illas 
autem usu et consuetudine maxime assequamur’, DC, p. 12.3-11. 
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Landino has Lorenzo say ‘you mentioned that practice of life [institutum vitae] which is occupied in 
the investigation of lofty matters’. Here we should interpret the phrase institutum vitae, a Ciceronian 
term which Landino borrows from the De finibus, as a set of rules or practices for living rather than 
the ‘kind’ or ‘type’ of life indicated by the phrase genus vitae that Alberti goes on to use in his 
response to Lorenzo, with the variation in language in the back-and-forth between the two speakers 
giving a clue as to Landino’s intention.231 As the rest of the discussion unfolds, each of the genera 
vitae is, therefore, referring to the programmatic application, or institutum, of the virtues. Hence, 
Landino sees the two types of virtue as ontologically and heuristically prior to the ways of life which 
depend on them. It follows that he is seeking to engineer the subsequent disputation in such a way 
as to investigate the extent to which these virtues obtain in self-mastery, in the relationship between 
individuals, and between the individual and the state.  
After having stated that the soul is the principle of human life on account of its existence, 
Landino has the character Alberti begin his assessment of the two genera vitae with a clarification of 
their relationship to the functions, or munera, of the soul: 
 
When we act in a prudent, just, brave or temperate manner with respect to the things which pertain to social 
life or, separating the mind from the senses, we look up and speculate upon the divine and eternal, then we 
say that the soul [anima] is able to do so not because it exists as such, but because it has an innate capacity to 
obtain such powers. So, since we have been produced by nature both to act rightly and to investigate the 
truth, the learned decided to propose two ways of living in accordance with these two functions [munera] of 
human life... It is characteristic of the mind [mens] both to act while guided by reason and to speculate on the 
truth. So, having excluded the other functions of life, which are no more our functions than they are of any 
other animal, we say the life of a human being – insofar as what makes one a human being – should be 
devoted to action and speculation.232 
 
The munera, then, are the mental operations which consist in proper action (ad recte agendum) and the 
investigation of the truth (ad verum investigandum), and negotium and otium are the respective ways of 
life devoted to them. All the other munera of the soul which relate to growth, feeling or movement 
are held in common with animals and, since Landino considers that only those things which are 
peculiar to human life are relevant for its study, can therefore be ignored for the purposes of his 
analysis.233 Since Landino describes the two munera as ‘such powers’ (huiuscemodi vires), we can 
                                                          
231 Cic. Fin. IV.xv.40 
232 ‘Cum autem aut aliquid prudenter iusteque ac fortiter et temperate de iis rebus agimus, quae ad 
communem vitam pertinent, aut mentem a sensibus sevocantes divinum quippiam et inmortale suspicimus ac 
speculamur, iam non ea ratione, qua anima est, sed qua vim ad huiuscemodi vires assequendas habet, id posse 
illam dicimus. Quapropter, cum et ad recte agendum et ad verum investigandum natura producti simus, 
placuit doctioribus, ut sunt haec duo humanae vitae munera, sic duo vivendi genera ponere... Mentis autem 
est et ratione agere et verum speculari. Quapropter reliquis vitae muneribus, quae non magis nostra quam 
ceterorum animantium sunt, exclusis vitam hominis, qua ratione homo est, in agendo et speculando versari 
dicemus’, DC, pp. 13.25-14.21. 
233 These munera of the soul correspond to the vis vegetativa, vis motiva and vis sensitiva in the De anima, II, pp. 7-9 
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understand them as being synonymous with the speculative power and active power of the De 
anima. This hypothesis is confirmed during the discussion of the goods of the soul in the second 
book of the Disputationes, when Landino repeats his theory of the threefold power of the human 
mens with reference to practical skill, the virtues of life and morals, and the investigation of the 
truth: ‘for there is the power with which it [the mens] creates, in the same way there is the power 
with which it acts, finally there is the power with which it speculates’.234 Moreover, in his 
description of the munera above he reminds the reader of the significance of the virtues to each of 
them, mentioning the four moral virtues explicitly in his account of the munus of action, and 
describing the munus of intellectual inquiry in terms of the abstraction from the senses emblematic 
of the dianoetic virtues. For Landino, therefore, the operation of the virtues occurs through, and is 
coterminous with, these munera. Just as the soul has an innate drive to perform and perfect each 
munus, it seeks at the same time to perform and perfect the moral and dianoetic virtues. Action and 
intellectual investigation, and the virtues employed in them, thus constitute the two superior 
functions of the mens; negotium and otium are the ways of life in which each of these types of virtue is 
preeminent. 
At this point it is worth addressing the misconception, widely-held before Bruce McNair’s 
valuable corrective, that the two ways of life which Landino is discussing in the first book of the 
Disputationes are the vita activa and vita contemplativa rather than negotium and otium, despite the fact that 
the phrases vita activa and vita contemplativa appear nowhere in the Disputationes.235 Across the course 
of centuries the semantic content of these terms had changed constantly, with the concepts of otium 
and negotium at turns being adjuncts to, synonymous with, or having flexible and mutable 
relationships with the vita activa and vita contemplativa.236 Yet there emerges an explicit division in 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei between, on the one hand, a vita activa and vita contemplativa which 
comprise an interior life devoted to questions of personal conduct and the nature of truth 
respectively and, on the other, the ways of life in which one can partake on earth: the otiose way of 
life, the active way of life, and the combined way of life (genus vitae otiosum, genus vitae actuosum and 
genus vitae compositum).237 Since Landino states throughout the opening exchanges of the Disputationes 
and the succeeding speeches that, on the one hand, action and intellectual inquiry are munera which 
exist in the mind and are devoted to the exercise of moral and dianoetic virtues and, on the other, 
that otium and negotium are genera vitae consisting in the tangible modes of behaviour encompassing 
these munera, it is clear that he is sticking closely to the Augustinian conception. In the Disputationes, 
                                                          
and passim as well as Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I Q.78. See above p. 64. 
234 ‘Est enim qua faciat, est itidem qua agat, est postremo qua speculetur’, DC, p. 85.4-5 cf. De anima, III, pp. 
40-41. 
235 McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino, Coluccio Salutati and the Best Life’, pp. 747-69. 
236 For an overview of the intellectual history of the debates about vita activa, vita contemplativa, otium and 
negotium, see Brian Vickers, ‘Leisure and idleness: The ambivalence of otium’, Renaissance Studies, 4.1 (1990), 1-
37, and 4.2 (1990), 107-154, and the valuable essays in Vickers, ed., Arbeit, Musse, Meditation: Vita Activa – Vita 
Contemplativa (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1991). 
237 Augustine, Civ. Dei VIII.4 and XIX.19. 
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then, it is the munera of action and intellectual inquiry that correspond to the vita activa and vita 
contemplativa, not the ways of life which are dedicated to them. The confusion arises because many 
of the arguments Landino has Alberti adopt are taken directly from questions 179-182 in Summa 
Theologiae II-II, which Thomas Aquinas titles ‘De vita activa et contemplativa’.238 Given the 
intricacies of the intellectual tradition to which Landino was trying to contribute, it is unsurprising 
that both his early readers and editors would look to this obvious reference point given the close 
correspondences between the two authors. 
While there are affinitive links between the munus of action and negotium on the one hand, and 
the munus of intellectual inquiry and otium on the other, Landino’s care in disconnecting the munera 
from the genera vitae (despite his affinity with Thomas’ position in the Summa Theologiae in so many 
other respects) shows that the relationships between them are non-restrictive. Indeed one could, in 
theory at least, undertake the munus of activity while living the way of life devoted to otium, or the 
munus of intellectual inquiry in the life of negotium. During the proem to the second book of the 
Disputationes, Landino confirms this possibility by celebrating the way in which Federico can 
develop his intellect amidst the demands of public and military life: 
 
As if you were another Ulysses advised by her counsel, you never lacked the help of Pallas Athena in the 
most difficult times and desperate situations, but amidst your important and almost innumerable public duties 
you have also striven, with the same goddess as a guide, to attain a degree of learning which many were 
scarcely able to touch upon when living in the highest otium and with everything in abundance. For when 
could either the fear of an enemy or the shouting of your soldiers resounding in your ears ever distract your 
mind in such a way that a whole day would pass with you being idle, in which you neither read something 
yourself nor listened attentively to the reading or disputation of another?239 
 
The reasons that Landino had for leaning towards an Augustinian position in separating these 
munera from the genera vitae would have been several. As we have already seen, the munera of action 
and intellectual inquiry align with two of the three mental powers he had already described in the 
De anima and consist in the operation of the moral and dianoetic virtues respectively. By separating 
these mental functions from the ways of life which relate to them he could conform to the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy which underpinned his moral psychology while at the 
same time avoiding the conclusions of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus on the unqualified 
                                                          
238 McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino, Coluccio Salutati and the Best Life’, p. 752; Thomas Aquinas, Summa II-II 
QQ.179-82.  
239 ‘Cuius [Palladis] quidem auxilio cum in difficillimis temporibus ac dubiis rebus veluti alter Ulixes instructus 
consilio nunquam egueris, eas etiam in maximis ac paene infinitis tuis occupationibus eadem illa duce 
doctrinas assecutus es, quas multi in summo otio ac rerum omnium affluentia vix degustare potuerunt. 
Quando enim aut hostilis terror aut tuorum militum auribus undique circumsonans clamor tuam ita mentem 
unquam avertere potuerunt, ut dies integer tibi vacuus transierit, in quo aut ipse aliquid non legeris aut alium 
legentem disputantemve non attentissime audieris?’, DC, p. 52.21-30. 
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superiority of contemplation.240 Similarly, in order for Landino to reach his conclusion in the first 
book that the statesman should employ each way of life as far as is necessary, he had to incorporate 
into his ethical system the capacity to move to and fro between negotium and otium, a contingency 
which would be impossible if the moral and dianoetic virtues were entirely synonymous with the 
genera vitae because in such a case the politician roused to negotium from otium must cease to be 
illuminated by reason. It is also important to recognise that Landino’s decision to separate the 
munera and genera vitae was vital in order for his virtue ethics to coincide with his allegory of the 
Aeneid, in which Troy stands for the voluptuous life, Carthage for negotium (or vita in actione posita) 
and Italy for otium. At the same time that Aeneas travels to these three locations which represent 
the genera vitae, his journey also represents the purificatory progression through the civic virtues, 
purgative virtues and virtues of the soul already purged – constituents, lest we forget, of the moral 
virtues, not the dianoetic – with his descent into the underworld in Italy marking the final 
exploration of human vice required to achieve a soul purged of bodily contagion. If the munera and 
genera vitae were identical, then either Aeneas’ journey would have to be reconfigured such that it 
ended in Carthage with a purged soul but not having contemplated the divine, or his descent into 
the underworld would have to take place after his soul had been purged. Needless to say, neither of 













                                                          
240 Influential upon Landino’s position here was Thomas Aquinas, Summa II-II. Q.180 A.2 (and see also 
Q.181), which describes how the moral virtues have only a dispositive, rather than essential, relationship with 
the contemplative life. 
241 This separation explains an apparent inconsistency between, on the one hand, Landino’s association of the 
virtutes purgatoriae and the virtutes animi iam purgati, the second and third grades of the moral virtues, with otium 
in the third book (‘in otium se recipientes’, DC, pp. 153.27-154.3) and, on the other, his association of the 
munus of speculation and the associated dianoetic virtues with otium throughout the first book. At least part of 
this irregularity had arisen from Landino’s attempts to align the virtue theory of Macrobius with that of 
Augustine and the Scholastics because it is in In Somn. Scip. I.viii.8, the primary source for Landino’s 
description of the grades of virtue in the third book, that Macrobius writes the virtutes purgatoriae are ‘the 
virtues of the otiosi, who withdraw themselves from the activities of state’. 
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2.5 Alberti’s first speech 
 
The question Landino seeks to answer in the remainder of the first book is whether otium or 
negotium is the superior genus vitae, with the debate centring on the question of precisely how the 
munera align to these ways of life. First he has the character of Alberti argue for the primacy of 
otium. Before beginning to advance his position, Alberti briefly addresses the idea that the 
speculative life is not a genus vitae because the term ‘life’ implies a movement which is inimical to 
actual speculation, an argument he dismisses by asserting that some form of internal motion must 
be necessary for the investigation of the truth.242 It is likely that here Landino was responding to 
Lorenzo Valla’s argument in the Dialecticae Disputationes that contemplation and action are one and 
the same, feeling that he was obliged to rebut this position before he was able to proceed.243 To 
begin the main body of his argument, Alberti concedes that the life of action and the life devoted to 
knowledge of the truth can each please God and benefit humanity. He first offers passages from 
Virgil in support of each way of life, and then moves to the authority of Scripture, using as his 
examples the stories of Rachel and Leah and of Mary and Martha, in which Rachel and Mary 
represent speculation and Leah and Martha action.244 Yet while each life can be praised, he 
continues, the munus of action is directed towards the right and the just, but that of intellectual 
inquiry towards the truth. Through the latter we begin an incremental ascent towards the divine 
essence of God. The ascent consists of a gradual awakening of the higher mental faculties, through 
which one proceeds in the following way: 
 
We nevertheless see some who, as if reminded by certain shadows and images of the things which fall in our 
senses, were so ardently inflamed by love of heavenly things that, having abandoned all duties and negotium, 
and having only hitherto perceived material bodies with the senses and the likenesses of these bodies with the 
imagination, they then contemplate these things in succession: the nature of the bodies with reason itself; 
spirits which are incorporeal, but nevertheless created, with the intellect; and, finally, that which is uncreated 
with intelligence.245 
                                                          
242 DC, p. 15.4-14. 
243 Lorenzo Valla, Dialectical Disputations, ed. and trans. by Brian P. Copenhaver and Lodi Nauta, 2 vols 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), I, p. 103 (I.8.21-23). On Valla’s ideas on this subject, see 
Letizia Panizza, ‘Active and contemplative in Lorenzo Valla: the fusion of opposites’ in Vickers, ed., Arbeit, 
Musse, Meditation, pp. 181-225; on Landino and Valla, see especially pp. 209-10. 
244 Genesis 29-30 and Luke 10.38-42. Both of these stories had been established as scriptural illustrations of 
Platonic thought by Augustine: Mary and Martha in Sermo LIV [CIV Ben.] and Rachel and Leah in Contra 
Faustum XXII.54. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa II-II Q.179 A.2, Q180 A.3 and epecially Q.182 A.1, and 
Dante’s reference to Rachel and Leah in Purg. XXVII.91-108. On the interpretive tradition of the story of 
Mary and Martha see Jennifer S. Wyant, Beyond Mary or Martha: Reclaiming Ancient Models of Discipleship, Emory 
studies in early Christianity, 21 (Atlanta: SBL, 2019). 
245 ‘Sed videmus tamen nonnullos, qui quibusdam veluti umbris atque imaginibus eorum, quae in sensus 
nostros cadunt, admoniti caelestium rerum tam ardenti amore inflammantur, ut relictis curis negotiisque 
omnibus, cum hactenus sensu corpora et imaginando corporum similitudines percepissent, deinceps ipsa 
ratione corporum naturam, intellectu incorporeos quidem, sed tamen creatos spiritus ac demum intelligentia 




Through these gradations of intellectual investigation, one penetrates ever closer to the nature of 
reality until the final truth at which one arrives is the cognition of God. Hence, as the mens 
progresses through faculties devoted to objects of increasing abstraction, so too is it perfected, 
because it moves its focus from the material to the divine. Landino has Alberti reinforce the 
expressed Platonism of this idea with images originally from the Phaedo and the Phaedrus but 
transmitted to him in the Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis of Macrobius: that the soul, having sunk 
into the material world from heaven, acts as though confused and drunk until it remembers its 
inherent divinity and bears itself to God on the twin wings of justice and religion.246 
Alberti’s systematisation of the faculties of the mens and their respective cognitive objects in his 
description of the ascent is the same as that in the third book of the De anima, and Landino’s 
purpose in reaffirming it here in the Disputationes is to establish the mechanistic basis through which 
the dianoetic virtues stimulate the ascent to God.247 In the earlier work, Landino had gone on to 
describe how the mental simulacra evoked by perception of such material and immaterial objects 
are apprehended through the dianoetic virtues under the speculative power: the virtue of 
intelligence perceives principles of these objects; that of scientific knowledge perceives their effects; 
and that of wisdom distinguishes between the two.248 So, the ascent consists of our employing these 
virtues to comprehend the principles and effects of the objects perceived through the successive 
gradations of our mental faculties. In the Disputationes, where he had already established that the 
speculative power is synonymous with the munus of intellectual inquiry, Landino could sketch this 
same ethical scheme with rather more brevity than in the De anima, not least because his audience 
of Florentine intellectuals would already have been familiar with the technical reasoning of the 
earlier work. 
Nevertheless, it was still necessary for Landino to clarify that cleansing the mind of vice is a 
necessary precursor to the ascent. He therefore has Alberti continue to sketch how the ascent 
through the faculties of the mind using the dianoetic virtues can only take place in a mens which has 
first been purified through the moral virtues: 
 
Separating the mind from the senses, elevated with its wisdom, and instructed in all the learning of the things 
I mentioned a little earlier, the human being is gradually guided upwards by this understanding, where 
eventually they are nourished by ambrosia and nectar. When Plato says this, what else do I understand that 
they enjoy apart from the cognition of God and the pleasure which is experienced through this cognition? 
For although the cognition of God is best achieved through the virtues of the mind – for intelligence 
                                                          
uses the term imaginatio, rather than phantasia, to denote the imagination. Ursula Rombach points out 
Landino’s debt in this passage and others to the Pseudo-Augustinian De spiritu et anima in Rombach, Vita 
Activa und Vita Contemplativa, pp. 83-85. 
246 DC, p. 17.5-15 and see above pp. 63-65. 
247 De anima, III, pp. 20-21. 
248 De anima, III, pp. 40-48. 
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perceives the principles of things, scientific knowledge the processes and the effects resulting from these 
principles, and, finally, wisdom tells one from the other –, we will nevertheless be attempting these things in 
vain if we are not free from all perturbationes. How will those enticed by carnal pleasures or captured by avarice 
or inflated by ambition be able to think about anything higher? So it is also thought that the virtues of life and 
morals, by which our minds are expunged of all squalor of vice, must be exercised, and exercised in such a 
way that we begin our ascent with them.249 
 
Alberti’s speech continues with two lengthy digressions, both of which address issues raised by 
Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae. The first of these involves whether the speculative power 
is situated in the mind (mens) or the will (voluntas). Here, Landino has Alberti state that the will must 
take priority over the mind, since it is the appetite, when under the control of reason, that compels 
us to strive for knowledge of the truth.250 The will inflames us to thought through yet another 
sequence of psychological gradations: first cogitation (cogitatio) involves drawing unity from 
multiplicity; then meditation (meditatio) forms conclusions from these base principles; contemplation 
(contemplatio) follows as a ‘sharp-sighted and firm intuition of the soul in the cognition of the truth’; 
from there wonder (admiratio) arises as a stupor originating from the perception of that which excels 
our faculties; and finally speculation (speculatio) allows us to perceive a simulacrum of the truth in 
those effects which proceed from causes.251 Alberti’s second digression is devoted to movements of 
the soul and is drawn directly from the De divinis nominibus and De coelesti hierarchia of Pseudo-
Dionysius.252 He claims that the soul is subject to three types of motion: straight (rectus), when 
something progresses from the external senses to the mind in an act of observation; circular 
(circularis), when its movement is ‘one and the same and simple’ and tantamount to immobility, 
permitting simple intuition of the divine; and oblique (obliquus) when a circular motion degenerates 
due to its being mixed with some external disruption.253 As we progress from sense-perception to 
abstract mental objects our souls move in a straight line, then, when ‘illuminated by the divine 
                                                          
249 ‘Nam a sensibus mentem abducens sua sapientia erectus ac plurimis doctrinis instructus earum rerum, quas 
paulo ante dixi, cognitione eo paulatim deducitur, ubi tandem ambrosia nectareque alatur. Quod cum dicit 
Plato, quid aliud intelligit nisi cognitione dei et voluptate, quae inde percipitur, illum frui? Hoc enim etsi 
maxime per eas virtutes, quae a mente sunt, assequatur – intelligentia enim principia rerum, scientia vero 
progressus effectusque a principiis manantes ac postremo sapientia utrunque percipit –, tamen, nisi omni 
perturbationum genere vacemus, frustra haec tentabimus. Quomodo enim aut corporeis voluptatibus deliniti 
aut avaritia oppressi aut ambitione turgidi quicquam altum aut egregium cogitare poterimus? Quapropter eas 
quoque virtutes adhibendas censent, quibus animi nostri ab omni vitiorum sorde expurgantur, atque ita 
adhibendas, ut inde initium sumamus’, DC, pp. 17.21-18.6. 
250 DC, p. 19.4-29 Elsewhere Landino states that the voluntas is in fact synonymous with the appetite under the 
control of reason. See above pp. 64-65 and n. 183 as well as De anima, II, pp. 122-23 and DC, pp. 133.25-
134.14. Thomas Aquinas addresses the relationship in Summa Theologiae I Q.82. 
251 DC, pp. 19.25-21.27. 
252 The sources for this discussion on the motion of the soul by Pseudo-Dionysius are De divinis nominibus 
IV.7-10 and De coelesti hierarchia VII.4, but Landino would also have been aware of Thomas Aquinas’ 
treatment of the topic, both in Summa Theologiae II-II. Q.179 A.1 and Q.180 A.6 and in his commentary on 
Pseudo-Dionysius. Landino had addressed the movement of the soul before in De anima, III, pp. 130-31.  
253 DC, p. 22.1-10. 
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light’, they begin their oblique movement, until we finally emulate the angels in the contemplation 
of God when our souls adopt the constancy of circular motion.254 
Having concluded his analysis of the genus vitae devoted to the investigation of the truth, Alberti 
turns to that devoted to action. This life, he says, is truly worthy if led by an appropriate person in 
accordance with the moral virtues, to which he refers through circumlocutory allusions. Such an 
individual should exhibit prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice: that is, they should possess 
evident ‘sharp-sighted intelligence and mature counsel’; their mind must be ‘guarded against all 
dangers’; they should live ‘with restraint in the face of pleasure’; and should ‘[reflect] on nothing 
unless in a just and pious manner’.255 Proper moral conduct of this type is important because ‘we 
were not born for ourselves alone’, Alberti states, using the famous Ciceronian formulation of 
oikeiotic republicanism from the De officiis.256 Our moral responsibilities in negotium thus consist of 
successive and sequential duties. Those to family and the household should be fulfilled by 
furnishing one’s dependents with culture, education and patrimony, and those to society in general 
should be discharged by benefitting the state through public disbursements of wealth, great works 
and civic tributes.257 One can then devote oneself to the administrationem rem publicam through the 
eloquence and mental strength developed through the cultivation of the moral virtues, striving to 
achieve religious piety, justice and temperance throughout the citizenry. Indeed, Alberti expresses 
his astonishment at those who think that anyone could manage (administrare) such affairs without 
the virtutes de vita et moribus (and here again he uses this exact phrase) since they direct us to the right 
action which is particular to humans as opposed to any other living creature. Yet none of this is 
enough for the advocate of otium: 
 
On the other hand, I must dare to say this: no one who is thoroughly lacking in learning will properly 
administer either himself and his house or the republic. For how can I know either what the summum bonum of 
humanity is, or how it might be acquired, having ignored both the nature of humanity and the nature of 
things? Does someone who never touches upon the understanding of divine things practice religion 
correctly? Anyone who wishes to preside over a republic should not be ignorant of such matters. I 
acknowledge, however, that it is difficult for the man who is occupied by constant negotium of both a private 
and public nature to have a wholly exact understanding of them.258 
 
                                                          
254 ‘Sin autem divino quoque lumine irradiemur, non iam recto, sed obliquo movemur’, DC, p. 23.14-15. 
255 ‘Quod vero in agendo versatur, id, si ab eo viro assumetur, in quo perspicax ingenium maturumque 
consilium appareat cuiusque animus adversus omnia pericula saeptus, adversus libidinem moderatus existat, 
qui nihil nisi iuste pieque cogitet, egregium quiddam profecto erit et vere homine dignum’, DC, p. 23.24-28. 
256 DC, p. 23.29-30, from Cic. Off. I.vii.22. 
257 DC, p. 24.1-22. 
258 ‘Quin et illud audebo dicere: neminem aut se domumque suam aut rem publicam recte administraturum, 
qui omni penitus doctrina expers fuerit. Quo enim pacto aut quid sit summum hominis bonum aut quo modo 
id acquiratur cognoscam et hominis simul et rerum natura ignorata? Religionem autem quis recte colet, qui 
nulla ex parte rerum divinarum cognitionem attigerit? Non erit igitur expers earum rerum, qui rei publicae 
praeesse volet. Fateor tamen difficile esse illarum exactam omnino cognitionem habere eum virum, qui 
assiduis privatis publicisque negotiis occupetur’, DC, p. 25.2-11. 
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The life devoted to action should not therefore be condemned as it corresponds with human nature 
and forges beneficial bonds between humanity, but since the mens, which is particular to human 
beings, is perfected by the cognition directed to the summum bonum, speculation should be preferred 
to action by far.  
With the main elements of Alberti’s opening speech having now been summarised, it is worth 
briefly clarifying an issue of terminology. Through a comparison of passages by Landino and 
Thomas Aquinas in which Landino has replaced contemplatio and its derivatives with speculatio, Bruce 
McNair has argued that Landino, following Salutati, ‘is concerned to show that the soul ascends 
from action to speculation to contemplation’.259 McNair’s main intention in this article is to tease 
out Landino’s intellectual debt to Thomas and Salutati and establish continuities between his 
thought and theirs, but it is nonetheless necessary to challenge this claim. The only place in the 
Disputationes in which Landino places speculation and contemplation in contraposition with each 
other is his digression in Alberti’s first speech on whether the speculative power is situated in the 
mind or the will, where he defines contemplatio and speculatio as stages through which the will compels 
us to the knowledge of the truth. There is evidently some redundancy here between the terms vis 
speculandi and speculatio because in this passage speculatio is, like contemplatio, a mechanism of the mind, 
not a munus. Indeed, from the outset Landino uses investigatio veri and cognitio veri as synonyms for 
speculare and speculando with regard to this munus, and at one point he even uses the term speculatio to 
refer to the genus vitae for which he would customarily use the word otium.260 Even if this were not 
the case, the fact remains that Landino places contemplation below speculation in the hierarchy of 
mechanisms of the mind, which is inimical to McNair’s claim. Landino’s language, which uses 
speculatio and contemplatio interchangeably as synonyms for intellectual investigation as well as 
drawing a contrast between them in their role as mental mechanisms, is rather more fluid and 
inconsistent than McNair suggests. 
Throughout Alberti’s first speech, then, the superiority of the genus vitae of otium is justified in 
terms of its instrumental value in enabling uninterrupted dedication to the munus of intellectual 
inquiry. The life of otium is superior to that of negotium because the munus to which it is devoted 
perfects the most distinctively human part of us, the mens. Yet, Landino’s underlying purpose in 
Alberti’s first speech is somewhat broader than setting out the primacy of otium. Not only does this 
speech articulate all the main elements of Landino’s perfectionist virtue ethics as they pertain to the 
psychological ascent towards God, but the reader has by now been exposed to all the main 
elements of his moral theory as they pertain to the moral virtues and the munus of action. Even in 
this commendation of the life of intellectual inquiry, Landino is, through Alberti, unambiguous 
about the purificatory role of the moral virtues. Moreover, in the speeches which follow, neither 
Lorenzo nor Alberti offer any significant revisions to this fundamental model of the moral virtues 
                                                          
259 McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino, Coluccio Salutati and the Best Life’, p. 752. 
260 ‘Negant speculationem vivendi genus esse’, DC, p. 15.6-7. 
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purifying the mind of vice so that it can, through the dianoetic virtues, devote itself to 
contemplation. Landino’s decision to structure the disputation in this way betrays how the next two 
speeches in the first book should be read. Rather than introducing substantive changes to his virtue 
theory, they will instead offer anticipated objections to it, present his answers to them and provide 
context for the relative importance of the roles played by the munera of action and intellectual 
inquiry with regard to how the statesman should administrare rem publicam. This is a common trope in 
disputation literature which engenders a particularly self-conscious artificiality because, as was 
common in such cases, the characters of Lorenzo and Alberti are representing views opposite to 
those their real counterparts held.261 Employing the rhetorical device of prosopopeia, Landino has the 
characters of Lorenzo and Alberti act as instruments for his own opinions, an approach which 
serves both to provide him with authorial distance and to illustrate his own internal intellectual 
wranglings in devising his moral philosophy. With this in mind, we now turn to Landino’s 
























                                                          
261 On this conceit in Renaissance disputations on otium, see Vickers, ‘The ambivalence of otium’, II, p. 140. 
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2.6 Lorenzo’s reply 
 
Lorenzo’s defence of negotium begins from the simple premise that any investigation of human life 
would be foolish if it did not recognise that the human being is a unity of body and soul, just as two 
horses yoked to a chariot form an entity which is atomic in epistemological and lexical terms when 
referred to as a ‘biga’. It necessarily follows the best genus vitae is that which perfects both body and 
soul, and since the purificatory power of the moral virtues is necessary to begin intellectual inquiry, 
it is the genus vitae which cultivates them which is essential to human life: 
 
Ethical living [ratio vivendi], which is perfected by civil action, is demonstrated to be the superior genus vitae, 
because the virtues of life and morals to which civic actions are directed serve both the body and the mind as 
a whole at the same time. For when the health and vigour of all the limbs and the integrity of the senses are 
preserved by these virtues, then the unpolluted soul is guarded from every stain of the vices. So action, which 
maintains the investigation of the truth (which itself is devoted to caring for the mind alone in such a way that 
it neglects the care of other things), must be placed first.262 
 
Lorenzo’s second argument for the superiority of negotium concerns the oikeiotic roots of civil 
society, adapting a concept which Landino has adopted from Cicero and Seneca and which was 
touched upon by the character of Alberti in his own treatment of the active life. He offers this 
precis of the theory: ‘But who shall not see that nature, the great mother, produced us to celebrate 
meetings and the unions, and to conserve common society?’263 According to this reasoning, we are 
moved ‘by nature’ to conserve common society, and Lorenzo continues to point out how the 
introduction of philosophy into cities by Socrates sought to inculcate the principles by which we 
manage ourselves, our families and the state through actions purified by the moral virtues (we 
should note that here, once again, Landino uses his administrare rem publicam formulation).264 Since 
every human being struggles daily with both the fear of pain and the hope of pleasure – that is, 
both the irascible power and the concupiscible power which Landino identified in the De anima as 
the two constituent powers of the appetite – the citizenry should strive together in a common 
endeavour to engender moral virtues in civic life. One who spends their time in otium is, therefore, 
forsaking a gift granted to them by God.265 
                                                          
262 ‘Ratio autem vivendi, quae civili actione perficitur, hoc praestare ex eo convincitur, quod virtutes de vita et 
moribus, quibus civiles actiones diriguntur, et corpus simul et animum incolumes servant. Illis enim cum 
valitudo roburque membrorum omnium sensuumque integritas servatur, tum animus ab omni vitiorum labe 
impollutus custoditur. Praeponenda est igitur actio, quae hoc praestat veri investigationi, quae in sola mente 
curanda ita versatur, ut rerum ceterarum curam negligat’, DC, p. 26.24-31 
263 ‘Illud autem quis non videat ad concilia coetusque celebrandos et ad communem societatem 
conservandam nos parentem optimam naturam produxisse?’, DC, pp. 26.32-27.1. 
264 DC, pp. 26.32-27.12. 
265 ‘Quisquam sit, qui in otio marcescens haec negligat, nonne munus sibi a deo demandatum deserere 
videatur?’, DC, p. 28.5-7. 
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In support of this latter argument, Lorenzo presents a thought experiment. He invites the 
listeners to imagine an empty city which a sapiens, the paradigmatic Ciceronian sage, has the task of 
populating. In order to produce the best imaginable state, free from any superfluous population, the 
sapiens admits citizens in order: first legislators, orators and judges; then physicians, lawyers and 
soldiers; then artisans and artists; and so on with tailors, weavers, butchers, bakers and the like.266 
The sapiens who dedicates his life to otium as described by Alberti, however, would appear to have 
no part in this city. Instead, he should be despised as ‘a lazy drone come to another’s honey’, and 
two analogies serve as evidence for this claim.267 First, Lorenzo compares the state to a ship at 
wartime in which the sapiens otiosus occupies the place of another who could provide some use, 
acting only as a burden to his fellow crewmembers.268 Then, he uses the analogy of the body politic, 
claiming that the corporate nature of civic harmony is like the unity formed from diverse organs 
and limbs, which ‘drives away those things which are abhorrent to it and receives the favourable 
and healthy’ (another reference to the irascible and concupiscible powers) and which cannot do so 
if one part abdicates its function like the sapiens otiosus.269 The pragmatic dimension of these appeals 
to the cooperative basis of the republic extends beyond the mere redundancy of otium as a way of 
life. Since only the most gifted individuals are able to devote themselves to speculation, all the more 
harm is caused to the state because the civic duties which they have abandoned are left to the less 
talented, as if the Greek army at Troy had lost Achilles rather than Thersites.270 
With something of a rhetorical flourish, Lorenzo now has the sapiens otiosus defend his value to 
the state on the grounds that he transmits to political leaders the precepts of statecraft which are 
the fruits of speculation. Lorenzo remains unconvinced that this is necessarily the case, thinking 
that too often such wisdom remains hidden. For him, not only should wisdom profit others and 
not be secreted away, but its active application in civic life is a central pillar of the life of negotium. 
To illustrate his point, Lorenzo produces a catalogue of historical, mythological and scriptural 
exempla of the civic benefits of wisdom, and then remarks pointedly on how, if they had devoted 
themselves to contemplation, ancient republicans including the Scipios, Catos, Laelii, and Brutus 
would not have performed valuable service, nor would their names have survived.271 Next he turns 
to the contemporary example of Federico da Montefeltro as one who does not allow the 
                                                          
266 DC, pp. 28.8-29.12, drawing on Plat. Rep. II.368e-376c and see Eugene M. Waith, ‘Landino and Maximus 
of Tyre’, Renaissance News, 13.4 (Winter 1960), 289-94. Landino was likely also thinking of Bruni’s systematic 
praise of the people and institutions of Florence in his Laudatio.  
267 ‘Ipsum veluti ignavum fucum ad aliena mella venire omnes indignabuntur’, DC, p. 29.20-21. 
268 DC, pp. 29.26-30.11 The original source of this image is Plato’s analogy of the ship of state in Plat.Rep. 
VI.488a-489d. Lorenzo’s argument here, however, mirrors that of the real Alberti in his short work Fatum et 
fortuna from his Intercenales, in which he warns of the dangers posed to the ship of state by those who indulge 
in otium. See Leon Battista Alberti, Autobiografia e altre opere latine, ed. and trans. by Loredana Chines and 
Andrea Severi (Milan: Rizzoli, 2012), pp. 138-56. 
269 DC, p. 30.11-26. 
270 DC, pp. 30.26-31.8. 
271 On the classical topos of rhetorical copia, see Cic. De orat. I.vi.21, I.xiii.59, and II.liii.214 and Quint., Inst. 
VIII and X. 
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speculation he undertakes in otium to hinder him in the administration of his state or the military 
ventures for which he is renowned.272 Then, in one of the more famous passages of the 
Disputationes, Lorenzo illustrates his point with the figure of Hercules who, he claims, was a sapiens 
but ‘but not a sapiens for himself; instead his wisdom benefitted nearly all mortals’.273 Using a 
legendary figure as a case study here is, for Landino, an opportunity to extend his arguments from 
the particular to the universal through the means of Platonic mysticism. Hercules is the son of 
Jupiter, the Platonic anima mundi which would cause time, the planets and the elements to cease 
their movement were it to pause in its action, and so Lorenzo is able to present his negotium as 
having an ontological continuity with the forces of the universe itself.274 The final specific example 
that Lorenzo adduces is that of St Paul, the doctor gentium whose evangelism and ministration 
imparted his knowledge for the salvation of others. 
Landino has Lorenzo present two more subsidiary arguments as to why negotium is superior to 
otium. The first is that the negotiosi are popularly preferred to the otiosi – and are duly awarded 
triumphs and honours – because the former set a moral example through their governance as they 
‘better obey unerring nature’.275 Those otiosi who defy this nature are often, in fact, hypocrites who 
praise emperors more than philosophers in any case. Here the ‘nature’ to which Landino is referring 
is once again the republican-oikeiotic view of civic relations in the commonwealth, which Lorenzo 
had discussed earlier in his speech.276 The second of Lorenzo’s arguments consists of a striking 
elaboration of this theory. He suggests that the Christian injunction to ‘love your neighbour as 
yourself’ offers a reciprocal basis for civic life, because one best exhibits love (caritas) towards one’s 
fellow citizens by executing one’s appropriate role within the state as fits one’s abilities.277 Landino 
has Lorenzo, swept up in his conflation of republicanism and Christian creed, finish with a 
rhetorical and somewhat hyperbolic declamation: 
 
For, since all who were ever philosophers are resolved that we were born to the social and communal life, 
anyone who is not a citizen should not be called human, nor should anyone be called a citizen who neglects 
the care of that state in which they are born.278 
                                                          
272 See above pp. 40-43. 
273 ‘Fuit sapiens Hercules. At non sibi sapiens, verum sua sapientia omnibus paene mortalibus profuit’, DC, p. 
32.22-23. Landino’s primary point of reference here is Bernardus Silvestris, The Commentary on the First Six 
Books of the Aeneid of Vergil Commonly attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, ed. by Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth 
Frances Jones (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), p. 71.25, but another influence was 
Salutati’s De laboribus Herculis, on which he would base much of the allegorical exegesis of the third and fourth 
books and which the idealised Hercules can be found in, for instance, II.xvii.3-5 and III.xiii.5.  
274 DC, pp. 32.27-33.6. 
275 DC, p. 34.22-23. 
276 DC, p. 26.32-27.1 and see above p. 88. 
277 DC, p. 35.3-4, referring to Matthew 22.39 and Mark 12.31. Landino may have been influenced here by 
Dante’s allusive treatment of these passages in Purgatorio XVII.58-60. 
278 ‘Nam cum omnes qui unquam fuerunt philosophi ad socialem communemque vitam nos natos esse velint, 





For all the abundance of historical and literary exempla he employs, Lorenzo’s speech is 
parsimonious and tightly-argued in that it consists of three principal points: that the mind and body 
consist in a unity and so the best genus vitae must perfect both; that our interpersonal bonds compel 
us by nature towards civic action within society; and that wisdom has a public utility that should not 
be dissipated by the abandonment of society by the learned. To reiterate, nowhere does Lorenzo 
modify or repudiate Alberti’s central premise of a progression through purificatory moral virtues to 
speculative dianoetic virtues. Rather, his defence of negotium is a matter of emphasis, allowing 
Landino to question whether there is a case for prioritising the former over the latter because, just 
as Alberti has defended otium in terms of its value in providing space for the munus of intellectual 
inquiry, so Lorenzo’s arguments for negotium are phrased instrumentally with regard to the munus of 
action and the moral virtues which govern it.  
To this extent, we can deduce that these three points were the most significant factors in 
Landino’s decision to afford greater emphasis to the munus of action than his Platonism might 
otherwise cause us to expect. Each of these arguments ultimately derives from the thought of 
Cicero. The matter of the unity of body and mind was rooted in Cicero’s discussion of this topic in 
the De finibus, in which he explores the idea that ‘the human being consists of both body and mind’ 
and ‘the life we seek is that which is filled with the virtues of body and mind’ (though Landino 
would also have been thinking of Thomas Aquinas’ treatment of this subject in the Summa 
Theologiae); Landino’s interpretation of the oikeiotic and reciprocal nature of civil society comes, as 
we have seen, from the De officiis; and the notion that the public benefits of wisdom should prevent 
the wise from abandoning civil life can be found in the same work, in which Cicero criticises the 
Platonic view of philosophers who ‘detained by their zeal for learning, abandon those they ought to 
defend’.279 Since the common characteristic of these points – from the natural sense of self-
appropriation emergent from the unity of body and mind to the common bonds of shared 
humanity which compel us by necessity to share the benefits of knowledge – is that of the Stoic 
concept of oikeiosis, it is necessary to spend some time understanding the significance of this idea to 







                                                          
279 Cicero’s discussion on the unity of the mind and body takes place in Cic.Fin.V.xii.34-44, and that of 
Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I Q.76. On the public benefits of wisdom see Cic.Off. I.ix.28. A 
penetrating analysis of these three arguments can be found in Rombach, Vita Activa und Vita Contemplativa, 
pp. 120-38, though she characterises the third as ‘Die inutilitas philosophorum’. 
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2.7 Oikeiosis, action, and the state 
 
It should be clear by now that, for all his reliance on Aristotelian psychology and natural 
philosophy, Landino draws his fundamental associative principles from Cicero rather than Aristotle. 
It is true that, like most humanists, Landino takes certain assumptions from Aristotle such as the 
need for virtue in political rulers and the idea that human beings are by nature political animals. 
When advocating the republic as the best political entity, however, he does not undertake any 
Aristotelian comparison with alternative organisational structures or forms of government, and, 
more significantly insofar as his virtue ethics is concerned, he views participation in civic life as 
being valuable only in an intermediary sense. Instead, Landino’s political philosophy follows Cicero 
in viewing the commonwealth of citizens and the proper functioning of the state as being purely 
instrumental, a vehicle for the exercise of civic virtue through which one can go on to attain one’s 
summum bonum, as opposed to Aristotle’s opinion that the purpose of the state consists in advancing 
human well-being and self-realisation as an end in itself.280 Given that the question of the 
relationship between individual and state is central to his project in the Disputationes of uniting 
republicanism with a Platonic ascent to God, it is necessary to expand upon the intellectual 
underpinnings of Landino’s theory of human socialisation which, as we have seen several times, is 
that of oikeiosis. A concept that is Stoic in origin, oikeiosis is a natural appropriative impulse in a 
living organism that begins self-reflexively, such that an organism concerns itself with its self-
preservation and well-being.281 In humans, this impulse extends further to encompass the reciprocal 
well-being of family, friends, country, and, eventually, the entire human race. While Landino would 
have been familiar with Chrysippus’ definition of oikeiosis as reported by Diogenes Laertius, it is the 
treatment of the concept in the De finibus and De officiis from which he draws his inspiration in the 
Disputationes.282 In the De finibus, Cicero had the character of Cato relate the Stoic theory of oikeiosis 
in Latin: ‘As soon as a living creature is born... it is concerned with itself, and is committed to 
preserve itself [ad se conservandum], and values its own constitution and those things which preserve 
its constitution.’283 If one is to live one’s life according to virtue – which, for Stoics, is the summum 
bonum itself – then, after preserving oneself in one’s natural constitution and acting in accordance 
with nature, one must make moral choices in accordance with ‘appropriate action’ (officium, Cicero’s 
translation of the Greek καθήκον), a behaviour which, when habituated, eventually develops into a 
                                                          
280 For an alternative view which interprets Landino’s theory of socialisation in far more Aristotelian terms, 
see Rombach, Vita Activa und Vita Contemplativa, pp. 123-25. 
281 In Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties and Fate (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), p. 155 it is described as 
‘a sort of ordered hierarchy of animating principles or constitutions in different kinds of living things, or in 
one living thing as it matures’, whereas Long’s definition in Anthony Arthur Long, Stoic Studies (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), p. 153 is that oikeiosis is ‘the way Nature’s teleology manifests itself in 
animal psychology’. 
282 DL VII.85 
283 Cic. Fin. III.v.16 and cf. Cic. Off. I.iv.11-12. 
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choice in harmony with reason and nature.284 In humans, the affection towards offspring instilled 
by nature develops into an equally natural desire for association with others, so it follows that officia 
desirable for us include raising a family, the cultivation of friendship and a devotion to the 
collective benefit of one’s community.285 Hence emerges a basis for republican thought. Society 
ought to be organised on the basis of our owing reciprocal duties to one another on the grounds of 
the humanity we hold in common and, in turn, the sapiens should strive for the common advantage 
of all by seeking active involvement in the state. In the De officiis, Cicero moved from theoretical 
ethics to practical morality by expanding upon his conception of how such ‘appropriate acts’ relate 
to behaviour within society, while seeking, just as he had in the De finibus, to use the concept of 
oikeiosis to reconcile principles of human sociability with his belief that one’s rights to private 
property were inviolable. It is here that the summation of the oikeiotic principle most familiar to 
Quattrocento intellectuals was expressed: 
 
But since, as has been written exquisitely by Plato, we were not born for ourselves alone [non nobis solum nati 
sumus], but our country claims a part of us, and our friends another part, and since the Stoics hold that 
everything produced on earth is created for the use of humanity, that human beings are created for the sake 
of other humans so that they might be able to help one another, we should follow nature as a guide in this 
matter.286 
 
That this sentiment offers a rationale for political organisation within a republic while at the same 
time being laden with Platonic authority would make it a natural point of departure for Landino’s 
project in the Disputationes and, indeed, it is this idea, alongside the broader doctrine of oikeiosis in 
which it is situated, that permits Landino to extend some theoretical distance from the ‘theological’ 
Platonic philosophy espoused by Ficino. Here we can return to the passage I quoted in the 
introduction in which Riccardo Fubini articulates the dissimilarity with his customary precision:  
 
[Landino’s] point of reference was not direct Platonic doctrine – and much less in the ideological and 
emblematic sense in which Ficino assumes it – but the eclectic Academism of Cicero... The philosophy did 
not interest Landino as revelation of absolute and primordial truth, it did not interest him as ‘theology’, but 
for its capacity of elaboration and rational persuasion in the cultured ages.287  
 
Fubini argues that Landino’s approach to philosophy is that of an ‘institutional’, civic-minded 
Platonism developed in the chancelry and the scuola which is quite distinct from that of Ficino, and 
is distinguished by the preeminence of Ciceronian interpretations of Platonism in the Disputationes 
                                                          
284 Cic. Fin. III.vi.20-25. 
285 Cic. Fin. III.xix.62-xx.68 and see also Cic. Off. I.iv.12. 
286 Cic. Off. I.vii.22 




in particular and by Landino’s tendency to place Plato and Aristotle on an equal footing and 
counterpose their teachings. One could quibble with this argument by pointing out that Landino’s 
interest in virtue ethics predates his time in the scuola and chancelry on the grounds of evidence in 
his second redaction of the Xandra, and that his use of Cicero extended far beyond any ‘capacity for 
rational persuasion’ into the essence of his natural and political philosophy, but the distinction 
between the two approaches is nevertheless a valuable one.288 Nowhere is it better emphasised than 
in Ficino’s 1474 letter to Bartolomeo Scala about the Disputationes in which he writes, without 
mentioning Plato at all, that in the work Landino ‘imitates the dialogues of Cicero to perfection [lit. 
a fingernail]: he most happily portrays a happy man’.289 Ficino evidently viewed the Disputationes as a 
Ciceronian work foremost, probably on account of its thoroughgoing focus on the relationship 
between Platonism and republicanism. Certainly, whatever debt Ficino owed to Cicero, it was not 
one that involved theories of sociability. While Giovanni Corsi’s biography of Ficino speaks of him 
as having come to the study of Plato through Cicero – an assertion that has been supported by 
Fubini, when he argues that Cicero was the dominant influence upon early works such as the lost 
Institutiones Platonicae disciplinae, and in an extensive and informative paper by Valery Rees – it 
remains that Ficino devoted little attention to oikeiosis.290 In a letter to Cherubino Quarquagli he 
discusses Cicero’s use of the concept of officium in the De officiis, but with scarcely a passing 
reference to the theory of human socialisation that underpins it.291 References to Cicero in the 
Platonic Theology concern for the most part his transmission of the doctrines of other philosophers 
rather than his own thoughts about the relationship between human and society, and oikeiotic 
arguments are absent from other works which were valuable to Landino such as the De amore and 
the Philebus commentary. 
Rather than the works of Plato, Plotinus and their successors on which Ficino had drawn for his 
great philosophical statements such as the Platonic Theology, Landino’s philosophy had at its root 
sources which would have been immediately available in his formative years, whether those of Latin 
Platonism, such as Cicero and Macrobius, or of Christian authors such as Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas who had, to one extent or another, harmonised Platonic theory with Scripture. As far as 
oikeiosis is concerned it was Cicero and his humanistic successors in particular to whom Landino 
                                                          
288 See above pp. 27-31. 
289 ‘[Landinus] Ciceronis dyalogos imitatur ad unguem: felicem virum fabricat felicissime’, Marsilio Ficino, 
Lettere, ed. by Sebastiano Gentile, 2 vols (Florence: Olschki, 1940), I, p. 218 (I.119), and The Letters of Marsilio 
Ficino, ed. and trans. by Valery Rees, Arthur Farndell, and Adrian Bertoluzzi (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 
1975-), I, p. 183 (I.119). The second part of the quotation is an allusion to the Tusculanae Disputationes. Fubini 
sees Ficino’s analysis as a Platonic rebuke to Landino’s aspirations in the text, but I would not be inclined to 
attribute much rivalry between the two scholars in this regard thanks to Ficino’s encomiastic, and apparently 
unironic, contribution to the Comento four years later. 
290 Giovanni Corsi, ‘The Life of Marsilio Ficino’, in The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, III, pp. 137-38; Fubini, 
‘Cristoforo Landino, questioni di cronologia e di interpretazione’, pp. 555-56; Valery Rees, ‘Ciceronian 
Echoes in Marsilio Ficino’, in Cicero Refused to Die: Ciceronian Influence through the Centuries, ed. by Nancy van 
Deusen (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 141-62. 
291 The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, II, pp. 64-67 (III.53). 
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turned because while the strand of oikeiotic thought important to the Disputationes appears in 
authors in the Latin Platonic tradition after Cicero, it is often by no means dominant. For instance, 
Macrobius, otherwise the single most important source for Landino’s philosophical thought in the 
Disputationes, is content to write that, through the political or civic virtues, people ‘devote 
themselves to their commonwealths, protect cities, revere parents, love their children, and cherish 
relatives’.292 He enumerates these oikeotic responsibilities without discussing the natural philosophy 
which underpins them or expanding upon their sequential relationship to each other, although the 
fact that he is thinking in such terms is implied by his emphasising that ‘by these [political] virtues 
the good man is first made ruler of himself and then of the state’.293 For the Florentine humanists 
upon whom Landino relied such as Alberti, Palmieri, Scala and Salutati, however, the importance of 
oikeiosis as it manifests itself through the non nobis solum passage of the De officiis was crucial in 
establishing a natural basis for the republican social bond.294 While his influence is otherwise 
profound, Ficino does not impart any such ideas of human socialisation to Landino either through 
his original works or through his translations of Platonic texts such as the Phaedo and Phaedrus. We 
can therefore conclude, then, that oikeiosis is not a purely incidental element of Landino’s 
philosophy, but rather an essential differentiating factor from that of Ficino. Relatively 
unconcerned with practical ethics, Ficino preferred instead to concentrate on the metaphysical and 
psychological aspects of Christian Platonism by, for instance, striving to prove the soul’s 
immortality. His perfectionist philosophy is fundamentally salvific, inspired by an ideological and 
doctrinal commitment to Christianity and looking constantly to God rather than a human society 
whose bonds emerge through oikeiosis. For Landino, on the other hand, the natural impulse towards 
conservation and ‘appropriation’ of the self, which then proceeds to friends, family, fellow citizens 
and so on, is an important principle for reconciling a virtue ethics directed to self-perfection with 
republican norms of civic responsibility and a duty to others. As Di Cesare puts it, ‘Important to 
the discussion [in the Disputationes] is the notion of social man; man in society’.295 
Given that the goal of human life in Landino’s philosophy is, no less than in that of Ficino, 
knowledge of the divine, one might imagine that a tension arises within his approach between his 
desire to emphasise a natural, oikeiotic tendency for human socialisation and civic responsibility, 
which exists at the level of the civic virtues in the active life, while at the same time advocating the 
attainment of a summum bonum that demands the purgation of corporeal concerns and an ascent to 
                                                          
292 ‘His [virtutibus] boni viri rei publicae consulunt, urbes tuentur: his parentes venerantur, liberos amant, 
proximos diligunt’, Macrobius, In Somn. Scip., I.viii.6. 
293 ‘His virtutibus vir bonus primum sui atque inde rei publicae rector efficitur’, Macrobius, In Somn. Scip., 
I.viii.8. 
294 See e.g. Leon Battista Alberti, I libri della famiglia, ed. by Ruggiero Romano, Alberto Tenenti and Francesco 
Furlan (Turin: Einaudi, 1994), p. 139; Palmieri, Vita civile, I.17-19; Bartolomeo Scala, ‘Whether a Wise Man 
Should Marry’, in Scala, Essays and Dialogues, pp. 34-67 (p. 53); and Coluccio Salutati, ‘Reply to a Slanderous 
Detractor’, in Salutati, Coluccio Salutati: Political Writings, ed. by Stefano U. Baldassarri, trans. by Rolf Bagemihl 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 185. 
295 Di Cesare, p. 156. 
96 
 
higher grades of moral and dianoetic virtue. Yet, just as his theories of ethical development are 
integrated into a coherent whole, with the enlightened sapiens being able to benefit the state with his 
wisdom as much as the virtuous stateman does through the exercise of the moral virtues, so too 
does he show that the oikeiotic bonds between oneself and others which preserve the fundamental 
interconnectedness of society are supported and strengthened by engagement in contemplation as 
much as they are by conventional civic duty. In order to demonstrate this I will proceed in three 
steps. First I will briefly recapitulate the evidence for Landino’s general view of oikeiosis at both a 
linguistic and a structural level, which is displayed in Alberti’s first speech in the first book and in 
the discussions on the summum bonum in the second. I will go on to discuss how the concept 
pertains to the moral virtues that relate to the munus of activity, paying particular attention to the 
level of the ‘civic’ or ‘political’ virtues, and then, finally, I will investigate how Landino extends this 
idea such that the dianoetic virtues which are employed in the munus of contemplation are brought 
to bear to reinforce the social bonds which constitute the state. 
As we have seen, Cicero’s oikeiotic language supplies the backbone of Landino’s political 
vocabulary in the Disputationes. The administrare rem publicam formulation which is Landino’s 
distinctive way of referring to statesmanship is taken from the De finibus, and his intentional 
substitution of the term virtutes de vita et moribus for the conventionally Platonic virtutes morales has its 
origin in Cicero’s phraseology in the Tusculanae Disputationes, De officiis and De oratore.296 Moreover, 
Alberti’s first speech, which presents the fundamental details of the system of virtue ethics on 
which the two discussants can both agree, outlines a central role for oikeiosis in the conception of 
human relations. He begins his speech with an articulation of the non nobis solum formulation, and 
then repeats the sentiment at its end, in the extensive, almost overwrought, passage that declares 
that while the life of action is inferior to the speculative life in proper administration of the state, it 
is not nevertheless to be condemned.297 Since we were born not only for ourselves but also, in a 
much greater sense, to serve in human society, he writes, we ought to praise one whose devotion to 
his family and the education of his children, whose generosity and liberality, whose eloquence in 
civic discourse, whose military prowess, and whose piety makes him the best of the human race.298  
In each of these cases Landino is advancing oikeiotic socialisation in order to justify the merits 
of the active life which he will have Lorenzo commend in due course, but his purpose here is to 
establish a common ground for the intellectual arguments which follow rather than to link oikeiosis 
with the active life alone. To indicate to the reader from the outset that our bonds with other 
human beings are natural and extend successively from our own self-appropriative impulse (for it is 
no exaggeration to say that his audience would have been more familiar with the De officiis than 
most other texts save the Bible) is a statement of rhetorical intent and, indeed, in the second book 
Landino offers a more robust theoretical grounding for this view in his discussion of what is 
                                                          
296 Cic. Fin. III.xx.68. See above pp. 60-61 and 69-70. 
297 DC, pp. 14.29-15.4. See above p. 85. 
298 DC, pp. 23.28-24.20. 
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valuable in Peripatetic philosophy. The Peripatetics, he writes, argue that we are born with an 
instinctive impulse for self-preservation which is directed towards the first inclinations of nature of 
the body and the mind which are called the prima naturae.299 Guided by virtue, we desire what is 
good for its own sake both for ourselves and, in oikeiotic succession, for others in accordance with 
their relationship to us: 
 
But the Peripatetics also want this happy life to be situated in society. So the sapiens values the goods of 
friends for their own sake, and he desires the same for his friend which he desires for himself: not for his 
own sake, but for his friend’s. Yet he will have a careful distinction in humankind, so that he best understands 
in what rank the country, children, parents, blood relations, other more distant relatives, citizens, finally other 
mortals should be ordered, until the whole race of humanity is encompassed.300 
 
Alongside this oikeiotic principle, Landino took from the Peripatetics (as relayed by Cicero) the idea 
that one makes moral progress by recognising and choosing between the different kinds of goods 
represented by the prima naturae. I will return to this concept in more detail to assess its implications 
for the practical aspect of Landino’s ethics but, simply put, he argues that the more we refine our 
moral conduct, the more we turn away from the irrational appetition that directs us towards inferior 
goods and instead strive for the summum bonum.301 We learn to distinguish correctly between, on the 
one hand, the prima naturae which are good for their own sake and can lead one closer to God and, 
on the other, those that are merely useful or even harmful. Since the natural urge for self-
preservation extends to others in successive degrees, one is therefore compelled to desire the 
proper goods for others as well as oneself. Devoting ourselves to the highest good is therefore a 
task that has repercussions for society at large. Our responsibilities to others oblige us to seek the 
best goods for them, whether through acting, thinking, leading or teaching.  
Yet even more fundamental, from the point of view of Landino’s psychology, is that the self-
constitutive, self-preservational urge towards proper behaviour is of a kind with that which causes 
us to associate in social groups. It is the same natural impulse which directs us to God (by driving 
us to make the correct choice between goods which lead us to our summum bonum) as it is that 
causes us to seek human society (by predisposing us to form social bonds with others). With this in 
mind, it is not surprising that Landino would see the appeal of an approach which contextualised 
                                                          
299 Cic. Fin. III.v.17-30; V.vii.18-viii.23. Note that, since Landino’s understanding of the prima naturae is based 
on the De finibus, he presents them as a Peripatetic rather than a Stoic concept. This is because in the fifth 
book Cicero argues that the Stoic position advanced in the third has in fact developed from Peripatetic 
philosophy. 
300 ‘Huiuscemodi autem beatam vitam socialem quoque esse volunt. Quapropter amicorum bona propter se 
ipsa diliget sapiens sicut sua idemque cupiet amico, quod sibi, non propter se ipsum, sed propter illum, 
habebit tamen diligentem in humano genere delectum, ut quo loco patria, quo liberi, quo parentes, quo agnati, 
quo reliqui necessarii, quo cives, quo postremo ceteri mortales suo ordine habendi sint, quousque universum 
genus hominum complectatur ipse optime teneat’, DC, p. 63.17-24. 
301 For instance, in the Aeneid allegory in DC, pp. 128.20-131.17, we see the potential pitfalls of directing 
ourselves towards the wrong prima naturae. 
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virtue within a series of successive and reflexive responsibilities centred on personal self-mastery. 
While the Platonic concept of an embodied soul which seeks to return to God and a system of 
political organisation predicated on a natural desire for socialisation with other humans might at 
first seem incompatible, they are, in fact, equally valid constituent elements of Landino’s system of 
virtue ethics. 
Landino would have the reader believe that our motivation to make ethical choices derives from 
the same instinctual behaviour from which the moral fabric of society is formed. It is for this 
reason, not to mention the fact that he acquired his oikeiotic ideas from Ciceronian sources, that he 
is particularly interested in using oikeiosis to establish a natural basis for human socialisation which 
can be used to justify engagement in the active life at the level of the civic virtues. Landino had 
articulated this idea in full several years earlier in the De anima in his discussion of the Macrobian 
grades of virtue. Drawing on the De officiis as he would later in the Disputationes, he describes how 
the other-directedness of the civic virtues emerges from the sociability implanted in us by nature: 
 
For, since a human being is neither a solitary creature nor hostile to the fellowship of other humans, but is 
born for association and to engage in assemblies, it thinks that its foremost duty is that it inhabits cities, takes 
care of the republic, safeguards the well-being of its fellow citizens, protects its friends, and, finally, 
restraining the hand and soul from all wrongdoing, looks to the common good with the powers of both mind 
and body.302 
 
When returning to the issue of the oikeiotic basis of civic virtue shortly thereafter, his approach is 
distinctively Ciceronian once again: 
 
With such virtues, those who are involved in the common life and human society first govern themselves, 
then their relations, and finally the state, and devote themselves to people in such a way that they inhabit the 
civil life and do not depart from respectability.303 
 
Here Landino could scarcely be more unambiguous about the centrality of oikeiosis to his 
conception of civic virtue. Yet what is distinctive about Landino’s treatment of the oikeiotic basis 
of the civic virtues in the De anima as opposed to the Disputationes is that he goes on to discuss the 
higher grades of virtue on the grounds that they mark a departure from this principle. The next 
level of purgative virtue, he writes, is the preserve of those who follow the Platonist view that 
human beings are no more than a soul temporarily incarcerated in the body, and separate 
                                                          
302 ‘Nam, cum homo neque solivagus neque a reliquorum hominum consortio alienus sit, sed ad coetus 
conciliaque celebranda natus, id in primis ad suum officium pertinere existimat, ut urbes incolat, ut 
reipublicae consulat, ut suorum civium salutem tutetur, ut socios protegat, ac denique ab omni iniuria manus 
animumque continens et animi et corporis viribus in commune consulat’, De anima, III, p. 52. 
303 ‘Huiuscemodi igitur virtutibus, qui in vita communi et hominum societate degunt, primum se ipsos, deinde 
suos ac postremo rem publicam recte administrant, atque ita inter homines versantur, ut et vitam civilem 
colant, et nusquam ab honestate discedant’, De anima, III, p. 57. Also, see above p.77 and n. 230. 
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themselves from the republic into otium. In particular, those who exercise the purgative virtues ‘do 
not apply those four virtues to the conservation of human society [ad conservandam hominum societatem] 
for the common advantage’.304 This is a view of the grades of virtue above the civic virtues as 
explicitly and characteristically non-oikeiotic in their aim.  
To return to the Disputationes, we have seen how in Lorenzo’s speech in the first book Landino 
lays out three principal arguments for the superiority of negotium – the union of mind and body, the 
natural bonds of reciprocity in civic society and the public utility of wisdom – and that each of 
these has its roots in oikeiotic theory.305 First Lorenzo argues that the virtues pertaining to life and 
morals protect the integrity of the goods of the body as well as the mind which, as is made clear in 
the following chapter, is a reference to their encompassing all the prima naturae which we have the 
natural urge to appropriate and which could be of any kind of benefit to us in life.306 Then, 
redoubling his appeal to nature, he makes his clearest statement of the oikeiotic basis for civil 
association, writing ‘But who shall not see that nature, the great mother, produced us to celebrate 
meetings and unions, and to conserve common society?’.307 Hence, Lorenzo claims, philosophy 
itself was introduced by Socrates to benefit society in order that we might purify ourselves with the 
moral virtues and in so doing ‘our purified actions administer not only ourselves and our family 
affairs, but also – in a much higher degree – the whole republic’.308 His third justification for the 
superiority of negotium leads on logically from this view of socialisation, in that it asserts that the 
civically-engaged sapiens benefits others with his wisdom in a way that the otiosus does not. 
Common to each of the arguments that Lorenzo deploys is the proposition that the merit of the 
active life lies in its fulfilment of the natural, oikeiotic propensities of humankind. These 
propensities emerge from an instinct for self-preservation and consist in the impulse to appropriate 
the prima naturae and the drive towards forming reciprocal social bonds. Indeed, he later specifies 
explicitly that this is the case by claiming that those who engage in negotium are held higher in the 
esteem of the public than their contemplative counterparts because they ‘better obey unerring 
nature’ when governing and thereby set a better moral example.309 Since we are born for the social 
life, ‘anyone who is not a citizen should not be called human, nor should anyone be called a citizen 
who neglects the care of that state in which they are born’.310 From the perspective of political aims 
in the republic, Lorenzo’s concern (as well as that of Landino) is therefore summarised in his 
statement above. He wants to show that that we are moved by nature to ‘conserve common society 
                                                          
304 ‘Quam ob rem quatuor illas virtutes, quod paulo ante nominavi, non in commune ad conservandam 
hominum societatem adhibent’, De anima, III, p. 57. 
305 See above pp. 88-91. 
306 DC, p. 26.24-27 and pp. 61.9-63.24. 
307 ‘Illud autem quis non videat ad concilia coetusque celebrandos et ad communem societatem 
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308 ‘[praecepta] quibus actiones nostrae emendatae non solum nos ac rem familiarem, sed multo etiam magis 
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309 DC, p. 34.22-23 and see above p. 90. 
310 ‘Nec homo is appellandus est, qui non civis sit, nec civis, qui eius in qua natus est civitatis curam negligat’, 
DC, p. 35.15-17. 
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[ad communem societatem conservandam]’, an idea which is, once again, of Ciceronian origin. Recall that 
Cato’s explication of Stoic theory in the De finibus defines the natural, oikeiotic impulse to self-
preservation as a living creature being ‘committed to preserve itself [ad se conservandum]’.311 When he 
goes on to describe how this impulse also compels us to preserve other human beings, he uses the 
same language alongside the phrase administrare rem publicam that Landino would later adopt as his 
characteristic definition of political action: ‘Since we see that human being is born to safeguard and 
preserve other humans [conservandos homines], it is in accordance with nature that the sapiens wishes to 
manage and administer the republic [administrare rem publicam]’.312 This passage was an important 
source for Landino, and is key in understanding how his political thought arises from his natural 
philosophy. Both Cicero and Landino believe that we are able to administer the republic 
(administrare rem publicam) because nature instils in us an urge to conserve common society (conservare 
communem societatem). Hence when, at the beginning of the Disputationes, Alberti asserts that no one 
will be able to administrare rem publicam properly unless they have been purged by the moral virtues 
and illuminated by the dianoetic virtues, and Lorenzo in turn asks what such a governor might learn 
from the investigation of the truth, Landino is not only embarking on an exercise in formulating the 
perfectionist virtue ethics that affords moral legitimacy to the statesman, but is also inviting the 
reader to engage in a dialogue with the Ciceronian tradition and consider how these two kinds of 
virtue relate to the conservation of those societal bonds which arise by nature. As far as negotium is 
concerned, Landino’s intention is to reconcile the quest for personal perfection through which our 
souls can return to God with his Ciceronian, oikeiotic principles by advancing the case that it is all 
the moral virtues, not simply those at the level of the civic virtues, that help us to conserve and 
benefit society. It is, according to Lorenzo’s second argument, our purified actions as well as those 
undertaken in civic virtue through which we administer ourselves, our families and the republic. 
Note how this position differs markedly from that of the De anima. Where Landino had described 
his oikeiotic theory and had used the phrase ad communem societatem conservandam in the De anima, it 
was to argue that it was the civic virtues alone that were concerned with the conservation of these 
social bonds. Yet, in the Disputationes, he is unambiguous that all grades of moral virtues (and, as we 
shall see, the dianoetic virtues) can benefit the state. This development emerged from the necessity 
to account for political involvement and the exercise of power by the otiosus. If proper political 
action consists in conserving society, but the best person to guide that action is one who has 
purified himself by ascending through the Macrobian grades of virtue, one could hardly argue that 
the impulse to conserve society only exists at the lowest level of these grades. Instead, the will to 
conserve society must obtain in one form or another throughout the purificatory process and, 
ultimately, at the level of the dianoetic virtues, when the sage benefits the state by imparting the 
                                                          
311 Cic. Fin. III.v.16 and see above p. 92. 
312 Cic. Fin. III.xx.68. See also Cic. Off. I.xlv.159 and the use of the verb conservare in Cic.Rep.I.vii.12, 
Rep.II.xxv.46 and Rep.VI.xiii.13. 
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knowledge he has gleaned through contemplation. We must now therefore return to Alberti’s 






































2.8 Alberti’s second speech: Landino’s virtue politics 
   
Given Landino’s dialogic conceit of having his two interlocutors act as ciphers for his own 
wranglings over the question of action and contemplation, Lorenzo’s speech should be understood 
as confronting Alberti’s original theory with standard civic humanist objections such that they can 
be dismissed or incorporated as Landino sees fit. Landino signals as much with Alberti’s knowing 
nod to the reader: 
 
For it quickly becomes clear that everything you have said just now in favour of the civic life has all been 
directed to this purpose: that you might induce me to corroborate those arguments by which the investigation 
of the truth is placed above action.313 
 
So, while the purpose of Alberti’s second speech is ostensibly to respond to Lorenzo’s arguments, 
in truth its reasoning is tendentious and directed to a preordained end. For this reason it is 
necessary to address its conclusion first before analysing its particularities. 
Having offered rejoinders to each of Lorenzo’s points by arguing for the superiority of 
contemplation, Alberti concludes by making what seems like a volte-face. The best way of living, he 
states, is in fact that which unites the two genera vitae. In such a way of life, one devotes oneself to 
the munera of action and speculation as far as is necessary.314 The two genera vitae are, he says, sisters, 
‘Mary and Martha living under the same roof’.315 We must remain close to Martha, but we should 
be closer still to Mary, because the contemplation of the truth is the only means by which one can 
ascend towards the knowledge of God. This idea of a way of life which employs each munus as far 
as it is needed is the natural consequence of Landino’s virtue theory having a fundamental structure 
which disassociates the munera from the genera vitae. If one can undertake the munus of speculation in 
both otium and negotium, then neither way of life can be said to have any inherent superiority over 
the other in the exercise of the dianoetic virtues, nor can this be said of the munus of action as it 
applies to the moral virtues. The appeal of such a separation to Landino over the traditional view of 
civic action in Florentine republicanism should not be underestimated, because the life which can 
move between otium and negotium offers the politician a degree of pragmatic control over his public 
conduct rather than prescribing any fixed mode of behaviour: the statesman can engage in the 
practical business of politics to the extent he deems necessary while justifying any withdrawal from 
such duties on the grounds that otium offers longer-lasting strategic and intellectual benefits to the 
state. Since, as we have seen, political legitimacy was conferred within the Quattrocento republic on 
account of perceived standards of virtuous behaviour, mediated through rhetoric and resting on 
                                                          
313 ‘Facile enim apparet, quaecumque paulo ante pro vita civili dixisti, huc omnia tendere, ut me ad ea 
corroboranda excitares, quibus veri investigatio actioni praeponatur’, DC, p. 36.10-12. 
314 DC, p. 47.4-18. 
315 DC, p. 47.19-20. 
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oikeiotic assumptions, Landino’s virtue theory would have been enormously valuable for a 
statesman as a means of maintaining a sense of propriety regardless of the extent of his direct 
involvement in governance.316  
Here we are, of course, led back to the position of Lorenzo de’ Medici in contemporary 
Florentine politics. Like his father and grandfather before him, Lorenzo exercised power through a 
network of loyalists in the various arms of state but by 1471 – three years before the completion of 
the Disputationes – his reforms to the Cento granted him far greater control of Florentine 
government than that of his forebears, meaning that he was able to effect political change both 
directly through personal (and public) intervention in trade, legislation, foreign policy and so on, 
and indirectly, exercising power at arm’s length from official business.317 This latter form of political 
governance did not in itself constitute civic action in the sense it was commonly understood and 
instead demanded a certain detachment from civic life which would have been more characteristic 
of otium. Writers in the intellectual traditions of Florentine republicanism offered little in the way of 
a philosophical basis for such a use of power either because – in the case of Bruni and his 
successors – they celebrated the superiority of the active life and therefore had little time for the 
role of the otiosus in politics, or – in the case of Petrarch and Valla – because otium was viewed in 
humanistic rather than political terms. An arguable exception might be Salutati’s De tyranno, which 
presents a defence of monarchy as the best form of republican constitution (in the very broadest 
sense of ‘republican’) and has some commonality with the Disputationes in advancing the humanistic 
project of promoting virtue in a ruler. Since it is so divergent from Salutati’s earlier opinions, 
however, it is an ambiguous work to interpret, and even if we assume that the work should not (as 
Trinkaus suggests) be understood as a rhetorical exercise, the fact remains that for Salutati the 
monarch is still a figure who is emphatically political rather than an otiosus.318 Lorenzo’s position 
therefore stood at odds with the principles of the Florentine republic in a philosophical sense, just 
as it aroused suspicion on the part of anti-Mediceans such as Tommaso Soderini on political and 
practical grounds. Any humanistic defence of Lorenzo’s politics must therefore have been able to 
accommodate his personal involvement in government through, for instance, convening balie and 
wrangling with the Signoria, while at the same time absolving him of the charge that he was 
subverting constitutional norms by effecting political change from a position of civic withdrawal.  
To this end, a synthesis of otium and negotium was politically expedient in that it permitted, and 
even encouraged, detachment from direct civic intervention on the grounds of its value for strategic 
or exemplary guidance on the part of the statesman. Landino’s integration of the two genera vitae 
should therefore be understood as a legitimisation of Lorenzo’s political behaviour. His system 
presents a justification for the exercise of political power by someone who does not themselves 
                                                          
316 See above pp. 45-58. 
317 See above pp. 33-34. 
318 Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, II, p. 673. On Salutati’s view of the monarch as a political figure, see, 
for instance, De tyranno IV.18. 
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occupy any office of state while at the same time remaining true to the traditions, terminology and 
spirit of Florentine republicanism.  
If we view Landino’s advocacy of a life which incorporates otium and negotium as a justification 
for the use of unsanctioned power under Medicean republicanism, Alberti’s concluding speech of 
the first book of the Disputationes takes on a new light. In order to situate such political intervention 
in a republican context, Landino must establish a philosophical grounding for the return to negotium 
of the individual who has devoted himself to otium. For all that Landino has maintained that action 
and intellectual inquiry (and the ways of life which govern them) are both essential to administrare 
rem publicam, thus far he has for the most part expressed the movement between the two munera as 
unidirectional, an ascent through the grades of moral virtue to achieve psychological purity which 
continues through successive dianoetic virtues so that one might draw closer to God. Yet it is 
movement in the other direction – of the enlightened sapiens returning to politics to offer the 
benefits of his wisdom to the state – that provides the intellectual basis for the exercise of political 
power without occupying formal office. Alberti’s volte-face is therefore nothing of the sort. His 
preceding arguments, which show the benefit of the sage to the republic, have been preempting his 
conclusion. 
With this in mind, we can now approach Alberti’s responses to Lorenzo’s individual points. He 
begins by recapitulating his stance on the preeminence of the mens. For the mens to involve itself in 
anything other than speculation on the truth would be unworthy because, since this task is devoted 
to incorporeal things without intermediary sense-perception, it involves the most divine part of us 
and therefore must be preferred to any task of activity. It therefore follows that the munus of 
intellectual investigation is superior to that of action because the former is aloof from the 
materiality which afflicts the embodied soul. In order to drive this point home, he delivers a 
rhetorical defence of this superiority which is illustrated by aspects of the story of Mary and Martha 
in the gospel of Luke.319 The arguments he advances to this end include the fact that contemplation 
keeps us on a constant course while action involves incessant distraction; the fact that a greater, 
undisturbed, mental pleasure should be preferred to a lesser one; the fact that, following Psalm 26, 
speculation is sought on its own account rather than for another end as action is; and the fact that 
we undertake intellectual investigation in tranquil otium, while activity must take place in a material 
world which is subject to the perturbationes that the moral virtues must quell.320 The deployment of 
this story, laden with scriptural authority, helps Landino to foreshadow his final conclusion that the 
two ways of life are, like Mary and Martha, ‘sisters’ with their own particular value. 
Since the superiority of the intellect has now been reiterated, Alberti abandons his oratorical 
approach in favour of a dialectical method, addressing the specific points raised by Lorenzo in his 
speech one by one in order to justify the extrapolitical exercise of power. First he seeks to counter 
                                                          
319 Luke 10.38-42. See above, n. 244. 
320 DC, pp. 36.13-37.25, from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, Q.182 A.1. 
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Lorenzo’s claim that the sapiens otiosus is a redundant drain on the efforts of other citizens with the 
exemplary figure of Paolo Toscanelli, the prominent Florentine intellectual and friend of Alberti 
and Landino who served as interlocutor in the De anima. A lengthy embedded speech made on 
Toscanelli’s behalf by Alberti imagines how he might defend himself from such charges. Toscanelli 
– who takes care to point out that he conducts himself according to the virtues pertaining to life 
and morals and adheres to all laws – is aware of the esteem in which the political life is held by the 
citizenry if statesmen execute (administrent) their offices with the highest virtue, but emphasises that 
politicians who fall short of this ideal are invariably disgraced because prominence in positions of 
governmental authority can serve to magnify one’s vices as much as one’s virtues: ‘Those who are 
placed in an exalted and lofty position can hide neither their virtues nor their vices, and the more 
they deviate from the right path the more they are criticised’.321 This advice is at once cautionary 
and reflective, in the sense that it would necessarily have drawn the contemporary reader’s mind to 
the sack of Volterra in 1472 in which the massacre perpetrated by Federico’s mercenaries reflected 
badly on Lorenzo whether or not it happened because of the wilful intervention of the young ruler. 
As I mentioned earlier, by the time of the completion of the Disputationes the sack of Volterra was 
already beginning to be seen as a lapse of judgment on the part of Lorenzo by scholars and 
politicians – if not the citizenry – and it would have provided an object lesson in the reputational 
risks of political decision-making, especially on the part of supporters of the Medici such as 
Landino.322 Prevailing humanistic attitudes to virtue created an environment in which statesmen 
were legitimised by their moral worth, and the rhetorical apparatus which regulated this 
environment could easily be brought to bear on a statesman in order to insinuate that his political 
misjudgments were illustrative of conduct which was less than virtuous, so it was important that 
any system of virtue ethics in the wake of Volterra should address this issue.  
The mitigation of such reputational risks is addressed in Toscanelli’s next claim, which is that 
political decision-making is a matter of acquiring the relevant skill (artificium) and tools (instrumenta) 
for the administration of the state, an essential prerequisite for which is the knowledge of the truth. 
This knowledge, however, is unattainable when vice is present: 
 
Through this knowledge alone does not only the ultimate end (which everyone desires to reach) display itself 
to us, but we are also shown the shortest and easiest way which leads us there... We will never attain the light 
of knowledge through sordid and vulgar conduct, nor will we attain it when addicted to pleasure, nor subject 
to avarice, nor bound to ambition. But we will attain it when inflamed by an ardent love for the discovery of 
the truth, so I follow the guidance of reason in order that I may reach it, and I do not abandon the signs of 
nature itself.323 
                                                          
321 ‘Qui enim in sublimi ac excelso loco constituti sunt, eorum neque virtutes neque vitia quenquam latent ac, 
quantum a recta via aberratum est, tantum exagitantur’, DC, p. 38.27-29. 
322 See above p. 37. 
323 ‘Hoc enim uno non solum ultimum illud, quo quisque pervenire cupit, se nobis ostendit, verum etiam quae 




For Landino, the suppression of vice is not only valorised for its purgative benefits in moral ascent, 
but also for its crucial role in political praxis. One cannot possess the skills necessary for political 
decision-making without first curbing the risk of error by using the moral virtues to cleanse oneself 
of sensual pleasure, avarice and ambition, and the moral virtues themselves are perfected by the 
knowledge of the truth achieved through the dianoetic virtues. This position leads to two main 
consequences for Landino. First, by having Alberti express his advocacy for a life which includes 
both action (that is, governmental decision-making and the purgation of vice) and detachment (for 
intellectual inquiry into the truth) in terms of its mitigation of reputational risk, Landino illustrates 
the political expediency of such a life for Lorenzo and politicians like him. Simply put, such 
politicians must hone their statecraft through the munus of intellectual inquiry to avoid the damage 
to their standing that another Volterra would bring. These are practical grounds for political 
withdrawal which stand as a justification for the statesman to detach himself from the civic context 
of governmental activity when necessary, directing policy and exercising power free of the usual 
republican constraints of the purely active life. Second, Landino’s concern with the amplificatory 
quality which the exercise of power has upon a politician’s vices, and the fact that these vices are 
presented as an impediment to attaining the techniques of statecraft as well as being an obstacle in 
the ascent to God, further explains his decision to emphasise their significance in the rest of the 
Disputationes. When Landino introduces the taxonomy of vice into his system of virtue ethics in the 
second book and emphasises the triad of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio throughout his allegorisation of 
the Aeneid, he is doing so because vice has deleterious consequences for one’s political as well as 
moral development. 
Having offered a rationale on pragmatic, reputational grounds for political guidance by a leader 
who is withdrawn from offices of government, Landino must reaffirm that otium is nevertheless 
entirely consistent with republican orthodoxy in the benefits it brings to the state. He does so by 
having Toscanelli advance the position that those who dedicate themselves to the investigation of 
the truth benefit the state far more than those devoted to negotium. For Toscanelli, one who 
conserves the state in its material form – its ‘harbour, shipyards, walls, temples or portico’ – really 
‘conserves’ nothing at all in the inevitable course of time, whereas collective action in a common 
cause produces civic concord, the sole power which can truly maintain the state. An elaborate 
causational chain explains how such civic concord is brought about by otium: 
 
The best legislation will produce [civic concord], and the observance of this legislation will be maintained by 
the virtue of those who exercise it. Reasoning achieved by diligent intellectual inquiry will foster virtue, and 
                                                          
nunquam assequemur, Neque enim voluptatibus addicti neque avaritiae obnoxii neque ambitioni obligati id 
assequemur, sed ardentissimo quodam veri inveniendi amore incensi, quo ut perveniam sequor ducentes 
rationes et vestigia ipsius naturae non desero’, DC, p. 39.12-27. 
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only mental discipline devoted to the truth will perfect this reasoning. Finally, we will procure the truth after 
having devoted our attention to it in a long period of otium.324 
 
Thus reason stimulates the soul to learn, to memorise what it has learned and to use what it has 
memorised in its pursuit of the truth and, ultimately, the summum bonum.  
Alberti’s position here indicates how Landino hopes to extend the oikeiotic idea that political 
responsibility consists in ‘conserving common society’ such that it applies to the munus of 
contemplation as well as that of action – or, to put it another way, that the dianoetic virtues are 
devoted to the oikeiotic conservation of society as well as the moral virtues. By using Toscanelli to 
defend otium, he is inviting the reader to wrangle with what precisely it means to ‘conserve’ the 
state.325 Rather than consisting in the preservation of the physical integrity of walls, buildings and so 
on, what truly conserves the state is civic concord, through which ‘the deeds accomplished by 
individuals united in one whole’ preserve our communal bonds through social harmony.326 For 
Toscanelli, and therefore Alberti, and therefore Landino, however, this concord is not sustained by 
the practice of the moral virtues. Instead, the only thing that can maintain it is legislation drawn up 
by statesmen who have cultivated the dianoetic virtues through intellectual inquiry. If we are to 
fulfil our natural impulse to preserve others, we must therefore look to purifying ourselves such 
that we can exercise the dianoetic virtues in contemplation. Landino is careful not to stray into the 
traps of either specifying the precise workings of the legislative process any further or following 
Aristotelian tradition in comparing different systems of government, each of which would present 
him with uncomfortable questions about how a legislator who withdraws himself from political 
activity might be integrated within the collective and collegial decision-making characteristic of 
republicanism. Instead he maintains a studied vagueness which allows him to maintain that those 
who devise legislation through the cultivation of dianoetic virtues in otium do so in the best 
republican traditions of oikeiotic reciprocity, contributing to the conservation of society whether 
they operate in an official capacity or not. Later in the Disputationes Landino returns to this subject 
but elides his earlier separation between the official and unofficial leaders of the state by 
maintaining that it is those in charge of the republic whose speculative vision allows them to offer 
advice and guidance:  
 
They see Carthage from a high position because – as we also discussed the day before yesterday – a republic 
will never be regulated with the best institutions and laws unless those who are in charge of it wisely arrange 
                                                          
324 ‘Id autem optima legum institutio pariet, legum autem observantiam eorum, qui illis utuntur, virtus 
conservabit, virtutem autem rationes a diligenti inquisitione profectae pariunt, illas autem sola exercitatio circa 
verum perficit, verum postremo diuturno quodam otio circa ipsum adhibito nobis comparabimus’, DC, p. 
40.9-13. 
325 See above p. 88 and pp. 99-100. 
326 ‘Concordia civium, quam actiones a singulis profectae in unum coeuntes ita conficiunt’, DC, p. 40.5-6. 
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everything they recommend or prohibit according to the rule and norm of that which they perceive through 
speculation on great things.327 
 
It is clear from both of these formulations that when the sage returns from otium to impart the 
benefits of his investigations, he will not only dispense strategic advice but will also offer concrete 
legislative recommendations to best enrich the common good. When compared with Salutati’s De 
tyranno and its explicit endorsement of a form of republican monarchy, Landino’s view of the 
foundation of law demonstrates the extent of his efforts to maintain continuity between legislation 
on the part of an extrapolitical individual and the communal foundations of Florentine 
republicanism. It is the inverse of princely or monarchical edict that Landino is describing here. No 
claims are made for the supremacy of the legislator: rather, the virtue he cultivates in otium is 
committed to the flourishing of equal intrapersonal bonds in a way that other intellectual lynchpins 
of Florentine republicanism such as Bruni would find difficult to dispute. 
With Toscanelli’s imagined defence of the sapiens otiosus having been concluded, Landino 
establishes grounds for the return of the sage to the political realm by having Alberti respond to 
Lorenzo’s argument that the unity of body and soul necessitates that the correct genus vitae is that 
which perfects both.328 While the body should not entirely be neglected, Alberti says, it is like a 
chain, a vase or a vestment for the soul whereas the human being itself is in fact the mens alone, as 
both Plato and the Christians profess. Even if we concede that the human being is constituted of 
body and mind, and that the moral virtues preserve them both and maintain the senses necessary 
for the cognition of the divine, we must still acknowledge that, since these virtues emerge from the 
understanding of what is just and in accordance with nature, they cannot be perfected without the 
intellectual investigation of the mens. The investigation of the truth – and, by extension, the 
dianoetic virtues which promote it – both produces and aids the moral virtues but touches an 
element of the divine they cannot. In order to make explicit the link between this rather abstract 
notion and the business of government, Landino has Alberti venture into scriptural semiotics by 
suggesting that this is the reason why God handed down the Ten Commandments. In so 
instructing Moses in the law, he claims, God was showing us that the intellectual investigation of 
the divine is necessary to administrare rem publicam. The dianoetic virtues will, therefore, serve us 
better in both strengthening the oikeiotic bonds of civil society and in controlling the appetite and 
its constituent parts, the irascible and concupiscible powers: 
 
                                                          
327 ‘Carthaginem vero e loco superiore cernunt, quoniam, ut nudius quoque tertius disputatum est, nunquam 
optimis institutis et legibus temperata erit res publica, nisi qui illi praesunt cuncta, quae aut praecipiunt aut 
prohibent, ad eorum, quae per rerum magnarum speculationem viderint, regulam ac normam sapientissime 
dirigant’, DC, p. 181.9-14, referring to Aeneid I.419. Stahel’s translation is unreliable here because he 
concludes with ‘according to the rule and norm of those who have a speculative vision of great things’, which 
would only be accurate if the final ‘quae’, an accusative neuter plural denoting the things perceived, were ‘qui’, 
a nominative masculine plural denoting those who perform the act of perceiving. 
328 DC, pp. 40.20-42.24. 
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This is why, with regard to both conserving common society and overcoming the two enemies of human 
tranquillity [viz. pain and pleasure, or the vis irascibilis and vis concupiscibilis], the virtues which are devoted to the 
cognition of the truth will serve us better than those which strive in action. Nonetheless, both common 
society, by which the human race is bound together because it seeks to satisfy bodily need rather than the 
excellence of the soul, and those fierce enemies, which you were casting before our eyes in your oration in 
order to strike fear into us, are to be buried as one with the body.329 
  
After death our souls, free from their bodily entombment, will therefore continue to enjoy the 
pleasure of the truth which is why, says Alberti, Jesus declared that ‘Mary chose the best part, which 
was not taken away from her’.330 This is why those who devote themselves to otium discover things 
which can be used by politicians to manage civic affairs (ad rem civilem administrandam).331 
By explaining this aspect of the relationship between the two kinds of virtue in terms of the 
priority of the cognitive faculties over those of the senses, Landino not only sidesteps an apparent 
contradiction – he has, after all, maintained so far that one must first purify oneself through the 
moral virtues in order to develop the dianoetic virtues in any meaningful way – but also he 
introduces into his moral psychology a mechanism for the transposition and assimilation of the 
benefits of cognition into the realm of activity. This conceptual structure allows him to extrapolate 
the operation of the virtues from the level of the individual to that of the corporate body of the 
state. If proper moral or civic behaviour supervenes upon the cultivation of the dianoetic virtues 
then it follows that the intervention of those devoted to intellectual inquiry in otium must also be 
necessary for government – even a republican government – to work properly. Hence, according to 
Alberti, ‘the things which will be advantageous to the administration of republics cannot be 
discovered except through the intellectual investigation of supreme things by humanity’.332 Just as 
the enlightened philosopher can return to Plato’s cave to communicate his knowledge of the forms, 
so too can the sage gain wisdom in contemplation with which he can benefit the republic.333 
It is therefore the dianoetic virtues rather than the moral virtues which ultimately serve us best 
in conserving the civic bonds of society, and when the sapiens, having exercised his cognitive 
faculties in otium, returns to impart his wisdom to the state he has divine sanction to do so. That 
this otium should necessarily take place free from the constraints of any official political obligations 
                                                          
329 ‘Quapropter et ad communem societatem conservandam et ad duos illos humanae tranquillitatis hostes 
superandos multo efficacius hae virtutes nobis proderunt, quae in veri cognitione versantur, quam illae, quae 
in rebus agendis laborant. Quamquam et societas, qua humanum genus devincitur, non propter animi 
excellentiam, sed propter corporis indigentiam expetatur et hostes illi, quos oratione tua ita saevos oculis 
paene nostris subiciebas, ut horrorem incuteres, una cum corpore sepeliendi sint’, DC, p. 42.5-13 and see 
above pp. 65-66. 
330 ‘Maria optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea’, DC, p. 42.18-19 quoting Luke 10.42. See also 
Augustine, Sermo LIV [CIV Ben.]. Landino mentioned this passage in passing earlier in DC, p. 37.19-20, while 
adapting Gregory’s interpretation from his Homilies on Ezekiel II.2.9. 
331 DC, p. 42.21-24. 
332 ‘Quae ad rerum publicarum administrationem utilia futura sint, non nisi per supremarum rerum 
investigationem ab hominibus excogitari posse’, DC, p. 42.3-5. 
333 Plat. Rep. VII.514a-520a. 
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permits the intervention of influential citizens such as Lorenzo and Cosimo in the management of 
the republic on supervisory or strategic grounds, providing advice gleaned from their intellectual 
inquiries to perfect mechanisms of state which cannot themselves transcend corporeal mundanity. 
Landino elaborates on this idea in his allegorisation of the Aeneid in the third and fourth books of 
the Disputationes. First he describes how the passage in which Aeneas feeds and consoles his 
followers after having been shipwrecked in Carthage symbolises the way in which the sapiens must 
intervene in practical matters when necessary: 
 
For this is the ministration [administratio] of the best leader: when he sees that civic action serves a human 
need – although it does not serve that which is divine in us – he will devote himself to it, but in such a way 
that when he has provided the things which are necessary for human needs he will direct their souls to the 
divine...334 
 
Similarly, Landino later interprets the passage in which Aeneas leaves Dido but promises to 
remember her forever as demonstrating the extent to which the statesman ought to devote himself 
to each way of life: 
 
For we call ‘perfected’ the one who devotes himself to speculation while he lives in such a way that, in his 
turn, he acts as the circumstance demands. Therefore he does not so much flee the life of activity as withdraw 
from it, because [Aeneas] did not enter into a contract of marriage with [Dido]. We were not born so that we 
might devote ourselves to mortal things as though we were married to them: one devotes oneself to them for 
the sake of necessity and we only expend as much effort on them as is required to conserve society.335 
 
The messy business of politics is only to be undertaken out of necessity. When the contemplator 
stirs himself from otium it is for the purpose of conserving society (ad societatem conservandam), which, as 
we have seen, is a tell-tale phrase that Landino uses to indicate the kind of political action which is 
devoted to the maintenance of communal bonds. Yet non-interference remains the default position 
for the individual detached from government, and any political intervention on his part carries with 
it no constitutional obligation or responsibility as would a ‘marriage’ to civic activity. It is instead 
                                                          
334 ‘Haec enim optimi principis administratio est. Nam cum videat civilem actionem humanae indigentiae, non 
autem ei quae in nobis est divinitati inservire, ita in illa versabitur, ut, cum quae ad mortalium inopiam 
necessaria sunt providerit, suorum tamen animos ad divina erigat’, DC, pp. 174.27-175.1, referring to Aeneid 
I.198-207. Incidentally, this is one of only a handful of occasions where Landino uses the word princeps in the 
elucidation of his political philosophy in the Disputationes. Since these all occur within a short section in which 
Landino interprets the actions of Aeneas when he lands in Carthage, it would seem that he is transferring the 
epithet from Aeneas to the more generalised description of a republican political leader he describes 
elsewhere throughout the text. The other instances occur at DC, p. 174.12 (‘ea enim principis cura est’) and 
DC, p. 176.12 (‘Est enim optimi principis vel praecipuum munus’). 
335 ‘Nam eum denique absolutissimum appellabimus, qui ita in speculatione, dum vivit, versetur, ut vicissim, 
cum res postulat, agat. Ergo non fugit a vita agendi, sed inde recedit, quia cum ea non contraxerat 
matrimonium. Non enim nati sumus, ut circa mortalia versemur illisque coniungamur, sed necessitatis causa 
est illis insistendum, ut tantum operae impendamus, quantum ad societatem conservandam sat sit’, DC, p. 
197.17-23, referring to Aeneid IV.333-61. 
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entered into on impromptu grounds and carried out with reluctance, as though no other option 
were supposedly available. Of course, given the reality of the political position that Landino was 
attempting to defend – that is, Lorenzo’s intervention in Florentine politics without being part of 
the government – he seems to be advising that, should such an individual adopt this position of 
feigned hesitancy, he will be better placed to excuse political interference in the workings of a 
republic in which he holds no official position. 
To reinforce this argument, Landino next has Alberti take issue with Lorenzo’s claim that 
negotium offers the greater benefits to society. Alberti argues that, on the contrary, the benefits of 
otium are disseminated more widely and to more people than those of negotium. The figure to whom 
he turns as his model is Cicero. To hold up Cicero as an exemplum of humanistic values, whether in 
the context of statesmanship, Latinity, or philosophy, was of course a commonplace of Renaissance 
literature and Landino would have been familiar with many such presentations including those by 
Salutati, Bruni and Petrarch, not to mention his own praise of Cicero as a literary and philosophical 
exemplar in his prefatory lecture on the Tusculanae Disputationes.336 Moreover, the fact that Lorenzo’s 
three principal objections to the superiority of otium have their roots in Ciceronian thought supports 
the relevancy of this choice. Just as Lorenzo had sought to defend activity through a 
comprehensive roster of eminent men of action, so Alberti brings to bear the moral authority of 
Cicero’s numerous historical actions, both during and after his consulate, in order to establish that 
his dedication to the common good through civic duty was deserving of praise. Yet in otium, Alberti 
argues, Cicero’s intellectual investigations offer teachings for all time. Referring indirectly to the De 
finibus, De officiis, and Tusculanae Disputationes, Alberti describes how Cicero grants us insights into 
human nature and ends, the moral duties of life, and how to scorn death, suffering and perturbationes 
animi.337 Moreover, he continues, the De legibus and De republica describe a ‘universal civil doctrine’ 
which demonstrates the constitution of the state, its laws, politicians and peoples. Just as Cicero’s 
works have continued to instruct subsequent and future generations, so those of other otiosi have 
instilled prudence and liberal education (humanitas) into the human race. Indeed, intellectual inquiry 
by such sages was a prerequisite for the formation of the first human comities and their laws. For 
Alberti, Cicero shows us that the benefits of action are ephemeral when compared to those of 
speculation, which last forever.  
By way of illustration, Alberti returns to Lorenzo’s account of the constitution of the ideal city. 
Once the sapiens negotiosus has admitted all of his citizens, he must also allow entry to the sapiens 
otiosus who (supported by public funds) will benefit communal life by absenting himself from all 
                                                          
336 Scritti, I, p. 14. From the wealth of humanist literature on the exemplarity of Cicero, see for instance 
Salutati’s use of Cicero as an interlocutor in letter VIII.10 in Epistolario, II, pp. 408-409, and Bruni’s Cicero 
Novus passim. For all Petrarch’s concern with Cicero’s moral fibre, he celebrates Cicero as a model of literary 
excellence in e.g. Trionfo della Fama III.19-20 and Familiares XXIV.4. A useful survey of Ciceronian exemplarity 
among humanists is David Marsh, ‘Cicero in the Renaissance’, in The Cambridge Companion to Cicero, ed. by 
Catherine Steel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 306-18. 
337 DC, p. 43.12-19. 
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negotium and devoting himself to intellectual inquiry, the findings of which he will set down in 
writing. In doing so, he profits civic life by setting an example of a model citizen and offering 
advice to those who need it. Just as he had with the example of Toscanelli, so too here Alberti 
justifies the benefits of contemplation in terms which relate to the process of oikeiosis. When Alberti 
refines Lorenzo’s image of the sapiens admitting citizens into an empty city according to their 
particular role in its welfare by giving preeminence to those who contemplate God, he perpetuates 
the metaphor he attributed to Toscanelli of the city being unable to properly conserve civic 
concord without an animating legislation that is divinely inspired.338 Through the wisdom the sapiens 
gains, which in turn he communicates through his writings, Alberti believes that each individual will 
‘learn to execute the role demanded of them in the state’, and thereby better strengthen the 
reciprocal human bonds of society that Lorenzo was himself advocating.339 Later, at the end of the 
third book, Landino presents an even more vivid illustration of this sublimated form of oikeiotic 
theory when he interprets the construction of the city of Carthage in Aen. I.423-29 as being an 
allegory for the constituent functions of the republic. First come the walls and dwellings which 
represent its capacity to protect its inhabitants; then the laws and government which enshrine the 
moral behaviour particular to humanity; then the public works which represent things that are 
useful (utile) in their contribution to the financial and political power of the republic; then cultural 
buildings which represent the capacity for relaxation of body and soul.340 
Alberti’s last rebuttals to Lorenzo’s arguments preempt potential objections to the case Landino 
has constructed in favour of the republican otiosus. For instance, Lorenzo’s analogies of the ship and 
the body politic are both unconvincing, he claims, because in each case it would be necessary to 
have a presiding power (that is, a navigator and a mind respectively) which remains free from 
activity to make proper judgments. It is clear that Landino is seeking to propose how in practical 
terms an individual can and should appropriate political power in a republican context, and his 
strongest justification for such an action appears when Alberti addresses Lorenzo’s point that the 
state ends up being governed by inferior leaders when the most talented devote themselves to otium. 
It is rare for a sapiens to ‘abandon’ civic life as such, he claims, because they are able to benefit the 
state through advice and example and, in any case, the sapiens will involve himself in governance of 
the state if called upon by the citizenry, or if the current leadership is incompetent. In the case of 
incompetence on the part of political leaders, intervention is, as far as possible, obligatory on the 
part of the sage, who must either ‘take charge in their [the current leaders’] place, or try to make 
them better’ or otherwise ‘return into himself and benefit humanity in another way’.341 If, though, 
he sees that another sapiens is in charge he should devote himself to otium because Plato tells us ‘it is 
                                                          
338 DC, pp. 28.8-29.12 and pp. 44.15-45.8. 
339 ‘A quo quisque partes sibi in re publica demandatas obire discat’, DC, p. 45.3-4. 
340 DC, p. 181.18-28. 
341 ‘Aut ipse [sapiens] illorum vicem obire aut eos meliores reddere tentaturum; quodsi neque ipse admittetur 
neque illi meliores fieri patientur, rediturum ad se aliaque ratione hominibus profuturum’, DC, p. 46.5-8. 
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much more pleasant to be ruled [regi] than to rule [regere]’ under such conditions.342 The sapiens must 
also rely on benefitting the state through his otium if the current rulers are unwilling to accept his 
advice or he is not allowed to take their place.  
To reconstruct the political involvement of an extra-governmental figure as an act of public 
service in this way would have been as compelling in its significance to a reader familiar with the 
context of recent Florentine politics as it was convenient in its validation of Lorenzo’s rule. Since 
the Medici had gained control of Florence under Cosimo, internal opposition to them within 
republican institutions had manifested itself consistently, albeit in various different ways: Cosimo 
was forced into exile in 1433 by prominent politicians for his supposed financial and electoral 
crimes; Piero faced the attempts of the ottimati to reassert power; and Lorenzo was confronted with 
a restive Signoria during the Volterra crisis and faced struggles with the Cento over his reforms.343 
In each of these cases the Medici resorted to balie as their preferred instrument of wresting back 
institutional control and overcoming threats to their authority. The fact that such balie were 
supposedly only ever convened in times of war speaks as to an inclination on the part of the Medici 
to portray their acquisition of power as a regrettable necessity in desperate times, a stance entirely 
consistent with the idea that political failure requires the intervention of the sapiens and an example 
of the kind of ‘feigned hesitancy’ towards exercising extrapolitical power that I mentioned earlier. 
Moreover, the Medici would often seek to delegitimise their political rivals both implicitly or 
explicitly, whether through a willingness to treat them far more ruthlessly than other oligarchic 
elements of the Florentine ruling class did (examples could include Cosimo’s exiling of Rinaldo 
degli Albizzi, Palla Strozzi and others, and Piero’s exiling of the signatories of the 1466 oath of 
defence) or through the retrospective attribution of moral and intellectual failings (such as Piero’s 
portrayal of the conflict with the ottimati in 1466 as a conspiracy which sought his assassination).344 
If a rival was bad enough to be exiled or wicked enough to attempt any conspiracy, it would only 
have been right that a more ‘virtuous’ leader assumed power in such cases. Hence, by couching the 
adoption of power on the part of an extrapolitical figure as the reluctant action of the withdrawn 
sapiens, Landino can maintain a sense of moral propriety about any Medici involvement in the 
workings of the republic.  
Finally, Alberti acknowledges that Lorenzo’s catalogue of eminent men of action throughout 
myth and history is indeed worthy of praise, but he favours those men who follow the 
contemplative life because speculation touches the divine: ‘He is a god amongst mortals who, as it is 
in Virgil, “was able to know the causes of things”. And I consider he who governs properly as the 
greatest and most eminent man within the human race’.345 A statesman deserves admiration on 
                                                          
342 ‘Est enim divini Platonis praeceptum, si sapientem rebus praeesse viderit sapiens, usurum illium otio suo, 
cum multo sit suavius regi quam regere’, DC, p. 46.2-4. 
343 See above pp. 23-44. 
344 On Piero’s conflict with the ottimati, see Najemy, A History of Florence, pp. 298-306. 
345 ‘Deus est inter mortales, qui, ut est apud Maronem, rerum potuit cognoscere causas. At maximum ac 
excellentissimum virum inter homines et iudico, qui recte rem gerit’, DC, p. 46.14-16. 
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account of his devotion to the common bonds of humankind through care of strangers, self-
sacrifice and because he can rouse himself from otium to negotium when necessary. The honours and 
wealth accumulated by such men are also necessary because ‘the state honours above all those who 
it is in its greatest interest to honour’, and it is in the interest of the state that such men defend it 
and cause it to grow.346 Human frailty requires that such honours entice those who might lack 
Ciceronian right reason (recta ratio) towards proper civic behaviour. Notwithstanding Landino’s 
interest in the humanistic debates on the moral implications of prosperity since the second 
redaction of the Xandra, it is difficult to imagine that his decision to tackle this subject was not 
motivated at least in part by the inconvenient fact of Lorenzo’s enormous wealth (and, for that 
matter, that of Federico da Montefeltro) and his conscious striving for the social currency of 
‘honour and benefit’ (honore e utile).347 Since Landino would not have been able to address the matter 
in Alberti’s initial speech in praise of the life of intellectual inquiry because it did not align with the 
idea of the withdrawn sapiens, it was necessary for the character of Lorenzo to raise it in his speech 
so Alberti could respond with specific reference to the movement from otium to negotium on the part 
of the recipient of honours and therefore absolve extrapolitical figures from the shame of having 
accumulated wealth and accolades during their public duties. Landino partly justifies the acquisition 
of honours on the pragmatic grounds of their inspiring flawed human beings, but it is his 
endorsement of the bestowal of honours on the grounds of the self-interest of the state in 
attracting those who ‘defend it, grow it and amplify [its] majesty’ which ties this line of thought to 
the potential rewards for the unsanctioned exercise of power within a republican context. By 
honouring those who take part in political activity the state assures that it continues to flourish, and 
in this way of thinking it is justifiable for the sapiens who is moved reluctantly into political service 
(as Cosimo, Piero and Lorenzo supposedly were) to be rewarded with garlands such as, for 
instance, Cosimo’s being granted the title of ‘Pater Patriae’ on his death.348 
We should note that Alberti’s arguments show how, for Landino, the reason which compels the 
contemplative sage to return to administrare rem publicam with his divine wisdom is that of oikeiosis. 
Beyond all others, the quality that compels us to fulfil our political responsibilities is the reciprocal 
pull exerted by the social bonds of humanity. Hence, Alberti tells us how ‘a human being is 
produced in such a way that he is tied to others in the bond of charity and, at the same time, burns 
with the love of understanding things’, and the best individual is one who both preserves the 
oikeiotic bonds of society and strives towards the summum bonum: 
 
                                                          
346 ‘Eos enim res publica in primis honorat, quos honorare sua maximi intersit’, DC, p. 46.21-22. 
347 Prominent humanist interventions on the subject of the moral utility of wealth include the De avaritia of 
Poggio Bracciolini, the Della famiglia of Leon Battista Alberti, and De paupertate, the third book of Francesco 
Filelfo’s Commentationes florentinae de exilio. On the specific relevance of such debates to Lorenzo, see in 
particular Bullard, Lorenzo il Magnifico, pp. 43-79 and pp. 133-53, and see above p. 29. 
348 On the incorporation of this honour into subsequent mythologising of Cosimo as a republican stateman, 
see Brown, ‘The Humanist Portrait of Cosimo de’ Medici’, pp. 186-221 
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One who engages in activity as much as the needs of mortal matters and the bond of human society demand 
and as the love of his country compels him; but who devotes himself to speculation so that he remembers it 
is the purpose of humanity, except to the extent that our weakness distracts us from it.349 
 
Landino has had Alberti maintain a consistent position in all his responses to Lorenzo’s points, 
such that he accepts the oikeiotic assumptions of civic Ciceronianism while at the same time 
maintaining the precedence of the dianoetic virtues over the moral. For Landino, there is no 
contradiction between viewing the republic as a form of natural human socialisation and advocating 
political influence from a position of otium. Since he has recognised that the dianoetic virtues are the 
optimal means of conserving society then, a fortiori, he has confirmed beyond question that the 
higher grades of moral virtue – the purgative virtues and the virtues of the purged soul – are also 
beneficial in this regard as they are the only means through which one can attain the capacity for 
the investigation of the truth. Politically speaking, the intellectual apparatus of oikeiosis imposes a 
moral imperative to concern oneself with the well-being of the state that is equally applicable 
whether one engages in the munus of action, through direct governance or purification, or that of 
contemplation, through guidance inspired by the dianoetic virtues. 
As far as political action is concerned, then, it is the maintenance of natural social bonds that 
demands the return of the sage from contemplation. Since Landino is using here the precise 
phraseology of Cicero he has consistently adopted to this end, it is unquestionable that here and 
elsewhere he means to draw attention to the fact that he is departing from the Ciceronian tradition 
in ascribing a role to the otiosus in cultivating these oikeiotic relationships. To repurpose the 
Ciceronian interpretation of oikeiosis in the service of political interference from those withdrawn 
from public life is as explicit an example of fulfilling his aims as one can imagine. For so fervent a 
Medici loyalist as Landino, an unmediated republicanism that did not permit one to wield power 
beyond the confines of government would never suffice, yet, with some justification, he can claim 
that he upholds the very Ciceronian (and, for that matter, Florentine) traditions he is subverting. 
Since human beings are political by nature, and that this same nature compels them to separate 
their souls from their bodies and draw closer to God, then it must follow that one who has 
completed the process of self-divinisation can, indeed must, guide the direction of society. 
To summarise briefly, in Alberti’s second speech Landino has made a case for the exercise of 
political power by one who does not hold office in philosophical, pragmatic, oikeiotic and 
republican terms, not to mention his also presenting Cicero as an exemplary historical precedent for 
the sapiens otiosus. De Robertis has observed that such a diversity of methodology in the exchange 
between Lorenzo and Alberti serves as an investigation into the various epistemological stances 
                                                          
349 ‘Cum ita natum, ut et caritatis nodo cum ceteris devinctus sit et rerum cognoscendarum amore flagret’, 
DC, p. 47.8-9; ‘qui actionibus tantum praebeat, quantum rerum mortalium indigentia atque humanae 
societatis vinculum postulat, quantum patriae amor impellit. Ad speculationem autem ita se convertet, ut ad 
eam, nisi quatenus inbecillitas nostra inde avocet, se natum meminerit’, DC, p. 47.11-15.  
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which a ruler might use to uncover the best kind of knowledge for conducting his political affairs, 
and there is certainly some value in conceiving Landino’s approach in this way when considering 
the didactic function of the text.350 I would argue, though, that De Robertis’s view underestimates 
the significance of any overarching intention for the Disputationes on Landino’s part by focussing 
too much on its dialogicity, interpreting the discourse between the two characters as a genuine 
representation of different epistemological positions rather than tending towards a particular goal. 
As we have already seen, the purpose of the disputational back-and-forth between Lorenzo and 
Alberti is in fact to tease out the implications of a political-philosophical system which Landino 
specifies at the outset. Nevertheless, it is true that Landino’s employment of different 
methodologies is deliberate and self-conscious. That he deems the variety of his approaches to be 
comprehensive enough to support his aims is shown by having Alberti return to Lorenzo’s 
metaphor of the imagined city, reaffirming his central thesis by declaring that the sapiens otiosus 
should offer guidance to its citizens because the benefits of speculation are permanent while those 
of action are temporary.351 
It is necessary to make an important qualification about Landino's efforts to accommodate 
extrapolitical influence within a republican context. Despite the Platonic underpinnings of his moral 
philosophy, the idea which he is advancing is in an important sense profoundly different from that 
of the philosopher-king described in Plato's Republic. The view that Landino’s Platonism and 
support of the primacy of otium mean that he is intent on resurrecting the concept of the 
philosopher-king endures in some secondary literature on the Disputationes. Quentin Skinner claims 
that ‘Landino ingeniously connects [the concept of the philosopher-king] with a further defence of 
otium against the demands of active citizenship’.352 Ursula Rombach argues in a similar vein that 
Landino’s unification of otium and negotium incorporated ‘the ideal of the philosopher-king and the 
development of his education’, and Bernhard Huss and Gernot Michael Müller align Landino’s 
intentions with those of Ficino and Lorenzo, asserting that the Disputationes is part of an overall 
project that ‘legitimises Lorenzo, glorified as a philosopher-king’.353 I find the use of this 
terminology unsatisfactory in describing Landino’s true position, and would reiterate that the image 
in the Disputationes of the statesman who combines the life of intellectual inquiry with that of 
political action cannot be separated from its republican context. It is true that Landino’s political 
thought is suffused with many of the Platonic tropes found in the Republic and that his statesman 
resembles the philosopher-king in that he must be educated in the moral virtues and that he 
                                                          
350 Tommaso De Robertis, ‘Machiavelli’s reading of Aristotle: a reassessment’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of Parma, Ciclo XXVIII, 2013), p. 152. 
351 DC, pp. 44.15-45.8. 
352 Skinner, Visions of Politics, II, p. 141. 
353 ‘Das Ideal den Philosophenherrschers und der Werdegang seiner Erziehung’, Rombach, Vita Activa und 
Vita Contemplativa, p. 162; ‘als Philosophenkönig glorifizierten Lorenzo... legitimieren’, Bernhard Huss and 
Gernot Michael Müller, ‘“Illud admiror, cur Ficinum silentio praeteritis”, Renaissanceplatonismus und 
Dialogform in Cristoforo Landinos Disputationes Camaldulenses’, in Möglichkeiten des Dialogs, ed. by Klaus W. 
Hempfer (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), pp. 225-78 (p. 271) and see also pp. 239-40. 
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possesses political legitimacy on account of his having directed his cognitive faculties in an ascent 
towards the summum bonum, the knowledge of which informs proper governance. There is, 
moreover, no doubt that Landino’s allusions to the Republic throughout the first book of the 
Disputationes – such as, for instance, the use of the metaphor of the ship of state, or Lorenzo’s 
imitation of Adeimantus in his assertion that the otiosus brings no benefits to society – are deliberate 
in their attempt to reinforce his Platonic credentials.354 Yet the philosopher-king of the Republic is an 
absolutist, if benevolent, ruler who occupies the highest rank in a state organised according to a 
corporatist hierarchy and who is able both to exercise power and make political decisions free from 
any mediation or interference from citizens of inferior castes. Throughout the Disputationes, Landino 
forcefully opposes any such form of princely rule, constantly reinforcing the Stoic-Ciceronian view 
that the bonds of human society are oikeiotic and arise from reciprocal obligations. Again and again 
he couches his arguments in terms of how they relate to administrandam rem publicam. One could 
argue, of course, that Landino might have adopted this phrase and his broader republican stance in 
an attempt to appease Florentine tradition and disguise any inclinations he might have had towards 
Medici supremacy and princely rule, but the absence of any outright advocacy of such a stance in 
the Disputationes and the fact that there was no shortage of humanistic defences of rule by princes 
would indicate otherwise.355 Indeed, as we have seen, it is through a conscious attempt to draw the 
reader’s attention to the Ciceronian flavour of his Platonism that he reconfigures Plato’s most 
famous dictum concerning the philosopher-king – that the perfect state will only emerge when 
‘philosophers become kings or... kings have genuinely and adequately begun to philosophise’ – into 
a republican form.356 Through his adoption of Ciceronian terminology, Landino establishes early on 
in the Disputationes that the model for his statesman, rather than the philosopher-king, is the 
Ciceronian sapiens, the sage of the De officiis and the Tusculanae Disputationes who possesses the 
‘knowledge of things human and divine’, and it is this term which both Alberti and Lorenzo use to 
refer to the ideal citizen of their transparently Platonic imagined city.357 As a further corrective to 
the view that Landino’s statesman was any kind of philosopher-king, we must also consider the 
contemporary position of Lorenzo, to whom the Disputationes is implicitly addressed and whose 
political instruction provides the diegetic basis for the discussion therein. It is without question that, 
by the time the Disputationes was being composed, Lorenzo not only exerted unrivalled control over 
all Florentine institutions, but had also taken pains to assume an image of princely glory at odds 
with the republican values that he purported to uphold. Yet his image was only that. He was utterly 
unable to adopt any official kind of monarchical role and the power he wielded, while vast, was 
                                                          
354 Cf. Plat. Rep. VI.488a-489d and VI.487c-487d. 
355 See e.g. Giovanni Pontano, On the Prince, trans. by Nicholas Webb in Kraye, Cambridge Translations of 
Renaissance Philosophical Texts, pp. 69-87; Bartolomeo Sacchi, On the Prince, pp. 88-108; Aeneas Silvius 
Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione in Kallendorf, Humanist Educational Treatises, pp. 126-258. 
356 DC, p. 11.22-24, and see above pp. 60-62. 
357 DC, pp. 28.8-30.11 and, in particular, p. 44.21-45.2, where Alberti draws a distinction between ‘tuus 
sapiens’ and ‘noster sapiens’. 
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exercised through a network of proxies and allies. This is hardly the position of a philosopher-king, 
and Melissa Bullard is one scholar who has appreciated the implications of his situation, trenchantly 
observing that Lorenzo ‘did [not] fit the role of a Platonic philosopher king because his methods of 
political control in Florence were necessarily indirect’.358 On the other hand, what Lorenzo did 
possess that legitimised his exercise of political power in a life of otium was a profound devotion to 
learning and other humanistic pursuits. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, contemporary 
opinion held that humanistic learning inculcated certain moral qualities that informed good 
leadership, and since Landino’s schema conceives the munus of intellectual inquiry as the 
prerequisite for and the complement to the virtue achieved through the munus of activity, it follows 
that Lorenzo’s commitment to his education must vindicate his engagement in politics at a 
distance.359 As Landino would have it, Lorenzo was justified in intervening in the political sphere 
even if he were not a philosopher-king because he had apprehended the truth necessary for political 
decision-making through cognitive faculties honed by the studia humanitatis. 
As much as Platonic theories of the ascent of the soul underpin Landino’s moral philosophy, 
then, he is unable to commit fully to the idea of a state that is ruled by philosophers. This is due in 
part to a patriotic commitment to the principles of Florentine republicanism that would later reach 
its apogee in the panegyric to Florence and its citizens in the prologue to his Comento on the 
Commedia.360 Throughout the Disputationes, the reader is in no doubt that Landino has Florence in 
mind as the situational locus for his advocacy of republicanism: the disputation is set in motion by 
Lorenzo’s demand to know what he might learn from Platonic thought to improve his own 
governance of the republic, and when Landino has Alberti choose a model for the otiosus who 
contributes to the civic good, he picks Paolo Toscanelli for the specific and stated reason that he is 
Florentine and that he shows how intellectual investigation can benefit their own city. Yet the 
logical consequence of any wholesale incorporation of the ideas of the Republic to his own political 
theory would be the disavowal of Florentine traditions which made the city worthy of such 
attention in the first place. Landino was unwilling to advocate any such radical steps that would 
strip the city of its republican inheritance. We might also attribute Landino’s reticence to abandon 
republican ideals to his intellectual debt to another of his paradigmatic figures from the 
Disputationes, Cicero, whose Tusculanae Disputationes was, after all, the inspiration for his text and who 
Ficino saw as the primary referent of the work rather than Plato.361  
With these two influences in mind, it is tempting to view Landino’s moral instruction in the 
Disputationes as a gentle reprimand to Lorenzo which seeks to restrain his princely self-
mythologising and to remind him that republican ideals must still obtain. As we shall see in due 
                                                          
358 Bullard, Lorenzo il Magnifico, p. 50. 
359 See above pp. 45-58. 
360 Comento, Proem. passim. On the cultural and patriotic themes of this prologue, see Gilson, Dante and 
Renaissance Florence, pp. 163-93. 
361 See above n. 289. 
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course, there is plenty to support this view in the more practical elements of Landino’s ethical 
system, since one’s moral development depends on restraining the sins of luxuria, avaritia and, in 
particular, ambitio, which Landino also characterises as a ‘desire for honours and empire’ (honorum 
imperiique cupiditas) on the part of an individual that is inimical to both the life of action and that of 
intellectual inquiry.362 That these lessons might extend to the wider readership of humanistically-
inclined Florentines – not to mention foreigners – was all the better. It would be reductive, though, 
to view the prominence of republicanism within the Disputationes through this prism alone. The 
relationship between Landino and Lorenzo was not only that of a humanist and his tutee, but also 
that of a functionary and his political sponsor, as well as a dependent and his patron. Ambition and 
a sense of expediency on Landino’s part would have provided an incentive for him to engineer a 
post hoc intellectual justification for Medici dominance which was in accord with the principles of 
Florentine political thought. If Lorenzo’s power over government could be reconciled with 
republican tradition through philosophy, any dissatisfaction with his influence on the part of the 
citizenry and his political rivals would be shown to be baseless, which would be of no small 
consequence given the fractious years of his early rule. What is more, we have already seen how the 
Disputationes also describes an ethical framework through which the actual dedicatee of the work – 
Federico da Montefeltro – and the implicit dedicatee – Lorenzo – might find common cause in the 
face of the growing influence of Sixtus IV.363 While Federico himself was no republican despite his 
humanistic tendencies, the fact that he unified the lives of action and contemplation provides 
Landino with some moral validation of his rule. It therefore follows that, mutatis mutandis, Lorenzo’s 
position in the Florentine republic could also be legitimised by a life which comprised both genera 
vitae if he were to follow the example of his ally.  
By now, we have examined in some detail Landino’s ethical system in the Disputationes and the 
ultimate end to which it is directed – that is, the justification of an extrapolitical exercise of power 
within a republic. Yet the Disputationes is a prescriptive work as well as it is analytical. It seeks to 
inculcate proper moral conduct as well as describe how action and intellectual inquiry coexist within 
an ethical schema for the ascent of the soul. To properly understand Landino’s system of virtue 
ethics, it is necessary for us to examine the distinguishing features of his applied moral philosophy. 
I will therefore proceed as follows. First, I will examine Landino’s thoughts on the practical 
application of virtue, focussing in particular on how, in the second book of the Disputationes, he 
believes we ought to make choices between the different Aristotelian categories of goods, how vice 
can emerge when the wrong choices initiate perturbationes animi which become fixed as habits, and 
how restraining vice is central to the cultivation of the moral virtues in the first stages of the ascent 
of the soul. Then I will analyse Landino’s prospectus for applied virtue ethics as it appears in the 
allegory of the Aeneid of the third and fourth books, in which he actualises his Platonic-republican 
                                                          
362 DC, p. 155.21. 
363 See above pp. 40-44. 
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theories by tracking the progress of an individual soul towards the knowledge of God through 






































2.9 The practical application of virtue 
 
The second book of the Disputationes serves a different role in its contribution to Landino’s virtue 
ethics than might be at first supposed. Having established a broad outline of his theory of virtue in 
the first book of the Disputationes, which itself built upon the systematised psychology of the De 
anima, Landino has the character of Alberti suggest to the company at the beginning of the second 
book that, before proceeding to the Aeneid allegory, there ought to be a digression. While 
yesterday’s dialogue covered the ‘most suitable way to lead us to the goal’, he continues, it still 
remains today to address the subject of ‘where it is we want to be led’, which is to say the summum 
bonum, or the highest good.364 Yet since the investigation of the nature of the summum bonum 
involves an assessment of the comparative advantage of different types of goods – goods of the 
body, of the mind and so on – the first half of this book is as much concerned with the decisions 
one has to make in choosing between these goods as it is with exploring the teleology of the human 
condition. It is by making these choices that the human mind either controls the appetite or 
submits to it, so in order to understand the progression from theory to praxis in Landino’s virtue 
ethics and better appreciate his approach to practical virtue it is necessary to spend some time 
unravelling his arguments on the goods.  
Landino has Alberti begin the second book of the Disputationes with a selective doxography of 
ancient and Christian views on the nature of the summum bonum which traces the subject through 
the various philosophical schools which emerged after Socrates and, in keeping with the tenor of 
his own philosophy, takes the form of an incremental ascent from what he perceives to be the 
falsest opinions on the nature of good towards the Platonic-Christian conception of the summum 
bonum as God. This doxography owes a debt in its choice of subjects and terminology to two 
sources in particular: Cicero’s De finibus and the nineteenth book of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei. 
Indeed, several passages are near-direct reproductions from these texts, a choice which attests to 
Landino’s opinion of Cicero as philosophically consonant with both Platonic and Christian 
doctrine.365 Investigating the idea of the summum bonum by way of a historical survey (as opposed to, 
for instance, from philosophical first principles) is an opportune choice of methodology for 
Landino, because it allows him, step by step, to incorporate into his theoretical framework useful 
features of other philosophies which he deems to be in accordance with Platonism. He therefore 
begins by summarily dismissing those philosophical schools which situate the summum bonum in 
pleasure, such as the Epicureans and Cyrenaics (although he mentions that Epicurus’ exemplary 
personal conduct is worthy of commendation), and those who place it in the absence of pain, such 
                                                          
364 ‘Tunc enim quae via potissimum nos commodius duceret quaerebatur, nunc vero quid illud sit quo duci 
optamus investigandum censeo’, DC, p. 55.3-5. 
365 The references in the Lohe edition are comprehensive in illustrating these concordances. See for instance 
the close similarity of DC, p. 57.20-28 with Cic.Fin.V.xxxi.94. 
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as Democritus.366 Of far more importance to the practical aspects of his philosophy are the two 
traditions which, notwithstanding the fact that their stances on the summum bonum are erroneous, 
can nevertheless contribute something to the understanding of how an ascent to the divine might 
be achieved in this world. These are the school of Aristotle and his followers the Peripatetics, who 
place the summum bonum in the mind itself insofar as it is devoted to understanding its own nature, 
and the school of the Stoics, who place the summum bonum in virtue alone. Landino has Alberti 
digress on their respective views in order that he might flesh out the intricacies of his own position. 
As we saw in an earlier chapter, Landino attributes to the Peripatetics the foundational elements of 
the doctrine of oikeiosis which is so significant to his republican theory.367 The Peripatetics, Alberti 
explains, claim that human beings are made happy by living in accordance with their nature and that 
the summum bonum therefore consists in a set of goods called the prima naturae, through which we are 
disposed to preserve and maintain our human nature through a kind of instinctual, self-reflective 
integrity. Within the prima naturae the goods of the body comprise, amongst others, health, vigour 
and integrity of the senses and those of the mind include memory and aptitude for learning.368 As 
well as these two sets of qualities the Peripatetics value virtue, which is prior to the goods of the 
mind and the body and acts as a guide, employing the prima naturae as far as they are needed. Those 
prima naturae which are essential for the exercise of virtue are vital, while the others are good but 
inessential. Moreover, since we desire such goods for their own sake the happy life is therefore 
social by its very nature, with the primal drive to self-appropriation extending outwards from the 
self to country, friends, family, and thereon to all humankind through the process of oikeiosis. 
Alberti continues to assert that those who claim that the summum bonum is virtue – that is, the Stoics, 
a ‘limb torn from the body of Peripatetic philosophy’ – are the most accurate school described so 
far.369 Our lives are dominated by the battle of the appetite against reason as a consequence of our 
souls being incarcerated in the body, and virtue is therefore vital for our happiness because the four 
moral virtues preserve the mind against the assault of the perturbationes roused by the appetite.370 Yet 
virtue alone cannot be the summum bonum. Bodily infirmity can take away faculties such as memory 
and judgment which are necessary to acquire virtue but if we consider these preferred advantages of 
the body as goods then any corresponding disadvantage must be evil and able to make us prefer 
death to life.371 Since mortal life is made happy through the hope and expectation of eternal life, 
                                                          
366 DC, pp. 56.23-59.22. 
367 See above pp. 96-97. 
368 DC, pp. 62.4-15. Landino’s articulation of this philosophy repeats the position attributed to the Academics 
and Peripatetics in fifth book of the De finibus, in particular Cic.Fin.V.vii.18, V.ix.24-27, and V.xii.35-36, 
although his exposition of the principles of the Peripatetic view of the relation of mind and body to the 
summum bonum in DC, pp. 61.14-62.4 and pp. 62.21-63.24, comes from Varro as described in Civ. Dei XIX.2-3. 
369 ‘Membra quaedam avulsa ex eo corpore’, DC, p. 66.24-25. 
370 Landino had, of course, already established this conflict as the foundation of his Platonic moral theory in 
both the first book of the Disputationes and the De anima. See above pp. 64-68. 
371 DC, pp. 67.24-68.3. 
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both the Christians and Plato (who knew this ‘before Christ was born as a man’) say that the 
summum bonum must therefore be God.372 
However derivative this opening survey might be, it is nonetheless revealing of the concepts that 
Landino thought most valuable in integrating practical ethical instruction with the idea of an ascent 
towards God through the exercise of virtue. From the Peripatetics (as interpreted by Cicero) he 
takes the idea of a natural, appropriative drive to preserve the self and others from which it follows 
that progress towards the summum bonum consists in a choice between different categories of goods; 
from the Stoics (via Cicero and Augustine) he takes a belief in virtue’s power to overcome the 
mental perturbationes that arise from the appetite. Having thus established these premises, Landino 
turns to the character of Ficino to expand upon the Platonic understanding of the summum bonum, 
with Alberti lauding him as an authority on Plato and praising in particular his Philebus 
commentary.373 As is so often the case with Landino’s approach to philosophy, the ‘Ficinian’ 
Platonism that the character expounds is a reading of Ficino’s work which is heavily mediated by 
other Latin sources, with Cicero and Augustine once again preeminent. He nonetheless affords a 
degree of verisimilitude to the speech in that several of the passages do bear a genuine Ficinian 
influence through a reliance on imagery from original Platonic sources and an emphasis on divine 
love.374 The character of Ficino begins by offering a proof that the summum bonum is God and, in 
order to do so, he takes up the Peripatetic concept of distinct categories of human goods, adding to 
the aforementioned goods of the body and goods of the soul a category of external goods, or goods 
of fortune, which includes wealth, honours, titles and so on. This is the division advanced by 
Aristotle in the Ethics.375 Since the summum bonum is acquired for its own sake, it cannot consist in 
the goods of fortune, which strive for sake of the body, or in the goods of the body, which either 
strive for the sake of the soul or can act as ‘instruments of the passions’ which are actively 
corruptive. The summum bonum must therefore consist in the goods of the soul somehow, but not, 
Ficino explains, in the mental faculties such as memory which constitute the prima naturae, nor in 
the moral virtues whose purpose is purgation, as each of these is devoted to another end. Instead, it 
consists in turning the intellectual virtues towards the ‘cause, the origin, the fount and beginning of 
everything’, God, the cognition of whom releases our souls from their bodily fetters.376 Thus, he 
says, Platonic and Christian doctrine are consistent. The ideas in the Phaedrus of the soul in heaven 
being nourished by the contemplation of truth and – significantly, given the previous day’s 
conversation – of the soul returning to heaven on the twin wings of the moral virtues and 
intellectual virtues illustrate the rewards of the virtuous Christian: the ambrosia of the vision of 
                                                          
372 ‘Quod et ante Christum ut hominem natum Platonem senisse constat’, DC, p. 68.9-10.  
373 DC, p. 68.10-15. Ficino had interpreted the central theme of the Philebus as the summum bonum rather 
pleasure, on which see chapter I.9 in Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, ed. by Michael J. B. Allen 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 126-30. On Ficino’s ideas in 
the Philebus, see pp. 15-22 and 26-35. 
374 DC, pp. 69.12-75.23. 
375 See above n. 152. See also Reden, p. 66.26-31. 
376 ‘Quod causam, originem, fontem principiumque omnium rerum appellamus’, DC, p. 71.11-12. 
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God and the nectar of joy in Him.377 This parallel prompts Landino to have the character of Ficino 
intervene in the medieval debate on the relative priority of the intellect and the will in favour of the 
supremacy of intellect, thus misrepresenting the real Ficino’s view on a subject of some importance 
to him.378 To conclude, Ficino addresses the question of how mortals can ascend to sublimity.379 
The more perfect the good, he claims, the more such a good pervades those sharing in it, and the 
wider its extent. It follows that God, the highest good, must therefore impart Himself to the entire 
human race. Every single human being partakes in this highest good and, implicitly, must therefore 
be capable of ascending to God by nature. 
With Ficino’s speech, Landino has established a continuity between the discussion in the 
previous book on the ascent of the soul through moral and intellectual virtues and that in the 
current book on the tripartite division of goods and the perturbationes animi. He has shown that the 
operative functions of the moral and intellectual virtues which perfect the munera of action and 
                                                          
377 DC, pp. 72.8-73.6. As we have seen, this is the second time Landino has used this analogy, although in the 
first book the wings refer through synecdoche to iustitia and sapientia, the principle moral and intellectual 
virtues respectively. See above, n. 179. Here, as Lohe notes on DC, p. 72, Landino is following chapter 1 of 
Ficino’s De voluptate, in which the wings symbolise the two kinds of virtue directly. 
378 On the question of why this misrepresentation occurred, see Wadsworth, pp. 23-31; Kraye, ‘Moral 
Philosophy’, pp. 351-53; Tamara Albertini, ‘Intellect and Will in Marsilio Ficino: Two Correlatives of a 
Renaissance Concept of Mind’, in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. by Michael J. B. 
Allen, Valery Rees and Martin Davies (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 2002), pp. 203-25; and Federico 
Ferrarese, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici De summo bono: Proposta di edizione critica’ (unpublished PhD thesis, 
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, 2013/14), pp. XIX-XXVII. Ficino and Lorenzo had arrived at the position 
that the will was superior in a debate at Careggi towards the end of 1473, and had presented their conclusions 
in Lorenzo’s poem L’Altercazione (or De summo bono) and Ficino’s letter to Lorenzo, De felicitate, which is 
undated but was probably written in early 1474. Since Ficino had wavered on this issue over the years, being 
inclined towards the superiority of the intellect in the Philebus commentary completed in 1469 while asserting 
the primacy of the will in the Platonic Theology circulated in early 1474, it is quite possible that Landino 
misrepresented him unintentionally. Indeed, Landino has Alberti offer enthusiastic praise for each work in 
the fictive setting of the Disputationes. On the other hand, Landino could have been following the rhetorical 
tradition of disputation literature by having the character advance the opposite opinion to that supported by 
its real-life counterpart, just as he had with Lorenzo and Alberti. Wadsworth advances the former argument, 
viewing the letter De felicitate as a reprimand to Landino and an opportunity for Ficino to set the record 
straight. He points out that the close structural and thematic similarity between the De felicitate and the second 
book of the Disputationes show that Ficino used Landino’s arguments as a template for his letter. To construct 
our own hypothesis, it is necessary to introduce three further facts. The first is that Fubini’s dating of the 
completion of the Disputationes to April 1474 shows that Landino would have been working on it at the same 
Ficino wrote De felicitate. Second, the Disputationes, the De felicitate and L’Altercazione all mention the Platonic 
Theology and its influence is apparent in the Disputationes from the first book onward. Third, evidence internal 
to the Disputationes such as the proem to the fourth book (DC, p. 188.1-3) shows that Landino had distributed 
each book to colleagues and friends as soon as it had been written. Since the Platonic Theology, distributed no 
earlier than late 1473, must have preceded the Disputationes, De felicitate and L’Altercazione, and the second book 
of the Disputationes must have preceded the De felicitate, which was itself written as Landino was completing 
the Disputationes, a plausible theory is, therefore, that Ficino’s letter, and possibly the debate at Careggi itself, 
sought to respond to the second book of the Disputationes which Landino had recently circulated in 
manuscript form (this also aligns with the accepted position that the L’Altercazione preceded the De felicitate). 
Given that the solution to the debate in Platonic Theology was fresh enough in Landino’s mind to have 
supplanted Ficino’s earlier ideas in the Philebus commentary, and that the personal and professional 
relationship between the two scholars was sufficiently close that it would be surprising if they had not 
discussed the Platonic Theology before or during the composition of the Disputationes, I believe it improbable 
that Landino was unaware of Ficino’s current views. Landino was therefore following the conventions of the 
disputational dialogue in having the character of Ficino advance a contrary argument to his real counterpart. 
379 DC, pp. 74.11-75.15 
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speculation also constitute the goods of the soul, and in doing so has reiterated the respective 
necessity of each type of virtue while maintaining the hierarchy between them. While the moral 
virtues have an instrumental role in purging the appetite, it is only the intellectual virtues which can 
achieve the summum bonum. In order that his practical system of virtue ethics can reconcile the 
choice between goods in human life with the progress towards the divine, it remains for him to 
flesh out precisely how the enticements of the goods of the body and of fortune inhibit the 
intellectual virtues from striving for God. So, following on from Ficino’s lead, Alberti begins to 
tease out the commonalities between Platonic thought and Christian doctrine, spending some time 
discussing the inferior types of good which can supplant the summum bonum in people’s minds. This 
lengthy digression is heavily reliant on the second question of Summa Theologiae I-II in which 
Thomas Aquinas analyses the things in which human happiness consists. Landino’s approach is 
similarly systematic, addressing the goods of the body, the goods of fortune and the goods of the 
soul in turn with Alberti’s concern being to show ‘the first two types to be false’.380 
In order to dismiss the goods of the body, Alberti focuses on the dangers of pleasure (voluptas) 
and the limitations of other bodily goods, denouncing pleasure in a diatribe which he acknowledges 
is indebted to Plato and which centres upon the role pleasure plays in corrupting judgment in the 
sensible world.381 According to Plato, he says, pleasure is fleeting, mutable and unstable, is held in 
common with animals (the same reason he uses to dismiss the other subsidiary goods of the body 
such as health, strength and beauty), hinders the virtues and offers no benefit to the common good 
of humanity. Returning to the earlier argument of the Peripatetics, he points out that pleasure is 
inherently base because it is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of something else such as, 
for instance, food, drink or sex. What is more, since Platonic doctrine holds that the human being 
and the soul are one and the same and that the body is only ‘a prison and fetter’ for the soul, 
pleasure immerses us in the seductions of the sensible world which prevent us from returning to 
heaven.382 Hence, pleasure always opposes the summum bonum because it originates not in reason but 
from the infirmity of the senses, ‘our most fearsome enemies’.383 Alberti confirms that the 
psychological dissonance aroused by pleasure causes the perturbationes animi which it is the duty of 
the moral virtues to calm and purge: ‘from pleasures come many perturbationes, which constantly 
afflict and devour the soul like tortures. So pleasures are not goods, but the very worst things.’384  
Next Alberti moves onto the goods of fortune, with his aim being to dismiss them by 
emphasising the ultimate inadequacy of honour, glory and riches for human flourishing.385 He 
begins with honour (honor), in the sense of the titles and garlands awarded by way of civic 
                                                          
380 ‘In primis igitur duobus generibus refellendis’, DC, p. 78.10, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II 
Q.2. 
381 DC, pp. 78.13-80.22. 
382 ‘Carcer vinculumque animae’, DC, p. 79.11-12. 
383 ‘Saevissimos hostes nobis’, DC, p. 79.16. 
384 ‘At a voluptatibus multae extant perturbationes, quae veluti carnificinae animum assiduo cruciant atque 
exedunt. Non igitur bonae voluptates, immo pessimae’, DC, p. 80.10-13. 
385 DC, pp. 82.16-84.19. 
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recognition. Again, Alberti deploys an Aristotelian argument to expose the flaws of honours, 
reasoning that they cannot possibly be the summum bonum because their benefits are only 
instrumental, in that honours are not sought for themselves but for the affirmation and esteem of 
others. Moreover, he continues, since the summum bonum must be within each individual’s capacity 
to achieve, and since honours are subject to the discretion of the one bestowing them rather than 
their recipient, then such honours cannot be the summum bonum. By extension, it follows that false 
opinions on the part of flawed human beings can lead to honours being bestowed upon the wicked 
and, of course, the summum bonum admits no evil. Similar to honour is glory (gloria), which Landino 
takes to mean good reputation and fame, a distinction adopted from that made by Thomas in the 
Summa Theologiae and also influenced by Cicero.386 Glory is, of course, something that is not sought 
for its own sake but for the sake of praise, and is thus disqualified as being the summum bonum 
according to Landino’s prior definition, but Alberti also makes the point that reputation – insofar as 
the capacity to be known or to be an object of cognition – is a quality possessed by even the most 
insignificant of things but the faculty of knowing is possessed only by human beings. Reputation 
and glory cannot, therefore, occupy a superior place amongst the goods. Next, Alberti addresses the 
good of wealth. Returning to the same Peripatetic argument he had used for pleasure, honour and 
glory, he notes that wealth is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of its use (utilitas). He 
also argues that since the nature of the summum bonum is that it is preserved, and that the benefit of 
wealth is only evident when it is disbursed on oneself, one’s family or for the good of others, then 
wealth cannot possibly be the summum bonum.  
The final good of fortune that Landino addresses is political power which, he claims, cannot be 
our ultimate aim in life because it is often subject to the whim of fate, with rulers being established 
or deposed by murder or conspiracy. In those cases where political authority is exercised justly, the 
stress and danger of ruling are so great that it is ‘much more agreeable to be well-ruled than to rule 
well’.387 This sentiment appears at first to be a rather incongruous departure from the attitudes 
Landino has expressed so far. Not only does it depart from the Platonically-inclined republicanism 
which was the basis for the fictive conversation and which has been evangelised throughout the 
first and second books, but it uses the verb regere rather than administrare which, as we have seen, is 
Landino’s preferred verb for describing the management of a republic. Moreover, it contradicts 
unambiguous accounts of the relationship between the statesman and the republic in the first book 
such as, for instance, that prosperous republics are those ‘administered by philosophers or whose 
administrators have begun to philosophise’.388 While we must acknowledge that authorial self-
                                                          
386 See Summa Theologiae I-II Q.2 AA.2-3. Landino is also thinking here of Cic. Tusc. III.ii.3-4, Cic.Off. I.xx.66-
xxii.78, and Cic.Off. II.ix.31-x.38. 
387 ‘Suavius multo esse bene regi quam bene regere’, DC, p. 46.4. The Aristotelian idea of a natural hierarchy 
between ruler and ruled originates in Aristot. Pol. I.ii.7-9; I.ii.20-21; I.v.1-11, and would also have been 
transmitted to Landino through, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, Summa II-II Q.47 AA.11-12 and Dante, 
Monarchia I.v.3. 
388 See above pp. 59-62 and passim. 
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contradiction is far from rare in humanistic texts and that there is a risk of imposing unwarranted 
consistency on Landino’s line of thought within the Disputationes, it is nevertheless worth attempting 
to understand why he saw fit to include such a sentiment. This seeming paradox can be resolved by 
acknowledging that the central allusion of this passage is to the republican theory of the third book 
of the Politics during Aristotle’s discussion of whether a good man and a good citizen are the same 
thing. While the virtue of a ruler is qualitatively different from that of a citizen, Aristotle concludes, 
it is nonetheless of benefit to both citizen and ruler to understand the reciprocal responsibilities and 
virtues of each role so that the exercise of political authority works properly. This is because 
political rule in a polity – unlike the purportedly ‘natural’ rule of parent over child, husband over 
wife, and so on – is a form of authority perpetuated between individuals of equal intellectual 
capacity. Hence ‘the goodness of a citizen consists in the ability both to rule and to be ruled well’.389 
Yet this is not quite the statement that Landino is making. Aristotle does not claim that it is more 
pleasing to be ruled than to rule. Here we must remember that the intended audience of the 
Disputationes is a political and cultural elite, taught the Politics from childhood, and that within the 
fictive setting the context of the sentiment is that of Alberti explaining to Lorenzo how to manage a 
republic. Its meaning must therefore be predicated on the assumption that the reader is himself a 
member of the governing class and, to some extent or another, responsible for exercising political 
power rather than a common citizen who might require justification for his lowly position in the 
republic. This is not an audience unsure of its position in society, nor is it an audience unfamiliar 
with Aristotle. It follows that, rather than serving as an injunction to obedience on the part of the 
ruled, the sentiment that it is ‘more agreeable to be well-ruled than to rule well’ is instead conveying 
a gentle irony to Landino’s readers. It subverts the similar phrase in the Politics to signal that 
political authority is a wearisome burden to bear and that, in some sense, those who are ruled have 
an easier time of it than those who must govern. While the wielding of political power is an onerous 
task, Landino tells us, it is nevertheless a necessary one, even if its travails and inconstancy mean 
that it cannot be the summum bonum.390 
Landino has Alberti conclude his analysis of the inferior goods with a relatively brief discussion 
of the goods of the soul, which principally serves to reiterate the argument of the first book that the 
intellectual virtues of intelligence, scientific knowledge and wisdom (intelligentia, scientia, and sapientia) 
are superior to the moral virtues in attaining the summum bonum.391 His attempt to incorporate some 
form of behavioural praxis into his perfectionist ethical system has, as such, come full circle. He has 
shown that to choose between the different types of goods is to choose whether to submit to 
corporeal appetites or to strive towards God, because the perturbationes animi which impede the 
                                                          
389 Aristot. Pol. III.ii.7, see also III.ii passim and VI.i.7. It is likely that Landino also has Sen.Ira II.15 in mind. 
390 We should note too that certain eremitic Christian teachings align with the opinion that it is easier to be 
ruled than to rule. See, for instance, Julian of Speyer in Enrico Menestò, ed., Fontes Franciscani (Assisi: Edizioni 
Porziuncola, 1995), XII.67. 
391 DC, pp. 85.1-86.5. 
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soul’s ascent to God arise when the goods of the body or the goods of fortune supplant the 
summum bonum as the mind’s goal. Undue appetitive desire for the goods of the body manifests as 
the pursuit of sensual pleasure, while that for the goods of fortune is more diverse but broadly 
speaking takes two forms: on the one hand, a craving for wealth; and, on the other, a drive for 
political power and recognition. If the statesman is to use his intellectual virtue to achieve cognition 
of the divine and then guide the republic by imparting this wisdom, he must first purge himself of 

































2.10 Vice and perturbationes animi 
 
His analysis of the goods in the second book aside, Landino favours the language of moralising 
rhetoric to technical vocabulary in the Disputationes. He prefers to speak of the irrational desires 
which initiate mental perturbationes in respect of their corresponding vices, with the desire for 
corporeal pleasure corresponding to the vice of luxuria or voluptas, desire for wealth to the vice of 
avaritia and desire for political power and recognition to the vice of superbia or ambitio. We have seen 
how Landino, following the Tusculanae Disputationes and Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, conceives the 
appetitive desires themselves as provoking mental perturbationes.392 When these perturbationes become 
dispositional habits they are implanted as sicknesses (morbi) which are identical to these vices.393 An 
illustration of this relationship appears in the fourth book of the Disputationes: 
 
Just as when the blood in the body has been corrupted... sickness and disease arise, so too does the 
dissonance of these perverse disturbances [perturbationes] deprive the soul of health. From these disturbances 
arise diseases [morbi] which are called νοσήματα, then sicknesses [aegrotationes] called ἀρρωστήματα … When 
this madness and excitement of the mind becomes habitual and sinks into one’s veins and marrow, so to 
speak, then disease and sickness come forth. For when we become inflamed with a desire for money by some 
false opinion which values wealth more than it should be valued, and the Socratic medicine which 
extinguishes this desire is not continually employed, then that desire spreads into our innermost parts and 
produces that disease and sickness which we call avarice.394 
 
We should recall that, throughout the discussion on the best kind of life in the first book of the 
Disputationes, Landino had established these three particular vices as those which the moral virtues 
must overcome if one is to release oneself from bodily distraction and concentrate on the divine. 
Early in his first speech in this book, Alberti singles them out as obstacles to the exercise of the 
intellectual virtues in his summation of his ethical theory: 
 
                                                          
392 Cic. Tusc. III and IV passim and Augustine Civ. Dei XIV.8-10 and IX 4-5. 
393 Note that here Landino departs somewhat from his opinion in the De anima, in which the perturbationes 
themselves are habits. See above pp. 65-66. 
394 ‘Nam veluti, cum sanguis in corpore corruptus est... morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur, sic pravarum 
perturbationum dissonantia animum sanitate spoliat vehementerque perturbat. Ex perturbationibus vero 
morbi conficiuntur, quae illi νοσήματα vocant, deinde aegrotationes, quae appellantur ἀρρωστήματα... Verum 
cum iam huiuscemodi furor ac mentis concitatio inveteravit et tanquam in venis medullisque insederit, tum 
existit morbus atque aegrotatio. Nam cum ex falsa quadam opinione, quae plus tribuat divitiis, quam 
tribuendum sit, pecuniarum cupiditate inflammemur nec adhibeatur continuo Socratica quaedam medicina, 
quae cupiditatem extinguat, manat illa in venas efficitque eum morbum atque aegrotationem, quam avaritiam 
nuncupamus’, DC, p. 232.3-16, and see also De anima, III, pp. 63-65.  Cicero’s system of mental perturbationes 
was present in Landino’s scholarly thought early, appearing in his opening speech to his lectures on the 
Tusculanae Disputationes in 1458 (Scritti, I, pp. 6 and 10) and being discussed at some length in his 1461 Juvenal 




For although [the cognition of God] is best achieved through the virtues of the mind – for intelligence 
perceives the principles of things, scientific knowledge the processes and the effects resulting from these 
principles and, finally, wisdom tells one from the other – we will nevertheless be attempting these things in 
vain if we are not free from all mental disturbances. How will those enticed by carnal pleasures [voluptates 
corporeae] or captured by avarice [avaritia] or inflated by ambition [ambitio] be able to think about anything 
higher? So it is also thought that the virtues of life and morals, by which our minds are expunged of all 
squalor of vice, must be exercised, and exercised in such a way that we begin our ascent with them.395 
 
Later, in the speech which concludes the first day’s discussion, Alberti reinforces the idea of the 
threefold division of vices obstructing the search for knowledge, in contradistinction to the healthy 
appetitive urge to the investigation of truth: 
 
We will never attain the light of knowledge through sordid and vulgar conduct, nor will we attain it when 
addicted to pleasures [voluptates], subject to avarice [avaritia], or bound to ambition [ambitio]. But we will attain 
it when inflamed by an ardent love for the discovery of the truth...396 
 
Even though these passages come before Landino saw fit to mention the precise relationship of the 
three vices to the categories of goods it is clear that they, and the confinement within the shackles 
of corporeality they represent, were integral to his system of virtue ethics in the Disputationes from 
the outset of the work. It is these vices more than any others that he considers to be the 
impediments to speculation on the divine. Moreover, Landino stresses in the first book that, of the 
three vices, the latter two in particular can corrode the principle of comity on which the state is 
founded. If civic concord is to be maintained, both the statesman and citizen must avoid superbia 
and avaritia. For instance, Lorenzo identifies these vices as being a motivating factor for threats to 
the state both internal and external: 
 
When grave and unremitting dangers threaten [the state] from all sides, and it is constantly either attacked 
with weapons and deception by the ambition [ambitio] and avarice [avaritia] of many princes and peoples, or is 
disturbed by a faction of seditious citizens.397 
                                                          
395 ‘Hoc enim etsi maxime per eas virtutes, quae a mente sunt, assequatur – intelligentia enim principia rerum, 
scientia vero progressus effectusque a principiis manantes ac postremo sapientia utrunque percipit –, tamen, 
nisi omni perturbationum genere vacemus, frustra haec tentabimus. Quomodo enim aut corporeis 
voluptatibus deliniti aut avaritia oppressi aut ambitione turgidi quicquam altum aut egregium cogitare 
poterimus? Quapropter eas quoque virtutes adhibendas censent, quibus animi nostri ab omni vitiorum sorde 
expurgantur, atque ita adhibendas, ut inde initium sumamus’, DC, pp. 17.26-18.6. See above pp. 83-84 and n. 
248. 
396 ‘Verum id sordidis vulgaribusque artibus nunquam assequemur. Neque enim voluptatibus addicti neque 
avaritiae obnoxii neque ambitioni obligati id assequemur, sed ardentissimo quodam veri inveniendi amore 
incensi’, DC, p. 39.22-25. 
397 ‘Cum gravissima assiduaque pericula sibi undique semper inmineant assiduoque aut multorum principum 





Alberti also specifies that his model citizen Paolo Toscanelli conducts himself ‘neither with 
rudeness nor arrogance [superbum] nor greed [avarum]’ towards other citizens, and in so doing 
establishes superbia and avaritia as the first characteristics which he would expect to be inimical to 
good citizenship.398 
In classical philosophy, the tripartite division of vice ultimately derives from Plato’s discussion 
in the ninth book of the Republic of how each of the three parts of the mind – the rational logos, the 
spirited thumos, and the appetitive epithumia – has its corresponding pleasures, with the rational part 
being motivated by wisdom and love of knowledge, the spirited part by ambition and the appetitive 
part by the various forms of sensual pleasure and wealth.399 A parallel tradition, influential on 
Augustine in particular, emerges from scripture in the First Epistle of John: ‘all that is in the world, 
the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride [superbia] of life, is not of the Father, but 
is of the world’.400 For Landino, though, the primary source of this theory was the articulation of 
Stoic thought by Cicero in the Tusculanae Disputationes. As we have seen, in both the De anima and 
the Disputationes Landino follows Cicero in defining distress, delight, fear and lust as the four types 
of perturbatio which can disturb the human mind.401 According to Cicero, delight and lust can 
become entrenched in the mind as diseases (morbi) or sicknesses (aegrotationes) which practically 
amount to the same thing: a persistent, and deep-rooted disposition which desires the undesirable, 
causing the emotions to overwhelm reason.402 After using avaritia and gloriae cupiditas as prime 
examples of diseases of the mind, Cicero broadens his scope to describe the chief kinds of sickness 
thus: 
 
There are certain kinds of sickness such as avarice, ambition, fondness for women, stubbornness, over-
refinement, dipsomania, delicacy, and anything similar. And indeed, avarice is a strongly-held, persistent, and 
deep-rooted disposition about money such that it ought to be desired above all else, and the definition of the 
other kinds of sickness is similar.403 
 
If the various types of sensual pleasure are grouped together, this list bears a close resemblance to 
the threefold division of vices and, indeed, when Cicero was able to generalise elsewhere in his 
work this is just the separation he made, writing in the De re publica that, like anger, ‘avarice, desire 
for power, desire for glory, and sensual pleasures’ can dominate the mind and must be brought 
                                                          
398 ‘Neque inurbanum me neque superbum neque avarum gero’, DC, p. 38.19-20. 
399 Plat. Rep. IX.580d-583a. 
400 I John 2.16-17. See also Augustine, De libero arbitrio I.xii.25.84-xv.33.113, II.xvi.41.161-xx.54.206 and 
III.i.1.5-i.2.11. See above pp. 56-57 and n. 165. 
401 See above p. 66. 
402 Cic.Tusc.IV.xi.24-26.  
403 ‘Aegrotationi autem talia quaedam subiecta sunt: avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, ligurritio, 
vinulentia, cuppedia, et si qua similia. Est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecunia, quasi valde expetenda 
sit, inhaerens et penitus insita, similisque est eiusdem generis definitio reliquarum’, Cic.Tusc.IV.xi.26-27. 
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under the control of reason.404 Later Stoics would follow Cicero in discussing the three vices 
together, and Seneca – himself an important influence on Landino – would pay particular attention 
to this division in his moral writings such as, for instance, Epistulae Morales 69, where he discusses 
the rewards of vice: ‘No evil is without reward. Avarice promises money; luxury, many and varied 
pleasures; ambition, high status, applause and – from that applause – power and all it can do.’405 
While Landino looks to the Stoic theory of emotion in order to explain the psychological effects of 
the three vices, it is Sallust to whom he turns for insight into their political implications. For Sallust, 
Rome’s military dominance after the destruction of Carthage led to such wealth and complacency 
among the political classes that the vices of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio utterly corrupted the body 
politic and precipitated a moral decline which led to the crises of the late Republic. In the Bellum 
Catilinae he writes that ‘on account of wealth, sensual pleasure [luxuria], avarice [avaritia], and 
ambition [superbia] invaded the youth [of Rome]’ and that the effeminacy and decadence inculcated 
in the populace by habitual vice meant that the minds of the citizens ‘filled with bad habits, could 
not easily abstain from their desires, and were in every way more wantonly abandoned to 
acquisitiveness and extravagance’.406 This is an instrumental understanding of vice, interpreting its 
consequences less in personal and psychological terms than to the extent that they are injurious to 
republican principles. Hence Sallust’s disgust at these vices is phrased in terms of their capacity to 
destabilise the social bonds which are essential in maintaining the commonwealth, with avaritia 
being deplored because it ‘subverted trustworthiness, integrity, and other good qualities and instead 
taught pride, cruelty, neglect of the gods, and all venality’ and, likewise, ambitio because it ‘incited 
many people to become deceitful, to keep one thing concealed in the heart, and another ready on 
the tongue, to appraise friendships and enmities according to their benefit rather than their 
authenticity, and to present a good image rather than maintain a good character’.407 Had these vices 
been expunged from the body politic, a critical threat to the stability of Rome would have been 
forestalled.  
This lesson was not lost on Landino.408 Since Rome was the exemplar of the Quattrocento city-
state for him just as it was for other humanists, the vices which caused its decline were therefore 
those which moral and civic instruction had to address. If Landino were to teach the Florentine 
                                                          
404 Cic.Rep.I.xxxviii.60. 
405 Sen. Ep. 69.4.  
406 Sal.Cat.12, and Sal.Cat.13. See also Augustine, Civ. Dei II.18 and V.12. Rombach, Vita Activa und Vita 
Contemplativa, p. 127, briefly notes the influence of Sallust on Landino’s view of moral degradation. She points 
out that, in the Casanatense manuscript of his early Virgil lectures, Landino invokes Sallust to warn of the 
dangers of moral degeneracy. So, in his allegorisation of the Harpy Celaeno in Casanatense cod. 1368, fol. 
117v, he reports that ‘Sallust ait enim avaritiam animum virilem etiam effeminare’. On ambitio, he writes in 
Casanatense cod. 1368, fol.127v, that ‘[Ambitio] enim, ut ait Salustius, multos mortalium transversos ire 
coegit.’ 
407 ‘Ambitio multos mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore aliud in lingua promptum habere, 
amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re sed ex commodo aestumare, magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum 
habere’, Sal.Cat.10. 
408 Nor, for that matter, by other Quattrocento educationalists: see Grendler, p. 261. 
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political classes anything, it would be to understand the consequences of Rome’s decadence and 
thus avoid the attractions of sensual pleasure, wealth and honours in order that the moral integrity 
of the state be maintained. So, when Landino affords luxuria, avaritia and ambitio such significance in 
the Disputationes, he is therefore exhorting the reader to purge these vices not only for the purpose 
of self-divinisation but also as a prophylactic against political degeneracy. At the same time that the 
moral virtues purify the statesman so that he can benefit the state through the wisdom gained in 
contemplation, so too do they help him to administrare rem publicam by extinguishing vices which 
threaten to corrode the bonds of society. 
An interest in the three vices of luxuria, avaritia and superbia or ambitio had been manifest in 
Landino’s work long before the Disputationes. As we have seen, in the Xandra Landino was led to 
explore themes of ethics and human frailty in his love poetry, choosing to devote the epideictic 
elegy Contra avaros to the theme of avaritia and reserving particular bile for the way in which this vice 
undermines the foundations of civic comity.409 Later, on the occasion of his accession to the chair 
of oratory and poetry at the Florentine Studio in 1458, his opening speech to his lectures on the 
Tusculanae Disputationes identified the three vices as the source of mental perturbationes in language 
following that of Cicero’s work: 
 
O what an extraordinary man! O the great stupidity of us who, believing that we are made happy by devoting 
ourselves to pleasure [voluptas] or ambition [ambitio] or avarice [avaritia], offer harsh sustenance to the 
perturbationes which torment us day and night, just like the sufferings and sicknesses of the body!410 
 
Landino’s notes on his lectures on the Aeneid four years later in 1462 illustrate how he had 
transplanted these ideas into the realm of Virgilian allegory, a move which was no doubt prompted 
in part by earlier attributions of these vices in the allegorical tradition and the need to maintain 
some continuity with them. As Arthur Field has shown, these lectures contain a more or less fully-
formed version of the Aeneid allegory which would follow in the Disputationes, with the main 
elements of the latter exegesis – that is, Troy symbolising luxury, Thrace and the Harpies avarice 
and so on – already being in place.411 When Landino came to write the De anima in the late 1460s, 
his introduction to the third book also preempted the depiction of vice in the Disputationes, although 
in this instance it was Alberti’s first speech which was being prefigured: 
 
                                                          
409 See above p. 29. 
410 ‘O egregium virum, O ingentem nostram stultitiam, qui, dum aut voluptatibus aut ambitioni aut avaritiae 
inserviendo felices effici credimus, crudelissima pabula iis, quae nos dies ac noctes excarnificent, 
perturbationes praebemus, aegri profecto aegrotantiumque corporum persimillimi!’, Scritti, I, p. 12. 
411 See Field, ‘A Manuscript of Cristoforo Landino's First Lectures on Virgil’, pp. 17-20 and Field, The Origins 
of the Platonic Academy of Florence, pp. 231-68. 
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For a soul that has attained true wisdom understands that those things for which most mortals are either 
inflamed by desire or stirred up by avarice or driven mad with ambition do not only fail to make life happy, 
but make it most wretched.412 
 
Such was the significance of luxuria, avaritia and superbia to Landino’s thought that they also 
continued to occupy a central role in the works which followed the Disputationes. In the De vera 
nobilitate he has the character Aretophilus discuss the role of superbia in Sallust’s account of the 
Catiline conspiracy before launching into a diatribe against all three vices in an excoriation of false 
nobility which could have been written by the Roman himself: 
 
They [i.e., those who falsely think themselves noble and well-born] are mad, inflamed by desire for wealth, or 
by ambition for power and honours, or by lust for many and varied sensual pleasures, in such a way that that 
there is nothing so wicked, nothing so execrable, nothing so repugnant to all humanity that they will not 
undertake it with all rashness and insolence and bring it about without any shame at all.413 
 
By so identifying the moral failings which emerge from distractions in the sensible world with a 
flawed political class, Landino shows that these vices have deleterious practical consequences for 
the state. Courses of action undertaken by statesmen mired in vice are antithetical to those taken 
under the good governance of the virtuous and wise – that is, those who have true nobility – and 
the Roman dissolution chronicled by Sallust offers a warning as to the cost to republics of such 
behaviour. The influence of Sallust also looms large in the ubiquitous presence of the three vices in 
the Comento on Dante’s Commedia. This work is by its nature a study of the taxonomy and 
psychology of sin, and Landino scrutinises each of the individual vices at their appropriate positions 
in the Inferno and Purgatorio. Yet he analyses the three vices with which he has a particular concern 
together at several points in the commentary, usually in a Sallustian fashion. For instance, Landino 
refers to Sallust explicitly when discussing the three vices in the proem to the Comento, where he 
notes that Dante vituperates the factionalised and ambitious Florentines just as Sallust vituperated 
the ambitio, luxuria and avaritia of the Romans of his time.414 Likewise, in the chiosa to canto XXXII 
of the Purgatorio Landino extends his criticism of the political consequences of these vices to the 
clergy, fulminating that the contemporary church was inspired by the ambitione, avaritia and luxuria 
of Simon Magus rather than the poverty, humility and chastity (povertà, humilità and castità) of the 
                                                          
412 ‘Veram enim sapientiam [animus] nactus animadvertit, quibus plerique mortales aut ex concupiscentia 
incenduntur aut ex avaritia exagitantur, aut ex ambitione insaniunt, ea non modo non beatam, sed 
miserrimam vitam efficere’, De anima, III, p. 5. 
413 ‘Eos [qui nobiles generososque sese putant] ita insanire, ut aut divitiarum avaritia, aut honorum imperiique 
ambitione, aut multarum variarumque voluptatum libidine inflammati nihil neque tam impium sit neque tam 
nefarium neque tam ab omni humanitate abhorrens, quin illud per summam temeritatem cum omni petulantia 
aggrediantur impudentissimeque perficiant’, DVN, p. 60. The character Philotimus instigates the discussion 
on Sallust’s account of Catiline on p. 58. 
414 Comento, Proem. II.48-52. 
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apostles Paul and John.415 Most strikingly of all, Landino would follow Boccaccio and other 
commentators in suggesting that the three vices are symbolised by the three beasts which bar the 
pilgrim’s ascent of the sunlit hill at the beginning of the Inferno.416 It is the presence of these 
creatures – the lonza which represents luxuria, the wolf which represents avaritia, and the lion which 
represents superbia – that forces the pilgrim to descend to the realms of the afterlife in the first 
place.417 Since the Comento, in keeping with the Dantean commentary tradition, identifies this hill 
with the ascent towards the divine illuminated by the light of reason, these beasts represent the 
main corporeal impediments to the soul’s journey just as their allegorical counterparts do in the 
Disputationes. Landino spares no time in tracing the commonalities between his Dante allegory and 
his recapitulated arguments from the earlier text: 
 
Through Aeneas, Virgil wants to show how a human being can arrive at the highest good, and sets out that 
there are three main inconveniences which impede us so that we cannot attain our end. Of these the first is 
luxuria, which means every unbridled delight and pleasure of the senses that rule in us when our mind is not 
restricted by the reins of temperance. And he depicts this through Troy, which Aeneas did not want to leave 
at all if Venus, motivated by divine love, had not inspired him to leave, as I have shown in my allegories. The 
second is avarice, which he expresses through Thrace and through the isles of the Strophades and through 
many other things. The third is ambition and immoderate desire for magistrates’ honours and for power. This 
vice is greatly demonstrated through the immortal hatred of Juno for the Trojans. So the person who, by 
nature, loves virtue, hates vice, desires their highest good, and flees suffering, would always proceed along the 
straight path if three things did not impede them. These are pleasure [piacere], profit [utile] and honour [honore], 
and to achieve these we often stray from the true road. So here Dante signifies the same thing through three 
beasts: the lonza is pleasure, the wolf is profit and the lion honour.418 
 
                                                          
415 Comento, Purg. XXXII.94-108.6-11. 
416 Comento, Inf. I.31-36, and cf. Boccaccio, Esposizioni I 1.31-60. The association between the three beasts and 
the vices of luxuria, avaritia and superbia was made in the earliest commentary on the Commedia by Dante’s son, 
Jacopo Alighieri, in 1322 and became a staple of the tradition of Dante criticism, appearing in, for instance, 
the commentaries of Francesco da Buti in 1385-95 and Filippo Villani in 1405. 
417 The term lonza indicates a large, spotted feline, probably a leopard, lynx or panther, although the precise 
species is unclear. On the lonza and its place in the Dantean commentary tradition, see Rosa Affatato, 
‘Riflessioni sulla “lonza” alla luce di alcuni commenti medievali alla “Divina Commedia”’, Tenzone: revista de la 
Asociación Complutense de Dantología, 18 (2017), 197-226. 
418 ‘Vuole Virgilio per Enea dimostrare come l’huomo possa arrivare al sommo bene, et pone tre essere e 
principali incomodi, e quali impediscono che non possiamo conseguire el nostro fine. De’ quali el primo è la 
luxuria, intendendo per luxuria ogni lascivia et ogni sfrenata voluptà et piacere della sensualità, el quale regna 
in noi quando l’animo nostro non è ritenuto sotto el freno della temperantia. Et questo configurò per Troia, 
la quale non voleva lasciare in nessun modo Enea se Venere, posta pel divino amore, non l’havessi spirato a 
partirsi, chome nelle nostre allegorie dimostrai. El secondo è l’avaritia, la quale exprime et per Tracia et per 
l’isole Strophade et per molte altre chose. El terzo è l’ambitione et immoderata cupidità de gli onori de’ 
magistrati et degli imperii; el quale vitio maxime dimostra per le immortali inimicitie di Iunone contra a’ 
Troiani. Adunque l’huomo el quale di sua natura ama la virtù et ha in odio el vitio et disidera el sommo suo 
bene et fugge la miseria, sempre procederebbe per diricta via se tre chose non lo impedissono. Queste sono 
piacere, utile et honore; et per conseguir questi spesso torciamo dalla diricta strada. Questo medesimo 




 It was important to a project predicated on the wisdom of the poeta theologus that Landino made 
clear the alignment between the Dantean and Virgilian commentary traditions in the Comento. He 
had already recognised this fact in the proem to the fourth book of the Disputationes. In this proem 
he lists elements of the Comento that exhibit Virgilian influence including the midpoint of life, the 
forest, the sunlit mountain-top and – crucially – the three beasts which, given his knowledge of the 
commentary tradition, shows that he must have already been aware of their traditional association 
with luxuria, avaritia and superbia.419 That in the Comento Landino presents a synoptic view of the 
similarities between Dante and Virgil concerning the treatment of the three vices not only speaks to 
his hope to impose consistency across his ethical theory, but also emphasises their crucial role in his 
moral philosophy, in each case being placed at the first steps onto the path of virtue, as it were. Just 
as he had argued in the Disputationes that the ambit of the Aristotelian goods of the body and of 
fortune contained all other ends inferior to the summum bonum, so he emphasises in the Comento that 
the three vices encompass every other moral failing: 
 
Nor does it matter that, because the vices which are obstacles to virtuous living are so many and so varied, 
the poet sets out only three of them. Since these three contain all the others, it follows that he who is not 
corrupted by the lust that is the lonza, or by the greed for possessions that is the wolf, or by the desire for 
honours and positions and lordships, can be conquered by no other vice.420  
 
The pervasive influence of the three vices in Landino’s work over the course of three decades and 
their pivotal role in the intersection of theory and praxis in his virtue ethics, both inside and outside 
the Disputationes, shows their importance in deriving normative political and ethical standards from 
an otherwise abstract idea of psychological ascent. While his interest in the three vices had been 
sparked earlier in his career by Cicero, Sallust and the medieval commentary tradition, it was in the 
Disputationes that they were first integrated into the comprehensive psychological theory he had first 
set out in the De anima. Notwithstanding the contribution he sought to make in the Disputationes to 
the humanistic debate on how political legitimacy could be derived from personal virtue, Landino 
was also able to offer guidelines for proper conduct to his audience and, in particular, Lorenzo de’ 
Medici, by presenting easily-digestible illustrations of bad behaviour in the form of the three vices. 
For a young stateman who had struggled with the uprising in Volterra and was having to grapple 
with the enmity of Sixtus IV, the avoidance of pleasure, wealth and empty glory was a trenchant 
and memorable lesson to learn, and Landino’s system would have had additional appeal since it 
could explain away any personal failings as a form of appetitive disquiet emendable through moral 
purgation. From the broader point of view of the health of the body politic, Landino owed a great 
                                                          
419 DC, p. 190.7-20. 
420 ‘Né muova alchuno che benché sieno tanti, et sì varii vitii e quali ci sono obstaculi al vivere virtuoso, el 
poeta ne ponghi solamente tre. Imperoché questi tre contenghono tutti gli altri, conciò sia che chi non è o 
corropto dalla voluptà che è la lonza, o dalla cupidità dell’havere che è e la lupa, o dal desiderio degli honori et 
stati et signorie, di nessuno vitio può esser vincto’, Comento, Inf. I.61-66.11-16. 
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debt to Sallust. Alongside his stated aim of exploring the division between intellectual and moral 
virtues and advocating a stratified Macrobian system to govern the purgation of the soul, the 
practical purpose of his virtue politics was to preserve the norms which would help the republic 
flourish and prevent its degradation. Since the aim of the Disputationes was to vindicate the exercise 
of power in a republic by one without an official role, its attempt to encourage principles which 
perpetuate communal solidarity over venal and opportunistic behaviour was all the more important 
in offering a veneer of republican respectability, however superficial this might actually have been. 
There is therefore a secondary end to the exercise of the moral virtues beyond simply purging the 
soul for contemplation: in the active life, one must cultivate the moral virtues that best help to 
maintain the republic and expunge the vices that are most harmful to it. We can now therefore turn 
to the illustrative depictions of sensual pleasure, wealth and political ambition in the Aeneid allegory 
which occupy the third and fourth books of the Disputationes, in order that we might assess their 



























Chapter Three – Allegory and Practical Ethics 
 
3.1 The vices allegorised 
 
That Landino chooses poetic exegesis as the vehicle for transmitting the advisory aspect of his 
ethics is consistent with the significance which he attributed to poetry throughout his career, from 
the Xandra poems, through his lectures at the scuola and philosophical dialogues, all the way to the 
Comento.421 In the proem to the third book of the Disputationes, Landino recounts how Plato explains 
that the furor poeticus, the divine madness which inspires poetry, is that which compels our souls to 
remember their divine origin, escape their bodily shackles and return to God.422 Here he draws his 
inspiration from the Ion and the Phaedrus, which had recently been translated by Ficino, and his 
arguments (which recur in a similar form throughout his works) are derived from those in Ficino’s 
letter De divino furore of 1457.423 For Landino, poetry therefore ‘embraces all the other liberal arts’ 
and creates a continuity between the prisca theologia and Christian theology.424 Moreover, its 
fundamental quality of semantic transference, its capacity to transmute ideas through allegory into 
forms that are more penetrating and comprehensible to the listener, speaks to its pedagogic value: 
 
Whatever human beings have done, whatever they have known, whatever they have contemplated, poetry 
dresses in wonderful images, and it transfers these things into other forms so that not only do they seem to 
relate something rather more base and humble, and not only are they supposed to mimic mere stories to 
amuse the ears of the idle, but they also bring forth what is most elevated and hidden in the very source of 
the divine nature. Having finally perceived this most agreeable error, the listener not only reaches the highest 
understanding of such matters, but is also filled with wonderful pleasure from the image.425 
                                                          
421 See above pp. 15-19 and 25-31. 
422 DC, pp. 111.18-112.27. 
423 A detailed synopsis by Roberto Cardini of similar passages can be found in Scritti, II, pp. 206-09 but some 
examples include the prolusion to Landino’s Dante lectures in Scritti, I, pp. 45-55, the proem to In Artem 
Poeticam, pp. 97-99, the introduction to the 1488 commentary on the Aeneid in Scritti, I, pp. 226-33, and 
chapters X and XI of the Proemio to the Comento. Landino is referring to Ion 533d-536 and Phaedrus 244a-245a 
and his original source for this theory, Ficino’s De divino furore, can be found in Letters, I, pp. 42-48 and Lettere, 
I, pp. 19-28. On Landino and poetic furor, see Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, II, pp. 712-21; Gilson, Dante 
and Renaissance Florence, pp. 186-93; Craig Kallendorf, ‘From Virgil to Vida: The Poeta Theologus in Italian 
Renaissance Commentary’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56.1 (January 1995), 41-62; Don Cameron Allen, 
Mysteriously Meant: The Rediscovery of Pagan Symbolism and Allegorical Interpretation in the Renaissance (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 145-49; and James K. Coleman, ‘Furor and Philology in the 
Poetics of Angelo Poliziano’, in New Worlds and the Italian Renaissance: Contributions to the History of European 
Intellectual Culture, ed. by Andrea Moudarres and Christiana Purdy Moudarres (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 251-89. 
424 DC, pp. 111.3-8 and 112.27-114.15. See also Scritti, I, p. 230 and Kallendorf, ‘From Virgil to Vida’, pp. 50-
52. 
425 ‘Quaecunque homines egerint, quaecunque norint, quaecunque contemplati fuerint ea miris figmentis 
exornet atque in alias quasdam species traducat, ut, cum aliud quippiam multo inferius multoque humilius 
narrare videantur aut cum meras fabellas ad cessantium aures oblectandas ludere credantur, tum maxime 
excelsa quaedam et in ipso divinitatis fonte recondita promant, quo quidem gratissimo errore tandem 
animadverso auditor non solum in summam rerum cognitionem deveniat, sed mira etiam voluptate ex 




As we know, rhetoric was the social technology through which Quattrocento humanists sought to 
influence behaviour and legitimise political power, and here Landino is disclosing to the reader the 
way in which he intends to adapt this traditional approach to moral instruction. His poetic 
allegorising is a form of rhetoric in itself: it seeks through verbal and literary ingenuity to persuade 
the reader of their ‘agreeable error’ of taking at face value the superficial attributes of the verse, 
thereby inculcating the precepts of his underlying virtue ethics. Landino has, of course, already 
shown on several occasions in the first book of the Disputationes that he is sensitive to the relative 
benefits of different modes of communication. For instance, to conclude his speech on the active 
life the character of Lorenzo mentions that he has approached the subject rhetorically, as he would 
practice with Landino, rather than through philosophical argument.426 Similarly, in his second 
speech Alberti introduces his example of Paolo Toscanelli as a means of advancing the disputation 
‘with dialectic rather than with oratory’.427 Landino’s overt discussion of the nature of poetry in this 
proem indicates his acknowledgement of a departure from the disputational approach of 
philosophical inquiry which had constituted the first two books of the Disputationes in favour of the 
more didactic and persuasive methods of his allegorisation of the Aeneid. Since his aim in the third 
and fourth books of the Disputationes is to modify the reader’s behaviour, we can therefore 
understand the allegorical techniques he uses therein as a subtle instance of the rhetoric which was 
the primary means of regulating civic conduct for humanists.428  
This change in rhetorical approach can be illustrated by the divergence between the role that 
Aeneas assumes as a moral paradigm in the Aeneid allegory in comparison to the models deployed 
in the first and second books that display either the moral advantages of the active life – such as in 
the case of Hercules and an array of classical statesmen and military leaders – or the contemplative 
life – such as in the cases of Paolo Toscanelli and Cicero. Aeneas, unlike these figures, is a cipher 
for philosophical principles rather than a guide for realistic attainment. Even when compared to 
mythological and semi-mythological figures used as exemplars elsewhere in the text, he stands as 
less ‘real’ because the former are used as concrete objects for moral orientation rather than 
possessing an entirely allegorical significance alone. At the start of the third book of the 
Disputationes, Landino makes this clear. Aeneas, he writes, was created by Virgil according to his 
plan for ethical instruction as a man who ‘gradually purged of numerous and great vices and then 
adorned with extraordinary virtues, eventually reached that which is the summum bonum of humanity 
and which no one can attain unless they are a sapiens’.429 The models of the first and second books 
                                                          
426 DC, p. 35.18-22. 
427 DC, p. 37.26-27. 
428 See e.g. Hankins, ‘Machiavelli, Civic Humanism, and the Humanist Politics of Virtue’, p. 102-05 and see 
above pp. 50-52. 
429 ‘[Virum informavit], qui plurimis ac maximis vitiis paulatim expiatus ac deinceps miris virtutibus illustratus 
id, quod summum homini bonum est quodque nisi sapiens nullus assequi potest, tandem assequeretur’, DC, 
p. 119.3-6, and cf. Comento, Inf. II.10-36.60. 
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constitute specific (if sometimes fictive) examples of proper conduct; Aeneas provides an abstract, 
paradigmatic illustration of the philosophical principles of virtue and vice as applied to human 
behaviour and psychology. One emerges from humanism and the rhetorical culture built upon it, 
the other from the primarily Platonic tradition of Virgil commentary. Now, recall that in an earlier 
chapter we touched upon how Vergerio valued the benefit of historical exemplarity to the humanist 
when compared to philosophical rumination.430 He writes: ‘in philosophy we find rules explaining 
what one may profitably do or shun, but in history we find [moral] examples; in philosophy the 
duties of all mankind may be found and what it is fitting for each person to do, but in history what 
has been done or said in every age’.431 With his use of both concrete and abstract exemplars, 
Landino is able to transmit both kinds of teaching at once. His innovation in the Disputationes, 
therefore, is to bring together in one text contemporary and historical models of good humanistic 
conduct with the allegorical exemplarity of the Virgilian critical tradition in order to transmit a 
virtue ethics built upon both humanistic and philosophical instruction. On the one hand, he builds 
a network of classical, mythological and contemporary references that readers can negotiate, 
aligning themselves to appropriate examples of either action or contemplation on their path to 
becoming a model citizen and sapiens. On the other, he guides his audience through the principles 
of his system of virtue ethics with an embodiment of his theory of gradualist moral perfectionism, a 
figure who stands as a paradigmatic example of how to purify oneself of the stains of day-to-day 
vice while, at the same time, offering a window into the psychological processes of the mind from 
which the shoots of improper behaviour spring. 
When Landino investigates vice in his allegory of the Aeneid, then, he is attempting to instil 
virtue through both ethical instruction and intense psychological reflection, systematising immoral 
behaviour and situating it in the human experience through the allegorisation of Aeneas’ travels and 
his descent to the underworld. The voyage of Aeneas to Italy represents the progress of the soul 
towards God through the expiation of vices that, according to Sallust and Cicero, cause the moral 
dissipation of the republic and thus prevent any attempt to administrare rem publicam. These vices 
hinder the exercise of civic virtue itself and prevent the ascent to contemplation, whose wisdom can 
benefit public life. In Alberti’s opening remarks in the third book he states that Virgil, recognising 
in Homer the hidden wisdom of the Egyptians, wanted to devise a similar figure to Ulysses to act as 
a vehicle for the moral philosophy of Plato. Hence he uses the following rationale to create the 
character of Aeneas: 
 
[Aeneas], gradually purged of numerous and great vices and then adorned with extraordinary virtues, 
eventually reached that which is the summum bonum of humanity and which no one can attain unless they are a 
sapiens. When Virgil learned from Plato that the summum bonum consisted in speculation on divine things, he 
learned at the same time that it cannot be reached until our souls are wholly restored, having been cleansed by 
                                                          
430 See above p. 49 and n. 139. 
431 Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus, p. 49 (my italics).  
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those virtues pertaining to life and morals, because Socrates himself denies that it is right for the pure to 
touch the impure. Hence he has not only marvellously expressed for us the ends of the good, but has also 
shown in what way and in what manner a person might eventually attain it, and so the part of his philosophy 
which the Greeks call ‘ethics’ and which we call ‘pertaining to life and morals’ was not omitted. For in this 
moral philosophy we seek nothing else but, first, the ends of good and evil [bonorum malorumque fines], and then 
the duties [officia] by which we may be led to them as if by some kind of road.432 
 
In this description of Virgil’s aim in composing the Aeneid, the emphasis on the moral virtues and 
the allusions to Cicero’s De finibus and De officiis in the final line of this passage indicate that the 
forthcoming allegory will deal with the process of purgation and the implications for personal 
conduct it entails rather than any divine speculation with the intellectual virtues. This sentiment was 
expressed even more explicitly in the introduction to his Virgil commentary of 1488, where 
Landino wrote that, just as Xenophon offered moral advice to a prince in in his Cyropedia, so the 
Aeneid teaches moral behaviour to all human beings: 
 
Moreover, as regards that which pertains to living well and happily, who could not see that all precepts by 
which human life is properly governed can easily be extracted and grasped from this poet as if from the 
venerable shrines of philosophy? For just as Xenophon represents the life of Cyrus from its very infancy, in 
order that the best prince might be fashioned by the example of that king, so too does Virgil’s poem express 
every kind of human life, so that there is no class of human being, no age, no sex, ultimately no situation, 
which cannot learn its duties in their entirety from him.433 
 
It is the exercise of moral virtue within human life that Virgil teaches us and, moreover, the fact 
that Landino posits the ethical lessons of the Aeneid as generalisations of the precepts found in the 
most famous classical work in the ‘mirror for princes’ genre shows that he views them as conveying 
the universalist and egalitarian principles important to his republicanism. These teachings, Landino 
argues, can be interpreted in four different ways: through history, which investigates bald fact; 
through etymology, which reveals causation; through analogy, which reconciles contradictions; and 
                                                          
432 ‘Qui plurimis ac maximis vitiis paulatim expiatus ac deinceps miris virtutibus illustratus id, quod summum 
homini bonum est quodque nisi sapiens nullus assequi potest, tandem assequeretur. Verum cum illud in 
rerum divinarum speculatione consistere a Platone didicisset, simul et illud didicit eo antea minime perveniri 
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ipse purum impuro attingere fas esse neget. Quapropter non solum fines bonorum nobis mirifice expressit, 
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eos deducamur’, DC, p. 119.3-17. 
433 ‘Quod autem ad bene beateque vivendum pertinet, quis non videat omnia quibus vita humana recte 
instituatur praecepta ab hoc poeta veluti ex adorandis philosophiae sacrariis promi facile ac percipi posse? 
Nam ut Cyri vitam Xenophon ita a primis incunabulis producit, ut eius regis exemplo optimus princeps 
informari possit, sic Maronis poema omne humanae vitae genus exprimit, ut nullus hominum ordo, nulla 
aetas, nullus sexus sit, nulla denique conditio, quae ab eo sua officia non integre addiscat’, Scritti, I, pp. 215-16, 
and see Craig Kallendorf, Virgil and the Myth of Venice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), pp. 62-63. 
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through allegory, which conceals truth in poetic images.434 It is through this fourth hermeneutic 
technique that Landino’s allegorisation will proceed. 
Landino’s adoption of the idea of the furor poeticus from the Ion and Phaedrus via Ficino meant 
that he interpreted the Aeneid as a source of philosophical truth and a medium for moral 
instruction. These ideas were, in one form or another, common to the tradition of Platonically-
inclined Virgilian criticism from which Landino drew. Servius in his In Vergilii Aeneidem commentarii 
and Macrobius in the Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis and the Saturnalia both interpreted the 
Roman poet as illustrating hidden knowledge through his poetic figures and, following the Phaedo, 
equated the underworld with the body; Fulgentius read the Aeneid as a moral allegory charting the 
course of human life; the commentary on the first six books of the Aeneid attributed to Bernardus 
Silvestris expounded a Platonic moral philosophy which included a detailed treatment of the 
descent to the underworld as representing descent into the body; and Petrarch’s analyses in the 
Africa and Seniles IV.5 interpret Aeneas a moral exemplar, a vir fortis ac perfectus whose virtue readers 
could seek to emulate.435 Moreover, to this intellectual lineage that Landino absorbed one can also 
add the profound influence exerted by Virgil upon Dante’s Commedia and the broader investigations 
of allegory found in texts such as Boccaccio’s Genealogie deorum gentilium, Ficino’s discussion of the 
judgment of Paris in the Philebus commentary, Poggio Bracciolini’s De avaritia and Salutati’s De 
laboribus Herculis.436  
However much Landino relied on this tradition – and on the commentary of Bernardus 
Silvestris and the De laboribus Herculis in particular – for individual elements of his allegory, his 
approach in the Disputationes was innovative in its scope, organisation and sense of continuity. As 
Kallendorf has commented, Landino prided himself that his allegory of the Aeneid in the third and 
fourth books of the Disputationes was the first to uncover its systematised moral philosophy 
according to the chronological order of its events rather than the order in which they are presented 
in the poem.437 While he is subjected to certain interpretive constraints because the Aeneid takes the 
form of a journey from place to place, he is nevertheless deliberate in deriving from it a system of 
moral perfectionism in which the soul is cleansed of vices in a specific order. First the human soul 
                                                          
434 DC, pp. 119.23-120.22. 
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‘Cristoforo Landino, Coluccio Salutati and the Best Life’. 
437 Kallendorf, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s Aeneid and the Humanist Critical Tradition’, pp. 533-544. 
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must free itself from sensual pleasure, then avarice, then ambition. Not only does this sequence 
serve as an implied hierarchy of vice, but also as an analysis of the human condition. At each step in 
the process of purgation Landino reminds us that our moral growth risks diversion and backsliding: 
the perturbationes inflicted upon the mind when the appetite is distracted by the corporeal world 
consist in the psychological difficulties we encounter and the vices to which we are most 
susceptible at the stage of moral development – and, indeed, of life – that we have reached. So, in 
youth we are inflamed with sensual pleasure, when entering into public affairs ambition inclines us 
to put off contemplation and so on. Since in the Disputationes Landino’s allegorisation treats these 
milestones as stations in a course of moral progress rather than direct correspondences with each 
human age, it stands as a refinement of similar theories of moral development in which the conduct 
expected of a person evolves through the successive phases of life. These appear not only in the 
commentators on Virgil, but also in humanistic ethical instruction more generally. The former 
tradition originates in the sixth-century Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae of Fulgentius, which aligns 
the unfolding story in the Aeneid (in the order of its relation rather than Landino’s chronological 
order) with the moral concerns of each human age. So, the shipwreck of the first book illustrates 
the dangers of childbirth, the second and third books youth, the fourth the lust of adolescence and, 
in the sixth book, Aeneas descends to the underworld to penetrate the secrets of virtue with the 
golden bough, or learning.438 Few later Virgilian commentators would escape this Fulgentian 
influence. Bernardus Silvestris, a profound influence on Landino, would follow a schema of 
allegorising the Aeneid as depicting moral progress from childhood to maturity with the descent to 
the underworld in the sixth book being the centrepiece of the analysis.439 On the other hand, the 
proximate humanistic influence on Landino that presented this opinion was the Vita civile of Matteo 
Palmieri, which prescribes a course of moral instruction conforming strictly with the phases of 
mortal life. Like Landino, Palmieri constructs his theories of civic engagement around the 
Macrobian grades of virtue and the purgation of psychological disturbances which arise from 
external goods, but the older humanist has the character Agnolo emphasise that he will tackle his 
moral instruction in life’s sequence.440 Since Landino mentions the Vita civile favourably in the 
prolusion to his university lectures on Petrarch in 1467, we know that he was familiar with the 
hermeneutic techniques set out in Palmieri’s work before he began to compose the Disputationes.441 
Given the aforementioned theoretical commonalities along with similar moral sentiments such as 
the censure of avarice in a leader of the republic, it is noteworthy that Landino resisted the 
temptation to follow Palmieri in adopting a methodology based on the ages of life.442 Among other 
                                                          
438 Fulgentius, Exp. Verg. passim. 
439 Bernardus Silvestris, Commentary, pp. 14-15 and passim. 
440 Palmieri, Vita civile, I.14. 
441 Scritti, I, p. 36.4-7. 
442 Palmieri, Vita civile, IV.209-12. Furthermore, I believe that, given the similarities between their main 
arguments and a common reliance on the Macrobian scale of virtue, a strong case can be made that Lorenzo’s 
speech in the first book of the Disputationes takes the Vita civile as its main model. 
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humanists, different modes of conduct were commonly associated with each stage of life in 
educational literature which took its lead from loci classici such as Aristotle’s Ethics and Cicero’s De 
senectute.443 For instance, in his De ingenuis moribus, Pier Paolo Vergerio maintains that ‘each age has 
certain vices peculiar to it: adolescence burns with lust, middle age is rocked by ambition, and old 
age wastes away in greed’.444 Similar views were transmitted in public correspondence, with Salutati 
writing that ‘when we have reached that age at which we should gather our burdens and long for 
the Creator, who is also the goal of all things, let us dismiss such follies and trifles [of the desire for 
glory]’.445 In the Comento, which is less rigid than the Disputationes in its conformity to the 
progression from luxuria to avaritia to ambitio, Landino mentions in passing this very idea, writing 
that ‘as the youthful age is impeded by lust, and the virile age by ambition and desire for honours, 




















                                                          
443 Aristot. Nic. Eth. IV.i.37; Cic. Sen. passim. 
444 ‘Habent enim et aetates sua propria quaedam vitia. Adulescentia libidinibus aestuat; aetas media ambitione 
iactatur; senectus cupiditate avaritiaque consumitur’, Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus, p. 20, and see also 
Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, p. 258. 
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Petrarch’s Familiares VIII.3 in n. 56. 
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The allegorisation of the Aeneid in the third and fourth books of the Disputationes is concerned with 
sketching a purificatory course towards the divine and hence intersects only incidentally with each 
stage of human life, but one such alignment appears at the very beginning of the allegory where 
Landino is unambiguous in interpreting Troy as representing the corporeal pleasures (voluptates) 
which reign in the pre-moral ages of childhood and adolescence.447 As Craig Kallendorf has noted 
in his analysis of Landino’s place in the tradition of humanistic criticism of the Aeneid, such an 
identification is a commonplace of Virgilian allegory which appears in Petrarch’s Secretum, Salutati’s 
De laboribus Herculis (although Salutati also identifies Troy with avarice) and Boccaccio’s Genealogie 
deorum gentilium, and to this list we can also add earlier commentators such as Fulgentius and 
Bernardus Silvestris.448 While the association of Troy with sensual pleasure did not comprise part of 
any broader intellectual itinerary in the three authors that Kallendorf cites, for Landino it offered a 
sensible starting point for a Platonist reading of the Aeneid which charted the soul’s liberation from 
being incarcerated in the body. Indeed, Michael Murrin has shown that the concept of Troy 
symbolising the human sensual condition is ultimately adopted from the commentary on Plato’s 
Republic by Proclus and thus constitutes one of six fundamental assumptions which Landino draws 
from Platonist interpretations not of the Aeneid, but of the Odyssey, which he mentions in the third 
book as being the philosophical and allegorical model for Virgil’s work.449 Since at this age, Landino 
argues, our capacity for self-reflection is unformed, we concentrate on the appropriation of the 
fundamental needs of nature, the Peripatetic prima naturae, and seek the pleasures of the body which 
all living beings know from birth. Our actions are essentially involuntary and we cannot yet 
consider them to be motivated by virtue or vice, and so ‘no one will say that there is virtue in a 
child’.450 Instead, we only begin to distinguish good from evil ‘when, with the progression of age, 
our mind begins to be illuminated to some extent by the light of reason’, that is, at the age of 
discretion at which the road of one’s life forks into the Pythagorean letter ‘y’ and its onward paths 
of vice and virtue.451 Aware that the consequence of characterising luxuria as a vice which has its 
                                                          
447 DC, pp. 120.23-121.29. Landino would later refer to this characterisation directly in Comento, Inf. I.31-36.9-
15 and I.37-43.131-154. 
448 Kallendorf, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s Aeneid and the Humanist Critical Tradition’, pp. 536-38. In the Exp. 
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origin in the impulsive, premoral phase of life before adulthood is that an explanation is necessary 
for its presence later in the course of moral progress, Landino therefore tends to focus on its 
atavistic character in later references to sensual pleasure. So, when discussing his theory of 
appetition, he writes: 
 
But sometimes this [appetitive] power judges in such a way that, regarding nothing beyond the senses and as 
if attracted by their charms and corrupted by the reward of pleasure it is offered, it discerns what is good for 
beasts as being good for human beings.452 
 
Similarly, when Aeneas reaches the Strophades, which represent the vice of miserly avarice, 
Landino writes that such a development occurs after one has abandoned the ‘pristine savageness’ of 
the sensual appetite.453 Hence, the threat that luxuria poses is that of a regression to a form of 
bestiality which, as we shall see later, extends to the influence of avarice and ambition in civic life. 
Landino has the character of Alberti illustrate the repercussions of the choice made at the onset 
of maturity with the contrasting fates of Paris, who is doomed by his adoration of Venus, and of 
Aeneas, who is led to Italy (that is, contemplation) by the same goddess.454 Acknowledging the 
inconsistency in his interpretation of Venus as both an instigator of and a liberator from sensual 
pleasure, Landino argues that, while Virgil was constrained by the existing mythography in which 
Venus was the mother of Aeneas, the poet nevertheless sought to introduce a Platonic conception 
of the goddess into the Aeneid. Virgil, he claims, is representing here the doctrine found in the 
Phaedrus and Symposium of the two Venuses, a heavenly Venus who signifies the divine love which 
seeks the beauty of God, and an earthly Venus who represents corporeal love which has earthly 
beauty as its end.455 It is the earthly Venus who rules in Troy, because while the perception of 
corporeal beauty is an important instrument in proceeding to the contemplation of God when one 
then transcends the sensible world through the direction of divine love, it can cause serious damage 
when the mind is unable to abstract its understanding of beauty from the senses and becomes 
consumed by a ‘love of a soul dead in its own body and living in another’.456 In such cases, the 
desire for corporeal pleasure becomes habituated, entrenching itself in the mind as a mental 
sickness or morbus and, as we saw in the previous chapter, these sicknesses are the psychological 
                                                          
(Munich: Fink, 1970). 
452 ‘Nonnunquam autem ita iudicat huiuscemodi vis, ut nihil praeter sensus respiciens et veluti illorum 
illecebris attracta et voluptatis oblato praemio corrupta, quod pecudis bonum est, ipsa hominis bonum 
decernat’, DC, p. 133.15-18. 
453 ‘Pristina feritate’, DC, p. 146.3. 
454 On the representation of Paris as sensual love, see also Cic. N.D. III.91. On the associations between Paris 
and sensuality in Landino and earlier commentators as regards his judgment of Juno, Minerva and Venus, see 
Chance (2015), pp. 408-15.  
455 Plat. Phaedrus 266a and Plat. Sym. 180c-185c. Landino’s understanding of the Platonic theory of the two 
Venuses is drawn from Ficino’s account in De amore II.7. See also Comento, Inf. I 37-43.136-154, in which 
Landino refers to this passage in the Disputationes. 
456 ‘Eum ardorem animi in suo corpore mortui in alieno viventi’, DC, p. 126. 
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dispositions which are also known as vices, in this case that of luxuria.457 Hence Paris, who is unable 
to remove his mind from the senses and, having thus fallen into luxuria, cannot proceed to celestial 
love, is consigned to the flames of sensual desire. Aeneas, on the other hand, can perceive vestigial 
images of the divine in the sensible world and is inspired by the heavenly Venus with a desire for 
contemplation that ultimately drives him to Italy.  
Still, the noble intentions of following divine love are only the beginning of one’s moral 
transformation. Aeneas continues to defend Troy, just as the immature remain distracted by bodily 
pleasures because reason is not yet aroused in the prima naturae. Such people, writes Landino, are 
ignorant of the precise nature of their summum bonum but are nevertheless instilled with a desire for 
it by the divine love, which causes them to begin to understand that the prima naturae of the body 
are ephemeral and corruptible and the body itself – that is, the city of Troy – must die. Alberti’s 
allegorisation of the fall of Troy concludes by drawing some further Platonic lessons for this advice 
from Virgil’s text. Since bodily pleasures are not only self-destructive – as Alberti established in the 
previous day’s disputation – but also inimical to the comprehension of the divine, the gods are 
complicit in Troy’s destruction.458 They undertake their assault while hidden from Aeneas in clouds 
and shadows, which Landino interprets as representing the common Platonic trope of the 
immersion in corporeal matter dimming the human mind and obscuring the truth.459 One who has 
resolved to proceed on the moral journey of purgation, however, is able to set the body aside and 
begin on their way, but the magnitude of the task initiates a struggle between the mens and the 
senses which requires the inferior part of the soul to be supported by the superior. Hence Anchises, 
who represents the sensual appetite and would rather die than leave the corporeal realm of Troy, is 
carried out by Aeneas.460 
It would seem that there are three practical steps to moral purity Landino would have his 
readership take before anything else. First, to become inflamed with a desire for self-improvement 
through ‘divine love’ (or, in other words, take the virtuous path at the Pythagorean ‘y’) when they 
reach the age of discretion; second, to struggle against any desire for bodily pleasures, or at least 
prevent any such desire from becoming the ingrained psychological disposition which is the vice of 
luxuria; and third, to understand that the corporeal world and the physical needs which we 
instinctively seek to appropriate are transitory. Furthermore, they should accept the difficulty of the 
challenge ahead. These three steps are a neat encapsulation of the marriage of humanist schooling 
and Platonic doctrine that constitute Landino’s virtue ethics. The advice that, upon reaching 
adulthood, one must assume personal responsibility for one’s own path was commonplace of both 
humanist moral instruction and the allegorical tradition, with variations on the figure of the 
Pythagorean ‘y’ appearing first in Persius, then in commentators such as Servius (who also 
                                                          
457 See above pp. 129-32. 
458 DC, p. 80.1-9 and see above p. 125. 
459 See e.g. Plat. Phaedo. 79c and 82e. 
460 DC, pp. 131.10-17. 
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identified the ‘y’ with the golden bough of the Aeneid), and finally in humanists including Petrarch, 
Salutati and Palmieri.461 Likewise, a recurring theme in the humanist education of adolescents was 
the necessity of maintaining moderation in personal behaviour and avoiding indulgence in food, 
wine and sex. For instance, Pier Paolo Vergerio writes that ‘[young people] are to be kept most of 
all from those sins into which they are easily and naturally led by their age’ and Palmieri (again) 
writes that ‘Here [in adolescence] youths begin to taste the pleasures of the world and desire to 
pursue them according to their desires... in all human acts it is not enough to abstain from 
reprehensible wickednesses, but one also wishes to be above all suspicion of them’.462 Only then 
could would-be statesmen develop the kind of virtue which would afford them political legitimacy 
among their fellow citizens. Yet by drawing a comparison between the divergence of the different 
paths of adulthood and the concept of the earthly and heavenly Venuses, and supporting the 
repudiation of the corporeal world and the evidence of the senses, Landino also introduces the 
Platonic elements of his virtue theory in these opening pages. Not only must his reader learn how 
to cultivate the traditional humanistic virtues of the vita activa that sanction the exercise of power 
within a republic, but these virtues are to be employed in a purificatory ascent to the divine from 
which the sapiens can then return to impart advisory wisdom to the state, thus obviating the need 
for him to occupy any official role.  
As well as identifying the danger of corporeal pleasures and the risk of their being fixed in the 
soul as luxuria, the escape of Aeneas from Troy allows Landino to set out two main themes which 
contribute to the intellectual underpinning of his allegorisation. The first is that he identifies the sea 
with the appetite, the power of the mind which acts upon sense data to appropriate or flee things 
and which, as we saw earlier, Landino had defined in the De anima as being a composite of desire 
(libido), the irrational appetite which relies upon the judgment of the senses, and the will (voluntas), 
the rational appetite which is subordinate to reason.463 Like the sea, the appetite can remain serene 
and direct its desire properly, but when cast into the psychological squalls of the perturbationes animi 
which arise from bodily contagion it becomes disturbed and erratic. Landino would again employ 
the concept of misguided appetition being a form of psychological turbulence in the Comento, in 
which he discusses the meaning of the souls of the lustful being buffeted by winds in canto V of 
the Inferno. Referring directly to his allegorisation in the Disputationes, Landino states that:  
 
                                                          
461 Persius, Satires 3.56-57; Servius, Commentary on the Aeneid of Virgil, VI.136-37; Petrarch, Familiares III.12.5, 
VII.17.1 and XII.3.5-7, and Secretum III.130-132; Salutati, De laboribus Herculis III.vii.2-3 and III.viii.15; and 
Palmieri, Vita civile I.92-104. On Landino’s use of the figure, see Chance, Medieval Mythography, p. 408 and pp. 
418-19; Murrin, p. 46; and Wilson-Okamura, pp. 166-67. On that of Palmieri, see Gilson, Dante and Renaissance 
Florence, pp. 106-08, and Timothy Kircher, Living Well in Renaissance Italy: The Virtue of Humanism and the Irony of 
Leon Battista Alberti (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2012), p. 77. 
462 Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus, pp. 20-22 and see also pp. 82-88; Palmieri, Vita civile I.103. Similar sentiments 
can be found in e.g. Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, pp. 142-56. 
463 See above pp. 64-66. 
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[Dante] makes a good comparison with the sea which, as I have demonstrated, represents the appetite and 
sensuality most excellently in the Aeneid of Virgil... These contrary winds [in the poem] make the sea roar, that 
is, they drive the sensuality of the lover to lamentation and misfortune.464  
 
It follows that, in the Disputationes, the navigator Palinurus who first guides the fleet of Aeneas but 
loses his way amidst the storms and winds, represents the libido, and his death shortly before 
reaching Italy thus represents reason abandoning any appetitive desire for sensual things.465 By 
characterising the journey of Aeneas in the Disputationes as an ongoing struggle against the violent 
and sudden attacks of appetition, Landino is able to implement the theory of emotions he had 
derived from the Tusculanae Disputationes as a form of practical guidance. The reader is induced to 
understand that the success or failure of their incipient moral progress will depend upon the extent 
to which they can maintain psychological discipline and equanimity, a Stoic approach to mental 
conditioning which was a commonplace of humanist education in the Quattrocento through figures 
such as, for instance, Pontano and Piccolomini.466 When Landino instructs the reader to beware the 
body’s baleful influence on human behaviour through the perturbationes of the material world, he 
incorporates an idea shared with these thinkers that the fallacious judgment of the senses can cause 
one to become adversely affected by circumstances that are subject to chance and beyond one’s 
control. Later, when allegorising the Carthaginian shore, Landino makes explicit this relationship 
between appetitive desire and the vicissitudes of fortuna: 
 
For you will not find in anyone a prudence with which one can entirely predict the outcomes of those matters 
to which fortuna devotes herself, in her fickleness. This is because we are exposed to such varied events that 
we very often seek out things which will be harmful to us with great determination, and flee with all our 
efforts those things which would turn out to be beneficial and useful, as if they were harmful.467 
 
For Landino, not only does fortuna represent the instability and transience of the material world in a 
general sense but, more specifically, he understands her as acting in a distributive capacity, as an 
agent whose function is to bestow or take away the external goods which enmesh us in 
corporeality.468 The choices we make between the ‘harmful’ goods of the body and of fortune and 
the ‘beneficial and useful’ goods of the soul are confused by the vagaries of external events driven 
                                                          
464 ‘Et ben fa comperatione del mare, el quale chome dimostramo nell’Eneide di Virgilio optimamente si pone 
per l’appetito et per la sensualità... Questi contrarii venti fanno mughiare el mare, cioè commuovono a mughi et 
a guai la sensualità dell’amante’, Comento, Inf. V.25-45.44-52.  
465 DC, pp. 144.13-145.23, 198.17-25 and 202.11-203.2. 
466 See e.g. Pontano, On the Prince, pp. 72-73; Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, p. 158. 
467 ‘Nullo enim in homine prudentiam invenias, qua earum rerum, quas sua temeritate fortuna versat, eventus 
penitus praevideat, cum tot tamque diversis casibus exponamur, ut persaepe et, quae nocitura sint, summis 
votis expetamus et ea, quae si evenirent saluti usuique essent, veluti noxia omni industria fugiamus’, DC, p. 
173.25-30. 
468 The concept of fortuna (or τύχη in the Greek) as a distributor of external goods is Aristotelian: see e.g. 
Aristot. Pol. VII.i.5 and Aristot. Nic. Eth. I.x.6-14.  
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by chance. By making this connection, Landino is alluding to the humanist commonplace, so 
beloved of Machiavelli and so central to the analyses of Quentin Skinner in particular, which sets 
(masculine) virtus or virtù in opposition to (feminine) fortuna and maintains that, through virtue, one 
can resist, endure and ultimately overcome the external events which disturb the soul.469 He is clear 
that making correct moral and political decisions in such circumstances is a function of an 
unperturbed mind because ‘the soul fortified against the blows of fortuna with virtue has been 
separated far away from perturbationes’.470 Hence in the ensuing allegorisation of the soul’s 
development in the Disputationes, the struggle against the appetite through which we overcome 
avarice and ambition and achieve a final victory of the superior over the inferior reason is not only 
a psychological battle against the desires which arise from the body but also a means of gaining 
some form of resilience against, if not mastery over, the influence of fortuna in human life. One 
might note that, in a culture in which humanists strove to portray political legitimacy as being 
contingent upon the virtue of its wielders, emphasising that virtue is valuable for its consolatory 
qualities in the face of capricious fortuna helps to resolve the thorny question of how circumstances 
could turn against rulers who had received proper moral instruction. 
The second significant theme of Landino’s virtue theory which he elucidates at this point is that 
of how virtue and vice are habituated in a moral agent, the discussion of which is prompted by 
Virgil’s depiction of Aeneas weeping as he leaves the shores of Troy.471 Following Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas and Ficino in the Platonic Theology, Landino describes four distinct categories of 
behaviour in regard to the virtue of temperance: intemperance, in which vices are implanted as a 
dispositional habit, or habitus, in the mind; incontinence, in which one fights vices but succumbs to 
them; continence, in which one acts with virtue but with distraction and difficulty; and temperance 
itself, in which the virtues are fixed as a habitus.472 Only in the first and last of these categories are 
vicious and virtuous behaviour respectively established as a habitus – although, as the example of 
Dido later shows, this habit can be broken – whereas in continence and incontinence, one’s moral 
condition is inchoate and mutable. What is more, Landino later makes it clear that true temperance 
is only achieved at the level of the virtues of the soul already purged, where one reaches the 
                                                          
469 See for instance Vincenzo Cioffari, ‘The Function of Fortune in Dante, Boccaccio and Machiavelli’, Italica, 
24.1 (March 1947), 1-13; Klaus Heitmann, Fortuna und Virtus. Eine Studie zu Petrarcas Lebensweisheit (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 1958); Garin, Italian Humanism; Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, I; Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment; and Antonino Poppi, ‘Fate, fortune, providence and human freedom’, in The Cambridge 
History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Keßler (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 641-67. On Landino’s view of fortuna, see also Comento, Inf. VII.67-96.  
470 ‘Nam animus virtutibus adversus fortunae impetus munitus procul a perturbationibus seiunctus est’, DC, 
p. 173.11-12. 
471 DC, pp. 134.24-136.31. 
472 Landino had outlined this idea earlier in De anima, III, p. 55. The fourfold division between temperance, 
continence, incontinence and intemperance comes from Aristot. Nic. Eth. VII.i-x and was elaborated upon in 
other sources with which Landino was familiar such as Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II. QQ.155-56 
and Ficino, Platonic Theology XVIII.x.6-16. The idea of habitus originates in Aristot. Met. V and Nic. Eth. II.v 
and was known to Landino from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II. QQ.49-54. 
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tranquillity, or apatheia, of having forgotten the influence of vice.473 That this system allows both 
advancement from vice to virtue and retrogression from virtue to vice serves two purposes for 
Landino. The first is theoretical, in that it fulfils the structural demands of Landino’s virtue theory 
by supplying a mechanism for transition upwards or downwards from one grade of virtue to 
another. The other is admonitory, in that it serves as practical advice to the reader to remind them 
that one who is only morally continent and does not cultivate virtue as a habit of the mind runs the 
risk of relapsing into former vices. Landino is telling his audience that the process of purgation is 
contingent on maintaining the virtues which are already present, and that one cannot afford to be 
complacent even when one’s behaviour adheres to proper ethical standards. By extension, the 
moral solidity of the state which rests on the virtue of its political class demands constant vigilance 
on the part of its citizens, lest unhabituated virtue backslide into the vices so harmful to the Roman 
republic. 
Landino’s theories of appetitive habituation account for two further appearances of sensual 
pleasure and its concomitant risk of falling into luxuria. The first occurs after Aeneas meets 
Helenus, or reason, whereupon he encounters luxuria once more, although this time alongside 
avaritia, with the two vices being represented by the monsters Scylla and Charybdis.474 Here, where 
the soul is on its course to the summum bonum and would seem to have suppressed its desires, the 
oceanic appetite is disturbed by perils of circumstance, with Scylla representing the luxuria that 
results from good fortune and Charybdis the avaritia that arises from poverty. The apparent 
inconsistency of the reoccurrence of the vices is so glaring that Landino has Lorenzo act as a reader 
surrogate and ask why they should appear once more when the soul would already seem to have 
conquered them. True to Landino’s earlier warnings, Alberti’s answer is that at this stage of moral 
development the soul is merely continent rather than temperate. To achieve cognition of the divine 
requires more than continence, and the ubiquity of the vices in both good circumstances and bad 
makes it necessary to struggle against them for a long time in a ‘sea inhabited by monsters’ before 
one develops temperance at the level of the virtues of the purged soul.475 Furthermore, when 
understood as cautionary advice to statesmen this idea gains another dimension beyond the merely 
personal. If the moral failings which corrupt the state can arise at the whim of fortuna in times of 
prosperity as well as those of adversity – and this is precisely the view of Sallust in the Bellum 
Catilinae – then all the more humility, moderation and perseverance must be maintained by the 
citizenry and exhibited by civic leaders. 
The final appearance of luxuria in the journey of Aeneas is in the figure of Dido. While, for 
Landino, the figure of Dido herself invites a multiplicity of subtle readings, prominent among 
which are her embodying the desire to rule and the state itself, the most dramatic interpretation that 
he devotes to her in his allegorisation is his analysis of what he understands as Dido’s gradual 
                                                          
473 DC, p. 152.16-23. 
474 DC, pp. 150.27-153.10. 
475 ‘Maria monstris obsessa’, DC, p. 151.2. On the fickleness of fortuna, see e.g. Sal.Cat.10. 
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abandonment of moral principles and deteriorating mental state due to her passion for Aeneas. 
Stating that Virgil followed Sallust in being aware that the foundations of civil society depend on 
virtue and that, if states were to retain the virtues by which they came into being, they would not be 
afflicted by as many adverse circumstances, Landino goes on to interpret Dido’s decline as 
symbolising how the moral standards of a republic degrade only gradually, such that ‘she, who had 
been a most virtuous woman and had been very vigilant in administering the republic [re publica 
administranda], falls into idleness and licentiousness, conquered by a dishonourable love’.476 At first, 
Dido is the model of temperance. She falls in love with Aeneas for the most noble of reasons: his 
virtue and his possession of goods which benefit social life such as nobility, appearance and 
articulacy. Yet she lapses from temperance into continence because she can no longer ignore the 
concerns of the corporeal world but still seeks to resist them. Her virtue is no longer fixed as a 
habitus. Distressed with the situation, she seeks the unreliable advice of her sister Anna who, basing 
her reasoning on the inconstant arguments of expectation and fear rather than philosophical 
reasoning, encourages her to entreat the gods that Aeneas will stay with her. Dido is therefore 
overcome by ‘unchaste’ love, slipping into incontinence, and when this love becomes a habit and 
she behaves as though she and Aeneas were married she has fallen all the way into intemperance. 
Landino views this perceived decline as illustrating his theory of habituation: 
 
All this shows how easily human minds descend from effort to appetitive desire in times of good fortune. 
Since the virtues of civic life are inchoate rather than absolute, the civic life is dealt with in such a way that 
Virgil wants to express what I said earlier: that the foundations of republics which grow from small things 
have happier beginnings than endings.477 
 
As Dido’s virtue ebbs away, so too do her piety, liberality, wisdom, sense of justice and devotion to 
public works. She offers ‘a profound example to us of how much harm comes to those who live in 
an empire when luxuria and sloth insinuate themselves into the minds of its rulers in place of 
diligence and effort’ and, needless to say, the same reasoning applies equally to the other vices.478 
These passages lay bare the Sallustian core of Landino’s virtue politics in the Disputationes. Although 
the institutions of Florence had been dominated by the Medici to the extent that it remained a 
republic in name only, the premise on which Landino’s political thought in the Disputationes relied – 
namely, that someone could act as steward and advisor to a republic and wield political influence 
                                                          
476 ‘Ut quae pudicissima fuerat mulier et in re publica administranda vigilantissima turpi amore victa in 
lasciviam otiumque labatur’, DC, p. 182.24-26. 
477 ‘Quibus omnibus ostenditur, quam facile rebus secundis humanae mentes a labore in libidinem declinent. 
Quoniam autem virtutes in vita sociali potius incohatae quam absolutae sunt, hic autem ita de vita civili agitur, 
ut velit exprimere, quod paulo ante dicebam, fundamenta rerum publicarum, quae ex parvis crescunt, habere 
meliora initia quam exitus’, DC, pp. 182.26-183.2. The dangers of the instability and volatility of sensual love 
are also mentioned in Comento, Inf. I.31-36.71-76 and Comento, Inf. V.52-69. 
478 ‘Ut Didonem gravissimum nobis exemplar proponat, quantum detrimentum iis, qui sub imperio sunt, 
proveniat, cum principum mentes pro industria ac labore luxuria atque ignavia irrepat?’, DC, p. 184.2-5. 
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without occupying an official role – could nonetheless allow him to look to Sallust’s Rome as an 
model. Both the allegorical example of Dido and the lessons taken from Rome’s decline show that 
one who wishes to exercise power in a republic, whether that power is officially sanctioned or 
otherwise, must be aware that the permanence of the status quo is never assured and it is the moral 
character of the governing class, as well as the collective virtue of the citizenry, which acts as a 
bulwark against civic degeneration. Ensuring the health of the state – and we should note that while 
Landino uses the term imperium here because he is referring to Carthage in particular and historical 
states more generally, he returns to his favoured term res publica when hearkening back to Sallust – 
requires that the minds of its rulers are guarded against uncontrolled appetition. For a young 
statesman such as Lorenzo who was still relatively inexperienced and governed Florence in a 
position that, notwithstanding failures of foreign policy such as the Volterra massacre, was 
reasonably secure thanks to his reforms to the Cento, this would have been a valuable reminder 
that both external enemies and the city’s anti-Medicean faction were poised to take advantage of 
any lapse of focus.  
Landino is able, moreover, to pluck some further observations from Dido’s decline that are of 
use in the political sphere. Dido’s conversation with Anna presents Landino with an example of 
how bad counsel can harm one’s moral decision-making. It is important which counsellors one uses 
in public life, he has Alberti point out, and one can be driven to bad deeds whether ‘moved by a 
poor example or encouraged by the incorrect arguments of those whom they hold dear’.479 One 
cannot say whether when writing this passage Landino had any contemporary figures in mind such 
as, for instance, Tommaso Soderini, whose attempts to influence Lorenzo in the early years of his 
rule threatened the inexperienced ruler’s relationship with Milan, but it was certainly intended to 
present the general point that overreliance on the advice of intimates runs the risk of one’s 
decisions being compromised by flattery, sentimentality or a simple lack of political experience on 
the part of the advisor.480 Landino also indicates that the fact that Dido is first swayed from 
temperance by the lineage, bearing and speech of Aeneas acts as a warning to readers that one 
should not overestimate the goods of social intercourse, which were already mentioned in the 
second book as being useful, but not essential, to the virtuous life. While valued popularly, these 
characteristics should not be deemed so important ‘in the scale of the wise’, he claims, a sentiment 
which points to the egalitarian strand in humanistic thought in which learning and mental acuity 
were favoured over familial prestige (which benefitted intellectuals from humble backgrounds such 
as Landino himself) and, what is more, absolves the Medici from the need to justify their relatively 
modest provenance when compared to other members of the Florentine ottimati. Ultimately, 
though, Dido’s fate is a consequence of her habituated sensual desire, the vice of luxuria. As 
Landino puts it, the passages devoted to her imitate the sentiments of Pausanias on the earthly 
                                                          
479 ‘Multi enim aut malo exemplo moti aut eorum, quos caros habent, non rectis suasionibus impulsi ad prava 
moventur’, DC, p. 183.15-17. 
480 On Soderini and others, see Najemy, A History of Florence, pp. 344-48. 
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Venus in his speech in the Symposium and their primary purpose is that ‘they execrate libidinous and 
corrupt love and, by the most grave example of this woman, they warn us to flee from so foul and 
pernicious a disease’.481 Until one achieves true temperance, the risk of sensual pleasure continues 
































                                                          
481 ‘Ut libidinosum et corruptum amorem detestentur atque tantae feminae gravissimo exemplo nos 






At this point in their moral development, the putative reader has, like Aeneas, become ‘exiled’ from 
the body and its attractions but does not yet know what the summum bonum is. They have established 
some degree of continence but have not yet adopted the habitus of virtue, so, instead of lusting after 
sensual pleasure, they fall into another form of desire which is the impulse to possess material 
goods. This desire becomes avarice or avaritia when habituated in the mind, and Landino 
distinguishes between two different kinds of this vice. One is acquisitiveness (that is, when ‘we take 
something when we should not’), which is represented by Thrace, the first destination that Aeneas 
reaches after leaving Troy, while the other is miserliness (when one ‘does not give to the person to 
whom he should give’), represented by the Strophades.482 In making such a distinction, Landino 
departs from many medieval discussions of avarice which tended to view the vice in Aristotelian 
terms as being a deficiency of an acquisitive and distributive attribute whose mean is the virtue of 
liberality, and the excess of which is prodigality. This model appears in William of Perault’s Summa 
vitiorum and, of course, the Summa Theologiae, but its most dramatic presentation appears in Dante’s 
depiction in the Inferno of the sinners in the fourth circle of hell, who are organised into groups of 
the prodigal and the avaricious and forced to joust with giant weights.483 In his analysis of the 
seventh canto in the Comento, Landino follows the Aristotelian line of thought by describing how in 
this circle the demon Plutus punishes sins relating to riches, with ‘one kind of sinner holding onto 
them too much; the other dissipating them too much’.484 Since these vices are two extremes about 
the mean of liberality: ‘even though avarice and prodigality are contraries, they nonetheless deserve 
to be punished in one and the same place because they have the same subject.’485 Yet he is also 
careful to specify that avarice itself consists in the two varieties he mentioned in the Disputationes: 
‘there are two kinds of avarice, as both one who does not give where and as much as he should, and 
one who takes whence he should not, is an avaricious person’.486 This subdivision of avarice into 
miserliness and acquisitiveness derives from a parallel medieval tradition which draws a distinction 
between the vices of avaritia and cupiditas, with the former consisting in not putting one’s wealth to 
good use, and the latter in desiring wealth itself. While the origin of this distinction is Isidore of 
Seville’s De differentiis verborum, once again it seems likely that the Summa Theologiae was Landino’s 
                                                          
482 ‘Duplex avaritiae genus sit – est enim avarus et is qui inde rapit unde minime convenit et is qui, cui 
dandum est, ei minime dat’, DC, p. 137.7-9. 
483 Aristot. Nic. Eth. IV.i; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II QQ 117-19; William Perault, Summa aurea de 
virtutibus et vitiis (Venice: Paganinus de Paganinis, 1497); Dante, Inferno, VII.22-99. 
484 ‘L’uno tenendole [richezze] troppo. L’altro spargendole troppo’, Comento, Inf. VII.1-3.44-5. 
485 ‘Adunque benché l’avaritia et la prodigalità sieno contrarii, nientedimeno perché hanno un medesimo 
subgetto, meritano esser puniti in un medesimo luogho’, Comento, Inf. VII.1-3.59-61. 
486 ‘Sono due spetie d’avarizia. Imperoché è avaro et chi non dà dove et quanto debba, et toglie donde non 
debbe’, Comento, Inf. VII.16-36.23-24. 
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source, for therein Thomas Aquinas defines the excessive love of wealth which is avaritia as 
consisting of two aspects: an excess of retaining and an excess of receiving.487 
Thrace, whose ‘avaricious shore’ Aeneas is later told to flee, is the first place that he visits after 
leaving Troy, Landino claims, because the acquisitive impulse first develops in the incontinent mind 
after it has abandoned carnal pleasure.488 For Landino, Thrace represents the acquisitive type of 
avarice both because its god is Mars, under whose name war is waged for plunder, and because its 
king, Polymnestor, murdered Priam’s son Polydorus after the fall of Troy in order that he might 
keep the treasure entrusted to him. While the association is far from universal in the allegorical 
tradition – there is no mention of Thrace in the Expositio Virgilianae of Fulgentius, nor in Salutati’s 
De laboribus Herculis, although Diomedes, the earlier king of Thrace, is associated with superbia and 
avaritia in the latter work – there is a precedent in the commentary on the first six books of the 
Aeneid by Bernardus Silvestris, in which he argues that Thrace stands for avarice because it ‘had the 
most avaricious inhabitants and the most avaricious king’ and, interestingly, separates the avaricious 
into the same two categories as Landino, writing that ‘an avaricious person is devoted to the 
accumulation of much money either by increasing it... or by guarding it with great reverence’.489 
Landino knew this commentary intimately and its influence on him here is unquestionable. While 
he does not follow the commentary of Bernardus in interpreting the Aeneid as an allegory of the 
ages of human life and thus situating avaritia among the vices of adulthood unequivocally, the 
consequence of associating Troy with the sensual desires of youth in the Disputationes is that 
abandoning them for avaricious impulses suggests a move from adolescence to maturity, even if 
such moral progress could theoretically take place at any point of life. This implication is probably 
unintentional on Landino’s part, because the fact that his plan was to proceed through the vices in 
the necessary order of their purgation meant that avaritia had to be psychologically prior to ambitio 
regardless, but it is worth noticing because it both diverges from the humanist educational tradition 
represented by figures such as Pier Paolo Vergerio and Matteo Palmieri – who as we have seen, 
viewed avaritia as a vice of the elderly – and would seem to impart the idea to Lorenzo and other 
young statesmen that acquisitive desire is the foremost threat which risks seizing them on first 
attaining the age of political majority.490  
Thanks to Aristotle’s discussion in the Ethics of the concept of pleonexia, which he sees as being 
the ultimate cause of all injustice within the polis, the seriousness of greed as a danger to political 
                                                          
487 Isidore of Seville, De differentiis verborum, II.4 (PL 83:9); Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae II-II Q.118 A.8. 
See also Richard Newhauser, The Early History of Greed: The Sin of Avarice in Early Medieval Thought and Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 108-09 and n. 41, in which he observes that a similar 
distinction is made in Horace’s Epistulae I.i.33. 
488 ‘Fuge litus avarum’, DC, p. 137.6 quoting Verg. Aen. III.44. 
489 ‘[Tracia] que avarissimos habitatores et avarissimum regem habuit’, Bernardus Silvestris, Commentary, p. 
17.21; ‘Itaque servit avarus agregationi multe pecunie vel eam augendo... vel eam reverentia magna 
custodiendo’, Commentary, p. 18.13-15. On Diomedes, see Salutati, De laboribus Herculis III.xxi.9. 
490 See above pp. 142-44. 
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and civil life had authoritative provenance for humanists.491 Landino’s understanding of avaritia 
throughout his career was similar to Aristotle’s in that, from his earliest writings, he saw it as a vice 
which was distinctive both for its insatiability and for its tendency to motivate other crimes. The 
first of these characteristics is illustrated in his early poem Contra avaros in the Xandra, in which he 
writes ‘as the pile of money grows, so much does the thirst for having money grow’ but its most 
vivid depiction in his work is that of the allegory of the she-wolf in the Comento on the first canto of 
the Commedia.492 Adducing classical authorities such as Horace, Virgil and Seneca and the 
mythological exempla of Midas and Tantalus, Landino describes how the emaciated and ravenous 
she-wolf represents an avaritia which, like dropsy, can never be sated and, indeed, grows greater and 
greater the more one accumulates riches.493 No other animal is more greedy and voracious, claims 
Landino, and just as the wolf uses ambushes and tricks to catch its prey in darkness, so does avaritia 
harm others with lies and deceit.494 The second characteristic of avaritia that Landino regularly 
highlights – that is, it being a wellspring for all other kinds of vice – is also visible in his 
allegorisation of the she-wolf in the Comento in that it he describes it as ‘certainly the worst vice of 
all’ from which ‘many other vices proceed’.495 Later in the De vera nobilitate he would repeat this train 
of thought by discussing how ‘those corrupted by avarice – imbued with a noxious poison, as it 
were – descend into every kind of dishonourable baseness and do not refrain from any kind of 
vice’.496 Yet the most florid and emphatic assertion of the universal influence and danger of avaritia 
appears in the analysis in the Comento of the seventh canto of the Inferno: 
 
Not without reason does he call him [Plutus] the ‘great enemy’ at the end of the preceding canto, because 
without fail he infests and troubles the human race a great deal. Avarice provokes and incites discord among 
those joined by blood, by friendship and by country. Avarice produces injustice, by which riots, sedition and 
civil war are stirred up. Avarice is the reason for external wars. Avarice fills the sea with pirates and corsairs, 
and the streets with robbers. In the city, avarice produces thefts, murders, poisons, perjuries, false testimonies 
and corrupt judgments. Finally, it makes the father of the family a cruel enemy to his wife, to his children and 
to himself, because through fear of consuming what he has amassed he cheats himself and all his family of 
necessary things. It puts laws and magistrates up for sale. It puts modesty and chastity up for sale.497 
                                                          
491 Aristot. Nic. Eth.V.i and IX.vi.3-4. 
492 ‘Quantum crescet acervus | nummorum, tantum crescet avara sitis’, Xandra II.3.17-18. 
493 Comento, Inf. I.49-54.10-32 and see also Comento, Inf. VII.7-15.14-25 
494 Comento, Inf. I.49-54.5-10. 
495 ‘Vitio certamente pessimo di tutti’, Comento, Inf. I.49-54.22-23; ‘dall’avaritia procedono molti altri vitii’, 
Comento, Inf. I.91-99.21-22. 
496 ‘Verum qui illa [avaritia] infecti, tanquam veneno malo imbuti, in omnes turpissimas sordes descendunt, hi 
a nullo scelerum genere temperant’, DVN, p. 63. 
497 ‘Né sanza cagione lo chiamò nella fine del precedente canto “gran nimico”, perché sanza fallo troppo 
infesta e molesta la generatione humana. L’avaritia suscita et commuove discordia tra congiunti di sangue, 
d’amicitia, et di patria. L’avaritia produce ingiustitia, dalla quale s’excitano tumulti, seditioni, et guerre civili. 
L’avaritia è cagione delle guerre externe. L’avaritia riempie el mare di pyrate et di corsali, et le strade di 
ladroni. L’avaritia produce nella città furti, homicidii, veleni, periurii, falsi testimonii, iudicii corropti. 
Finalmente fa el padre della famiglia crudele inimico alla moglie, et a’ figliuoli, et a sé medesimo, perché per 




Landino’s first concern in his discussion about Thrace in the Disputationes, however, is how keen 
political leaders are to wage unnecessary wars for the sake of the acquisition of wealth. The 
acquisitive impulse, he writes, drives people to military conflict because ‘inflamed with this desire 
[of surpassing others in wealth], they do not hesitate to undertake not only crimes, but also wars 
filled with suffering and danger’.498 This sentiment echoes that of Poggio Bracciolini in the De 
avaritia, in which the character Andreas declares that the avaricious ‘will urge war, even one that is 
unjust and with danger to the country, if they believe that they will be able to plunder anything for 
themselves from it’.499 Likewise, Christian writers such as John Chrysostom viewed avarice as the 
main motivation for military conflict, and Virgil himself has Evander say in the eighth book of the 
Aeneid that the Golden Age was followed by the ‘frenzy of war and the love of possession’.500 It is 
difficult to look beyond the Volterra massacre as a justification for Landino’s thoughts here. Recall 
that this crisis was precipitated early in Lorenzo’s rule on account of his attempts to maintain a 
grasp on the Volterran mining concession in alum, whose price was artificially inflated by a 
Medicean monopoly. Despite Landino’s later claims in his encomiastic proem to the Virgil 
commentary of 1488 that the Volterran reaction came ‘suddenly and unexpected by anyone’ and 
that Lorenzo ought to be exonerated of any wrongdoing, it cannot have escaped his attention that 
at each stage in the course of events Lorenzo’s inexperience caused him to aggravate matters by 
trying to assert his dominance rather than attempt a compromise as his advisors had suggested.501 
From the outset, Lorenzo’s efforts had been devoted to profiteering from the alum mine rather 
than allowing the resource to be used for public benefit, and the violent repercussions of such 
acquisitive avaritia provided a valuable moral lesson. Since direct criticism of Lorenzo was out of 
the question, the allegorisation of Thrace gave Landino the opportunity to comment upon precisely 
how hot-headed materialism in a politician could have dire consequences. Note too how, shortly 
before Landino began writing the Disputationes, the dispute between Lorenzo and Sixtus IV over the 
former’s attempted acquisition of Imola – a purchase that Sixtus was able to stymie, take on for 
himself and then turn into a diplomatic zugzwang for Lorenzo by demanding a loan for the 
transaction – was the spark that ignited the long-running enmity that would culminate in the 
                                                          
magistrati. Vende la pudicitia et la castità’, Comento, Inf. VII.1-3.27-40, and see also Comento, Inf. VII.16-36.11-
14. 
498 ‘Qua cupiditate inflammati non dubitant non modo nefaria, verum etiam laboribus periculisque 
refertissima bella suscipere’, DC, p. 137.18-20. 
499 ‘[Avari] hortabuntur ad bellum, etiam iniquum et cum periculo patriae, si quid ex eo se expilaturos 
confidant’, Poggio Bracciolini, De avaritia, p. 87, and see also Arthur Field, The Intellectual Struggle for Florence: 
Humanists and the Beginnings of the Medici Regime, 1420-1440 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 314, in 
which the translation from Poggio Bracciolini, ‘On Avarice’, in Benjamin Kohl and Ronald Witt, ed. and 
trans., The Earthly Republic: Italian Humanists on Government and Society (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1978), p. 278 is quoted in a discussion of this theme. 
500 John Chrysostom, Hom. 63 in Matt., 4; Verg. Aen. 8.327.  
501 See above pp. 37-38 and Scritti, I, p. 219. 
159 
 
murder of Giuliano de’ Medici in the Pazzi conspiracy.502 For the contemporary tensions 
surrounding Lorenzo to be instigated by what Medici supporters saw as the deliberately underhand 
and vindictive behaviour of Sixtus, conduct which could be entirely attributed to acquisitive 
impulses by Medicean humanists such as Landino, gave a particular piquancy to the warnings that 
conflicts could arise from the sort of avaritia represented by Thrace. 
At the heart of Landino’s analysis of Thrace are, once again, the condemnatory opinions of 
Sallust, whom he identifies in the passage as understanding that avaritia is a vice which emasculates 
one’s moral character, thus causing one to stoop to the very basest deeds.503 Such moral 
degeneration has implications for the realm of political praxis. Avarice, thunders Landino, ‘teaches 
the heart treachery and perjury by means of deceit; aiming at the ruin of others, it furnishes the 
tongue with lies, the hand with poisons and the sword’.504 Setting aside Landino’s central concern 
that this habituated form of appetition will prevent the ascent to wisdom which can in turn be 
imparted to the state, these are not the qualities of a ruler who could attract any kind of political 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. If the perceived moral character of politicians in the 
Quattrocento was essential in enabling the legitimate use of power, then for a statesman to behave 
in a manner that was deceitful, mendacious and aggressive would attract severe rhetorical censure 
and pose a threat to social cohesion, because these characteristics are not only morally deficient, but 
threaten to corrode the intrapersonal relationships on which rest the principles of republican 
comity. Yet of just as much practical use is Landino’s unstated but implicit premise that since 
avaritia can arouse these kind of qualities (that is, those that kindle conspiracy and insurrection), a 
canny ruler can both preemptively mitigate risks against himself by spotting signs of acquisitiveness 
in his allies, rivals and subordinates and managing them accordingly, and can understand the 
potential consequences to him if it is allowed to fester unrestrained. Aware that financial situations 
are volatile and that such dangerous rivalries and discontent can emerge quickly, Landino 
emphasises the fact that avaritia is a vice devoted to money, than which ‘there is nothing more 
unstable, nothing which is more subject to the vagaries of fortuna’.505  
Since the position the Medici occupied in Florence was founded on their enormous wealth 
rather than any noble lineage, they were, as a family, all too conscious of the risks of financial 
inconstancy. Landino’s advice that fluctuations in wealth at the level of persons, factions and states 
could inspire avaritia, which in turn could provoke treachery at any time, therefore had a powerful 
historical precedent in the exile of Cosimo de’ Medici. The accusations against Cosimo that 
occasioned his exile had primarily been financial in nature, centring on bribery and, most 
damagingly, the charge that he had prolonged the war against Lucca in order that he might profit 
                                                          
502 See above p. 41. 
503 ‘Quapropter recte Sallustius avaritiam ita malis venenis imbutam dixit, ut animum corpusque virile 
effeminet’, DC, p. 137.24-26. The same association can be found in Comento, Inf. I.49-54.24-26. 
504 ‘Ipsa enim perfidiam periuriumque edocet cor fraudibus, linguam mendaciis, manum venenis ferroque in 
aliorum perniciem instruit’, DC, pp. 137.28-138.1. 
505 ‘Nihil enim illa [pecunia] mobilius, nihil quod magis fortunae temeritati subiciatur’, DC, p. 137.23-24. 
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from his loans to Florence.506 His situation therefore offered three lessons about the dangers of 
avaritia: first, that great wealth can lead to accusations of avaritia and its attendant crimes of deceit 
and treachery, compromising one’s public standing even if one were innocent; second, how actual 
deceit and treachery can arise in a republic when money is involved (especially if Cosimo’s enemies 
are seen as being consumed with an acquisitive avaritia which overvalues external goods and 
produces envy of his status); third, how Cosimo’s swift transition from public benefactor to exile 
shows that their inherent inconstancy means that financial affairs can swiftly turn for the worse. In 
a rather different fashion, Landino also sought to forestall any such criticism of the Medici in his 
analysis of acquisitive avaritia in the De vera nobilitate. He argues, in a passage that is an unequivocal 
reference to the origins of Medici wealth, that the exercise of free trade without deceit benefits all 
human beings and affords merit to those involved in it.507 Drawing a clear distinction with these 
activities, and hence insulating the Medici from any criticism, he declares that in the realm of 
commerce it is in fact profiteering and corruption inspired by avaritia that is wicked and, indeed, 
harms the very foundations of the state. 
The second type of avaritia that Landino discusses in the Disputationes is miserliness or meanness, 
which is represented by the isles of the Strophades and their inhabitants, the Harpies. Almost all 
medieval and Renaissance mythographers – among them Fulgentius, Bernardus Silvestris, 
Boccaccio and Salutati –associated the Harpies with avaritia (albeit usually in a more generic sense 
than Landino) and the popularity of the attribution filtered into the works of authors less usually 
associated with allegory, with the Harpies making an appearance as symbols of greed in, for 
instance, Poggio Bracciolini’s De avaritia.508 The specificity of Landino’s allegorisation of the 
Harpies and the distinction between two types of avaritia exposes his view that, as far as his virtue 
politics was concerned, these two manifestations of greed posed separate dangers to the state, and 
hence a different ethical approach was required to tackle each of them. Where the risks to the 
statesman arising from the acquisitive avarice represented by Thrace were those of conflict, 
treachery, and moral degradation, Landino’s censure of this kind of avaritia highlights a different 
threat: the harm to social cohesion when resources are hoarded without being used for the public 
good. For Landino, the political consequence of such miserliness is that the oikeiotic principle of 
reciprocal support between individuals within a commonwealth is eroded. The kind of avaritia 
represented by the Strophades, he argues, corrupts us so that ‘out of those things which we have 
already acquired, we do not offer help to those whom justice, nature and the bond of human 
society require us to help’.509 Hence time and again his criticism of miserly avaritia in his allegory is 
                                                          
506 Najemy, A History of Florence, pp. 271-74. 
507 DVN, pp. 62-64. 
508 Poggio Bracciolini, ‘On Avarice’, pp. 253-55. As we have already seen (see above, p. 151), Aeneas later 
meets Charybdis, who, for Landino, represents recidivism towards avaritia in either of its forms after attaining 
some degree of moral continence. 
509 ‘Ex iis, quae iam peperimus, minime illis subvenimus, quibus ius naturaque ac humanae societatis vinculum 
subveniendum postulat’, DC, p. 145.27-29. 
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phrased in terms which stress the wickedness of wealth’s retention. Aeneas is prevented from eating 
the feast by the Harpies because ‘those who are the wealthiest prefer to die of hunger than to 
diminish their treasure by the very tiniest particle’, and the Harpies have hooked claws just as 
misers, dragged by the talons of avaritia away from the divine into the distractions of the material 
world, refuse to let go of their wealth.510 Like the she-wolf of the Comento, the Harpies are 
emaciated by hunger but this time, rather than attributing this imagery to acquisitive rapacity, 
Landino instead claims that Virgil created it thus because the more wealth the miser amasses, the 
greater the harm he causes by not distributing it properly.511 
Ideas of mutual advantage, of how the exchange of duty and wealth between individuals 
cements the state, were common among Quattrocento intellectuals thanks to the cultural centrality 
of that foundational text of humanism, Cicero’s De officiis.512 Its oikeotic underpinnings, exemplified 
in the non nobis solum formulation we have already encountered, have the natural consequence that 
humans within a commonwealth owe duties to one another and that we should ‘employ common 
benefits for the public good by the exchange of duties, by giving and receiving, and bind human 
society together between people with our skills, effort, and faculties’.513 Hence arises Cicero’s 
particular definition of justice, which is relational and distributive in nature and is seen as being 
devoted ‘to the conservation of human society, to rendering to every individual what is theirs, and 
to the keeping of contracts’.514 Landino appropriates this definition at the level of the civic virtues, 
declaring that the elements of civic justice are ‘that each is rendered their own, and that all live with 
equal rights’.515 Miserliness, as both Cicero and Landino see it, transgresses these collaborative 
conventions by suppressing the reciprocal exchange of duties and, in doing so, assaults the very 
principle of distributive justice which maintains the welfare of the republic. Hence, in his allegory of 
the Strophades, Landino describes the miser in Ciceronian terms: ‘more sparing with what has been 
acquired than is fitting on account of his great meanness, and performing no duty of generosity, he 
is of benefit neither to himself nor to his own’.516 This moral position is continuous with the 
Aristotelian concept of external goods on which Landino bases his theory of vice – that is, that 
avaritia consists in an appetitive impulse which is misdirected towards external material goods rather 
than its summum bonum. It is a short step from here to the issues that Cicero tackles in the De officiis. 
When translated into practical moral terms, Landino’s psychological objection to miserly avaritia is 
that, as far as the miser is concerned, wealth is sought as an end in itself rather than for its 
                                                          
510 ‘Qui etiam ditissimi sint, fame perire quam vel minimam acervi particulam inminuere malint’, DC, p. 
147.29-31. The allegory of the Harpies’ talons appears in DC, p. 146.20-30. 
511 DC, p. 146.15-20. 
512 Cic. Off. I.vii.22 and passim, although the concept ultimately derives from the discussion of justice and 
reciprocity in Aristot. Nic. Eth. V. 
513 Cic.Off. I.vii.22. 
514 Cic.Off. I.v.15. 
515 ‘Ut unicuique suum reddatur, ut aequo iure omnes vivant’, DC, p. 154.14-15. 
516 ‘Per summas sordes plus quam par est parto parcens nullo liberalitatis munere fungens neque sibi neque 
suis beneficus est’, DC, p. 146.4-6. 
162 
 
instrumental utility with regard to the common good, and it is this that instigates all manner of 
immoral behaviour. Cicero advanced precisely the same position, arguing that ‘for the most part, 
people undertake wrongdoing in order to acquire what they desire. In this vice, avarice is widely 
evident’.517  
The lesson that Landino wants the reader to learn is that, at the level of the civic virtues, the 
virtue of justice is not simply a habit attained for oneself, but it must also be operative – it must be 
put into practice for tangible benefit. One begins to purge the soul of avaritia by understanding that 
the external goods of wealth are purely instrumental (it is ‘due to the highest stupidity that we think 
riches are the greatest good, when they are either not goods at all or are very inferior goods’) and, 
moreover, that what advantage they possess is in their disbursement among citizens according to 
the principles of justice.518 By advocating this conception of operative virtue, Landino was cleaving 
to humanistic writings of the preceding fifty years such as Alberti’s Della famiglia and, once again, 
Matteo Palmieri’s Vita civile, which takes the question of how far one should do good with one’s 
wealth as a central theme.519 In the Vita civile, Palmieri follows the De officiis in celebrating operative 
virtue, claiming that ‘the true praise of each virtue is situated in its operation, and one does not 
achieve such operation without the faculties suitable for it’, and discusses how goods of fortune and 
goods of the body should be conserved in a civil union for all, with each paying taxes according to 
their ability to do so.520 While Palmieri, like Landino, bases his ethical system on the Macrobian 
grades of virtue in that the civic virtues are the first step on the ascent to God, he nevertheless 
views the civic virtues as being necessarily and functionally prior to the higher grades and is led by 
this logic to take a conventional humanistic tack in prioritising the vita activa, asserting that one who 
lives in solitude and does not expend resources can never perfect their virtue.521 Landino, on the 
other hand, reiterates that ‘the desire of possessing distracts and separates us from the cognition of 
those things by which alone the soul can be happy’, showing that the exercise of distributive justice 
in combatting avaritia in civil life consists in engendering an understanding of the true value and 
function of external goods.522 It is the unnecessary accumulation of wealth and the concomitant 
misleading of the appetite that he deems injurious to the attainment of the summum bonum. 
What, then, is the manner in which Landino thought wealth ought to be justly distributed by the 
political elite which comprised his readership, and by Lorenzo in particular? As we have seen, 
financial largesse was used by prominent citizens of the time to burnish their virtue through the 
                                                          
517 Cic. Off. I.vii.24 
518 ‘Cum enim ob summam stultiam divitias maxima bona putemus, cum aut bona non sint aut minima bona’, 
DC, p. 147.4-5. 
519 Alberti, I libri della famiglia, p. 46. 
520 ‘La vera loda di ciascuna virtù è posta nell’operare, et all’operatione non si viene sanza le facultà atte a 
quella’, Palmieri, Vita civile IV.24. See also III.169-83, IV passim and Cic.Off. I.vi.19. 
521 On the Macrobian scale of virtue, see Palmieri, Vita civile I.183-203. On criticism of the solitary life, see 
e.g. Vita civile III.29-30 and IV.24. 
522 ‘Avertit enim nos atque sevocat habendi cupiditas a cognitione earum rerum, quibus solis felix animus esse 
possit’, DC, p. 146.25-27. 
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support of public works and humanistic endeavours – with such expenditure in Florence being 
dominated by, but not limited to, the Medici – and, as Mark Jurdjevic and many other scholars have 
noted, the intellectual trends of Quattrocento humanism duly followed in beginning to advocate the 
value of private wealth in benefitting the republic, a stance exemplified in, for instance, Poggio’s De 
avaritia and Filelfo’s De paupertate.523 In the Xandra, Landino himself was open in judging Cosimo’s 
virtue as being commensurate with the generosity of his gifts to the republic and emphasised that 
‘the state has been stabilised in the highest place’ by the disbursal of his wealth for the public good.524 
In a similar fashion, Federico da Montefeltro is praised effusively in the proems of the Disputationes 
for his munificence as a patron of artists and humanists, being acclaimed because his generosity 
towards learning is no less than Ptolemy’s, because he provides ‘a safe haven and a unique sanctuary 
for learned men in calamity and offers glory and distinction to those placed in better fortune’, and 
because he contributes far more to scholars than other princes (note the avaricious implications of 
his description of Federico’s rivals): 
  
While the rest of Italy’s princes expend all effort in order that they procure very great treasures for themselves 
and their heaps of silver and gold grow larger and larger by the day, you lavish the greatest part of your wealth 
most liberally on the ornaments of the Muses and of those who cultivate the Muses.525 
 
Yet it is necessary to proceed carefully. Humanistic thought drew a distinction between, on the one 
hand, the just allocation of resources within the republic and, on the other, the kind of 
magnificence and lavish spending which emerges from personal generosity, because Cicero argues 
in the De officiis that the common bonds of human society are maintained by not one, but two 
constituent parts: justice, which we have already encountered; and beneficence (beneficentia, which 
can also be called benignitas or liberalitas), which is ‘connected’ to justice and can, in a sense, be 
understood as being subsidiary or ancillary to justice, since justice is inviolable but beneficence is 
contingent on proximate relations.526 Justice itself consists of two elements which are, first, 
preventing harm between individuals unless provoked by wrongdoing and, second, the distributive 
kind, using common resources for common interests and private property for one’s own while 
taking into account that our family, friends and country have a share in us.527 Beneficence requires 
                                                          
523 See above pp. 113-14 and n. 345 and Jurdjevic, pp. 1005-08. 
524 ‘Publica res summo constabilita loco est’, Xandra III.1.47-52. 
525 DC, pp. 192.20-193.11; ‘qui et calamitosis iisdemque litteratis viris salutaris portus unicumque profugium 
sit et maiori in fortuna constitutis decus ornamentumque afferat’, DC, p. 53.9-11; ‘cum reliqui Italianae 
principes in eo omnem industriam ponant, ut quam maximos sibi thesauros comparent aurique atque argenti 
acervus magis magisque in dies crescat, tu maximam tuarum opum partem in Musarum et eorum qui Musas 
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526 Cic. Off. I.vii.20. An elegant summary of Cicero’s views on justice and beneficence (therein translated as 
‘material aid’) is Martha Nussbaum, ‘Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy’, 
Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 54.3 (Spring 2001), 38-52. On the intellectual history of 
distributive justice and its relationship to beneficence, see Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive 
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 19-28. 
527 Cic.Off. I.vii.20-xiii.41. 
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more caution, in that it should not cause harm to its object or others, it should not be beyond the 
means of the giver, and that, since it is related to justice, any kindness is proportionate to merit or 
desert.528  
Landino’s praise of munificence in his patrons – such as the panegyrics to Federico in the 
proems to the Disputationes – tends to be phrased in terms of Cicero’s idea of beneficence. Setting 
aside the fact that his livelihood depended on the support of these figures (which would have 
inclined him more towards emphasising both the generosity directed to him and, by extension, the 
glory accrued by his patrons in supporting his intellectual endeavours), this is because their 
contribution to the common good is made through patronage of humanism and the arts. Theirs is 
not a redistribution of wealth which merits the application of distributive justice, nor indeed are 
they necessarily Florentine, although, as in the case of his celebration of Cosimo, Landino can also 
celebrate munificence as a civic rather than a Maecenean virtue.529 When analysing Landino’s 
theoretical view on the damaging effects of avaritia in the Disputationes, however, it is clear he 
believes that the idea that the corrupting influence of material goods is contrary to justice as well as 
beneficence alone, because he imitates Cicero’s language closely in denouncing its harm to ‘justice 
and nature and the bond of human society’.530 The metaphors of the Harpies’ emaciation, their 
talons and the uneaten feast all point to the idea that amassing great wealth through avaritia involves 
a disinclination to allocate resources as they ought to be allocated, which according to the 
Ciceronian view is not merely an absence of benevolence, but an injustice. This is a view of the 
distribution of wealth as being a zero-sum game within the state, in which the non-disbursal of 
accumulated riches on the part of the miser equates to a direct and proportional disadvantage to 
other citizens. Hence the Harpies, and thus miserly avarice, ‘[are reminiscent of] when herds and 
flocks graze indiscriminately, consume nothing therefrom out of need, and yet allow others to 
consume nothing’.531 Landino, therefore, is describing something rather more than a want of 
beneficence, because the miser does not simply not give, but actively harms the common good in 
his not giving. Worse still, this kind of avaricious behaviour can even appear disguised with the 
image of virtue, presenting itself as thrift, honour and sobriety while all the time eroding the 
opportunity for mutual advantage. This is why, Landino claims, Virgil represented the Harpies as 
having the faces of maidens but foul excrement: the miser appears to be noble, but what lurks 
behind the pretence is loathsome.532  
Yet this is not at all to say that Landino thought that there was no connection between Cicero’s 
idea of beneficence and the kind of disbursal of wealth that avaritia prevents. Indeed, some of the 
                                                          
528 Cic.Off. I.xiv.42-xviii.60. 
529 See above p. 28 and n. 62 on Alison Brown’s distinction between the kinds of praise. 
530 ‘Ius naturaque ac humanae societatis vinculum’, DC, p. 145.28; ‘si fortem generosumque sumamus 
animum’, DC, p. 148.3-4. 
531 ‘Hae [Harpyiae] igitur cum passim armenta gregesque pascant, nihil inde sibi ad necessitatem sumunt, nihil 
aliis sumere permittunt’, DC, p. 147.14-15. 
532 DC, p. 146.9-12. 
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language he uses when criticising avaritia seems to be referencing the principle of beneficence in the 
De officiis on purpose. Landino claims that the miser does not disburse his wealth because ‘more 
sparing with what has been acquired than is fitting on account of his great meanness, and 
performing no duty of generosity [liberalitas], he is of benefit [beneficus] neither to himself nor to his 
own’, and later writes that avaritia can be conquered with a ‘brave and generous spirit’ (although this 
time he uses the word generosus rather than the more Ciceronian beneficus or liberalis).533 Moreover, we 
should remember that all Landino’s claims about the hoarding of wealth only obtain at the level of 
the individual and do not stand as direct critiques of the fiscal and economic policies which would 
be the usual apparatus of distributive justice within a state. While an individual’s attachment to 
material goods is a sign of moral deficiency because it presents an obstacle to attaining one’s 
summum bonum, the same cannot be said of a republic which does not disburse a surplus in its 
exchequer, even if it might be an inadvisable policy. This implies that, for Landino, personal 
generosity must in some way figure in contributing to the common good, and the obvious example 
of a contemporary system that had integrated individual benefaction with a republican economic 
programme was that of the Medici in Florence.534 As we have seen, the idea that the money of the 
Medici helped to perpetuate Florentine republican principles was valuable to the family’s self-
presentation as virtuous leaders, however far it might have been from reality. Their desire for this 
kind of legitimisation was not lost on Landino who, in the second redaction of the Xandra, had 
argued that Cosimo’s ‘unique concern for liberty’ and his commitment to ‘civic constancy’ showed 
that his republican credentials surpassed those of the dictatorial Caesar.535 Moreover, since 
Cosimo’s return from exile, the largesse that maintained the Medici’s hold on power through gifts, 
patronage, loans and so on had been accompanied with economic innovations to benefit the 
general good, which included reforms to the maintenance of road and canal infrastructure in the 
1450s and 1460s, protectionism through tariffs to protect manufacturing and the Florentine textile 
market, and tax exemptions and civic privileges for specialised artisans and producers.536  
We can therefore understand that, for Landino, the characteristic blend of generosity and 
distributive justice which miserly avaritia suppresses, the kind which a statesman needs to properly 
administrare rem publicam, is exemplified by Medici policy. He is seeking to justify the Medici mode of 
economic operation and reinforce the concept of a republic in which eminent citizens benefit the 
commonwealth through their generosity, but collective resources are justly disbursed. This lesson is, 
of course, entirely consonant with Landino’s broader project of justifying the exercise of power in 
the republic by one who does not hold any governmental role. The idea that the kind of civic 
                                                          
533 ‘Per summas sordes plus quam par est parto parcens nullo liberalitatis munere fungens neque sibi neque 
suis beneficus est’, DC, p. 146.5-6.; ‘fortem generosumque... animum’, DC, p. 148.3-4. 
534 Landino also had in mind Seneca’s De beneficiis, which discusses the obligations of gift-giving in Rome, the 
model for Florentine republicanism. 
535 ‘Te libertatis unica cura tenet… Egregia haec virtus magna et constantia civis’, Xandra III.15.46-49 and see 
Xandra III.15 and III.16 passim. 
536 See Franco Franceschi, ‘Medici Economic Policy’, in Black and Law, The Medici, pp. 129-54. 
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beneficence exercised by the Medici is crucial in purifying oneself for the investigation of the truth 
(which in turn benefits the state) speaks as to the extent to which support of the regime permeates 
the allegory in the Disputationes. At the same time, however, the particular construction of Landino’s 
discussion about avaritia seems to be so arranged that, while it can constitute a defence of the status 
quo of the Medici regime within Florence, his distributive system nonetheless encompasses 
standard humanistic tropes of civic virtue such that it seeks to inspire moral self-advancement. The 
type of individual generosity he advocates is carefully circumscribed within the bounds of 
republican norms under which, in true Ciceronian fashion, proper distribution of resources benefits 
the common good, and hence the ethical acceptability of munificence is contingent upon its 
direction to noble ends. Seeing that he intends to persuade as well as justify, Landino is aware of 
the likelihood that his elite readership may harbour concerns about the combination of beneficence 
and distributive justice he endorses, and must address any such uncertainties in the allegory. To this 
end he uses the example of the harpy Celaeno, who seeks to inspire fear in the Trojans by 
predicting that they will eat their tables before the end of their journey, even though the execution 
of this prophecy would in fact be harmless (the Trojans later fulfil it by eating the bread on which 
they have placed their food). Celaeno, he writes, represents the unreasoning terror experienced by 
the avaricious when they are inspired to seek the divine, a terror which arises from the belief that 
abandoning avaritia means that one’s essential needs will not be fulfilled. This is, of course, hardly 
an issue for the poverty-stricken because such a situation presupposes some degree of wealth in the 
first place, and so the aim of this passage – whose interpretation is Landino’s own and does not 
appear in earlier commentators on Virgil – must be to acknowledge and assuage the fears of a 
prosperous audience. He encourages them to accept the central premise that, in order for a republic 
to function, its more affluent citizens must contribute to the common good through their own 
liberality just as the Medici had in Florence. 
As well as arguing that generosity should be employed in this way to overcome avaritia, Landino 
also prescribes another course of action. A recurring moral theme in Landino’s allegorisation of the 
Strophades is that satisfaction with one’s financial lot can also help to stave off the appetitive 
impulse and the associated perturbationes animi that persuade the mind into hoarding money. It is 
devotion to wealth for its own sake that causes perturbationes, so Landino is clear that, in order to 
defeat avaritia, one must learn that ‘the things which the most foolish desire of humanity thinks 
necessary for living life are not only of no benefit, but become the cause of all our ills’.537 This is 
best illustrated when Alberti asks Lorenzo which of Alexander the Great and Diogenes was the 
richer. Lorenzo answers (correctly, for Alberti and Landino) that, since Diogenes was satisfied with 
was he had, but Alexander could not stop lamenting when Democritus told him there were other 
worlds to rule and hence possess, then the richer of the two must be Diogenes.538 Since this is a 
                                                          
537 ‘Ea, quae hominum stultissima cupido ad vitam degendam necessaria putat, non modo nihil prodesse, sed 
omnium nostrorum malorum causam existere’, DC, p. 150.4-7. 
538 DC, pp. 148.22-149.19. 
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story which appeared regularly in didactic literature from the classical age to the medieval, and one 
which Landino would have known from Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputationes and Seneca’s De beneficiis, 
two of the main texts which steered his thoughts on avarice, it is necessary to be cautious in 
ascribing any broader motivations on the author’s part beyond an attempt to guide the reader along 
the path to personal moral perfectionism.539 It nonetheless remains, however, that the tenor of 
Landino’s discussion so far has been focussed on persuading his audience that miserly avaritia 
impedes the just distribution of resources according to the principles of operative virtue, and 
therefore the lesson he is seeking to impart here is that to be satisfied with one’s wealth is to 
understand that its value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. However wealthy one might be (and 
Landino’s readers certainly were), if one knows that money should be sought not for its own sake 
but for its utility then one can profit the common good through beneficence free from the 
distractions of the appetite. The value of this approach for Landino is that it allows his audience of 
Mediceans and oligarchs to eat their cake and have it: if they adopt a position of humility in 
understanding that the value of their massive financial power lies, according to Ciceronian ideals, in 
the benefit it can impart when distributed with generosity and with justice, then they can not only 
maintain their affluence but can also at the same time be assured that their minds are being stripped 


















                                                          
539 Cic. Tusc. V.xxxii.92; Sen. Ben. V.iv.3 and V.vi.1. See also Plut., Tranqu. Animi 4 and Ficino, Platonic Theology 
XIV.iv.2. On the provenance of this theme see George Cary, ‘The Most Popular Moral Anecdotes of 
Alexander, and their Medieval History and Usage: Alexander and Diogenes’, in The Medieval Alexander, ed. by 
David J. A. Ross (London: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 83-97. 
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3.4 Ambitio or Superbia 
 
The third and final vice which the soul must purge on its way to contemplation is ambitio or superbia, 
the appetitive desire for reputation, honours and glory.540 For Landino, the central figure about 
whom his ideas on the vice of ambitio coalesce is Juno, who signifies in the Disputationes what he 
terms the ‘desire to rule’ (imperandi cupiditas), or the ‘desire for honours and dominion’ (honorum 
imperiique cupiditas), phrases which are deliberate echoes of the libido dominandi which characterises 
the earthly city of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei.541 Landino would have the reader believe that the 
ferocity of Juno’s attempts to thwart the journey of Aeneas show how ambitio is the most difficult 
vice to discard if one aspires to power, and the richness and complexity of his analysis of this vice 
speaks as to the importance of avoiding it if one is to administrare rem publicam properly. To this end, 
his approach to allegorising Juno is distinctive. Among earlier commentators on Virgil there was 
little in the way of consensus about how Juno ought to be interpreted: for instance, in the Expositio 
Vergilianae Fulgentius associated her with childbirth; and Bernardus Silvestris identified her with 
both the air and the active life.542 The broader ambit of medieval mythographers brought no more 
clarity, with Boccaccio interpreting her as the earth, air, sea, terrestrial wealth and kingship, and 
royal power, and Salutati, in whose De laboribus Herculis Juno features as prominently as one might 
expect given her enmity to Hercules, bestows upon her an encyclopaedic array of associations 
including air, the will, fortuna, the sensitive appetite, astrological functions and, in particular, the 
jealousy she feels towards her husband’s illegitimate son.543 An analysis of the Judgment of Paris by 
Fulgentius in the Mythologies, though, associates Juno, Minerva and Venus with the active, 
contemplative and voluptuous lives respectively and, since this episode is interpreted similarly by 
Bernardus Silvestris and Boccaccio, we can establish at least some precedent for, and sense of 
continuity around, the allegorisation of Juno as representing the vita activa.544 As Jane Chance has 
shown, the mythographical tradition of the Judgment of Paris was influential on Landino’s 
understanding of Juno, and Craig Kallendorf has described how its interpretation by Ficino in his 
Philebus commentary contained the raw materials which Landino could develop in the 
Disputationes.545 In the Philebus commentary Ficino reiterates the traditional identification of the 
goddesses with the three ways of life and notes that the respective ends to which they are devoted 
                                                          
540 Unless otherwise specified, I will follow Landino in using the terms interchangeably. 
541 DC, p. 129.21; pp. 155.21 and 158.28-29. On the libido dominandi, the earthly city and Rome as its model, 
see Augustine Civ. Dei. Pr., I.30-31, III.14, XIV.15 and 28, and XIX.15. Lorenzo argues that the oikeiotic 
bonds of humanity help us overcome the cupiditas imperandi in DC, p. 27.22.  
542 Fulgentius, Exp. Verg.; Bernardus Silvestris Commentary, pp. 4-9 and 46. On the earlier allegorisations of 
Juno, see Chance passim. 
543 On Juno, see Boccaccio, Genealogie deorum gentilium II.3.5, IV.20.7, V.24.3, V.25.16, IV.35.4, IV.54.3, and 
IV.68.27; and Salutati, De laboribus Herculis II.iii-vi and II.xix. 
544 Fulgentius Mythologies II.1, and see Kallendorf, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s Aeneid and the Humanist Critical 
Tradition’, pp. 540-41. 
545 Chance, Medieval Mythography, pp. 408-15; Kallendorf, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s Aeneid and the Humanist 
Critical Tradition’, p. 529 and 541. 
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are pleasure (voluptas) for Venus, domination (imperium) for Juno and wisdom (sapientia) for 
Minerva.546 Unlike Landino, Ficino argues that the active life is further away from the summum 
bonum than even the voluptuous life is, because nothing is further from the tranquillity of our 
ultimate end than imperium and its followers but, nevertheless, the commonality with Landino’s line 
of thought is plain from the analogy Ficino continues to make with the protagonist of the Aeneid: 
‘Aeneas is therefore depicted as being plagued by psychological disturbance [perturbatio] because of 
Juno (that is, because of his desire to rule), and Ulysses is disturbed for the same reason’.547 The 
symbolism Landino associates with the Juno of the Aeneid is therefore unusual, and the notion that 
it was deliberately tendentious is supported because previous representations of the goddess in his 
non-allegorical work had not taken any such form. In an early poem, Landino had appealed to Juno 
in her guise of Lucina, goddess of childbirth, to help his ‘Xandra’ during parturition, and later, she 
is mentioned several times in the De anima, but none of these mentions portray her as representing 
ambitio, power or the active life.548 Yet we must note that, while the precedent that Ficino set was 
influential in guiding Landino’s thought, there is an important discontinuity between their thoughts 
on this subject. Ficino articulates precisely what Juno represents when dedicating the work to 
Lorenzo in the proem: ‘We think that to be understood under the term “power” [potentia] are: 
authority in both civic and military governance; abundance of wealth and excellent renown; and the 
virtue of active affairs [negotiosam virtutem].’549 Like ambitio in Landinian ethics, Juno or ‘power’ 
consists in the false ends of dominion, reputation and glory, but with the significant addition of 
active virtue. For Landino, whose philosophy has its foundations in Cicero and Latin Platonism, the 
active life does not hold the negative connotations that it does for Ficino because the munus of the 
soul which deals with activity is admirable in its own right, and the civic virtues are an essential first 
step on the purificatory path towards God. He therefore disposed of this element of Ficino’s 
interpretation. In the Disputationes, it is not the active life that Juno represents but the ‘desire for 
honours and dominion’. She does not expedite the journey towards self-perfection but impedes it, 
and Chance and Kallendorf could perhaps have emphasised this departure rather more. 
Landino’s innovative treatment of Juno in the Disputationes indicates that he thought the 
extirpation of ambitio to be a crucial aspect of the moral education of the statesman rather than an 
afterthought which merely sought to complete the threefold Sallustian division he had begun to 
represent with Troy, Thrace and the Harpies. This significance is evident from Landino’s first 
serious allegorical treatment of the vice. When Aeneas visits Helenus after leaving the Strophades, 
                                                          
546 Ficino, Philebus commentary, p. 446-50. 
547 ‘Propterea fingitur Aeneas ob Junonem perturbatione vexatus, id est, ob studium imperandi, eademque 
ratione agitatur Ulixes’, Ficino, Philebus commentary, p. 448, and see also Ficino’s comments on Hercules and 
Socrates. I have used my own translation rather than Allen’s to maintain continuity with the themes in the 
Disputationes already discussed. 
548 Xandra I.21; De anima, I, pp. 3 and 8, and II, p. 136. 
549 ‘Sub appellatione potentiae auctoritatem in gubernatione civili pariter atque militari divitarumque 
affluentiam et splendorem gloriae negotiosamque virtutem comprehendi putamus’, Ficino, Philebus 
commentary, p. 482, my translation. 
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he is warned that he will never reach Italy while opposed by Juno, which Landino interprets as 
teaching how those who aspire to positions of power and influence are subject to the distractions 
of ambitio more than any other vice. After all, ‘it is easy for those who already have bigger things in 
mind to despise sensual desires’.550 Ambitio therefore poses a risk to those who would seek to hold 
political office in three different ways, Landino has Alberti explain. The first is that the honours, 
titles and dominion which excellence rewards can seem to possess an intrinsic worth; the second is 
that an aspiration to become like God by bestowing benefits particular to powerful roles can 
provoke an overwhelming desire for political precedence; and the third is that a noble desire to 
excel can become perverted into ambition, tyranny, crime and slaughter when not directed by 
reason.551 
In one form or another, these are definitions which had endured from ancient thought. The 
concept of superbia and ambitio being essentially monarchical traits, antithetical to republican order, 
which cause states to collapse into tyranny and cruelty is one of the central conceits of the works of 
Sallust. I have already articulated how Landino drew on both Sallust and the Aristotelian tradition 
in his understanding of ambitio as being directed at external goods as an intrinsic end, and his 
republican interpretation of this view follows Ciceronian sentiments such as the injunction in the 
Tusculanae Disputationes to beware the seductions of honours and popular glory.552 The impropriety 
of bestowing benefits on account of superbia and ambitio was a common theme in Seneca and, as 
regards the aspect of self-divinisation, Landino was aware that Cicero thought that we ought to 
engage in politics for the exaltation of soul rather than on account of popular approval, and that 
Sallust concluded that ambitio is closer to virtue than avaritia on account of this striving for what can 
be noble ends.553 Yet Landino’s formulation of these characteristics and, in particular, the idea of 
superbia potentially being a dangerous vice because it seeks to emulate God, emerges from Christian 
writings. An early analysis of the characteristics of superbia and ambitio, whose similarity to that in the 
Disputationes suggests an influence on Landino, can be found in Augustine’s Confessions: 
 
For pride [superbia] imitates exaltedness, whereas You alone are God, highest over all. And what does 
ambition [ambitio] seek apart from honours and glory, whereas You are to be honoured above everything and 
are glorious for eternity? And the cruelty of the powerful wants to be feared, but who is to be feared apart 
from God alone?554 
 
                                                          
550 ‘Facile est enim contemnere voluptates ei, qui iam maiora mente concepit’, DC, p. 155.21-22. 
551 DC, pp. 155.16-156.10. 
552 See above pp. 55-57, 132 and 134-35, and Cic. Tusc. V.xxxvi.103-05. See also Yelena Baraz, ‘From vice to 
virtue: The denigration and rehabilitation of superbia in Ancient Rome’, in Kakos: Badness and Anti-Value in 
Classical Antiquity, ed. by Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Rosen (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2008), pp. 365-97. 
553 Sen.Ben.II.5 and II.11-13 and V.6; Cic.Tusc. II.xxvi.62; Sal.Cat.11. 
554 ‘Nam et superbia celsitudinem imitatur, cum tu sis unus super omnia deus excelsus. Et ambitio quid nisi 
honores quaerit et gloriam, cum tu sis prae cunctis honorandus unus et gloriosus in aeternum? Et saevitia 
potestatum timeri vult: quis autem timendus nisi unus deus…’, Augustine, Confessions II.6. See also Augustine 
Civ. Dei I.31 and V.12, Gregory, Moral. XXI.22-30 and the fourfold definition of pride in Moral. XXIII.6 
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These sentiments were developed by Thomas Aquinas, another important point of reference in the 
development of Landino’s moral philosophy. Thomas continued to distinguish between ambitio and 
superbia in the Summa Theologiae, defining the former as being the contrary vice to magnanimity, a 
constituent aspect of fortitude, and the latter as being the contrary vice to humility, an aspect of 
temperance.555 In doing so he articulates the same three points described in the Disputationes, 
defining ambitio as both an inordinate love of honour and an unhealthy desire to excel which is 
opposed to proper magnanimity, and describing how superbia is an appetite for excellence beyond 
right reason, from which emerges Landino’s idea of ambitio perverting excellence into tyranny when 
right reason does not control it. 
In his allegory, however, Landino deals first with the third way in which ambitio presents a risk – 
that of the descent into tyranny and slaughter – to ensure that the statesman avoids any outright 
cruelty in his administration of the republic. He is offered the opportunity to illustrate this kind of 
behaviour in the form of the Cyclops Polyphemus, who represents the great-souled leader whose 
efforts to achieve exalted deeds are not guided by reason, which causes such politicians to ‘often 
deceive themselves and fall into monstrousness through their greatness of soul’.556 Landino’s 
allegorisation of Polyphemus is, like that of Juno, relatively novel because the Cyclops did not have 
any exclusive association with tyranny or ambitio in the tradition of Virgil criticism save in 
Fulgentius, for whom Polyphemus represents superbia but in the sense of the arrogance of youth 
which is overcome as one progresses through the journey of life.557 Instead, the principal 
mythographical influence here is Boccaccio, who interprets the Polyphemus of the Ulysses myth as 
representing the tyrant and writes that the Cyclops possesses a single eye because ‘tyrants care 
about their own concerns alone: they have no regard for God; for those closest to them; for their 
subjects’.558  
For Landino to fashion his allegorisation in such a way that the first lesson to be learnt about 
ambitio was that one must seek to prevent it from precipitating a descent into tyranny marks it as a 
pressing concern in his programme of civic education. In this he was far from alone among 
humanists, for debates about the nature of tyranny had abounded in political writing over the 
preceding decades. Approaches to defining precisely what a tyrant was varied. Some humanists 
(such as Giovanni Pontano in his De principe and Bartolomeo Sacchi in his work of the same name) 
followed Aristotelian methodology in presenting tyranny as a degraded form of constitutional 
monarchy, thereby legitimising the rule of princes, while others (such as Poggio Bracciolini in the 
De infelicitate principum) preferred to adopt the Ciceronian-republican view that autocracy is unsound 
by nature whether an ruler is called a king or a tyrant, since the common good has nevertheless 
                                                          
555 See Summa Theologiae II-II Q.131 and II-II Q.162. 
556 ‘Saepe falli et pro animi magnitudine in inmanitatem labi’, DC, p. 156.13-14. 
557 Fulgentius, Exp. Verg. 
558 ‘Solam enim suam rem tyranni curant, nil in deum, nil in proximum, nil in subactam plebem respiciunt’, 




been rendered subordinate to personal advantage.559 On the other hand, James Hankins has argued 
that, while humanists interpreted their sources variously and would adapt their methods as they saw 
fit, there were in fact two main classical approaches to understanding the tyrant on which they 
drew: a Greek character-based conception which emerged in Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon; and a 
Roman interpretation, found in Cicero, which understands tyranny as a violation of civil law.560 As 
we have seen, there is no doubt that humanistic virtue politics of the Quattrocento generally sought 
to privilege this ‘Greek’ view, with political evaluations of statesmen being based primarily on their 
personal character even when legalistic analyses were present, and whether or not the writer 
approved of princedoms as well as republics. Likewise, Landino is unconcerned with legal or 
constitutional arguments and bases his definition of the tyrant – that is, one who is perverted by 
ambitio or superbia – solely in terms of the virtue ethics which emerge from his scheme of 
psychological perfectionism. His idea of tyranny as a state of mind inculcated by disturbances of the 
appetite which can be subdued by reason, is, of course, Platonic in nature. A recent precedent for a 
psychological approach to tyranny focussed on superbia had been set by Coluccio Salutati. In the De 
tyranno, Salutati was careful to emphasise the role of superbia in tyrannical behaviour even while 
defending the monarchy as a legitimate form of government (as Hankins puts it, ‘Like other 
humanists, Salutati was not an exclusivist’).561 He points out that Virgil uses the terms rex superbus 
and tyrannus synonymously and, as Bartolo da Sassoferrato had done years earlier, when attempting 
to define tyranny he quotes St. Gregory: ‘Strictly speaking, a “tyrant” is one who rules a communal 
republic unjustly...but everyone who rules with superbia exercises tyranny to their particular 
degree.’562 Hence, for Salutati, tyranny can exist as a mental attitude regardless of the degree of 
power one holds. It follows that, when one does possess authority, one’s state of mind matters. 
Petrarch makes this point in Seniles XIV, arguing that excesses of power arise from a desire for the 
external goods of honours and glory (that is, superbia, in the Landinian definition) rather than true 
greatness of soul: ‘it often seems to base persons that when they have attained high office, they 
have reached heaven, so losing their perspective they lose control. On the contrary, no earthly 
honour is of much importance to the truly magnanimous leader.’563 The characteristic feature of 
Landino’s psychological treatment of tyranny, however, is his assertion that superbia is such a danger 
as a corrupting force precisely because its sufferers are possessed of a greatness of soul (magnitudo 
animi) which makes them capable of the greatest deeds.564 He would continue to hold this opinion 
                                                          
559 On this interpretive division, and on Pontano and Poggio in particular, see Hester Schadee, ‘“I Don’t 
Know Who You Call Tyrants”: Debating Evil Lords in Quattrocento Humanism’, in Evil Lords: Theories and 
Representations of Tyranny from Antiquity to the Renaissance, ed. by Nikos Panou and Hester Schadee (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 172-90. 
560 Hankins, Virtue Politics, pp. 103-52. 
561 Hankins, Virtue Politics, p. 128. 
562 Salutati, De tyranno I.3-4, from Gregory, Moralia in Job 12.38, also cited in Bartolo da Sassoferrato, De 
tyranno II.4-15. The passage of Virgil to which Salutati refers in De tyranno I.1 is Verg. Aen. 8.480-84. 
563 Francesco Petrarca, ‘How a Ruler Ought to Govern His State’, trans. by Benjamin G. Kohl, in Kohl and 
Witt, The Earthly Republic, pp. 35-79. 
564 See above pp. 38-40. 
173 
 
throughout his career, later warning in De vera nobilitate (following Terence) that a republican official 
must take care in seeking justice in case they fall into the vice in which ‘the greatest good may cause 
the greatest injury’, and going so far in the Comento as to claim that the tyrant, whose violence is 
‘born of a desire which has its origin in superbia’, wants to overcome the laws of God and nature 
that make all equal because they are an affront to his ambition for primacy.565 This position, like 
that of Petrarch, draws from Cicero and Seneca. Cicero teaches in the De officiis how excessive 
greatness or exaltation of soul can turn into a lust for power and glory which increasingly leads one 
into injustice and autocratic rule, even devolving into savagery when unrestrained by social 
bonds.566 In the De clementia, Seneca warns: ‘how little harm can the cruelty of a private individual 
cause! But the savagery of princes is war’.567 Landino spares no effort in forcing these points home. 
Polyphemus represents the tyrannical life because he is a cannibal who prefers to eat the living than 
the dead, just as tyrants kill any ‘lover of justice and liberty’ in order to preserve their station and, in 
case the reader remained in any doubt, such rulers are ascribed a lurid litany of crimes comprising 
assassination, mass murder, plunder, rape, vandalism, despoliation, slavery, and sedition.568 Yet 
hope remains. The statesman who aspires to the summum bonum but at the same time seeks honour 
and political authority because his magnanimitas is not fully-formed will nonetheless recognise and 
despise this kind of cruelty.569 Landino deems this kind of tyrannical brutality so contrary to nature 
that simply being on the correct path ought to protect one: just like the other vices, superbia can 
only manifest its worst excesses when, through self-deceit, it has situated itself in the mind as an 
intemperate habit. Hence, he interprets Achaemenides as representing a warning to the statesman 
which shows the reversals in fortune which tyranny causes for citizens both common and 
illustrious. Even when these things happen to an enemy (for Achaemenides is a Greek) one’s 
natural sympathies are aroused. 
Polyphemus, then, insofar as he exemplifies the idea of ‘the bolder the spirit, the fiercer the 
crimes’, is a model of tyranny who illustrates a leader’s mental overreach, the megalomania which, 
when left unchecked, can cause a state to devolve into autocratic savagery. In keeping with 
Landino’s underlying structure of successive virtues purging the mind of distracting appetites, this is 
a conception of proper leadership that prioritises self-control as a prophylactic against tyranny. A 
statesman whose magnanimity is guided by reason (by receiving good advice, adopting an attitude 
of humility and moderation and so on) can avoid the excesses of power and foolhardy decisions 
that endanger the state in this way. While the consequences of failure in such a task might be very 
serious indeed, this ought not to be too difficult to perform because we possess a natural 
                                                          
565 ‘Dum iustissimi esse cupimus, in summam iniuriam recidat’, DVN, p. 88; ‘[Violentia tirannica]... nasce da 
cupidità, la quale ha origine da superbia’, Comento, Inf. XII.46-66.25-26; 67-70 and 103-09. 
566 Cic. Off. I.xix.62-69 and I.xliv.157. 
567 Seneca De clementia I.5; on the De clementia, see also Hankins, Virtue Politics, p. 113, Schadee, p. 176, and 
Peter Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
568 DC, pp. 156.16-157.9. 
569 Following Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae II-II QQ.129-38, Landino states in De anima, III, p. 53, and 
DVN, p. 71, that magnanimity is a constituent part of fortitude. 
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disinclination towards tyranny so, in this respect at least, Landino displays a fundamental optimism 
about the statesman. His analysis of this phenomenon is, furthermore, wholeheartedly republican. 
Just as his humanism impressed upon him a desire to understand tyrannical impulses in terms of 
personal vice and virtue, so did his republican inclinations led him to eschew the Aristotelian 
tradition of opposing tyranny with benevolent princedom.570 Since his aim in the Disputationes was 
to justify the exercise of power in a republic by those who did not hold political office, he could not 
define the danger of tyranny as that of simply being a corrupted counterpart of monarchical 
government and neither, as a patriotic Florentine, could he avoid the fact that so much republican 
self-perception of his city was bound up in opposition to autocrats such as the Visconti.571 When 
describing the risk of tyranny signified by the Cyclops he therefore speaks of statesmen using 
egalitarian language, as individuals who ‘seek great and exalted things’, rather than as occupying any 
particular rank or role. Also, the very idea that the desire for imperium represented by the Cyclops 
necessitates the concentration of political power in one individual is, as Bruce McNair has noted, 
anti-republican, and by presenting it as an obstacle to the moral development of the statesman 
Landino is at the same time stressing the need for collective governance.572 His philosophical 
understanding is likewise predicated on republican principles. In both the De anima and the De vera 
nobilitate Landino describes magnanimity as ‘that which drives us to excellent and difficult things in 
the expectation of virtuous utility’, from which it follows that the corrupted greatness of soul that 
the Cyclops represents is the exercise of great deeds directed towards personal benefit or, worse, 
persecution and cruelty rather than any common good.573 This is corroborated in the Comento on 
Inferno XII, in which the tyrant said to ‘turn every advantage and utility to himself and to allow 
inconveniences and harms to others’.574 By so integrating the concept of utility into the 
psychological foundations of tyranny, Landino means to define the tyrant’s corruption by superbia as 
running contrary to the republican distributional principles of that central text of ‘civic’ humanism, 
the De officiis. When the tyrant appropriates what is useful for his own ends rather than using it for 
the benefit of fellow citizens, he also, according to Cicero, destroys the bonds of political society 
contrary to the principles of natural justice.575  
Just as Landino’s political contextualisation of tyranny is informed by Cicero, so too is his 
attitude towards tackling republican notions of virtue and vice. For instance, his allegory of 
Polyphemus follows a view expressed in the De legibus (quoted by Petrarch in Seniles XIV) that 
wrongdoing aristocrats are especially dangerous to the state because their vices and corruption seep 
                                                          
570 Landino does draw an opposition between tyrants and kings in Comento, Inf. XII.46-66.74-94, but conflates 
the idea of king with that of the republican governor and the Christian shepherd. 
571 See Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, passim but especially pp. 12-46. 
572 McNair, ‘Cristoforo Landino, Coluccio Salutati and the Best Life’, pp. 763-64. 
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575 Cic. Off. II.vi.21-viii.29. 
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into the marrow of the commonwealth.576 Yet, even more overwhelmingly, Landino’s outlook bears 
a Sallustian influence. Sallust maintains that superbia is utterly opposed to peace in a republic and 
warns that, on occasion the plebs have seceded from the patricians with arms on account of the 
superbia of their rulers.577 Constant vigilance is therefore required on the part of republican 
politicians, and Sallust pointedly illustrates the corrosive effect of ambition on Roman politics – and 
the contempt in which it was held in contemporary discourse – when he presents the evidence of 
Marius, who was ‘later carried away by ambitio’, attempting to discredit Quintus Caecilius Metellus, 
who himself displayed a ‘proud and disdainful spirit that was a common failing of the nobility’, with 
the accusation that the latter was ‘a man of vanity and regal superbia rejoicing in too much power’.578 
The destructive effects of ambitio which Sallust chronicled at length in the Bellum Iugurthinum and the 
Bellum Catilinae taught lessons which Landino took seriously, not least because, just two years prior 
to his composition of the Disputationes, the massacre of Volterra had shown how youthful pride and 
overconfidence could easily lead to catastrophe. Whether the bloody consequences of Lorenzo’s 
response to the Volterran uprising were due to negligence or intentional cruelty, they nonetheless 
provided an example to Landino of how easily a spirited but inexperienced leader could apply 
excessive power in order to attempt to establish his reputation. One might suspect that Landino 
had some misgivings about Volterra in mind when writing about tyranny in the Disputationes 
because, as we have already seen, in his justification of Lorenzo’s actions in the proem to his Virgil 
commentary fourteen years later he emphasises that Lorenzo waged war against Volterra because 
he was ‘great-souled [magnanimus] and born for the honour of his republic’.579 As a loyalist and client 
of the Medici, Landino could not voice criticism openly, but to ascribe the perpetration of a 
massacre to a quality of Lorenzo’s which, as he had explained in detail, could easily slip into 
tyrannical cruelty when unconstrained seems to be protesting too much, as though he were striving 
to confirm that Lorenzo was following Ciceronian precepts on magnanimitas by acting for the 
common good, the ‘honour of the republic’, rather than his own glory. In any case, there is no 
doubt that the broader influence of Sallust meant that lessons Landino sought to teach in the 
Disputationes held currency both through their rhetorical value, in that they taught statesmen how 
the perception of a leader’s virtue depends on his avoidance of brutality and excess, and through 
their practical value, in that he, like other humanists, viewed the avoidance of cruelty as being of 
genuine benefit in avoiding damage to the fabric of the republic. 
Returning to the allegory, Aeneas has escaped the Cyclops in the same way that the good 
statesman evades any temptation of cruelty in the administration of the republic. Landino now 
proceeds to investigate the more insidious dangers of ambitio. On leaving Sicily, or the inferior 
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reason, and having buried Anchises, or sensuality, Aeneas leaves for Italy but has not made peace 
with Juno, just as when a leader of a republic tries to turn away from human affairs he is unable 
pass up the chance of honours or imperium. At Lorenzo’s prompting, Alberti explains that Juno 
hates the Trojans whether they are in Troy or are on their way to Italy because ambitio despises both 
pleasure and the search for contemplation. She is still stung by the Judgment of Paris (which once 
again calls to mind Ficino’s representation of Juno in the Philebus commentary). Inspired by this 
hatred, Juno commands Aeolus to whip up a tempest to prevent the Trojans from reaching Italy, 
just as the desire for involvement in human affairs draws one away from the divine.580 The 
allegorisation of the storm gives Landino the opportunity to recapitulate some of the finer points 
about the relationship between the superior reason, the inferior reason and the appetite (here 
represented by Neptune, Aeolus and the sea respectively) that he had already discussed at length in 
the De anima.581 It is nevertheless of interest to note how, in this section of the allegory, he points 
out that because the appetite is controlled under reason which is devoted to God in accordance 
with the Platonic dictum that ‘for the good man God is the law, for the evil man the law is sensual 
appetite’, it is necessary for ambitio to deceive the inferior reason.582 Since the inferior reason only 
exercises itself when the appetite is disturbed by desire for externalities such as political power, the 
things it considers ‘great’, it believes it owes a debt to ambitio. Landino seems to be attempting to 
establish from first principles how a tendency arises in civic leaders towards the self-deceit which he 
attributes to the tyrant: how, in the mind of a statesman, the perception can arise that struggling 
nobly against the desire for honours and titles makes one all the more deserving of them. This is a 
trenchant insight into the psychology of power which, by identifying self-deception as an apparatus 
by which the civic life seduces and corrupts leaders, not only probes into the formation of the 
tyrannical mind, but also suggests how the frameworks of flattery, insincerity and toadyism which 
perpetuate such beliefs might be sustained. Landino’s strategy for suppressing the tyrannical 
impulse seems to be to invite the reader into critical self-assessment: the statesman must constantly 
scrutinise his achievements and aims to ensure that they are properly motivated. 
With the appetitive storm having been calmed by Neptune, the superior reason, the Trojans 
arrive in Carthage. For Landino, this signifies the desire to involve oneself in human society rather 
than progress towards the knowledge of the truth, thinking it is enough that the vices have been 
subdued at the level of the civic virtues. He offers a penetrating analysis of the kind of rationale 
through which people justify this decision to themselves, laying out an array of republican and 
oikeiotic principles chiefly drawn from the De officiis – the desire to strengthen and grow society; its 
reciprocal bonds of duty; the opposition of injustice – that he has so far defended.583 If we were not 
capable of contemplation, he states, no one would fault this stance. Contemplation can, according 
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to this position, be put off for later life, with youth and adulthood being the best years for a lover 
of wisdom to administrare rem publicam, and Landino acknowledges the arguments to this effect from 
humanist defenders of the civic life, citing Plato, Xenophon and Homer as classical authorities for 
the deferment of contemplation until older age.584 As one might expect, Landino is to some extent 
sympathetic to these views (which are broadly those sketched out by Lorenzo in the first book of 
the Disputationes) declaring that the rewards of civic action are utility for others and glory and 
tranquillity for oneself. Since his aim is to offer a defence of the exercise of extra-political power 
within a republic which relies on achieving intellectual contemplation, he must also acknowledge 
the value of civic action within the republic, which can in turn benefit from the reluctant 
intervention of the sapiens who is furnished with divine wisdom. 
To this end, he spends some time outlining how Carthage illustrates the institutions and 
leadership of a good republic before returning to any further discussion of how ambitio inveigles 
itself into the civic life. First he describes how the natural harbour of Carthage’s shore resists the 
buffeting of the sea which represents the perturbationes of the appetite, and that Aeneas feeds the 
Trojan survivors just as one who undertakes the administration of a republic must ensure the well-
being of his citizens. Then, just as he had done in the first book, Landino wants to confirm that 
oscillating between non-involvement and political governance is entirely legitimate behaviour on 
the part of a civic leader. Hence, Aeneas’ famous speech, telling his compatriots that ‘perhaps one 
day it will help to remember even this’ because they will rebuild Troy in Italy, serves to teach the 
reader that the soul’s earlier, sensual pleasure will be replaced by the true pleasure of contemplation, 
and – importantly – that the best leader will engage himself in civic action as far as is necessary, but 
will continue to guide them to the divine through the blows of fortune.585 Landino continues to use 
his allegorisation of Aeneas’ exploration of the Carthaginian lands to embark on a revealing 
discussion about how an administrator of a republic (administrator rei publicae) must recognise vice 
and those under its power. Earlier, I touched upon how he views the sensual appetite or libido and 
its associated vices which dominate the premoral stage of life as comprising the animalistic part of 
the human mind.586 Under this understanding, vice constitutes a deterioration into the bestial, 
instinctive aspect we share with animals, and can only be excised through proper moral conduct at 
the age of discretion through the use of the superior appetite, the voluntas, which is under the 
command of reason. Just as Cicero had argued in the De officiis that republican leaders must 
cultivate human rather than animalistic qualities, and thus avoid the cunning of the fox and the 
violence of the lion wherever possible, so too does Landino forbid any underhand means in politics 
which might ultimately arise from the sensual part of our nature.587 Hence, for Landino, when 
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Aeneas wants to discover whether Carthage is inhabited by beasts or human beings, this symbolises 
the scrutiny of the civic life which is necessary to understand the moral ecology of the citizens in a 
republic. Many – the ‘human beings’ – are devoted to civic concord, liberty, justice, the rule of law 
and so on, but one may also find ‘beasts’ among the citizenry: 
 
You may find many whose most lascivious desire leaves nothing holy and nothing undefiled. You may find 
many inflamed with the greatest avarice who think that everything can be bought and either, like foxes, 
deceive the incautious with their tricks and plots, or, with regard to people superior in their mental powers, 
want to surpass in wealth and honours those to whom they are very much inferior in wisdom and virtue. So 
although people depraved by these vices retain a human face and limbs, nonetheless, since they have assumed 
animalistic habits, they should be considered as the most savage beasts and no longer as human beings.588 
 
This dualistic view of human nature, consistent with Landino’s favoured metaphor of the two-
horsed chariot of the Phaedrus and systematised in his separation of the powers of the soul and the 
twofold appetite, therefore necessitates practical advice.589 It is imperative that the statesmen 
recognise the threats of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio in his fellow citizens, the threats which Sallust 
enshrined as fatal to the preservation of the republic. This task may be difficult, because such 
‘beasts’ retain a human face – they dissimulate and deceive and the danger they present may not be 
immediately appreciated. Advice of this nature would have had some resonance for Lorenzo with 
regard to figures such as Tommaso Soderini, who had attempted to manipulate him shortly after his 
ascent to power.  
Landino goes on to reemphasise his point that the republic can and must be guided by those 
who depart civic action for the investigation of truth. When Venus appears to Aeneas disguised as a 
huntress (because the statesman who takes care of his people must pursue the beasts mentioned 
above), he recognises her as a goddess, which shows how the love with which politicians desire 
what is just has a divine provenance, even when qualities like piety, justice and greatness of spirit 
are devoted to the perishable ends of human activity. Hence, ‘when we have cultivated what is right 
and worthy in civic life for a long time, we are led by their beauty to the divine, of which these 
things are likenesses’.590 Similarly, he interprets Aeneas’ first sighting of Carthage from the high 
point at the brow of a hill as signifying how the best laws and institutions for regulating the state 
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require lawmakers who legislate according to the recommendation of those who speculate on great 
things, drawing a distinction between the official and unofficial leaders of the republic.591 Before he 
changes subject he discusses one more point of interest, which is Virgil’s comparison of the 
Carthaginians to bees. This is the one point in the Disputationes where Landino would seem to skirt 
close to advocating a political system headed by a philosopher-king – a stance of which, as we have 
already seen, he is often accused. He describes the characteristics of bees using Ciceronian 
commonplaces, claiming that they collaborate with the greatest fairness (summa aequitate) and highest 
concord (summa concordia), and that they seek all in common (omne in commune quaeritur), but states 
that they would nonetheless establish a Platonic state if transferred to a republic because they 
follow the rule of their leader unquestioningly.592 This view is at odds with the remainder of the 
Disputationes, but can be reconciled if one understands that Landino’s analysis here is descriptive 
rather than prescriptive. His approval of the diligence and concord represented by the bees need 
not demand that their hierarchical system and blind obedience (which are indeed characteristic of 
the ideal state set out in the Republic) ought to be carried over into his broader system of virtue 
politics, which he has by now expressed very clearly. Rather, Landino is simply seeking to show 
how Virgil illustrates the admirable qualities of the political life when subject to the allegorical 
constraint of a city that is governed by a single leader. 
Having laid out his ideas on the proper administration of the republic, Landino now returns 
once more to ambitio, studying its effects on the civic life through the figure of Dido. As we have 
seen, Dido is a complex figure whose fall from temperance into intemperance was induced by the 
habituation of sensual desire or luxuria and stands as Landino’s foremost example of the Sallustian 
moral decline of a republic.593 The political implications of this decline have already been addressed 
in the analysis of luxuria, but there is a further aspect to Landino’s interpretation in that Juno’s 
attempts to effect Dido’s marriage to Aeneas symbolise the way in which the libido imperandi or 
ambitio causes the statesman to become wedded to the civil life. Craig Kallendorf has identified this 
depiction as Landino’s most radical departure from the allegorical tradition because, rather than 
simply serving as a cautionary tale about lust, Dido’s story also illustrates the final reappearance and 
suppression of ambitio before any advancement to the contemplation of the divine.594 This is, in my 
view, correct, and it is instructive of Landino’s intentions that he hopes to show that, at a point in 
the civic life in which the vices of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio have been subdued at the level of the 
(inchoate) civic virtues, it is ambitio that reappears and seeks to entrap the statesman in direct 
involvement in governance of the state. Although the great-souled man wishes to proceed to the 
purgative virtues and the virtues of the purged soul, he becomes so involved in the earthly concerns 
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of civic life that he forgets to continue on to the divine.595 This involvement emerges from the libido 
imperandi or desire to rule: 
 
For the desire to rule wants to marry Aeneas to Dido (that is, to give the excellent man authority over the 
kingdom) but it is unable to accomplish this unless the excellent man’s love agrees. But this love notices that 
such a marriage does not benefit Aeneas, but Dido: the marriage is not useful to the souls of men born for 
greater things, but to the government itself. It is better for us to proceed towards true wisdom than to devote 
ourselves to activity, but if the administration of the state is abandoned by the wise then human affairs are 
finished. So, although the excellent man’s love understands that what the desire to rule urges is false, it 
nevertheless agrees: either it has already been ensnared by the desire to rule or it is moved by compassion for 
those who need to be looked after.596 
 
Since Landino has already established that the civic life is noble in its own regard and that there are 
legitimate reasons to involve oneself in it, not least the return from contemplation of the sapiens, it is 
necessary that he introduce the codicil that sometimes it is not ambitio but regard for the vulnerable 
that can move one to engage in human affairs. Nonetheless, it follows that the advice which 
Landino hopes to impart to his readers is that, while a statesman can contribute to the good of the 
republic perfectly well through the extra-governmental exercise of power, he can easily be 
persuaded into involving himself in the machinery of state by this ‘desire to rule’ or the immoderate 
hunger for political dominion. This is, of course, the first of the three dangers of ambitio that 
Landino adumbrated in his initial allegorisation of Juno, the devotion to externalities such as 
honours and glory and, in this case, power over others, or imperium. Landino continues to underline 
this point by portraying the couple’s descent into the cave to consummate their relationship as 
signifying the corporeal nature of these ends. Hence, just as Aeneas languishes in Carthage over the 
winter, so ‘even excellent men are occasionally diverted from the right course by ambition’.597 
The arguments against the kind of ambitio that causes one to be immersed in affairs of state, 
then, are somewhat different from those against slipping into tyranny. While the core Sallustian 
danger of moral laxity remains, the broader harm of the sapiens engaging in the civic life rather than 
contemplation is that, rather than presenting any existential risk, it proves suboptimal for the state 
when compared to the benefits of the statesman’s investigation of the truth. This is essentially a 
utilitarian stance which recapitulates the position on the benefits of the contemplative life advanced 
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by Alberti in his second speech in the first book. Much is therefore made in Landino’s discussion of 
Carthage of the fact that the individual whom Aeneas represents is wise, excellent, superior, of great 
prudence, and so on, because an enmeshment in civil life only harms the state if a politician is of 
sufficient virtue and wisdom to gain the benefits of intellectual contemplation. In terms of practical 
moral advice for avoiding such entrapment, Landino presents two lessons through his criticism of 
the desire to rule that engineers the marriage of Aeneas and Dido. On the one hand he warns 
against being seduced by the possession of power over others and ruling for ruling’s sake, as it 
were; on the other, he reminds the reader that the libido imperandi is contrary to republican principles 
in that, if one undertakes civic action on its behalf, then one is by definition not acting for the 
common good of the people. As such, this desire represents an inching towards the kind of 
imperium represented by the Cyclops in which one individual possesses all the power in the state. In 
the context of his immediate audience these lessons can therefore be understood as a warning to 
statesmen to adhere to republican norms and to avoid revelling in one’s power, even if, as the case 
of Lorenzo in particular would suggest, this is simply a question of paying lip service to the 
traditions of Florentine politics. 
Landino is frank in acknowledging that, just as Hercules struggled to defeat Juno, so this desire 
to rule is a difficult enemy to overcome.598 Indeed, it causes the most admirable individuals to 
abandon virtue, compromising such moral exemplars as Alexander and Julius Caesar.599 If one is to 
vanquish ambitio and separate oneself from direct involvement in civic affairs, then Landino believes 
that divine intervention is required. When Mercury, on Jove’s command, orders Aeneas to 
recommence his journey, Aeneas is persuaded by the argument that, even if he cannot rouse 
himself from the administration of Carthage and continue to Italy for his own benefit, then he must 
do so for his son Ascanius. For Landino, this signifies how, since eternal life in heaven depends on 
our virtue in this mortal life, we should divest ourselves of corporeal concerns and ensure our 
perpetual bliss through contemplation. While rather more of a recondite argument than the hard-
headed moral calculus that presents contemplation as being of greater benefit to the state than 
engagement in civic affairs, this nevertheless makes logical sense in that it directs the reader to the 
summum bonum that is the aim of Landino’s moral psychology. Continuing in this vein, Landino 
interprets Dido’s attempts to persuade Aeneas to stay as the inferior reason striving to maintain 
one’s bonds to the civic life rather than proceed to contemplation. The manifold reasons she offers 
serve to remind the reader of the genuine case for civic action: the civic life loves the sapiens because 
it is through his wisdom that the state is founded, preserved and grown; he has promised to devote 
himself entirely to the administration of the state; it is difficult to reach contemplation; when the 
state is deprived of the good it runs the risk of falling into avarice and tyranny.600 Hence, this is the 
point at which, as we have already seen, Landino impresses on the reader that one devoted to 
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599 DC, p. 186.11-16. 
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contemplation ‘acts as the circumstance demands’ and ‘does not so much flee the life of activity as 
withdraw from it’ and, moreover, he asserts that the death of Dido shows us that ‘republics which 
are deprived of their sapientes must by necessity die’.601 As much as the defeat of ambitio in its guise 
of the desire to rule frees the statesman from the rigid constraints of direct civic governance, the 
pursuit of contemplation must nevertheless remain contingent. Even the withdrawn sapiens – or 





























                                                          
601 ‘Ut vicissim, cum res postulat, agat. Ergo non fugit a vita agendi, sed inde recedit’, DC, p. 197.18-19, 
‘Didonis vero interitus nobis perspicue ostendit perire necesse esse eas res publicas, quae sapientibus 
deserantur’, DC, p. 198.12-14, and see above pp. 109-12. 
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3.5 From practical to strategic advice 
 
While the bulk of Landino’s Aeneid criticism consists in educating the reader to regulate the vices of 
luxuria, avaritia and ambitio in civic life, and therefore mitigate their risks to the proper functioning 
of the state, his allegorisation in the fourth book of Aeneas’ descent into the underworld adopts a 
different mode of instruction. Earlier, I identified two distinct senses in which Landino conceives 
the administration of the republic: one situated in the munus of right action that involves practical 
political behaviour in civic life; the other in the munus of intellectual inquiry that consists in the 
strategy, foresight and guidance one can impart to the state having been made wise by the 
contemplation of the divine.602 So far, in accordance with the first of the two forms of political 
engagement, Landino has set forth a course of moral purification that seeks to improve the health 
of the body politic at the same time as it excises any appetitive influence from the statesman. 
Hence, when Aeneas reaches Italy, he has attained, and shown the reader how to attain, the second 
level of virtue, the purgative virtues. Yet the challenge now at hand is to progress to the highest 
level of moral virtues, the virtues of the soul already purged, at which one forgets the influence of 
the appetite and can exercise the dianoetic virtues without distraction. Thereafter, one can develop 
the wisdom that allows one to discharge the advisory and strategic role which constitutes the 
second kind of political engagement. Landino is aware that this demands a change of tack. When 
one exercises the munus of detached intellectual speculation, many of the reasons Landino has 
emphasised thus far to justify his virtue politics no longer obtain. Let us take the obvious example. 
In order to establish a connection between individual morality and the proper functioning of the 
state, Landino has hitherto advanced the Sallustian argument that vice’s corrupting influence on the 
intrapersonal foundations of the republic demands certain standards of personal moral conduct on 
the part of the statesman. If this were the sole factor in proper governance, then there would be no 
need for any further moral development once vice has been expunged by the purgative virtues. It is 
therefore necessary for Landino to shift the focus of his teaching from an advisory approach, in 
which the reader is made aware of the dangers of vice and thereby helped to confront his own 
failings, to a therapeutic method which invites one to self-analyse in order to recognise the 
psychological process that lead to vice, in such a way that one is prepared both to purge vice utterly 
from oneself and to guide others in doing so. The vehicle for this ‘inward turn’ is the descent into 
the underworld or descensus ad inferos that Aeneas undertakes once he has reached Italy, which 
represents how the soul must analyse embodied vice if it is to contemplate the divine. 
As I have already mentioned, Landino followed the tradition of prior Virgil criticism in 
affording a central role to the descensus ad inferos in his allegorisation of the Aeneid, and his models in 
this respect comprised Servius, Fulgentius, Boccaccio, Bernardus Silvestris, and Coluccio Salutati.603 
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Never afraid to appropriate existing interpretations, Landino freely repurposes elements of these 
works and interpolates them into his analysis. Yet his adaptations of earlier commentators are 
devoted to the service of innovation and the ultimate realisation of the ethical schema he has 
outlined. Aware that his analysis of the descensus is central to the exposition of his virtue ethics as far 
as it concerns the transition to the speculative life, and that his educated audience would know it to 
belong to an intellectual tradition that admitted a variety of readings, Landino spends some time 
teasing out its historical, literary and philosophical interpretations. He has Alberti enumerate five 
different opinions on the meaning of the descensus: the Platonic opinion, in which the soul falls from 
heaven into the underworld of the body; the Christian view, in which the souls of wrongdoers go to 
hell after their death; a figurative sense, in which one is said to fall into hell when succumbing to 
vice; a magical or esoteric sense in which one ‘descends’ to the underworld to call back the spirits 
of the dead; and an analytical-investigative sense, in which we devote our intellectual energy to 
studying the nature of the vices.604  
His favoured opinion, and the one on which he bases his allegorisation of the descensus, is the 
fifth, that the descent to the underworld represents the investigation of vice and hence – as 
Kallendorf has recognised – his main focus here is not on the descent of the soul into the body.605 
Yet Landino is nonetheless obliged to dedicate some scrutiny to the first, Platonic understanding of 
the descensus because, according to his moral psychology, vice arises from an appetite directed 
towards corporeal things. He therefore offers a potted summary of the theory of the soul which is 
chiefly assembled from the writings of Macrobius, Salutati and Ficino, seeking to reaffirm the 
conventional Platonic interpretation of the descensus in earlier commentators with an emphasis on 
the ideas from the Phaedo of which Landino is particularly fond.606 Plato, he claims, follows 
Orpheus and ultimately the Egyptians in asserting that that ‘the underworld for our souls is nothing 
other than the body itself, in which they are confined as if in a prison’.607 There are twin lights in 
the soul, a natural, innate light which is devoted to the cognition of itself and things inferior to it, 
and a heavenly, infused light through which it is compelled to return to God and receive knowledge 
of the divine. As the soul relies on its innate light to preserve itself and grow the body, it is dragged 
down by the weight of this purpose and becomes drunk and confused with corporeal desire, falling 
from the supernal realm of the fixed stars, or aplanes, through the inferior spheres of the planets, 
from which it acquires various attributes, until it reaches the prison or tomb of the body.608 This 
                                                          
604 DC, p. 218.8-21 and cf. Comento Inf. III.1-12.1-127. As Kallendorf, In Praise of Aeneas, p. 141, has noted, 
Landino summarises these methods of descensus in his 1488 commentary on the Aeneid. See Virgil (comm. 
Maurus Servius Honoratus and Christophorus Landinus), Opera, (Florence: Printer of Vergilius [C 6061]), 18 
March 1487-8, 127r. 
605 Kallendorf, ‘Cristoforo Landino’s Aeneid and the Humanist Critical Tradition’, p. 543.  
606 DC, pp. 212.25-218.7 and cf. Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.x.6-I.xii.18; Salutati, De laboribus Herculis IV.i.1-3 
and IV.ii.2-3; and Ficino, De amore 4.4 and 6.13, Platonic Theology XVIII.iv-v and De voluptate 2. 
607 ‘Plato... ita singula prosequitur, ut nihil aliud inferorum locum animis nostris esse velit quam corpus ipsum, 
quo veluti carcere includuntur’, DC, p. 213.19-21. 
608 Earlier I mentioned the six fundamental assumptions that Murrin argues Landino inherited from Proclus 
and Porphyry, and Landino’s philosophical and cosmological arguments here satisfy the first three of these: 
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Platonic concept of the pre-existence of the soul runs counter to the Christian doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo, so Landino is obliged to point out that, in reality, the purgation of the body’s influence on 
the soul applies only to the vices committed in this life through choices made under free will, and 
that hell consists in punishment of such crimes.609  
In summarising the Platonic view thus, Landino has offered a philosophical basis for his own 
preferred definition of the descensus. Yet since his focus is how one might pass from civic virtue into 
intellectual contemplation, mere theorising on the relationship between soul and body will not 
suffice on its own. While the katabasis does involve a descent of the soul into the corporeal realm, 
it is a therapeutic descent whose purpose is to reflect on vice in order to finally purge it. This is 
quite a different matter from the application of the moral virtues in the republic so, in order to 
properly understand the purpose of the descensus for the would-be participant in the speculative life, 






















                                                          
see above p. 145 and n. 449 and Murrin, p. 31. 
609 On the pre-existence of the soul and Christian theological objections to it see Lodi Nauta, ‘The 
Preexistence of the Soul in Medieval Thought’, Recherches des Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 63 (1996), 93-135, 
and Peter W. Martens, ‘Embodiment, Heresy, and the Hellenization of Christianity: the Descent of the Soul 
in Origen and Plato’, Harvard Theological Review, 108 (2015), 594-620. Also, see above p. 63 and n. 177. 
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3.6 Preparing for the descensus ad inferos 
 
The remainder of Aeneas’ journey to Italy after leaving Dido is interpreted by Landino as a series of 
realignments of the parts of the soul as one approaches the munus of speculation: the burning of the 
ships by women inspired by Juno represents the vulnerability of the inferior reason to the senses 
when sidelined by the superior reason; the abandonment of the weaker Trojans in Sicily illustrates 
how the mens must separate itself from the senses, the weaker powers of the soul; the death of 
Palinurus symbolises the wasting away of the appetite once reason has devoted itself to 
contemplation of the divine.610 When he lands on the Italian shore he therefore represents a mind 
divorced from the sensible world and with the purgative virtues instilled as a habitus: 
 
For the arrival in Italy displays a habit of virtues already firmly established in such a way that Aeneas would 
not be swayed from this intended life: not a habit of those virtues which are of the soul already purged, for 
nothing difficult has yet presented itself [in Italy], but of those which are called ‘purgative’.611 
 
While his comrades busy themselves with finding resources, just as the inferior powers of the soul 
attend to the preservation of life, Aeneas seeks the Cumaean Sibyl, the learning which is concerned 
with divine things (rerum divinarum doctrina), who resides in a cavern at the top of a mountain which, 
like the shining hill of Dante’s Inferno, signifies the loftiness of contemplation.612 Since the temple of 
Apollo near the Sibyl’s cave is joined to the grove of Trivia, which represents human affairs, 
Landino is able to interpret the arrangement as showing how wisdom (sapientia) consists in scientific 
knowledge (scientia) of both divine and earthly things, a clear reference to Cicero’s definition of 
wisdom in the De officiis.613 Just as Landino had made clear in the earlier books, the lessons gleaned 
from contemplation are as applicable to the state as they are to the celestial realm. 
By explaining how the properties of the mind transition from being directed to the munus of 
action to concentrating on that of speculation, these points serve to tie up any loose ends of 
Landino’s allegorisation of the journey from Troy to Italy. Yet Landino’s identification of the Sibyl 
with learning, or doctrina, indicates his forthcoming direction. His account of the meeting between 
Aeneas and the Sybil is characteristically dense in its allusions, but within this thicket of 
allegorisation one can discern that he is seeking to impress upon his readers the difficulties of the 
contemplative life, and to inculcate the rigorous mental discipline necessary to withstand them. For 
instance, the solidity of Apollo’s marble temple signifies that the speculative mind must be firm 
against psychological perturbationes, and the shrine which Aeneas promises to the Sibyl represents the 
                                                          
610 DC, pp. 199.17-203.2. 
611 ‘Nam adventus in Italiam ostendit habitum virtutum iam contractum ita, ut a proposita vita non sit 
discessurus Aeneas, non tamen earum virtutum, quae sunt animi iam purgati – nam nihil sibi difficile iam 
proponeretur –, sed earum, quas dicunt purgatorias’, DC, p. 203.16-20. 
612 DC, p. 204.15-25 and cf. DC, p. 181.9-14 and see above pp. 107-08 and n. 327. 
613 Cic. Off. II.ii.5. 
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necessity of preserving one’s learning in the memory.614 The tool with which we can overcome the 
difficulties of contemplation is learning, to which those who excel morally and intellectually can 
devote themselves and transcend the fallibility of the body that conquers the foolish. All this is 
crucial because the Sibyl warns Aeneas that, even though he has defeated the dangers of the sea, 
‘harsher things await on the land [of Italy]’ than he has hitherto encountered in his voyage.615 
Landino recognised the inherent inconsistency of the idea that the contemplative life could hold 
greater terrors than those of a life subject to the vagaries of the appetite and therefore interprets the 
Sibyl’s warning as symbolising the lingering desire for civic engagement on the part of one who has 
taken up speculation. The withdrawal from ‘common life and human association’, he claims, 
precipitates sharp pangs of desire that seek to compel one to return to human society.616 While 
detachment can, under the right conditions, set one on the path to transcending humanity, it can 
also induce the opposite effect, provoking beastly madness and melancholy. In order to avoid 
falling victim to these afflictions, a course of rigorous self-examination is needed. If the Trojans are 
not to repent of their having arrived in Italy – figuratively speaking – then their leader, possessed of 
true learning, must foresee all potential eventualities.617 Landino therefore feels it necessary to draw 
one more line between the lives of civic engagement and contemplation by interpreting the burial 
of Misenus as representing the elimination of any trace of the desire for empty glory or, to use the 
terminology followed so far in the Disputationes, ambitio. While the death of Dido would have 
seemed a natural point for Landino to conclude his discussion on this vice, he argues that its 
ultimate eradication takes place in Italy – and, therefore, when all vices should have been purged – 
because this is not only a death, but a burial, in which any last traces disappear, never to be 
revived.618 Sticking to the formula he has followed so far concerning ambitio, Landino points out the 
transience of empty glory, the pursuit of which seeks only ‘honours and the residual signs of virtue’, 
branding it a danger to the state on account of the moral decline of the statesmen who pursue it 
and thus ‘destroy the republic and encounter the greatest hatred of its citizens’.619 So close to 
contemplation this enemy is easily overcome, for it appears ridiculous when compared to true, 
divine, glory. The association of Misenus with vainglory is a common one in the tradition of Virgil 
criticism, appearing in Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris, but here Landino’s aim is to 
recontextualise this interpretation.620 He seeks to impress upon the reader that, if one is to self-
examine to the extent necessary to gain the strategic knowledge to guide the state, then civic society 
must be understood at arm’s length. By extension, his insistence that any desire for recognition 
must be quelled is an attempt to urge his audience to accept that the decisions one makes when 
                                                          
614 DC, p. 207.21-208.18. 
615 Verg.Aen.VI.84 as quoted in DC, p. 209.4. 
616 ‘A communi vita ac hominum coetu’, DC, pp. 209.28-210.1. 
617 DC, p. 212.4-20. 
618 DC, p. 227.17-20. 
619 ‘Honores vero ac reliqua virtutis insignia sectantur’, DC, p. 226.26-27; ‘et rem publicam saepe perdunt et in 
summum civium odium incidunt’, DC, p. 227.2-3. 
620 Fulgentius, Exp. Verg. and Bernardus Silvestris, Commentary, pp. 60.6-61.3 and 63.23-24,  
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wielding power in a republic outside of civic office must not be made with an eye on posterity or 
public acclaim. If we are to comprehend how best to direct the republic, then our reflection on the 
vices that plague it must take place with a mind uncluttered by other interests. 
The need to extinguish the longing for civic engagement is part of the wider duty of the 
purgative virtues to expunge any terrestrial influence from the mind, to which end, as Landino puts 
it, ‘it is necessary that the spirit wage the fiercest war against the flesh’ prior to contemplation.621 
One must undertake one last investigation of the vices that have been restrained: 
 
It is the first inroad into speculation away from the vices, for there should be a fundamental understanding 
about the nature of evil so that we might be able to abstain from it. If we are not purified of the vices, we will 
never reach the divine. 622 
 
This is not the day-to-day advice for avoiding the attacks of appetition that Landino has laid out in 
his allegory so far, but an attempt to gain an understanding of the vices from first principles. Nor is 
it devoted solely to personal perfection. The fact that Landino has placed so much weight on 
interpreting the Sibyl as doctrina, learning that is acquired and taught, implies that it is not only a 
form of revelatory understanding or experiential knowledge about vice that is being transmitted 
but, also, a lesson that can itself be passed on in its turn, just as he himself is doing in the 
Disputationes. Alongside the purpose of purgation there is therefore a didactic principle that compels 
the investigation of vice, one that the contemplative sapiens – or the statesman withdrawn from any 
official duties – can impart to others once he has received it. To put it another way, if one knows 
the origins and processes of vice intimately then one might better prevent it in one’s fellow citizens. 
This didactic means of transmitting wisdom stands as the mechanism through which it is possible 
to offer political strategy and guidance when one returns from contemplation to the civic life. 
When, therefore, Landino dismisses four of his five interpretations of the descensus (the Christian, 
Platonic, figurative and magical explanations) and concentrates on the idea that it consists in an 
intimate investigation of the vices, he is explicit that it is a transmissible, didactic kind of learning 
that is being used to undertake this task. It is for this reason that he has Lorenzo, when articulating 
how the descent of Aeneas represents the investigation of vice, recognise how the whole 
disputation thus far has been devoted to his education and that of his brother.623 Recall that the 
original question which precipitated the company’s discussion was ‘what it is in [Plato] that you 
think a governor of the republic should adopt from those who are devoted to the investigation of 
truth’.624 Lorenzo is acknowledging that the lessons derived from the study of vice in contemplative 
                                                          
621 ‘Necesse est, ut acerrimum bellum... spiritus adversus carnem gerat’, DC, p. 210.12-14. 
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623 DC, pp. 218.22-219.13. 
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life can be used to guide and govern the republic (and, for that matter, shows the reader how 
Landino is self-conscious about his own role as moral instructor). His answer to Alberti therefore 
follows the thread of his interlocutor’s reasoning: 
 
Aeneas therefore entreats the Sibyl (whom you have already interpreted as learning [doctrina]) to lead him into 
the underworld and to his father. When he asks this, he shows how the mind descends into sensuality with 
learning itself guiding it. For he wants to know the vices which come from sensuality completely... Not only 
have you made me understand what was said by Virgil in his divine inspiration but, with the similarity of the 
subjects having been brought to mind, I can now easily imagine what our own Dante meant too.625 
 
Just as Virgil holds that the descent to Avernus is easy, so too is this immersion into sensuality. To 
return from such a venture, on the other hand, is a far more difficult task and only achievable in 
three ways, represented by those whom the Sibyl refers to respectively as ‘of ardent virtue’, the 
‘children of the gods’, and ‘those whom kindly Jupiter loved’.626 The first two means by which one 
can ascend from sensuality are excellence in the moral virtues or in the dianoetic virtues which, as 
we have seen, represent the twin wings of justice and religion through which the soul, weighed 
down by the body, can return to its origin in accordance with the orthodox Platonic doctrine of the 
Phaedrus.627 The third means through which one might return from sensuality is by way of a 
happenstance of birth that, for some, can instil a natural predilection for right action. This is, in 
terms of practical morality at least, a radical departure from anything discussed in the Disputationes 
thus far and derives its Platonic authority not from the Phaedrus, but the Timaeus. Landino’s line of 
reasoning runs thus. While the mind itself is not subject to the influence of the stars, the body and 
its appetites come from the world-soul, which Landino, following Macrobius and Ficino, 
characterises as ‘Jupiter’ and which permeates the universe.628 Since the mind can only act in the 
body through intermediaries such as the senses and the appetite (aside from an occasional divine 
flash of truth that manifests itself through insight, dreams or omens), and since every different 
body attracts its own distinctive characteristics through planetary influence or ‘the kindness of the 
stars’, it follows that certain individuals are born with an instinctive disposition towards the moral 
or dianoetic virtues.629 I believe that this view is of hitherto underappreciated significance, because 
                                                          
625 ‘Petit [Aeneas] igitur a Sibylla, quam tu iam doctrinam interpretatus es, ut ad inferos et ad parentem 
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627 See above pp. 63-64, 83 and 123-24, n. 179 and n. 377. 
628 DC, pp. 223.3-224.2 and cf. Ficino, Platonic Theology XVIII.viii.7, Phaedrus commentary, X.2-4 and the 
summary of chapter XIX, and Philebus commentary, XI; Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.xvii.14 and II.ii; and 
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190 
 
it grants Landino a mechanism through which he can explain why some republican politicians 
choose to remain in civic life – that is, in the realm of the moral virtues – while others can withdraw 
themselves into contemplation using the dianoetic virtues and therefore disassociate themselves 
from public office. In his treatment of this question in the first book of the Disputationes, Landino 
skirted around the issue somewhat by emphasising that those who favour engagement in politics in 
early maturity can put contemplation into abeyance until later life. If, however, the world-soul has 
gifted some leaders with a natural inclination towards speculation on the divine while others are 
better disposed to civic activity, then Landino’s earlier argument that the two munera and the ways 
of life devoted to them are equally meritorious despite the metaphysical superiority of 
contemplation seems to be based on firmer foundations.  
The means by which the descensus might be made safely is wisdom (sapientia) or, in Landino’s 
system of Virgilian symbology, the golden bough.630 Wisdom, which, like the golden bough, is 
flawless, brilliant and self-nourishing, grants one the capacity to judge what to choose and what to 
do – as we saw earlier, in Landino’s virtue ethics it is the dianoetic virtue which distinguishes 
between the principles and the effects of things.631 In keeping with his discussion of the world-soul, 
there is a certain exceptionalism to Landino’s view of wisdom because, while anyone can purge 
themself with the moral virtues, the intellectual investigation of the divine with the dianoetic virtues 
is the preserve of only a few. The Sybil advises that the golden bough will only grant itself ‘if the 
Fates call you’, so Landino must turn to Ficino’s Platonic Theology for his explanation.632 According 
to the Ficinian system, God’s self-contemplation consists in three successive orders of activity: God 
knows Himself; He knows all things; and He causes all things.633 These activities are wisdom, 
providence and fate respectively. The ‘Fates’ which call one to wisdom are therefore the earthly part 
of the providential order, and however much some might exert themselves in the search for doctrina, 
the ability to attain true knowledge of the divine is only granted to a few. Again, we can interpret 
Landino’s keenness to emphasise the particularity of this gift as an attempt to align conventional 
civic humanist thinking with the promotion of the contemplative life in Latin Platonism, in that it 
regards republican governance as a perfectly noble vocation for those who have not been granted 
the capacity for intellectual reflection by God. In this sense, it is an elaboration upon the idea in the 
previous passage of natural inclinations being imparted by the world-soul, but goes further in 
offering a providential basis for these inclinations which is concordant with Christian dogma as well 
as being consistent with Platonic psychology. 
 
 
                                                          
630 On the golden bough see Salutati, De laboribus Herculis IV.ii.9, Bernardus Silvestris, Commentary, pp. 58.3-
59.2 and Fulgentius, Exp. Verg., and cf. Ficino, The Philebus commentary, pp. 446-50. 
631 See above pp. 83-84. 
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3.7 The descensus and the ‘inward turn’ 
 
To summarise briefly, Landino believes that the descensus involves the psychological investigation of 
vice. Once the purgative virtues are embedded as a habit, one can immerse oneself in vice in order 
to accumulate the learning, or doctrina, through which one can pass to the virtues of the purged soul. 
If there is to be a hope of returning from it, the descensus must only be undertaken by those who 
excel in the moral or dianoetic virtues, or have a natural gift that inclines them in such a way. For 
those whom God deems worthy, wisdom will be the guide into the exploration of sensuality, and 
any lingering desire for personal glory must be extinguished entirely. 
So in what, precisely, does the descensus consist? Since its aim is for the utter purgation of vice 
through the understanding of its origins then, rather than simply analysing the external 
manifestations of vice in civic life alone, the descensus must investigate the foundational aspects of 
vice in human psychology, requiring of the reader the aforementioned ‘inward turn’ that was 
lacking from the Sallustian analysis of the third book. Hence, the reader must self-evaluate. He 
must reflect on his own mental processes to expunge the memory of vice, and thereby cultivate 
qualities such as proper decision-making, moral accountability and the capacity to endure the 
intellectual and physical demands of the speculative life. As these techniques of mental discipline 
and therapeutic reasoning become ingrained, one will forget the vices and be able to exercise the 
dianoetic virtues in the life of contemplation. Then, and only then, can the sage transmit the doctrina 
he has accumulated to his fellow citizens as moral advice, and thus guide the state without 
occupying an official role. The parallels between this course of psychological self-reflection and 
Landino’s intended political practice within the republic are therefore clear and intentional. Just as 
the enlightened sapiens will later descend from his contemplation of the divine to convey his 
wisdom for the benefit of the state, so too must one who seeks to fulfil this role first descend into 
the shadows of corporeality to reflect on the psychological processes from which vice emerges.  
That the moral education imparted by the descent to the underworld is therapeutic by nature, 
requiring a degree of introspection hitherto unseen in the Disputationes, is important in 
distinguishing it from the earlier lessons in the text. Landino’s account of the doctrina which one 
must accumulate consists in a recapitulation of the most important elements of his ethics. These are 
the usual themes we have seen thus far: that an appetite for corporeal things provokes mental 
perturbationes in the soul; that vice comes about when such disturbances are formed into a habitus and 
one slips from incontinence into intemperance; and that freedom from contagion of the body 
demands a process of purgation through moral virtues before drawing closer to God with the 
dianoetic virtues. Yet these lessons are recontextualised in such a way that emphasises their 
therapeutic purpose. Midway through the journey through the underworld Landino summarises the 




For the order in such matters is that first vices are recognised, then, having been recognised, they are fled 
from so that, having finally been purged of them, we are made suitable contemplators of the divine things in 
which the summum bonum consists.634 
 
The contribution of each part of the descensus to the understanding of vice roughly reflects this 
division. In the vestibule of the underworld, Aeneas is immersed in the vices, recognising them 
first-hand. As he continues his travels through the underworld, the reader is encouraged to reflect 
upon allegorical figures that mirror the interaction between vice and the will, such that they gain the 
mental tools necessary to recognise the psychological processes of vice and, exercising free 
judgment, can remove their influence. When Aeneas reaches Tartarus, the vices are revisited at a 
distance, such that they can be properly appreciated in the context of this new, analytical 
understanding of vice and can then, in turn, be purged. Finally, Aeneas enters the Elysian Fields just 
as the sapiens attains knowledge of the divine. 
The first step of the descensus, the recognition of vice, begins when Aeneas passes into the 
underworld itself and enters an antechamber filled with an array of monsters. Aware that he has an 
opportunity to align his interpretation with that of Plato, Landino notes that these apparitions not 
only satisfy Platonic doctrine by representing the perturbationes of the appetite that the soul 
experiences on its re-immersion in the body, but also support his own preferred view, in which they 
symbolise the ceaseless stings of conscience when one falls into vice.635 Landino makes much of 
Virgil’s line that ‘pale diseases’ (pallentes morbi) dwell in this vestibule because of the use of the term 
morbi in the Stoic theory of emotions transmitted by Cicero. As we have seen, this concept 
describes the condition which occurs when the perturbationes animi aroused by the appetite become 
implanted as dispositional habits and ossify into the vices of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio.636 For Virgil 
to have placed these entities early on in the descensus was convenient, since Landino was now able to 
employ his allegorical skill in the service of the soul’s recognition of the vices while seemingly 
having been afforded philosophical authority for the system of emotional dispositions he had 
already described. We are therefore told that, just as these monsters contravene the law of nature, 
so do the sins or morbi that they represent contravene the law of reason. Being empty images they 
cannot be overcome by force but can be evaded with reason’s aid. The colourful array of 
allegorisations that Landino deploys to explain their significance serves as a taxonomy of vice of 
likely mnemonic value to the reader. So, Old Age represents the risk of the soul falling into vice as 
it loses its vigour, Hunger and Poverty symbolise different aspects of avarice; Sleep, War, and 
Guilty Pleasures the turpitude, sordidness and agitation of the soul immersed in vice.637 Through 
                                                          
634 ‘Quoniam autem ordo in rebus huiuscemodi est, ut primo vitia cognoscantur, cognita deinde effugiantur, 
ut postremo illis purgati rerum divinarum, in quibus summum bonum consistit, idonei contemplatores 
efficiamur’, DC, p. 245.8-11. 
635 DC, pp. 230.22-231.12. 
636 DC, pp. 231.21-232.16. See above pp. 129-37 and cf. Cic. Tusc. IV.x.23-24. 
637 DC, pp. 232.21-233.10; 234.6-16. The following allegorisations of the monsters appear in DC, pp. 235.1-
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their hybridity, the Centaurs illustrate how the tyrant provokes a descent from human fellowship 
into barbarism, and the Scyllas once again represent excessive sensual desire.638 The Hydra 
symbolises intellectual and rhetorical deceit, its many heads signifying the fraudulent arguments of 
the sophist; the Chimera irascibility; the Gorgons the snares of sensual desire by which the foolish 
are ‘turned to stone’.639 Briareus signifies the rejection of the good advice of nature and, finally, 
Geryon represents one who, consumed with vice, is governed entirely by the inferior part of the 
soul. Moreover, proper recognition of vices demands that one knows what is not a vice, and hence 
Landino indicates how in the Aeneid the apparitions of Death and Labour are not said to be truly 
terrible but only seem to be so. The sage understands that, in life, the separation of the mind from 
the encumbrance of the body is a form of death, and one’s own mortality can be therefore 
approached without fear.640 Likewise, hard work should not inspire terror because one should spare 
no effort in the pursuit of either action or contemplation. Note that the scope of vices that Aeneas 
experiences in the underworld is far broader than the triad of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio whose 
management was the aim of the civic virtues. This is an immersion into vice in all its complexity 
and variety. The reader is now aware that it is the summum bonum rather than any external goods that 
is the end of life, but they must still be able to recognise sin in all its forms if it is to be properly 
understood and purged by rendering the appetite obedient to reason. Landino would later go into 
more detail on the process of immersion in the vices in the Comento when analysing the eighth canto 
of Inferno:  
 
Having made some progress in this matter [i.e., the cognition of the vices], if we cannot proceed any further – 
that is, to understand them all – we have to turn back – that is, to leave those things which we have 
understood. And he shows that we have to observe three things to turn back. First, to return by the same 
footsteps. This means that we have descended into vice only in order to understand it, and not to sully 
ourselves with it, and so having understood we have to repent of it in the same way. Second, to turn as a 
unified whole, because whenever the appetite is separated from the reason it will die. The third is that we 
have to turn swiftly, because having understood the malignity of vice we have to leave it immediately.641 
 
                                                          
236.15. 
638 For a similar interpretation of the centaurs, see Salutati, De laboribus Herculis, III.xii.20 and see also 
Boccaccio, Genealogie, IX.27. 
639 Landino’s allegorisation of the Hydra is drawn from Salutati, De laboribus Herculis, III.ix, but his 
interpretation of the Gorgons differs considerably from De laboribus Herculis, III.xlii and Boccaccio, Genealogie, 
X.10-11. 
640 DC, pp. 233.15-234.5. 
641 ‘Nella quale havendo facto alchun progresso, se non possiamo procedere più avanti, cioè conoscergli tutti, 
dobbiamo tornare adrieto, cioè uscir di quegli e quali habbiamo conosciuti. Et dimostra che noi habbiamo a 
observare tre chose a tornare a drieto. Prima ritornare per le medesime pedate. Il che significa che chome 
siamo scesi nel vitio solo per via di conoscerlo, et non illordarcene, così conosciuto dobbiamo pentircene per 
la medesima via. La seconda tornare insieme, perché ogni volta che l’appetito si scompagnassi dalla ragione 
perirebbe. La terza è che dobbiamo tornare rapto. Imperoché conosciuto la malignità del vitio, di subito 
dobbiamo partircene’, Comento Inf. VIII.97-102.24-32. 
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With Aeneas, and the reader, having now taken the ‘inward turn’ in order to recognise the vices 
through personal introspection, the next step in the process of self-reflection is to flee them. The 
main didactic method through which Landino hopes to transmit this knowledge is the analysis of 
the conscience and the operation of the mind during the act of sin. Landino begins his illustration 
of this process by describing how the four rivers of the underworld encountered by Aeneas – the 
Stygian swamp, the Acheron, the Styx itself and the Cocytus – represent each of the four steps in 
the lifespan of vice, from its origin in the mind all the way to the guilt which follows it.642 First 
there is an initial motion of conscience, then a conscious deliberation of sin, then the sorrow after 
the deed itself and finally a deep-seated remorse. To this disarticulation of the process of vice, 
Landino introduces another factor that hearkens back to his description of the Christian 
interpretation of the descensus as punishment for sins committed under free will, an idea that, for 
Landino, has implications that are procedural as well as theological. So, just as the boatman Charon 
commands the passage across the Styx, pushing with his bargepole, so too does vice fall under the 
auspices of the free judgment of the will as it exercises the power of choice (electio).643 However 
transparently Augustinian this emphasis on free choice during the act of sin might be, Landino’s 
view cannot be entirely credited to Christian doctrine. He maintains that, since free judgment itself 
is fallible, it is not required for those who have reached the third degree of virtue as their 
understanding of necessary goods is second nature. Free judgment is only exercised when choosing 
between the things which are not obviously goods or, to use the language of Cicero, what is morally 
indifferent: 
 
It is a quality of free judgment to turn to whichever it wishes: not just to the splendour of reason, but also to 
the ardour of desire... Let the night in us, which is nothing else than those shadows that come forth from 
ignorance, desist, there will be no need for deliberation because the mind would know the summum bonum 
clearly and would be drawn to it without any doubt. For we never ‘choose’ necessary things and all 
deliberation ceases once doubt is removed. So those who are now in the third order of virtues, which are 
called ‘the virtues of the purged soul’, do not use prudence to choose things but acknowledge nothing apart 
from true goods, and have regard for these things alone... But since, as I was just saying, no one deliberates 
about necessary things [i.e., true goods], it was proper for the power of deliberation to be bestowed with this 
freedom in order that, using one’s judgment, one might decide on one thing among many or, concerning one 
thing, whether or not it should be done.644 
                                                          
642 DC, pp. 236.16-237.6, and cf. Comento, Inf. III.70-81, Inf. VII passim and Inf. IX.73-81.21-26. Landino’s 
understanding of the rivers of the underworld derives from Boccaccio, Genealogie III.5 and 14-17, Salutati, De 
laboribus Herculis IV.ii.5-6, Bernardus Silvestris, Commentary, p. 51.20-25 and Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.x.10-11. 
See also the fragments of the lost Sullo Stige by Porphyry in Stobaeus, Anthology I.3.56, I.49.50-54 and II.1.32. 
643 DC, p. 237.11-23. Landino references this passage and the role of Charon in Comento, Inf. III.82-99. 
644 ‘Liberi est arbitrii ad utrum velit flecti et ad rationis fulgorem et ad cupiditatum ardorem... Cesset enim nox 
in nobis, quae nihil aliud est nisi ipsae tenebrae, quae ab inscitia proveniunt, nulla erit consultatione opus. 
Mens enim summum bonum perspicue nosceret et in illud sine ulla dubitatione ferretur. Nunquam enim 
eligimus necessaria ac sublata dubitatione omnis consultatio cessat. Quapropter qui iam in tertio virtutum 
genere sunt, quas purgati animi appellant, ii prudentia in rerum delectu non utuntur, sed praeter ea, quae sunt 




Hence, free judgment defers to wisdom, just as Charon is persuaded by the sight of the golden 
bough. Landino cannot be credited for the originality of these attributions because he had lifted 
them directly from Salutati’s De laboribus Herculis but, as is so often the case in the Disputationes, his 
inventiveness lies not in innovation, but in his ability to integrate disparate elements into a cohesive 
philosophical approach.645 It has already been established that the initial immersion in the vices or 
morbi can only be negotiated through reason, and so the purpose of this intimate and perceptive 
depiction of moral psychology is to inculcate the capacity to recognise vice at each stage of its 
existence. Likewise, the emphasis on the role of free judgment in the recognition of vice has its 
precedent. As we have seen, Landino’s discussion in the second book on the different categories of 
goods is phrased in terms of personal choice throughout.646 While the choice between goods is no 
longer a concern as one passes from the level of the purgative virtues to the virtue of the purged 
soul, Landino is nevertheless insistent that one must continue to exercise some degree of free 
judgment. To exercise power in the state without an official role is not to delegate all decisions, and 
since one will still be held accountable by one’s fellow citizens then one must exploit one’s 
knowledge of vice and virtue gained from the process of self-reflection. One can also interpret this 
passage as a rejoinder to the concept of the Platonic philosopher-king that Landino has at times 
been accused of supporting, in that it discourages the reader from any anti-republican sentiments 
that advance unquestioning obedience to political figureheads. Even if the sapiens has attained the 
third rank of virtue and knows nothing but true goods, he must still then exercise his judgment in 
more nebulous matters and this judgment is imperfect. Political legitimacy in the guidance of the 
state is granted by virtue, wisdom and the capacity to recognise vice, and these qualities are valuable 
for their intrinsic merits rather than for conferring any status that makes the sapiens beyond 
criticism. 
At this point, Landino feels it necessary to address the practical matter of the demands of the 
body in the contemplative life. These are signified by Cerberus, whose three heads represent 
hunger, thirst and the need for sleep, and such demands can only pacified through temperate 
living.647 Yet physical demands possess their own ethical dimension too. Landino has Alberti 
remark how both Lorenzo and Federico da Montefeltro avoid any kind of extravagance in 
satisfying the needs of the body, with their modesty and sobriety standing as a censure of ‘the 
luxury and lasciviousness of our men who profess a doctrine of total sanctity in their red and black 
                                                          
consulit, oportuit hanc vim ea libertate donatam esse, ut aut de pluribus unum aut de uno, sitne agendum, pro 
suo arbitrio decernat’, DC, p. 238.8-23. Note Landino’s debt to Cic. Fin. III.xv.50-xviii.61, especially Cic. Fin. 
III.xviii.61. 
645 Salutati, De laboribus Herculis IV.ii.6 and 7. 
646 See above pp. 121-28. 
647 Cf. Salutati, De laboribus Herculis IV.ii.3.29-30. In Fulgentius , Exp. Verg. and Bernardus Silvestris, 
Commentary pp. 90.11-91.10, on the other hand, Cerberus is depicted as representing rhetorical eloquence. 
Boccaccio interprets his three heads in Genealogie I.14.10 as flattery, false happiness and empty glory, but in 
Genealogie VIII.6.11 allegorises them as three types of avarice. 
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caps and their white veils’.648 This aside is a coded criticism of Sixtus IV, against the influence of 
whom Landino, as we have seen, sought to cement relations between the rulers of Florence and 
Urbino.649 In accordance with the aims of his virtue politics, his condemnation of the perceived 
failings of the papacy is on moral grounds, and seeks to destabilise any claims for Sixtus’s political 
legitimacy. More broadly, Landino would have viewed the example of vice on the part of the clergy 
as a relevant one in this particular allegorical context because of the religious associations with 
contemplation from the desert fathers through to Salutati’s De seculo et religione. The idea that those 
whose lives ought to be devoted to the knowledge of God are nevertheless subsumed in bodily 
luxury is utterly at odds with the related kind of contemplative detachment which Landino 
advocates for the sapiens. Lorenzo and Federico, on the other hand, exemplify the kind of virtuous 
leadership absent in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. 
Before revisiting the vices, one must undertake a final meditation on the processes of the mind 
which involves contemplating the course of human life through an allegorisation of Aeneas’ 
journey through the underworld to Tartarus. The purpose of this exercise is to understand the 
misery of those dependent on bodily pleasure, whose absence of virtue leaves them vulnerable to 
the blows of fortuna, and so Landino emphasises two subjects in particular: the fear of death and the 
disturbance of civic concord. While introspection on each of these matters has the effect of 
broadening the moral universe of the reader, it also serves to proffer pragmatic advice to the reader 
on issues relevant to the governance of the republic. First, Landino argues that the sapiens must 
overcome the fear of death which can insinuate itself into those who place too much reliance on 
the body and its senses. By way of example, he censures suicides who, he claims, ‘sin twice’: their 
obsession with the corporeal confuses them into thinking death as a great evil, and they ‘impiously’ 
desert their body before they ought to.650 In order to remove this fear, the sapiens must be free of 
guilt so that he can rejoice in returning to his true nature. Landino’s broader aim in discussing the 
fear of death, however, is to introduce issues of death’s injustice, and in particular that concerning 
capital punishment. On seeing one who, like Socrates, is unjustly sentenced to death, the sapiens, 
‘will convince with Socratic reasoning whoever has been behaving unjustly and cruelly towards 
another person that he is not harming them, but himself’.651 What Landino seems to be doing here, 
through the circuitous method of introducing a putative third party who might consider subjecting 
someone in their power to injustice, is advocating merciful and magnanimous conduct on the part 
of the enlightened politician. The second subject upon which Landino encourages the reader to 
reflect is the fate of warmongers and seditionists, for which his methodology is similar. While such 
leaders could have chosen an amicable life, they instead chose to disrupt and shatter the peace: 
                                                          
648 ‘Quantum nostrorum hominum, qui rubris nigrisque galeris ac niveis ricinis totius sanctitatis doctrinam 
profitentur, luxus lasciviaque exagitat’, DC, p. 243.25-27. 
649 See above pp. 40-44. 
650 DC pp. 245.24-26 and 246.18-247.7. See also e.g. Cic.Rep.VI.xv.15. 
651 ‘Quin et Socratica argumentatione convincet, quicunque iniuste crudeliterque in alium egerit, non illum, 




Either, having been inflicted with no harm, they are provoked spontaneously by ambition or avarice to assail 
with sword, fire and fraud those who are entirely undeserving of such treatment, or, having been provoked, 
they decide nothing according to law, which is fitting for human beings, and turn themselves to the use of 
force, which is for beasts. Hence we see the human race, which could have lived in the highest otium through 
harmonious behaviour, constantly thrown into chaos.652 
 
Once again, by censuring the unnecessary use of force by others, Landino intends to warn the 
audience against any such behaviour while wielding unsanctioned power within the state. Just as he 
had in the third book of the Disputationes, Landino presents the proper, lawful functioning of the 
republic as distinctively human, and contrasts such a state of affairs with a bestial alternative. Yet 
this time the animalistic quality is the spontaneous use of force which, unlike the avaricious deceit 
that he had described using the metaphor of the fox, has as its unspoken point of reference the 
other famous Ciceronian image from the De officiis, the lion.653 That Landino had this figure in mind 
when composing this passage is supported by the fact that Cicero had created the images of the fox 
and the lion as illustrations of injustice, the very subject that Landino had just addressed with regard 
to the fear of death. Hence, when one meditates upon the way in which the mind operates during 
the perpetration of vice, so too does one at the same time recognise and eliminate the seeds of 
injustice. Here Landino is expressing the view that, since the moral health of the state consists in 
that of its politicians writ large, then the ‘inward turn’ can have an immediate benefit to the republic 
in the same way as was the case for the ethical development of the civic virtues. When the 
statesman is purged of vice, the republic in turn ceases to enact the sort of internal injustice which 
leads to the cruel treatment of citizens and stops behaving unjustly towards external parties through 
war-making and violence. 
Having now concluded his reflections upon the workings of the conscience, and with the reader 
having assembled the mental toolkit with which to understand the process of sin properly, Landino 
continues his analysis of the moral psychology of vice through an allegorisation of the sinners in 
Tartarus (etymologically ‘the place of perturbation’), the purpose of which is to revisit the vices at a 
distance now that one is armed with a new understanding of their nature.654 Just as he had 
employed the image of the four rivers of the underworld to illustrate the progress of vice from the 
initial act of will to subsequent remorse, so now does he use that of the triple wall of Tartarus to 
expand upon this idea. Here the three concentric walls represent the mental conception of vice, the 
act itself, and then the fixation of the vice as a habit of the mind.655 As such, Landino adumbrates 
                                                          
652 ‘Nam aut nulla iniuria affecti ipsi ultro avaritia ambitioneve impulsi ferro, igni, fraude nihil tale merentes 
lacesserunt aut ipsi lacessiti nihil de iure, quod hominis proprium est, disceptantes ad vim, quae ferarum est, 
se contulerunt. Hinc genus humanum, cui per concordiam in summo otio vivere licuerat, assiduo misceri 
videmus’, DC, p. 247.11-16. 
653 Cic.Off.I.xiii.41 and see above pp. 177-78. 
654 DC, p. 248.7-11. 
655 DC, p. 248.11-23. 
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the central symbolic purpose of Tartarus, which is that it allows Aeneas and the reader to observe 
vices that have been implanted as a habitus. His particular interest is not only in such habits 
conceived as a state of being, but also the process by which they are inculcated or – to use the 
language of his philosophical system – how and why someone can fall from incontinence into 
intemperance. This is a question of free will. When a vice is established as a habit, Landino argues, 
it is almost impossible to return to virtue. In a sense, one’s capacity for the free exercise of the will 
has been annulled, because while the initial thought that compels one to vice is voluntary when one 
is only incontinent and struggles against sin, when that vice is established as a habitus in the 
condition of intemperance then one can no longer forgo it. We have already seen evidence that 
Landino considered the idea of slipping into intemperance to have an admonitory function in the 
civic life, and this view also obtains in the therapeutic process required for contemplation.656 He 
wishes to express to the reader that it is imperative that vices are not established as habits because 
they compromise one’s capacity to think and act, while at the same time emphasising that one bears 
ultimate moral responsibility for such a condition. That he deems it necessary to connect this 
principle of voluntary action with the concept of intemperance leads us to infer that his intention is 
to show how, if one who wishes to exercise power in a republic by imparting strategic and didactic 
wisdom, one must be free to make decisions without any constraining force of vice. One aim of 
this therapeutic descensus is, therefore, to inculcate a self-awareness that one’s political choices are 
made in a state of psychological freedom and non-dependence. Hence, since Landino deems it 
morally important to show that habitual vice originates from a choice freely made, it is unsurprising 
that he chooses to attribute characteristics of regret and remorse to the imagery of Tartarus. The 
fiery Phlegethon that surrounds Tartarus represents how ‘those who had delighted in vices, moved 
by regret, condemn and bitterly despise their former life and are furiously angry with themselves’ 
while the presence of the Fury Tisiphone at the gate symbolises the distress caused by the 
conscience which, even in the absence of witnesses to sin, ‘weighs down on you, censures you, 
carries you to judgment, delivers its grave testimony and finally convicts you’.657 Likewise, while 
some of the allegorisations of the tortured souls in Tartarus depict vices similar to those present in 
the creatures in the vestibule of the underworld – the Titans represent impiety, Ixion and Pirithous 
tyranny and avarice – others are said to symbolise moral qualities more in keeping with the themes 
of remorse and free will: the vulture devouring Tityos symbolises the conscience gnawing at one’s 
soul; the punishment of pushing rocks demonstrates the futility of devoting effort to things beyond 
one’s capability; the sinners hanging on wheels represent those who commit themselves to the 
whims of fortune rather than virtue.658 Through these latter images the reader is encouraged to 
                                                          
656 See above pp. 151-54. 
657 ‘[Tantum enim est vitiorum odium, ut et, qui illis delectati sunt,] tandem paenitentia ducti vitam 
praeteritam damnent vehementerque oderint, sibi vero ipsis accerrime irascantur’, DC, pp. 248.26-249.2; 
‘adest tamen ipsa conscientia, quae te urget, insectatur, in iudicium rapit, gravissimum testimonium dicit, 
convincit denique’, DC, p. 251.6-8. 
658 DC, pp. 251.12-253.7. 
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meditate on the importance of self-mastery for progressing to the life of contemplation and, by 
extension, for providing free-minded leadership when offering guidance to the state. 
It should now be the case that the sage who follows Landino’s prescribed course of 
introspection understands the vices in their true, psychological context which is centred upon free 
will and self-mastery. With this knowledge in place – knowledge which the sage can begin to pass 
on in turn in the form of learning or doctrina – the vices can be purged in order that one can 
proceed to the cognition of the divine, just as the purified Aeneas proceeds to the Elysian Fields. 
Now that the process of purification is complete, Landino is keen to show that his allegorical 
method could be applied more generally, and to this end he has Lorenzo remark upon the 
continuity between the elimination of vice achieved through the descensus in the Aeneid and that of 
the journey through Purgatory in Dante’s Commedia, the symbolic significance of which he had 
mentioned in the prolusion to his lectures at the Studio some years earlier, and to which he would 
later return in the Comento.659 Yet his main purpose is to tie up any theoretical loose ends of the 
disputation. Since the sapiens has now reached the highest level of the moral virtues, the virtues of 
the purged soul, Landino can once again remind the reader of the equivalent merit of the two 
munera in the first book of the Disputationes: 
 
If we consider carefully those men whom he places in heaven, we will understand that he has very cleverly 
included all the things which we set forth about the two ways of life on the first day of the disputation: those 
who are religiously devoted to the cognition of things and those who justly turn themselves to activity and 
civil life are both entirely worthy of returning to heaven, as if to their origin.660  
 
By emphasising this element of Virgil’s description, he hopes to show that the often thorny 
allegorisation he has outlined over the last two books has been brought to a conclusion that 
satisfies his preceding theoretical work, and that he has answered his original question of what 
might be gained from Plato in order to administrare rem publicam. To this end, it is essential for the 
purposes of his intellectual schema that men of action occupy just as auspicious a place in heaven 
as contemplatives, and Landino was not short of classical precedent in this regard. In his account of 
the dream of Scipio that ends the Republic, Cicero had granted a prominent position to such 
individuals in the afterlife and, as is so often the case, Landino’s thought is derived from the 
Commentary of Macrobius on these passages.661 Later in the Comento he would acknowledge how 
                                                          
659 DC, pp. 253.27-254.2 and 254.10-31 and cf. Prolusione Dantesca in Scritti, I, p. 53.27-33. 
660 ‘Nos autem si, quos viros ille in caelis reponat, diligentius considerabimus, ea omnia, quae primo 
disputationis die de utroque vitae genere a nobis exposita sunt, acutissime illum esse complexum 
animadvertemus, ut et qui in rerum cognitione religiose et qui in actionibus ac vita civili iuste versati sint digni 
omnino existant, qui in caelum veluti in originem suam redeant’, DC, p. 255.8-14. Note that the adverbs 
religiose and iuste relate to the allegory of two wings of religion and justice that Landino took from Ficino and 
the Phaedrus.  
661 Cic.Rep.VI.xiii.13 and VI.xvi.16. See also Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I.viii.12-13; I.ix.6-10; and I.xviii.4-12, 
and see also Plat. Rep. X.615b-615c. 
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Dante had placed military and political leaders in the spheres of Mercury, Mars, and Jupiter in the 
Paradiso and, since we have already seen the influence of Matteo Palmieri upon Landino’s thought 
in the Disputationes, it is also important to note that the same admixture of active and contemplative 
souls occurs at the conclusion of the Vita civile.662 In fact, as part of his broader humanistic defence 
of the value of the vita activa, Palmieri goes so far as to grant priority to civic leaders in the afterlife, 
arguing that God orders the gates of heaven to be opened most freely to governors of the 
republic.663 Given that we have seen evidence that the precedent he established in using the 
Macrobian scale of virtue as a means for becoming closer to God was influential upon Landino, it 
is likely that his affording such prominence in heaven to men of action served as a model for the 
latter humanist.664 Like Macrobius, Palmieri demonstrates to Landino how one can justify a place 
for republican leadership in a system of perfectionist morality, and thus emphasise the salvific value 
of both kinds of life. 
Where the implications of Landino’s treatment of the Elysian Fields differ from those in this 
Platonic-Ciceronian-Macrobian tradition of dream allegory is that the sequential nature of his own 
allegorisation must necessarily demand theoretical equivalence between the afterlife and the state of 
having been purged of vice through the moral virtues. Those who lead lives devoted to the munera 
of action and contemplation therefore appear for different reasons: the former because they have 
purged themselves with the moral virtues through a life of civic excellence; the latter because they 
have done so in order that they can continue on to contemplation by exercising the intellectual 
virtues. Landino’s initial conclusion that, while both kinds of life are admirable, contemplation is 
more perfect, is therefore satisfied, yet at the same time he has one eye on the political implications 
of this arrangement for the administration of the republic. Since Virgil writes that the souls in the 
Elysian Fields engage in the same activities they had in life, Landino is able to interpret him as 
adhering to the doctrine of Plato and the ‘Platonic Cicero’ that ‘administrators of republics, when 
received into heaven, would not set aside their concern for guiding human affairs’.665 Just as in the 
first book he had reconfigured Plato’s dictum about rule by philosophers to appeal to republican 
ideals, so too he has here adopted a sentiment directly from an ancient source – namely, Macrobius 
– and reformulated it in a similar way, by replacing rectores urbium with administratores rerum 
publicarum.666 This shows us that Landino’s emphasis on statesmen in the afterlife is far from being 
simply derivative, but is instead a calculated and self-conscious strategy for integrating Macrobian 
ideas on the soul into his own intellectual framework. By indicating that political leaders purged of 
vice can still maintain an interest in the civic life, he offers a justification for how, should any such 
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leaders continue to move away from affairs of state to contemplation – that is, disengage 
themselves from any official political role within the republic – they can then return to guide the 
state as needed. Later, Landino would use another allegory of heaven to present a similar view on 
the relationship between civic and speculative lives when, in his commentary on the Paradiso, he 
would interpret how Dante the pilgrim turning to the voice of Beatrice, or theology, in the 
thirteenth canto illustrates how we return to contemplation after having digressed to the vita activa 
for as long as one must.667 
With the descensus, then, Landino’s system of virtue politics, set out in the first two books of the 
Disputationes and whose prospectus of moral education began in the third, culminates with the 
prescription of a course of therapeutic self-analysis. When compared to thinkers whose advocacy of 
the contemplative life is somewhat less mitigated than his, Landino’s originality stands not only in 
his creation of a coherent and mutually advantageous relationship between contemplation and civic 
engagement, but also in his willingness to outline a programmatic method for how speculation 
ought to be undertaken. Hence, rather than being deprecated or relegated to an inferior role by the 
journey to contemplation, the virtues that govern the civic life are perfected through the ‘inward 
turn’ that prepares one for speculation on the divine. Unlike the allegorisation of Aeneas’ journey 
from Troy to Italy, the descensus consists of symbolic steps – the initial immersion in bodily vice, the 
reflection on the psychological processes of vice as a prophylactic against their influence, revisiting 
the vices armed with this new knowledge and their final purgation of vice – that seek to educate the 
reader by developing a capacity to make decisions based on intimate self-knowledge rather than by 
prescribing specific modes of behaviour. The ‘inward turn’ of the descensus therefore expands the 
horizons of Landino’s thought beyond Hankins’s interpretation of virtue politics as consisting in 
legitimising and mediating the use of political power by way of a rhetorical social technology. 
Certainly, when he is concerned with the exercise of civic virtue in the third book, Landino focuses 
on Sallustian and Ciceronian ideas of the cultivation of proper behaviour conferring a benefit to the 
republic. Within the back-and-forth of humanist rhetoric, such conduct could be employed for the 
purposes of granting political legitimacy according to the model that Hankins describes by 
demonstrating perceptible evidence of a statesman being wise, just, brave or so on. Yet, when it 
comes to the descensus, Landino’s is a virtue politics that also aligns with late twentieth-century 
accounts of virtue ethics because it seeks to develop the reader as a moral agent through the 
cultivation of interior characteristics, rather than being directed towards any external concerns such 
as deontological laws or considerations of benefit or disadvantage.668 Virtue, in this analysis, is not 
only a quality that is outward-facing in that it affords legitimacy of exercise in the eyes of others, 
but it also consists in an apparatus of moral epistemology that operates at the level of the subjective 
interior life by developing the conscience in order to eliminate vice. One cannot wield political 
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power unless one is secure in one’s own virtue, however much one is believed to be virtuous. 
Landino’s virtue politics therefore encapsulates the very essence of the Ciceronian maxim of ‘to be 
[virtuous] rather than to seem so’.669 Important as political legitimacy conferred by others might be, 
one can only employ one’s wisdom in the strategic service of the state after a period of self-































                                                          





Landino was not the first to subvert republican ideals in the interests of the prevailing political 
climate, as Salutati had done so in the De tyranno. Nor was he the first to suggest that it could 
benefit the republic for statesmen to undertake a Platonic ascent through purgative grades of virtue, 
because Palmieri had written as much in the Vita civile. Yet for him to advance an argument for the 
legitimate, non-monarchical exercise of political power in a republic outside government that was 
entirely consistent with both Florentine and Roman traditions, and to establish a basis for this 
exercise in a course of individual moral perfectionism reliant on the legacy of Plato, was a 
contribution to political thought that was utterly unique.  
This thesis has shown that Landino’s innovation was to craft a system of virtue politics that was 
established on the most fundamental psychological principles yet, since its purificatory programme 
extended from the premise that divine wisdom gained in otium could benefit the state as much as 
direct political engagement, still managed to justify the position of Lorenzo de’ Medici and to 
broaden the possibilities of what was acceptable in a republic. As such, the Disputationes was a 
startling intervention into the prevailing climate of humanistic political thought. Although Landino 
follows the conventions of Quattrocento virtue politics in believing that political legitimacy is 
afforded on account of virtuous behaviour, and that this behaviour should be regulated by 
humanistic rhetoric, he also repurposes certain foundational assumptions according to his needs. 
For instance, he reconfigures the central assumption of oikeotic interdependence in a republic such 
that the natural social bonds of humanity compel both the active politician and contemplative sage 
to concern themselves with the conservation of the state. Hence while the speeches in the first 
book illustrate the course of Landino’s own intellectual wranglings over the questions that had 
occupied humanist thinkers on the relative merits of action and contemplation – the relationship of 
mind and body, how individuals can best benefit the state, to what extent wisdom has a public 
utility – he nevertheless indicates from the outset that he expounds an explicitly republican 
Platonism by his distinctive and particular use of language. His conclusion that the best way of life 
involves both action and contemplation as far as they are needed – that is, that a statesman can 
both engage in political business and withdraw himself from public affairs to benefit the state with 
his strategic guidance – therefore preempts and addresses potential humanist objections. 
Landino’s moral teachings are informed by his keen awareness of Florentine history over the 
preceding decades, particularly as it related to prominent Mediceans such as Cosimo and Piero, but 
even more so does the contemporary political context have a bearing upon his guidance. Despite its 
dedication to Federico da Montefeltro, the Disputationes is foremost an analysis and a justification of 
Laurentian power. The events of the early years of Lorenzo’s rule – his parlous political position, his 
response to the Volterra uprising and his friction with Sixtus IV – all therefore encroach on both the 
practical advice Landino offers and the subjects he deems it necessary to address in the first place. 
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Moreover, in its celebration of the similarities between Lorenzo and Federico, one can view the 
Disputationes as an attempt to cement the relationship between the rulers of Florence and Urbino in 
the face of the influence of Sixtus. 
We have seen that, for all its engagement with contemporary events, the system of virtue politics 
in the Disputationes is philosophically rigorous. It rests on a bedrock of psychology and emotional 
theory which is as indebted to Aristotle and Cicero as it is to Latin Platonism, and which proceeds 
from the premise that the soul is imprisoned within the body. The appetite, the power of the soul 
through which we are moved to appropriate or flee things in the sensible world, can strive towards 
the false ends that are the external goods when it is governed by the senses rather than reason. This 
corrupt judgment induces perturbationes which, when established as habits, are implanted as vices. 
Since the external goods which distract the soul are sensual pleasure, wealth and status, the task of 
purification is to rid the soul of their corresponding vices of luxuria, avaritia and ambitio. It follows 
that, if we are to direct ourselves to the true summum bonum of the soul which is the cognition of God 
– and thereby gain the necessary insight to direct the state outside of government – then we must 
purge ourselves through successive grades of moral virtue before exercising the dianoetic virtues in 
contemplation of the divine. Yet the exercise of virtue has implications beyond the level of the 
individual. Political associations emerge from a natural human impulse to forge interpersonal bonds 
so, following Sallust, the restraint and expiation of vice at the level of the moral virtues is necessary 
for the political well-being of the republic. 
As well as establishing these philosophical foundations for his virtue politics, in his Aeneid 
allegory Landino also outlines a system of practical ethics with which one might purify oneself in 
order to contemplate God and thereby attain the wisdom that justifies the exercise of extra-political 
power. In the battle against sensual desire, Landino prescribes that we inculcate a desire for self-
improvement, that we prevent a desire for bodily pleasure as being habituated as the vice of luxuria, 
and that we understand the transitory nature of the corporeal world. In doing so, we gain resilience 
in the face of the appetitive attacks of fortuna. Then, we must be aware of the dangers of avaritia, 
both in its acquisitive form – through being aware of the risks of financial inconstancy and resisting 
the desire to wage war for wealth – and in its miserly form, by acknowledging that distributive 
justice, the proper allocation of resources and beneficence are essential to the functioning of a 
republic. For ambitio to be conquered, it is necessary that a leader’s greatness of soul must be 
directed by reason, avoiding cruelty and brutality in one’s decisions lest one descend into tyranny. 
Political leaders must also be aware of the risks of self-deceit, subjecting themselves to critical 
scrutiny and avoiding flattery and toadyism, and resisting the seductions of civic life that cause them 
to abandon the position of strategic guidance with which they can better benefit the state. 
To supplement this didactic schema of practical ethics, Landino steps beyond the Sallustian view 
of political morality he otherwise endorses. He encourages an ‘inward turn’, such that the reader 
undergoes a therapeutic process of self-reflection to gain the mental capabilities to utterly purge 
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themself of vice and communicate their knowledge of it to others. Through this programme of 
introspection, Landino offers a path to the kind of self-knowledge necessary to direct and guide the 
state outside of government. First one learns to recognise vice in all its forms, then one learns how 
to flee vice by understanding the operation of the conscience and the deliberative process under 
free will, celebrating mercy and censuring the use of force, then, finally, one learns the importance 
of self-mastery by revisiting the vices at a distance.  
With this thesis I have therefore demonstrated how the Disputationes functions as a defense of 
the exercise of extra-governmental power in a republic through its philosophical structure, its 
system of ethical praxis, and its involvement with the contemporary political and intellectual 
climate. I have shown how Landino’s adaptation of Platonic thought is rooted in the concerns of 
human society, aiming to analyse how political power ought to be used within a republic and 
seeking to foster the kind of moral development that strengthens the interpersonal bonds on which 
the state relies. In the Disputationes, Landino was presenting a form of ‘civic Platonism’ with its own 
distinctive aims, an approach which is deserving of study on its own terms rather than being seen as 
a derivate or revision of Ficino’s more theologically-focussed work. I think that awareness of this 
fact could lead to profitable future studies of the points of intersection between Quattrocento 
Platonism and republicanism, in particular those which might trace the genealogical and relational 
aspects of ‘civic Platonism’. Given the abundance of similarities between the Disputationes and the 
Vita civile, the work of Matteo Palmieri would seem an obvious starting point for such a task. 
Furthermore, I believe that my thesis raises other tantalising prospects for further research. How 
far might Landino’s loosening of republican conventions in the Disputationes have influenced 
subsequent political thinkers? In particular, how did its support of the use of unsanctioned power 
in a republic contribute to the contrasting defences of princely and republican government by 
Machiavelli? We might also ask whether Landino’s subversion of oikeiotic socialisation to extra-
governmental ends can tell us anything about contemporary theories of the foundation of the state. 
There are many implications for the arguments Landino lays out in the Disputationes. Understanding 
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Of all the varied and diverse endeavours in which the human race is engaged, Most Illustrious 
Prince Federico, there is one in particular that is not only universally valued by all who possess even 
a little prudence, but is also considered to be the best in the opinion of the wisest men. It is that in 
which we seek the ultimate goal of everything the Greeks call the telos, an goal at which, when we 
reach it, we can rest in safety and tranquility as if at the finishing line of a race. I do not know what 
I could imagine as being more wretched than the human condition if the highest God had not set 
out this end as certain and ordained. For if nature had established in all other things – either with or 
without souls – some final and ultimate end at which they were rightly said to be blessed when they 
attained it, wouldn’t we think it to be very unfair to us if it were only the human being who never 
discovered the goal to which it directs its wearisome and almost endless efforts, all its thoughts, the 
whole course of its life? Yet just as, for an archer, a target is set out in the distance at which he aims 
and directs his arrows, so too has the ultimate goal of humanity I mentioned been set out by 
unerring nature. If this goal is neglected then a person will always be wretched, but if not – and all 
ethical behaviours are directed towards it – then we will attain the highest bliss. What can we 
imagine to be more foolish than such neglect for those of us who grind out such assiduous vigils, 
who endure such intolerable labours, who rush into such manifest danger on behalf of things which 
are entirely fruitless and very often rather harmful? Should we not invest even the smallest concern 
in those things through which alone we can be armed against the varied blows of fortune, and 
through which we perceive the difference between what is empty and shadowed and what is solid, 
clear and truly good? 
Since I was often turning this subject over in my mind, it did not seem as though it would be 
without benefit if I were to commit to writing those speeches which I remember being given by 
Leon Battista Alberti, of all men whom I had ever seen the most well-versed in every kind of 
learning and distinguished by the highest eloquence. The speeches concerned the twofold way of 
life which is suitable for human beings and the ends of good and evil, and were based on the divine 
images of the poet Virgil. Since I wanted to dignify my book with the authority of a prince who 
greatly surpasses all those our age has produced in both these kinds of life, I found none whom I 
could compare to you, illustrious Federico, even though I circled the whole of Italy with my mind’s 
eye for a long time. For although there are some with a certain noble character who care for the 
community and state in such a way that, through wise advice and right action, they do not just 
benefit themselves but also others, and there are some who, endowed with a greater mind, raise 
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themselves to the contemplation of divine matters by leaving human affairs, don’t we know that 
you possess both of these qualities? It does not escape you that those who write about the social 
and civic life divide the subject as a whole into the studies of peace and war. They show that peace 
should be sought for its own sake and that war should be sought not for its own sake, but in order 
that it can be undertaken to attain peace. What virtue is unknown to you through which civic 
harmony and communal tranquility are first established in the state, and then maintained, as if on 
the best foundations? And what virtue is unknown to you through which we best guard against 
inciting the hatred, envy or contempt of foreign nations and princes through our own faults? For 
when I call to mind what your thought processes are when exercising your sovereignty with an 
almost divine wisdom, what administrative decisions you make on account of your excellent sense 
of justice, how much you always inspire faith, and how much you want this faith to become 
common amongst all, and since countless further examples offer themselves in which your great 
devotion to immortal God, your beneficent liberality, and your prince-worthy clemency have been 
noted across all Italy, I willingly recognise in you a second Numa.  
What is there in military matters that mortals can either desire from nature or pursue by 
industry, skill, habit or exercise, which we do not see completed and perfected in you? Indeed, by 
the common consensus, we think it a marvellous thing – and one which appears very rarely across 
all the centuries – that a man is found, distinguished in virtues which are so many and so great and 
so varied and so difficult, to whom the command of the whole army can be entrusted in the gravest 
danger, when it battles for the greatness of empire, for liberty, for the safety of the community, and 
even for life and blood itself. How should I recount what is best about you? I have no fear of 
seeming to have said on account of flattery things which are not only celebrated across all Italy, but 
also move many foreign peoples and countries to admiration. But I do not know how I can confine 
within the narrowness of this preface your deeds, which could not be treated satisfactorily in 
proportion to their worth even with the broadest range of historical narratives. On account of the 
great conflagration of wars in which all have burned for a long time, our age has brought forth 
leaders eminent in military matters with whom it was necessary for you to engage in combat on 
various occasions. But in order that I may pass over many of them, isn’t the common opinion 
about Jacopo Piccinino that he added profound judgment and no small courage to his intellectual 
quickness and familial cunning? Indeed, in the war that he waged so fiercely in hatred for the 
kingdom of Apulia, he conducted himself in such a way that I can name no one, besides you, who 
could have overcome him without the benefit of luck, but with strength and diligence alone. 
Sigismondo Malatesta had inflamed an implacable hatred against you, and the enmity had 
progressed to such a point that it seemed that one of you either had to die or to submit to the 
victor. This conflict had excited the minds of all Italians and, although most people wished you 
victory on account of the distinction of your life and your morals, the outcome of the matter 
nonetheless appeared doubtful to all. For the rumour was that he possessed the great power of 
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gold. He certainly had an excellent army, and the duke himself was perceived to be remarkable in 
his many virtues regarding matters of war and in his long experience. About you, though, I say 
nothing. While I am telling the truth, I shall not now seem to disparage one who, being dead, 
cannot respond to the life I have presented. However, both the just and unjust must acknowledge 
that you descended into battle reluctantly, provoked by the offence of your adversary, and that, 
driven by a cause most righteous, you undertook the matter with great deliberation and executed it 
with magnanimity. Finally, you managed the victory in a most clement way so that all were able to 
understand that you wanted nothing more than peace, and had conducted the war in nothing other 
than a peaceful spirit. For when the two brothers of your enemy came into your power, you 
encouraged them to hope for better things and sent them away uninjured after comforting them 
with a long speech, having honoured them with much money and assuaged them with numerous 
promises. Indeed, with his father dead, you embraced the elder of the two with such love that you 
recognised him as your own son and committed yourself, while duke, to defend and conserve for 
him whatever was left of his father’s kingdom. With this wisdom, with this preeminence of spirit, 
you liberated the city of Rimini from an arduous siege and overcame the strongest troops of the 
enemy so that the greatest part of the soldiers were captured along with their military banners and 
were looted of all their supplies! At the same time, although they had long resisted boldly, both 
Alexander Sforza, a duke distinguished in many wars, and Napoleone Orsini, a man highly 
celebrated amongst military leaders, finally obtained safety for themselves in flight after having been 
wounded. But these are a few things out of many. Our age remembers how many were the regions, 
diverse in both their position and the nature of their terrain, in which you fought different kinds of 
enemy under assembled banners. It remembers how strong the cities you besieged were. It 
remembers how many besieged cities you liberated from their enemies. Who could ever question 
either your capacity for foresight or your readiness to act in such matters? Fabius Maximus, or the 
two Catos, or Sertorius, or – to refer to foreigners – Hannibal or Mithridates, all of whose military 
acumen is praised to the utmost: what scheme did they ever devise craftily and shrewdly and 
cunningly against the enemy that you were unaware of in matters of war? We see that, on entering 
into public office, the endurance of fatigue on the part of leaders is worthy of the highest praise, 
because they perform the duty of both the highest commander and the most vigorous soldier at the 
same time. Of this type, so that I may pass over others, both Marius amongst the Romans and 
Jugurtha amongst the Numidians have been memorialised. Who doubts that a commander 
possesses a strength and toughness of the body to often turn the course of battles that are utterly 
lost? We read that Julius Caesar and the two Scipios – who died bravely in Spain after conducting 
themselves most gloriously in battle – also Marcellus and, amongst the Greeks, the Spartan 
Leonidas, the Athenian Themistocles and the Theban Epaminondas, led their armies through their 
own example and by throwing themselves first into danger, where previously no prayers, no threats, 
and no speeches had been able to urge their men on. Not only do those who are genuinely well-
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disposed attribute these two qualities to you, but your enemies are also compelled to concede the 
fact, even if unwillingly. But what are we doing? I did not set out to praise you at this moment. That 
needs more time and leisure. And so enough about your deeds. 
As far as the peaceful life and study of culture are concerned, who does not know that from an 
early age you were inclined to drink in youthful learning with great avidity during total freedom 
from other things? Thereafter, you were never so busy that you did not take yourself away from 
your affairs for a part of the day and spend it in the study of varied learning. So, since you could 
already interpret the poets very well early on, and had scrutinised the written words of all historians, 
and had not only made yourself very familiar with the principles of speaking but had also practised 
them diligently, you then turned all your attention to philosophy itself. In this subject you imitated 
the example of the greatest leaders. Since you read that Alexander the Great employed Aristotle, 
and Scipio Africanus employed the Stoic Panaetius, and that many other leaders employed the most 
learned men as teachers, you always – and with great generosity and honour – have people who are 
outstanding in every kind of learning as your guests. Whether you are at home, or abroad, or even 
at war, you always have many around you who are able to discuss the most profound subjects with 
learning, elegance, and skill, so that, even amongst the clatter and tumult of the greatest battles, 
constant voices of debate may be heard. It will therefore come as a surprise to no one if, just as all 
commend you as the most righteous in peace, the strongest in war and the wisest in either, so too 
do they deem you most learned in the pursuit of culture. To whom, therefore, could I have 
dedicated this book, in which both kinds of life are discussed, other than to you, who has embraced 
both of them so as to excel in each? But in order that we hear the disputation of Battista himself as 
soon as possible, hear first, and briefly, what the origin of this conversation was. 
When we had arrived at our estate in the valley of Casentino, my brother Piero and I decided on 
the following day to ascend into the Camaldolese forest – a region famous to you and all Italy for 
its ancient religion – for the sake of both avoiding the heat and relaxing our minds. In this forest, 
one can enjoy the spring sky and exceeding wholesomeness with the greatest pleasure when ‘Sirius 
rages vehemently bringing sickness and fever to mortals’, as it is in Homer. After we had come first 
to the cenobites, then to the hermits (if I use the Greek), we spotted that Lorenzo Medici and his 
brother Giuliano had arrived a little before us and had brought with them Alamanno Rinuccini, 
Pietro and Donato Acciaiuoli, Marco Parenti and Antonio Canigiani, very learned men and ones 
who, because they had attained power and variety of speech through great skill and long practice 
from their early years, had in turn made the greatest progress in philosophy with vigorous daily 
study. They went straight into their cell in which they rested, having been exhausted by the 
difficulty of their journey, and I came upon them while they were sitting down. Since they were 
expecting no such thing, they arose at once upon seeing us, seized with a sudden joy, and, after we 
had exchanged the pleasantries usual on the first meeting of friends, Lorenzo said ‘Landino, we 
longed for nothing more to happen than for you to surprise us in such solitude. For these few days, 
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in which all is being burned up in the most intense heat, we have decided to escape from the cares 
and distastefulness of the city into this pleasant place, in order that we might enjoy the more 
temperate skies of the mountain and devote ourselves to some pleasures of the mind. If you join 
these philosophers and me, I do not expect there will be any kind of enjoyment or pleasure that is 
lacking.’ 
When I began to respond to Lorenzo, something suddenly interrupted my speech. It was 
announced that Leon Battista Alberti would shortly arrive. He had recently come from Rome and, 
since he had followed the Aretine road into Figline to visit Marsilio Ficino, easily the most 
preeminent man of our time amongst the Platonists, they had agreed not to go to Florence until 
they had avoided the whole heatwave in the Casentino valley. They had already arrived at the 
monastery and, having stabled their horses, came up to us with a slow step alongside Mariotto, the 
prior general of Camaldoli, a man esteemed in both religion and learning. At this news all were 
seized with a sudden joy and were enthused with a great desire to meet and speak with them. We go 
to meet them; we meet; we greet each other. For the rest of this day – for by now the sun was 
already setting – we consumed the speeches of Battista. He was a man who was the most 
abundantly gifted with wit and culture of all who had been born for many centuries. For what could 
I say about his learning, when absolutely nothing exists that can possibly be known by humans to 
which he could not turn himself knowledgeably and wisely? 
The following day, when we had all risen and attended the holy rites, we decided – for the sake 
of health and pleasure – to walk through the higher part of the forest which extended to the 
summit of the mountain. Eventually we arrived in a flowery meadow, where a spreading beech 
covered a clear spring with its stretched branches. Here Battista said: ‘Look, my esteemed friends! 
Both the tree itself and the stream which gushes from the spring with a pleasant murmur recall the 
Socratic image of the plane tree and brook. The seats which you see everywhere, formed by nature 
but improved a little by the effort of a shepherd, receive us pleasantly, so that we may rest 
comfortably after this stroll up the steep hill.’ After we sat he said, ‘I think that those learned people 
who take themselves into some solitude – not all the time, but often enough – having either put 
their public and private affairs in order or set them aside for another time, are truly blessed. Thus, 
as it is amongst our theologians, with Martha having been left to the waves by which she is always 
buffeted, such people rest in Mary’s safe and peaceful harbour. Not only can they look down on the 
lands and the seas from her high rocks as if from some tall watchtower, but much more ardently 
can they look up to the heavens themselves and, having regained their Platonic wings, can soar 
around the whole upper world as another Zethus. But even though it should often be done by all 
learned men, it is very advantageous for you, Lorenzo and Giuliano, to do it most often of all. For 
you understand that the entire burden of the republic already rests on your shoulders because of the 
worsening sickness of your father. Although virtue appears manifest in you, Lorenzo, it should be 
thought more divine than human, because in your adolescent years nothing is so great or difficult a 
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problem that you cannot both grasp it with a mature prudence and approach it with an 
unconquered magnanimity. Although you flourish in an age which is always inflamed with every 
sort of greed, although established with a fortune and abundance of possessions by which we often 
see men who are great and noble through the long-lasting exercise of great virtues shaken from 
their firm moral position, you never transgress the limits of modesty. Nevertheless, I think that it is 
of great importance both for you and the republic that, since you will soon undertake the 
governance of the latter (and, indeed, for the most part you already have), you spend any free time 
here, withdrawn from public business. Distant from urban tumult, you can investigate and 
understand through debate – either by yourself or, preferably, with these learned men who care 
deeply about you – those things through which our souls are led to an understanding of their origin 
and divinity. For no-one will properly manage either himself or a republic unless he has first both 
purged his mind of every bodily fault with those virtues which improve life and morals, and has 
then illuminated the mind which has been purged with those virtues which provide an 
understanding of supreme things, so that he will have properly understood why he himself and the 
rest of humankind exist and for what reason they were created by the highest God. I think that this 
pretext motivated the divine Plato, for while he does not venture to assert anything outright about 
almost any other subject, he nonetheless seems to declare this without any hesitation: only those 
republics which are either administered by philosophers or whose administrators have begun to 
philosophise will ultimately prosper. So go on, good youths! While the diligence of your father and 
grandfather served to nourish you with learning almost from your very infancy, such that you seem 
to have sucked it up along with your nurse’s milk, you have now progressed to such a place that 
this birthright should no longer be held accountable for your ability. Because, thanks to nature’s 
blessing and your efforts, a sharp intelligence and extraordinarily mature judgment now shines in 
you both, you are easily able to achieve that which you desire.’  
Then Lorenzo said, ‘You indeed advise us wisely and – to respond for my brother too – with 
paternal concern. And so, in order that you see how much I value your teachings, I ask of you that, 
since you have mentioned this way of life which is occupied in the investigation of lofty matters, 
you continue and explain the whole subject in detail to my brother and I, as we would very much 
like to know about it. For although every kind of human action – whether you provide for yourself, 
or you take care of your personal affairs and family, or you ultimately undertake public office – is 
guided by the standard of the virtues which we call “pertaining to life and morals”, we still follow 
these virtues mostly through habit or through custom. And while everything that Plato has 
communicated to me on this subject through the mouth of Marsilio (who understands the mind of 
such a great philosopher more than anyone else) seems truer than any oracle, I would very much 
like to know what it is in that author that you think a governor of the republic should adopt from 
those who are devoted to the investigation of the truth. So, since you are always good-natured and 
liberal with whoever asks you questions, do not make things too difficult for us today, contrary to 
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your nature and habit. The pleasantness of the place and the hour of the day and delightful cool 
breaths of the breeze do not only allow, but even demand it, and the murmur of the flowing brook 
and the harmonies of varied birds alluringly urge us on with their voices.’ 
When Lorenzo had said this and all of us, admiring the intelligence of the youth, had 
enthusiastically approved the request, Battista, smiling gently, said ‘I would have preferred that I 
had less authority in your eyes than you immediately show how much you make of me, particularly 
in a matter which demands a much more careful investigation than our sojourn in the country – 
more suitable for leisure than for argumentation – is able to offer. For it is a difficult question, 
which cannot easily be resolved with an improvised debate either by the most learned men or by 
the less learned (within which I suffer to enumerate myself) without long preparation. But how 
impudent would it be to deny something to your youth, to which even those who are less 
knowledgeable and more severe are forced to be well-disposed, given such an ardent zeal for 
learning? Indeed, I hear the constant rumour from the many people who visit me daily in Rome 
that you have long been determined to dignify all those who excel in any way in learning with every 
kind of honour and reward, and that many already have experienced your care and liberality. I 
should therefore appear to be risking the charge not only of being severe, but also ungrateful, if I 
left wanting someone who very much deserves to learn. Add also that, since a little earlier I 
encouraged you into such a debate, I would be deserting my duty both as a good man and as a 
friend if I allowed someone with a most noble desire to desire in vain. So I will not approach the 
issue intent on hoping to resolve it as much as being compelled by the shame of refusal. For I 
would prefer to be thought lacking in my prudence by the learned men who are present while 
obliging your request than to be accused of rudeness if I did not oblige it. Since you ask this of me, 
I think I ought to proceed in my disputation on the two ways of life in such a way that first I 
address each one separately and then I compare them to each other. In this way, although we 
believe that the most perfect person in this life which we live has united both, it shall nonetheless 
be apparent which one of them is more excellent. And in order that I shall appear to know 
philosophy under the gaze of such great philosophers, that is how I shall begin. 
Not only do the learned demonstrate with clear arguments that the soul is the principle of life 
just for the reason that it exists, but everyone whose senses are unimpaired can almost see it with 
their own eyes too. When we act in a wise, just, brave or temperate way with respect to the things 
which pertain to public life or, separating the mind from the senses, we look up and speculate upon 
the divine and eternal, we do not say that the soul is able to do so because it exists as such, but 
because it has the capacity to attain such powers. So, since we have been produced by nature both 
to act correctly and to investigate the truth, the learned decided to propose two ways of living in 
accordance with these two functions of human life.’  
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‘They are very admirable,’ said Lorenzo, ‘but if someone were to ask me now whether there are 
other functions that the human soul performs besides the ones you spoke about, I would answer 
that there are indeed many.’ 
‘It performs many functions,’ said Battista, ‘while it is in the body. But it does not escape you 
that, since we are investigating human life, we seek only the sort of thing which is peculiar to 
human life insofar as it is present in human beings alone, and in nothing else. So what do we say is 
peculiar to something other than that to which it is most greatly inclined and disposed? They say 
that something lives both for that which is peculiar to it and that to which it proceeds of its own 
accord. If this is the case, we cannot say that a human being lives in order to nourish the body, or 
to grow to the right size from being very small, or to produce something similar to itself, because 
these functions of life are not peculiar and characteristic but are in common with crops and trees. 
Nor, on the other hand, does a human being live to feel or move, for how does this differ from a 
brute animal? But the human being lives in order to think, because it has a mind which, when you 
set humans aside, you find is shared with no other living creature. It is characteristic of the mind 
both to act while guided by reason and to speculate on the truth. So, having excluded the other 
functions of life, which are no more our functions than they are of any other living creature, we say 
the life of a human being – insofar as what makes one a human being – should be devoted to action 
and speculation. Some who argue in favour of adding to these two a third type, which depends on 
pleasure, seem to me to err gravely. For although many mortals are devoted to sleep and to gluttony 
or are captivated by sexual enticements and always lying on the ground, never looking up to the 
heavens, I do not see why they should be counted amongst men rather than amongst the herd. In 
fact, since the carnal pleasures by which the senses are titillated are not from the mind but from the 
senses themselves, why do we think they should be ascribed to humans rather than to other 
animals? So, since the mind alone is ours, if we are not to degenerate from our nature we should 
live with that mind as a ruler in such a way that we direct all our exertions either to the social bonds 
of life – and not for ourselves alone but, since we were born into a community and a society, we 
must care for our parents, for our children, for all our friends and devote ourselves to the just and 
the right – or, with civil office and activity either abandoned or postponed for another time, to 
devote ourselves to speculation on the truth.  
So either we do something, or we meditate. It does not concern me that some, engaging us too 
much in trivial quibbles, deny that speculation is a way of life. For they say that the term “life” 
implies some movement, but speculation should be performed in repose rather than in motion. 
This I cannot deny, particularly since it is written in the book of Wisdom that “entering into my 
house I will rest with her”. But who cannot see that, even if we must be free from external motion 
while we are devoted to the investigation of things, it nevertheless cannot be performed without 
some type of movement? So we can abandon this objection, because we do not investigate the life 
of other living creatures but that of humans, which is either devoted to doing things or to the 
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cognition of the truth, and in either case in such a way that, if it is done with right reason, we are 
doing something that is pleasing to immortal God and we are greatly benefitting the human race. 
This is established by the firm consensus of all amongst the ancient poets, who acted as theologians 
in the ancient religion, and all amongst our own theologians. To pass over the rest, doesn’t Virgil, 
when he proposes certain eternal rewards to the dead, bring forth the words “those who improved 
life through discovered skills”? So he praises those who invented various disciplines and sciences by 
daily investigation, or those who have contributed no little improvement to things which others had 
already invented. But in order that the other type of life is not left unhonoured, he proceeds with 
good deeds thus: “Here are the dead, who suffered wounds fighting for their country, and those 
who were unblemished priests while their life remained, and blessed poets, worthy of Phoebus’s 
words”. This pertains to Christians. It has been placed in the open in such a way that it does not 
need proof. For we see speculation represented both in the oldest writings of the Hebrews, under 
the name of Rachel, and in those which sprung from Christ, under the name of Mary. On the other 
hand, we see action represented in the former through Leah, in the latter through Martha. So each 
way of life is ours, such that we bestow with much praise the lives of those people who excelled in 
either one or the other. 
But since all things are distinguished from one another by their greatest end, who does not see 
that, just as we intend the right and fair in acting, so too are all intellectual investigations devoted to 
the truth? The latter, ascending many steps in their order, gradually climbs all the way to the 
contemplation of the incorporeal and divine essence of God Himself. For, although they are few in 
number, we nevertheless see some who, reminded by certain shadows and images of the things 
which fall in our senses, were ardently inflamed by love of the divine. Having abandoned all duties 
and active occupations, and hitherto having only perceived material bodies with the senses and the 
likenesses of these bodies with the imagination, they contemplate these things in succession: the 
nature of bodies with the reason itself; spirits which are incorporeal, but nevertheless created, with 
the intellect; and, finally, that which is uncreated with the intelligence. A wonderful progression 
through which our soul, gradually removing itself from the troublesome prison of the body and 
being raised to higher things by those increments which we have mentioned, ascends from the 
lowest dregs of matter all the way to the summit of divinity. So we can in fact infer a general 
argument if we say that the purpose of contemplation is to be devoted to truth, because the human 
mind is perfected and completed by this truth.  
Perhaps you will say: will it be any kind of truth? Indeed it will, and especially if we devote 
ourselves to the contemplation of God. Our intellectual investigation aims for God as the ultimate 
goal of its progress. All actions and human thoughts arrive at God. When you have reached Him 
there is nothing beyond to which you can progress. For there you will comprehend that ultimate 
and final highest good, which all desire by natural impulse. A few, having dispersed the mists of 
error and ignorance, understand that which not only the Christians proclaim, but the Aristotelians 
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understood long before the birth of Christ, and the Platonists long before any others. The divine 
Plato thinks that our souls have sunk from the lap of God into this extreme filth, or, rather, were 
taken down to adorn this lowest part of the world. They remain stunned for some time by the fall 
from such heights, and stupified, as if drunk, by the confusion of the matter which they entered, 
until gradually their inherent divinity awakens some remembrance in them, though it returns 
obscured. Inspired by this supreme love of divine things, the soul strives to recognise them in 
justice and religion, as if supported by two wings. It raises itself to the heights and, as far as the 
keenness of the soul endures the deadening contagion of the body, it contemplates the light of 
God, and not without the highest pleasure. But when our souls are stripped of all mortality and are 
returned to their simple nature, it will finally be possible not only to appease, but to thoroughly 
quench, the long-lasting thirst of knowing God.  
But I return to the human being – that is, to an living creature which, since it consists in a soul 
and a body, is able to overcome the weakness of the body in some measure with the durability of 
the soul. Separating the mind from the senses, elevated with its wisdom, and instructed in all the 
learning of the things I mentioned a little earlier, the human being is gradually guided upwards by 
this understanding, where eventually it is nourished by ambrosia and nectar. When Plato says this, 
what else do I understand that it enjoys apart from the cognition of God and the pleasure which is 
experienced through this cognition? For although the cognition of God is best achieved through 
the virtues of the mind – for intelligence perceives the principles of things, scientific knowledge the 
processes and the effects resulting from these principles and, finally, wisdom tells one from the 
other –, we will nevertheless be attempting these things in vain if we are not free from all mental 
disturbances. How will those enticed by carnal pleasures, or captured by avarice, or inflated by 
ambition be able to think about anything higher? So it is also thought that the virtues of life and 
morals, by which our minds are expunged of all squalor of vice, must be exercised, and exercised in 
such a way that we begin our ascent with them. For if, as in Plato, it is a sin to touch the pure with 
the impure, if in the Evangelist, “blessed are the pure in heart, since they themselves will see God”, 
then it will surely be futile for us to attempt this intellectual investigation unless we bring to it a 
mind that is cleansed of all stain. Virtue is “fleeing vice, and the beginning of wisdom is to have 
abandoned stupidity”. Horace is quite correct in saying these words, and indeed he saw the same 
thing that, many centuries before, the poet and prophet David expressed in his illustrious psalm. 
For he mentions someone who asks: “who will go up to the mountain of the Lord, or who will 
stand in his holy place?” To which he immediately replies: “the innocent in hands and the pure in 
heart”. So he who restrains not only his hand but also his mind from vice will be suitable to ascend 
the mountain of the Lord. For there is the unmoving rest which alone can make us blessed: not in 
the ascent, but when you reach the summit by ascending. So rest is not given unless you first strive, 
and you will not rest comfortably on the flat crest of the mountain, from where we can see all, 
unless you have first reached the summit by climbing through steep cliffs.’ 
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‘Now I see what you mean,’ said Lorenzo, ‘and I notice that you do not in any way situate the 
highest good in the actions which are regulated by the virtues of life and morals. Perhaps you will 
be clearer on this a little later. In the meantime, since we depend on the power of speculation, I am 
very desirous that – unless perhaps you think otherwise – you explain to me what you think about 
the matter in its entirety. For I see no little doubt amongst the learned whether it should be better 
placed in the mind or in the will.’ 
‘There is indeed so much controversy amongst them,’ said Battista, ‘and so much discord, that 
they are led into the most serious disagreement and often, having declared war, enter into pitched 
battle on the subject. They eventually separate with the result of the conflict so doubtful that it is 
not easy to see who has been victorious. Each position presents itself with an argument that seems 
reasonable. If we set the truth as the aim of speculation, who is unaware that the truth belongs to 
the intellect alone? So those who knew Hebrew interpreted Rachel, whom they regarded as the 
symbol of speculation, as the “vision of the beginning”. On the other hand, since those who 
speculate direct themselves towards the knowledge of the truth with all their strength, and since all 
the striving which is aroused in us originates in the will, speculation does not now seem to be 
situated in the mind, but in the will. But there are those who endeavour to break up such a great 
quarrel and to resolve the dispute, as if they were honorary judges. And certainly, if you look at the 
essence of the action itself, then without any doubt you refer to the intellect, but if you consider 
more diligently what moves it to action, then you must think it to refer to the will. The will does not 
only move the other powers of the soul, but also the mind itself. For we are inflamed towards a 
knowledge of the truth by the appetite that obeys reason, which all philosophers call the will. It 
does not matter if it happens through the desire to know or if the pleasure which is experienced by 
knowing draws it out in the same way. From here originates thought; from here meditation is 
initiated. From here we contemplate, from here we admire, from here we eventually speculate with 
great attentiveness. All these things are directed to the same end, but I will explain more carefully 
what each one means.  
The mind thinks when it collects multiplicity in one, so that, having removed what is 
superfluous as false, it finally chooses the truth. When multiplicity offers itself from everywhere and 
draws the soul in different directions because of the similarity of its elements, the sage must 
discover the remedy for this kind of evil. So first he gathers together the different things in a heap, 
as it were, and then, having gradually set aside what he has refuted through ratiocination, leaves 
only that which he discerns to be the truth because it cannot be refuted. You see, therefore, that 
because these things are forced [cogantur] into a unity, this action of the mind should called thought 
[cogitatio]. For the same reason we say “to think” [putare] because to think is to purge. From this 
comes “to prune” [putare] trees, which are restored to purity by the removal of superfluities, and 
pure [putus] gold – that is, gold which has been purged. From this also comes to dispute [disputare], 
when we adopt a kind of oration in which pure and clear terms are set out in order that nothing is 
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expressed which is confused or obscure. But, to return to the point, we will say that thought 
consists in the examination of many things.  
In meditation we understand an advancement of reason which has proceeded from the 
principles which relate the speculation of the truth, and in which there is a certain form of exercise. 
For one who meditates dashes, like a runner, from the starting-place of the principles all the way to 
the finishing line of the concluding arguments. That this word means “exercise” amongst the Latins 
is attested by Virgil. For he says “[Juno] devised [meditata] a pest for the Inachian heifer”, and 
Juvenal also says “Fuscus planned [meditatus] battles in his marble villa”. We see that the word is 
derived from the Greek, because they also attribute the same meaning to μελεταν.  
I see that we define contemplation as a sharp-sighted and firm intuition of soul in the cognition 
of the truth. If you ask the origin of the term, it should not escape you that the ancient Latins said 
the temple was a space in the heavens, which augurs designated for augury with a wand and from 
which they did not turn their gaze until it had been entered by a bird. So, from this very firm gaze 
on the temple [templum], we say that those who contemplate [contemplare] are intently affixed on the 
matter to be investigated. 
Admiration – in order that we now may pass to this – is said to be a stupor which originates 
from the perception of that which excels our faculties. For admiration is usually a companion of the 
kind of intellectual investigation with which we grasp what has hitherto differed vehemently from 
our own view. But enough on this. 
If you listen to the divine Augustine, you will know that “to speculate” [speculare] is derived from 
“mirror” [speculum]. Those who desire to know the truth happen to observe a certain simulacrum of 
truth in those effects which proceed from causes, just as we observe the images of bodies in a 
mirror. So much for the words.  
Although we call the motion of speculating an action, I do not want you to think that these 
words seem to contradict those who do not place speculation in movement but in rest. We certainly 
say that speculation is a motion, but only in the sense that one talks of motion as an act of a thing 
that is already absolute and perfect. For since our minds find their way by attaining the things which 
can be perceived by the mind alone through the things which are perceived by the senses, but the 
actions of the senses are not without motion, it was also acceptable to use the term motion for the 
actions of the mind which we reach through the actions of the senses. I could relate many things on 
motion here, especially those things which are said very perceptively by Dionysius and the many 
Christian theologians who followed him. But perhaps you do not desire them, so we can move 
onto other things.’ 
‘On the contrary, I would like to hear them above all,’ said Lorenzo, ‘for what can be imparted 




‘I shall follow your desire,’ said Battista. ‘And since we must talk about such motion, I see that 
there is a threefold motion attributed to our souls: straight, circular and – derived from the other 
two – oblique. The motion is straight in us when, in the actions pertaining to the mind, we proceed 
from one thing into the other. If we are moved in such a way that the form of moving is unique 
and the same and simple, that the motion is called circular, and it is the nature of a circle that the 
distance around the centre always remains constant as it is moved. If this motion is mixed with 
something that also proceeds in different directions, it will no longer be circular movement but 
oblique movement, because it degenerates from its former state. So although bodily motions, which 
originate from the external things that affect the mind, disrupt the silence of speculation, not only 
do the motions which I just discussed not disrupt the mind, but they greatly augment it. But you 
may say, are these movements of our souls the same as those movements of separate essences, 
which we call angels, the ancients now called demons, and now called gods? No. For we said that 
the correct motion in the human soul is when we progress from those things which strike the 
senses externally to those which are perceived by the mind alone. An angel does not reach the truth 
in its mind from a multiplicity of composite elements, nor, on the other hand, because it proceeds 
gradually by ratiocination, but whatever it does it does through an entirely simple intuition, so to 
speak. It constantly contemplates God, and always in the same way, without any beginning, without 
any end, as long as it exists. In this way, the circle is always moved around the centre. So, the angel 
does not know God by a straight motion like a human being, but by a circular motion, because 
human souls cannot proceed in a circular fashion from the beginning. Nor will human souls arrive 
at a point where they engage themselves in the same form of motion forever, until both straight 
motion and the motion which progresses by ratiocination entirely cease. When these movements 
have finally stopped, our souls fix themselves on the cognition of divine things with an immobile 
gaze in order that they will be agitated by no other motion. In this there is no error, and in this way 
we do not err in our cognition of principles, because we know them by simple intuition. So when 
we are moved in this way we are made equal with the angels, and we are at rest from the two other 
types of motion. But you say: doesn’t Dionysius attribute these types of motion to the angels too? 
Indeed he does, but in a particular way. For straight motion in an angel is not that in which it 
progresses from one thing to another by ratiocination, but that in which, according to its place in 
the providential order, what is superior illuminates its inferiors with its light. With the straight 
motion we progress first to the things which surround us, and then we ascend from the external 
things which strike the senses to the incorporeal things perceived by our mind. But nor do we 
correspond with the angels in oblique motion, for in the angels the purpose of the oblique motion 
is to reflect upon what is inferior according to the principles of their speculation on divine things. 
But I will talk about the angels some other time. What is truly relevant to us is that if we progress 
from those things which strike the senses to those which are perceived by the mind with the 
guidance of our innate reason, we are carried by straight motion, but if the divine light also shines 
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upon us, we are no longer moved by the straight motion, but by the oblique. For no-one disputes 
that the circular motion alone is characterised by immobility, so to speak. Likewise, there are those 
who say that souls are moved to the heavenly or to the infernal when we proceed from the genus to 
the forms, or vice-versa. In a similar fashion, they say there is a movement to the right and to the 
left if we proceed from one thing to its opposite. Finally, we are moved to the front or to the back, 
when we proceed from a cause to its effects or, on the other hand, from the effects to the cause. 
These, for the most part, are the things said about the way of life which is devoted to the 
investigation of the truth. But the life which is devoted to action will indeed be something eminent 
and truly worthy for a human being if it is assumed by a man in whom a sharp-sighted intelligence 
and mature counsel is evident, and whose mind is guarded against all dangers, who lives with 
restraint in the face of pleasure, and who does not reflect on anything other than in a just and pious 
way. For, since we were not only born for ourselves, but also much more so that we shall serve in 
human society, with what praise do we adorn someone who devotes himself to family and domestic 
matters in such a way that everything necessary for living and culture is present in abundance, 
within modest limits, so that the children and others whom he has in tutelage are educated liberally 
and are cultivated in all humanities, and such a way that patrimony grows with the highest care and 
diligence, with any suspicion of avarice far removed? This is someone who, besides those he is 
obliged to support, also uses his wealth to help others, and privately practises liberality to citizens 
and hospitality to strangers, and can benefit public utility either through the magnificence of his 
works and the splendour of his gifts, or through the collection of his taxes. When he applies 
himself to the administration of the republic he is cultivated in every type of virtue and adorned 
with every eloquence, in such a way that he always holds beneficial and honourable opinions 
concerning public affairs and he persuades others to share the opinions he holds with eloquence 
and abundance of speech. He is one who dreads neither the power of enemies, nor the rage of 
seditious citizens, but defends against the attacks of others with all powers of the mind and the 
body, thwarting their disloyal and angry attempts with the greatest independence. Finally, he is one 
who concerns himself with cultivating religion, preserving justice and fairness, and restraining the 
whole citizenry within the limits of modesty. He does not spare any efforts, any dangers, nor even 
his own life to achieve these things. So he who conquers like this, he who acts like this, don’t we 
say that he has performed the duty of a human being and should be merited best of the human 
race? On this point, I am amazed at those who ask uncertainly if anyone can properly administer 
these things without the virtues of life and morals. Without these virtues, what right action is left in 
us, or what action which is entirely our own and not instead held in common with beasts? For 
when we seek a rationale for acting, what else do we seek apart from what the necessary actions are 
for a person to conduct a social life? If these are not actions performed with justice, with fortitude, 
and with temperance, I do not know what they could be. But the reasoning is the same for 
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prudence, for unless, like the best directress, it sits at the beam and guides the course of life into a 
safe and tranquil port, we must sink amidst waves and tempests of confusion.  
On the other hand, I must venture to say this: no one who is thoroughly lacking in learning will 
properly administer either himself and his house or the state. For how can I know what the highest 
good of humanity is or how it might be acquired if I am ignorant of both the nature of humanity 
and the nature of things? Does someone who never touches upon the understanding of divine 
things practice religion correctly? Anyone who wishes to preside over public affairs should not be 
ignorant of such matters. I acknowledge, however, that it is difficult for the man who is occupied 
by constant business of both a private and public nature to have a wholly exact understanding of 
them. I am not ignorant of the fact that this is why Leah, who stands as the symbol of action in the 
writings of the Hebrews, was said to be short-sighted but fertile, because while she was distracted 
by many things around her she could not raise her thoughts aloft. But because she treated others 
well, many were indebted to her through her kindness as if they were her children.  
So you see that the life which is devoted to action should not be condemned. For it corresponds 
entirely to human nature, and through its industry and its efforts the human race unites itself with a 
delightful bond and works in order to foster justice and religion. But since our mind, through which 
alone we are human, is not located in mortal action but is perfected by immortal cognition – in 
which the highest good, to which all things are drawn and for the sake of which all things happen, 
is sought for its own sake – who does not see that speculation should be preferred by far?’ 
When Battista had said these things in roughly this way he sat silent for a while, gazing with eyes 
fixed on the same spot, like someone who had been turning over in his mind more things than he 
could express in words. We who were present had been seized with such great amazement by the 
man’s extensive learning that we were repeating amongst ourselves what we had heard so far rather 
than asking anything else. 
But Lorenzo, being of a very sharp mind and desirous of knowing everything, eventually broke 
our silence and followed the speech of Battista thus, not so that he could show off, but so that, by 
opposing it with his own words, he might ascertain more clearly the opinion of Battista on the 
subject: ‘Given the modesty that my age advises me to show, and the sense which even a little 
prudence can provide, it would seem that I should agree with what you said on account of the 
approval of such eminent men alone. I think, though, that it is conducive to the glory of your 
speculation that all understand she has emerged victorious from this battle after having triumphed 
over an adversary who refused her a bloodless victory. And indeed, when I consider our nature, as 
far as my powers of thinking are able, it does not seem that the arrays of arguments which civic 
action leads into battle should be disregarded. Foremost among them is this. When we investigate 
human life, I do not think that there is anyone with such a boorish intellect that they think we 
should conceive in our minds either a soul separated from the body or, on the other hand, a body 
abandoned by the soul. Just as when we say “a biga” we do not just mean one of those horses 
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which pull the chariot when collared together, but both at the same time, so too when we think of a 
human being do we imagine a unity which consists of both the mind and the body. If you allow me 
this, I must therefore convince myself that the preferred way of life is that which serves and 
perfects not either one of them, but both. Ethical living, which is perfected by civic action, is 
demonstrated to be the superior way of life, because the virtues of life and morals to which civic 
actions are directed serve both the body and the mind as a whole at the same time. For when the 
health and vigour of all limbs and the integrity of the senses are preserved by these virtues, then the 
unpolluted soul is guarded from every stain of the vices. So action, which maintains the 
investigation of the truth (which itself is devoted to caring for the mind alone in such a way that it 
neglects the care of other things), must be placed first. 
Who shall not see that nature, the great mother, produced us to celebrate meetings and unions, 
and to conserve common society? There is no way we can fulfil this task unless we establish a 
community. Why else did all Greece exalt Socrates to heaven with immortal praise other than 
because he first called down philosophy from heaven to earth and introduced it to the cities? When 
we say this, what else do we mean other than that this most pure man saw with his divine wisdom 
that it is much more advantageous for the human race to spend life in safety and tranquility if, 
having set aside the troublesome understanding of divine matters and arcane things of nature which 
are entirely obscured, people were taught those principles by which our purified actions do not just 
administer ourselves and matters of the family but also – in a much higher degree – the whole 
state? If we want to recall our origin, if we want to consider for what reason above all we were 
born, we should understand that from the outset we were sent by God into this lowest region of 
the world as though on a long and difficult expedition. He sent us so that, fighting bravely against 
many difficulties, we might overcome the two fiercest enemies, pain and pleasure, and having 
conquered them we might enjoy perpetual peace. Since everyone is inspired towards the just and 
the honest, with nature as their guide, you will not easily find a dissolute man who has not been led 
astray either by the fear of suffering or the hope of pleasure. What else do the desire of ruling and 
the desire of possessing – two evils which impel mortals to every abominable crime! – want for 
themselves apart from that they avoid every inconvenience, enjoy every pleasure? So since, having 
been recruited in this army, we are led daily into a battle in which we have to struggle for life and 
blood (that is, for the salvation of our souls), is it not the case that anyone who abandons their 
place in it and, having betrayed their companions, secretly retreats from the battle into the camp, 
should be regarded as a deserter? For I beseech you, since we are collected among the same 
citizenry, since we repel hostile attacks in the same walls and with the same arms, since by common 
agreement we establish the laws through which we will live justly, and will be inspired to guard 
against every attack on our dignity, and will not exceed the prescribed limits of moderation, must 
we not strive for each of these things with the all our strength, so that this civic life is free from 
every evil and embraces every virtue, and is not in fear of any pain or danger, nor weakened by any 
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pleasure? But if, on the other hand, there is someone who neglects these things, wasting away in 
leisure, doesn’t he seem to forsake a gift granted to him by God? 
In order that the difference between your leisurely contemplator and my active citizen is now 
demonstrated more clearly than the sun, let us imagine a city constructed before us in which every 
type of building – public and private, sacred and profane – is present in abundance and 
magnificence. Inside there is a very wise man, who decides to fill it with inhabitants who will yield a 
citizenry wealthy in every way. Just as in an animated body, no part should be present which does 
not serve the whole, and the wise man sitting at the gates will admit no one as a citizen before he 
examines each person who desires to enter with the greatest diligence, and understands entirely 
what benefit each of them will bring to the state through their prudence or skill. And so some will 
answer that they are wise legislators, others prudent counsellors, others powerful orators, others 
just judges. There will likewise be those who proffer their medical skill, those who promise to 
interpret the ambiguities of civil law, those who will be employed as soldiers. Architects will be 
present, sculptors, moulders, and artists will be present, ironmongers and joiners of wood. Besides 
these professions which, being exercised with intelligence and industry, are worthy of a free human 
being, various activities are also required so that the multitude which has been collected can not 
only live rightly, but also safely and comfortably. Merchants who work with money will therefore 
offer themselves too, who, by exporting our own goods and importing foreign ones, ensure that the 
populace is furnished with everything and is rich in financial terms. Those who make clothes from 
different wools will be present, those who dye the finished clothes in various colours, so that we 
can use them not only to ward off the cold and the heat, but to afford us some decoration and 
dignity. I will pass over those of lower status and mercenaries, whom we pay for their labour rather 
than their skill. I will pass over weavers, fullers, beltmakers, sowers of clothes and shoes, and many 
others of the same kind. And in order that I do not descend into the market, I will omit the 
vegetable-growers, dealers in salted fish, bakers, cooks, poulterers, butchers, fishermen, whom 
Terence’s Gnato boasts “to have helped in wealth and poverty”. So after the wise man, whose 
authority grants people citizenship, has admired both the intelligence and skill of those I listed at 
the beginning and has recognised the necessary work and labour of those I have just mentioned, he 
will finally admit them all, and will urge each person diligently to undertake the business they had 
just declared.  
If your wise man appears leisurely and sluggish amongst these people and, secluding himself 
alone at home in his library, never leaves, mixes with nobody, greets no one, and performs no task 
either publicly or privately, then what do we say that his part in the republic should be? What 
example to human life will he offer? Where shall we put him? For what should we use him? Will 
there be anyone who thinks that he is to be counted as human? He certainly will not be, but instead 
all will despise him as a lazy drone come to another’s honey. “I seek rest,” he says, “and I speculate 
on the power of nature in the highest leisure, and I seek to discover the truth in everything”. 
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“Indeed you are happy,” one would reply, “but beware lest you forget your nature, you who look 
after yourself alone such that you do not harbour any concern for others at all. Allow me to ask 
what I want to know. If you set sail in a fleet with a mind to engage the enemy and you do not sit as 
a captain at the helm, nor do you row the oars of the ship, nor, running to the bridge, do you tell 
those about to act what they must do about taking advantage of a side wind or about managing the 
sail-yards or sails, nor do you obey those ordering you, nor, when you are about to fight the enemy, 
do you stand equipped with arms, you will only act as a burden to the ship and, otiose, you will 
occupy a place in it where someone else would provide some benefit. If, I say, you set sail on a ship 
with a plan that involves you not wanting to help it either by effort or by strategy, wouldn’t those 
who outrank you on the ship consider you useless and fit to be thrown into the sea, and perhaps, if 
they were a little more strict, actually throw you in? Or maybe you think a republic has less need of 
the public-spirited than a ship? When grave and unremitting dangers threaten it everywhere, and it 
is constantly attacked with weapons and deception by the ambition and avarice of many princes and 
peoples, or it is disturbed by a faction of seditious citizens? Is there anyone who does not know 
that the state is most similar to a living creature, in which each of its members performs its function 
in total harmony? The heart produces from itself the spirit which gives life to a living creature. As 
far as nutrients are concerned, the stomach certainly provides some, but the liver provides many. 
What an animal senses depends on the brain, what it breathes depends on the lungs. In order that I 
do not spend any more time on the remaining parts which are hidden and less well-known by us, let 
us look at the external ones: feet carry; hands manipulate; eyes see; ears hear. A unity is formed 
from all these things just as a harmony is created from different voices in common, through which 
the living creature drives away the things which are abhorrent to it and receives the pleasing and 
beneficial. If the feet were to refuse to carry the weight of the entire body, or the eyes decline to see 
those things which contribute to the health of the whole, or the nostrils neglect to take account of 
odours, or taste not discriminate between the healthy and the unhealthy, how do you think that 
living creature would take care of itself, and how long would it endure?  
Add this, which is even more important: those who are devoted to speculation abandon the 
duties of the republic, and they are the same people who surpass the others in intelligence and 
judgment. It is inevitable that great harm is inflicted upon the state in such circumstances, because 
when the state is deserted by those who are wiser, it is left to the less prudent. Let us take the Greek 
army as an example. No great shift toward a Trojan victory would be occasioned if Thersites had 
abandoned his place in battle, because even if he were to fight with all his might he could inspire no 
great terror in the enemy. If, on the other hand, strong Achilles were to retire to his tent, wrathful 
against Agamemnon, the Greeks could easily have been turned in flight, for he who can be of much 
benefit when present will harm the most with his absence. It is the same with respect to a republic. 
If one who surpasses the others in intelligence and prudence relinquishes its guidance, then it is 
unavoidable that the state will be administered by those who are dimmer, with harmful 
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consequences”. “But,” says our speculator here, “I do this in order that, by speculating on the 
nature of things, I might learn what leads to human salvation, so that I can teach how states should 
be established and with which laws they should be regulated, and I can show what kind of people 
should be princes, by whom the magistrates should be appointed, by what penalties each crime 
should be punished, and with what honours the good should be dignified.”  
I admire this man as blessed and I praise him enthusiastically because he accumulates such 
treasures. But, on the other hand, when I realise that he keeps them hidden, and I do not see him 
devoting such riches to the liberty of others, I compare him to a very wealthy man who, secretly 
keeping his riches from all and burying them in the ground, does not benefit either himself or 
anyone else. It is as if someone ensures that he has the swiftest and toughest body and then does 
not take part in any race or competition. By immortal God, what benefit is there in possessing 
medicine unless we devote it to the health of the many? What benefit would Phidias have given us 
with his art if he had not sculpted it in ivory or gold? We hear that Numa Pompilius, the second 
ruler of Rome, was a wise man. And I see his wisdom, for he guided the people committed to his 
trust away from ferocity and excessive bellicosity into peace and leisure and the cultivation of 
justice and religion, and brought it about that those who were unable to defend themselves against 
their neighbours with arms and horses a short while earlier were safeguarded under the authority of 
one man. I pass over Brutus and Publicola concerning the beginning of liberty. I pass over Camillus 
who, in the times that followed, returned Roman power to its former dignity when it had been cast 
down to the depths from its former height. I say nothing about the Catos, the Laelii, the Scipios, all 
of whom we accept to have been educated men. I say nothing on the other innumerable men who, 
if they had not governed the republic with no less wisdom than courage but had devoted 
themselves to contemplation alone, would not have been of great value while alive, nor would their 
names live on in death even now after so many centuries. 
We have in our time Federico da Montefeltro, Prince of Urbino, who I do not doubt should be 
compared with the greatest commanders of a superior age. The virtues of this most distinguished 
man are many, and wholly admirable: an intellect that is sharp and enthusiastic for everything, and 
so much zeal for literature that there is no period of rest from his affairs in which he does not apply 
himself to leisurely learning. He achieves much by reading, much by listening, a great deal by 
debating, so that he is rightly thought to be amongst the most learned men. But force him to 
devote himself wholly to these speculations in such a way that he entirely neglects both his realm, 
which he administers so that it is peaceful and flourishing, and the military matters in which, 
without debate, he surpasses the leaders of his age and contends with all in antiquity? To what sort 
of person will he be reduced, having been such a great man? 
I return to the ancients. Hercules was a wise man, but he was not wise for himself. Instead his 
wisdom benefitted nearly all mortals. For, wandering the greatest part of the world, he killed fearful 
beasts, vanquished huge and destructive monsters, restrained the cruelest tyrants, and restored law 
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and liberty to many people and nations. If he had devoted such great labour to leisurely wisdom 
while lingering at the home of his tutor Atlas we would have a sophist for Hercules, and no one 
would venture to say that of the son of Jove, because Jupiter himself (if we understand him as the 
world-soul from the thought of the Platonists) never ceases. If he were to cease, everything which is 
agitated in constant motion would cease: for the heavens would not bear themselves around with 
constant movement; none of the stars would rise and set; the very elements would not be agitated 
in reciprocal transformation with each other; the rivers would not flow; the earth would not bear 
anything; time would never change; the Fates would no longer draw their lots; the Muses would not 
sing. 
But I return to humans. You see the men through whom the reputation of the Christians grew, 
how many they were, how numerous, how replete in learning. But out of those leaders whose effort 
and judgment established our Church, who can you show me that devoted themselves to learning 
in such a way that they did not engage in the practical business of life? In order that I might pass 
over the rest for brevity’s sake, in how much regard do you hold the apostle Paul? How many do 
you esteem whom you might compare to him? You observe the character of his speech. I do not 
think that one could imagine anything clearer than it, or more perceptive in teaching, or more 
effective in stimulation. For, concerning the instruction of humanity, what need is there either for 
my testimony or anyone else’s when, out of all people, one alone is rightly called “teacher of 
nations” by the steadfast consensus of all who are and were – he who ascended all the way to the 
third heaven through speculation, and who saw and understood that which is not permitted to be 
imparted to human beings? Did this man proceed to meditate, closing himself up in his cell such 
that he neglected the salvation of others? Read, I ask, what this most modest man writes about 
himself and what many similarly holy men relate about him: how many journeys, how many 
voyages he undertook in spite of his health; into how many dangers, into how many calamities he 
fell, so that he might lead Peter’s little boat, nearly sunk by the most terrible waves and dashed on 
the sharpest rocks, back to port in safety and tranquility. I recount one example out of many. But 
remember that we can count numerous learned men amongst the Latins, amongst the Greeks, all of 
whom we see to have freely burdened themselves with offices beyond those conferred on them, 
not for the sake of ambition, but through an ardent love for others. What else do I believe they 
wanted, apart from to benefit as many as possible by counselling wisely, by advising calmly, by 
reprimanding fiercely, and finally by helping many with work and deed? And is it not the case that 
they did not, like the servant [in Matthew 25], want to conceal unprofitably what they had expended 
much sweat and effort to learn, but instead to bring it forth for the use of others? 
But why do I persist for so long with these arguments when we always see active people 
preferred to the leisurely in the most steadfast consensus of all nations? Read, I ask, the 
constitutions of different states. You will always see that the greatest prizes and most prestigious 
honours are not granted to the leisurely, but to the active. There were triumphs devoted to the 
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greatest glory, there were trophies, there were ovations. Various garlands were invented, various 
titles devised. We see statues erected to many excellent men, and not only humble citizens, but also 
knights and officials. We see tombs superbly constructed, fields donated at the public expense, so 
that with such monuments men who were illustrious and well-merited by the state were rendered 
immortal. If you bring these things to mind from every age of antiquity, you will find it very rare 
indeed that those honoured with such prizes are among the leisurely, but it will be difficult for you 
to count the crowd of the civically-inclined. So why is this? No doubt it is so that you can 
understand from the example of the wisest and most just leaders, who have governed their 
republics with the best practices and laws, that the kind of people who better obey unerring nature 
are more loved. And in order that you understand how much power truth has: those same people 
who prefer leisurely learning to civic action much more often proclaim the praise of the emperor in 
their writings than that of the philosopher. For although the knowledge of great things – which I 
have always valued, as far as is suitable – pleases them a great deal, nonetheless the voice of nature, 
which all are compelled to obey, sometimes warns them to acknowledge what they often avoid 
entirely in their discussions, in which they are too boastful. 
But I see that I tarry longer than necessary on things which are very clear, particularly since the 
whole truth can be demonstrated by a single instruction from He who produced us out of nothing, 
He who restored those he had produced to life when we had fallen into death through rashness, by 
the single instruction, I say, of the highest God. Isn’t the instruction from God that “you love your 
neighbour as yourself”? But I do not see what could be more of a neighbour to you than the 
republic itself. How do you love your neighbour as yourself, if you do not lead him back when he is 
erring in his path, if you do not offer the right advice when he asks you in uncertain circumstances, 
if you do not offer your help right away when he asks you amidst the greatest disorder and danger? 
Your neighbour needs the citizen who will prudently and justly administer as a magistrate, he needs 
the captain, he needs the soldier. So how can you say that you love your neighbour as you should, 
unless you always help him with such diligence that you do not only endure all difficulties with a 
calm mind, but you also endure extreme danger and, if the situation demands it, you even go 
fearless into death? But what else? Since all who were ever philosophers are resolved that we were 
born for the social and communal life, anyone who is not a citizen should not be called human, nor 
should anyone be called a citizen who neglects the care of that state in which they are born. 
So these are the things I thought I ought to say about the civil life, presented in the declamatory 
manner in which I am used to exercising myself in the Landino’s presence rather than in 
philosophical argument. For it is much better that I draw out your most profound judgment on this 
matter in oratorical disputation than I set forth my own stance. If I have abused your patience by 
making you listen to me for a longer time than both your dignity and my respect for you demand, I 
hope you will forgive my ardent desire for knowledge. Since I am inflamed with an exceeding zeal 
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to learn, and it is very rare for me to be given the opportunity to address and question you, I ask 
you to be indulgent if I have tired you more than is suitable.’  
When Lorenzo had said these things, a great astonishment invaded the minds of all those who 
were present. Even though signs of brilliance had manifested themselves in the youth for a long 
time, so that everyone had already perceived great things in him, they nonetheless thought that so 
great a richness of improvised eloquence, such decisive arguments, and such varied examples would 
warrant no small praise even in someone of a more mature age. 
But Leon Battista, since he greatly adored all studious types by nature, valued Lorenzo’s genius 
paternally and singularly. ‘For a long time,’ he said, ‘I have listened to you attentively and not 
without great pleasure. For I see that you have not only embraced all the virtues of civic life, which 
can itself be seen as worthy of the highest admiration in such tender years, but you have also 
already turned your mind to things which are more divine. It quickly becomes clear that everything 
you have said just now in favour of the civic life has all been directed to this purpose: that you 
might induce me to corroborate those arguments in which the investigation of the truth is placed 
above action. This can, if I am not mistaken, be performed without much effort. 
The nobility of the subject displays itself to one reflecting on it even a little, considering that, 
since you learn the truth by speculation and intellectual inquiry, everything else to which the divinity 
of our mind could apply itself seems almost shameful. For when one observes human nature more 
closely, who doesn’t see that there is nothing more excellent in us than the mind? But it is not the 
mind’s task to act, but to speculate, and in particular to speculate on those things which consist in 
themselves alone and are perceived with no intermediary sense. So, since the investigation of the 
truth involves the part of us which is the most divine – because it devotes itself to entirely 
incorporeal things which do not fall into sense-perception –, shouldn’t it be preferred to activity?  
Add to this that, if we are lead by the duties of life to the highest good as if by a road, something 
which proceeds by some eternal sequence and which is not disjoined by any break would seem 
without doubt to surpass those things which are in the opposite state. But in meditation on great 
things we commit ourselves on a constant course, while in activity we are drawn in different 
directions to many things that are different among themselves at almost the same point in time. So, 
while Martha is disturbed by many things, Mary sits constantly with the Lord. Moreover, wherever 
a greater pleasure of the soul is experienced it should be preferred to that which affords lesser 
pleasure. The investigation of truth provides this for us. Mary feasts, but Martha is distracted by the 
many things around her. Nor do I want to pass over another point. For who does not see that 
something which is desired for its own sake should always be valued more than that which we do 
not want for its own sake but because of something else? I can show that speculation is desired for 
its own sake in both your opinion and that of all learned men, and I will easily prove what everyone 
believes of their own accord through the authority of the psalm. “For one thing,” the psalmist says, 
“have I desired of the Lord, that I will seek after”. Then he pronounces what he sought, for he 
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adds: “that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the will of the 
Lord”. Add to these words that we speculate in leisure and in rest. So, quite rightly the psalmist 
says: “Be still and see, because I am God”. But we do not engage in activity without noise and 
disruption. For Mary sits in leisure; Martha goes around preparing everything. Nor is this surprising, 
because the latter does not detach herself from matter, in which everything is disrupted and moves 
about in various waves of disturbances, but the former, with fixed eyes, always observes the divine, 
which never comes into contact with any disturbance. Mary performs her function with the mind 
alone, which is immortal and susceptible to no influence. Martha does nothing without the senses, 
which depend on the body and easily slip into corruption, and which we do not have in common 
with God but with the beasts. So the subject in hand is concluded most divinely by the divinity 
Himself: “Mary chose the best part, which will not be taken away from her”. He said the best, 
because you understand that action is also good but is nonetheless far surpassed. It is easy to show 
what is not taken from her. For if our souls, created by God, will be returned to God, and will find 
rest through contemplating Him, who does not understand that human activity will sooner or later 
cease and utterly pass away, but we will rest in the most joyful contemplation of God?  
But since these things are better expressed through dialectic than rhetoric, I can make more 
progress if I try another path. Since you were accusing as idle those who, having abandoned 
administration of republics, surrender themselves entirely to leisurely contemplation, let us pick 
someone from our city who lives like that and can defend their way of life well. Do we want Paolo 
Toscanelli, an excellent natural philosopher and mathematician whom your grandfather Cosimo 
loved a great deal, both for his admirable teaching and for a characteristic sweetness in speech and 
disputation?’ 
‘Yes, him indeed,’ said Lorenzo, ‘for, out of everyone I have known, he is alone among us as 
one who delights so much in the cognition of the loftiest things that its pursuit is the only thing 
which concerns him. There is nothing besides.’ 
‘So,’ said Battista, ‘born in Florence and having all the public affairs of our city in common with 
the remaining citizens, he is nonetheless devoted to the diligent questioning of the truth at home, 
fleeing all civil tumult and conflict. If, rejecting public duties, he were charged as a deserter of 
public welfare and dignity (so to speak), I think he might defend himself thus: “Men of Florence, I 
know very well that I inflict no harm upon you, because I lead a life separate from yours. For I do 
not appropriate for myself the riches of the treasury, nor those of any private citizen, whether by 
stealth or by force. Nor are my life and morals such that I bring any disgrace upon this city through 
which it would regret having produced me. Indeed, toward individuals I conduct myself neither 
rudely nor arrogantly nor greedily. There is no one who conducts himself with greater care for the 
laws and institutions through which the state can endure in good condition.  
I do not ignore, however, that the powers of the republic and the magistracy are valued greatly 
among the people and that the greatest honours come to those who discharge them, if they 
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administer them with the highest virtue. If it were otherwise, it would be inevitable that they were 
crushed by their disgrace. So Anaxagoras of Clazomenae wisely said that the ‘office reveals the 
man’. Those who are placed in an exalted and lofty position can hide neither their virtues nor their 
vices, and the more they deviate from the right path the more they are criticised. Because if 
someone tries to take on the administration of the state – whether led by false glory or moved by 
the highest love for the country – he should first consider and ponder for a long time the skill, or 
the tools suitable for that skill, with which he sets about so great an undertaking. Neither a painter 
nor a sculptor can complete a work properly unless first they know the technique very well and 
have all the instruments with which they can finish the work they have already conceived in their 
mind, lest they are either condemned by their ignorance or mocked when struggling with a lack of 
supplies. If anyone were to ask what qualities are necessary in someone to whom the state can be 
safely entrusted, I would respond without any hesitation that all the efforts he is about to undertake 
will be in vain unless knowledge of the truth is present. For just as the light by which we might 
observe all corporeal things offers itself to our eyes when we come into this life, so too, unless we 
stray completely from the right path, does the certain knowledge of things offer itself to our souls. 
Through this knowledge alone does not only the ultimate end (which everyone desires to reach) 
display itself to us, but we are also shown the shortest and easiest way which leads us there. If 
anyone strives to reach the end I have discussed having disregarded the light, he will lead as though 
blind, and those who follow him rush headlong into an abyss of all calamities, from which any hope 
of return inevitably perishes once they have been engulfed in it. I therefore think that this light, by 
which we understand our nature and those things which are fitting for it, should be valued far more 
than that which, coming forth from the sun, shows us the corporeal bodies subject to corruption. 
We will never attain the light of knowledge through sordid and vulgar conduct, nor will we attain it 
when addicted to pleasure, subject to avarice, or bound to ambition. But we will attain it when 
inflamed by an ardent love for the discovery of the truth, so I follow the guidance of reason in 
order that I may reach it, and I do not abandon the signs of nature itself. And there you have it as 
far as I am concerned. 
If you were to urge me on more zealously, I would appeal to any one of those who have applied 
themselves eagerly to intellectual investigation. They will not be afraid to declare that, on their own, 
they have benefitted the republic through that way of living far more than many of those you see 
exerting themselves daily in the forum and in the senate. And certainly, I will never agree that one 
who conserves a harbour or shipyards or walls or temples or a portico ‘conserves’ the republic for 
you. All of these, even if they are neither demolished by the fire or weapon of an enemy nor 
destroyed by an act of God, will waste away completely with the inevitable progression of time, 
than which nothing is more voracious. The sole defender and most faithful protectress is civic 
concord, which is established by the deeds accomplished by individuals being united in one whole, 
just as diverse voices coming from single strings in a lyre resound together in such a way that the 
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sweetest union of sounds, which the Greeks call harmony, issues forth from them. The best 
legislation will produce civic concord, and the observance of this legislation will be maintained by 
the virtue of those who exercise it. Reasoning achieved by diligent intellectual inquiry will foster 
virtue, and only mental discipline devoted to the truth will perfect this reasoning. Finally, we will 
procure the truth after having devoted our attention to it in a long period of leisure. For virtue uses 
no other tool besides true reason, by which the soul is stimulated and excited so that it learns, and 
maintains in the memory what it has learned, and uses what it has memorised. When using it you 
will not lose your way. This is the exercise of truth, this is the skill and the power of reason, which 
we must make the greatest efforts to attain. For it alone leads us to the highest good.” 
Do you see how a man devoted to speculation defends himself? I think he would respond to the 
things you have set forth so ingeniously and explained so elegantly in the following way. First, you 
said that what must be taken into account about the nature of humanity is that we consist of the 
body and the soul at the same time. It cannot be denied that, since we have been confined within 
the troublesome prison of the body, its care should not entirely be neglected and that we should 
instead take into account each part of ourselves, conceding that to some extent we consist of both 
body and soul. But if we examine our nature more carefully, we will not seem to be mistaken if we 
call the human being the mind alone. I see that this argument is acceptable not only to so great a 
man as Plato, but also to the Christians, who are unsurpassed in learning. So what is the body? I 
could say that it is a bond for the soul, from which it shall soon be unchained. I could call it a clay 
vase, which will shortly be broken. Finally, I could call it a vestment which shall soon age and be 
degraded. The mind, though, which is eternal, does not seek action but speculation for its food and 
nourishment, so to speak. But “we pursue a fatter Minerva”, as they say, and so we shall concede 
that the human being consists not only in the mind, but also in the body. What then? “Should the 
body,” you say, “be taken into account?” Indeed it should! While we live this mortal life, it is 
essential that the soul uses the aid of the body in many things because it cannot obtain its cognition, 
which concerns immortal and eternal things, except through those things which fall under its senses 
and which we see circumscribed in place and in time, continually being born and dying. I 
acknowledge, therefore, what you say about the civic virtues – which concern morals – caring for 
both the mind and the body at the same time, as long as you also understand this: that all these 
virtues derive their origin from the power of cognition. Who can live justly, unless they have first 
used their mind to discover what is just, and that what is just, and what must therefore be done, is 
in accordance with our nature? Indeed, this argument extends more broadly to both fortitude and 
temperance. So, those things which are devoted to activity cannot be perfected without the 
intellectual investigation of the mind. These things are apparent in Martha and Mary, for Mary does 
not demand Martha’s help, but Martha demands the help of Mary when, in the presence of the 
Lord, she complains that she has been abandoned by her. Hence, Martha demands help because 
without investigation of the truth activity achieves almost nothing. 
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The search for truth will therefore be more excellent than activity because it begets the virtues 
which we have said are devoted to action and helps to achieve things by them and, furthermore, it 
touches a divinity to which action is not worthy to aspire. Nor, I think, is there any other reason for 
immortal God bringing it about that Moses, the great leader of the Jews, did not accept the laws 
through which the people were instructed in right and honest actions in a city full of people, nor in 
a valley closed in on all sides, nor in a plain or depression, but on the peak of the highest mountain. 
For God, the architect of everything, wanted above all to signify to us by this act that the things 
which will be advantageous to the administration of republics cannot be discovered except through 
the intellectual investigation of supreme things by humanity. This is why, with regard to both 
conserving common society and overcoming the two enemies of human tranquility [viz. pain and 
pleasure], the virtues which are devoted to the cognition of the truth will serve us better than those 
which strive in action. Nonetheless, both common society, by which the human race is bound 
together because it seeks to satisfy bodily need rather than the excellence of the soul, and those 
fierce enemies, which you were casting before our eyes in your oration in order to strike fear into 
us, are to be buried as one with the body. For when our souls, free from all corporeal contagion, 
have returned into their natural state, society will not be desired, nor enemies feared, and activity 
will cease while meanwhile speculation will be strengthened more and more. The pleasure which 
comes from the truth endures forever. Not in vain does He who never says anything in vain 
declare: “Mary chose the best part, which was not taken away from her”. Although I have said 
these things, we will not stop from exalting the other type of life with the highest praise if it is 
undertaken with complete virtue. But we should think that more gratitude is due to these men who, 
in great tranquility, conceive and discover those things which your patrons use as general principles 
to administer civic affairs. 
Add to this that those things which are conceived through leisure are disseminated more widely 
and are of benefit to many more people than those which are accomplished in active occupation. 
The same example can be offered for each of these facts. For who can be conceived as being more 
admirable in action than Marcus Cicero? He had such prudence and strength of soul during his 
consulate that he held back a fire from the city, servitude from the Roman people, and devastation 
from the whole of Italy. After the death of Caesar, however, he was defenceless against the arms of 
Anthony, and, stripped of his consulate against the will of many senators, he was excluded from the 
city in such a way that, although he was not proclaimed an enemy by the senate, he was nonetheless 
held as an enemy. He accomplished these things while in the toga in such a way that they should be 
considered superior to the greatest triumphs of the most eminent military leaders. So what? Will we 
deny that such actions should be bestowed with immortal praise? No! How could we do so, seeing 
that he gave his all with the utmost efforts, the greatest risks and – since the outcome of the matter 
is known – also with his death, by which he restored to the citizenry a liberty which was interrupted 
or, rather, lost, for such a long time? I ask you: when, taking up residence far from public affairs, he 
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had wholly devoted himself to the investigation of superior things, was he now useless to his 
country such that he would offer nothing to it by way of benefit? When, scrutinising the great 
works of all the Greeks and examining everything with the divinity of his mind, he did not just 
understand what could help his citizens who were alive at the time but, having understood human 
nature in general, perceived what the end of human life is, to which everything returns, and what 
the duties of life are which lead to it, and discovered many approaches by which we might scorn 
death, pain and suffering of the body, illness and other disturbances of the soul? Finally, in those 
divine books the De legibus and the De republica did he not describe a universal civil doctrine to show 
everyone how a state should be constituted if it is going to be happy, what kind of princes and 
governors are in it, what the duties of the citizens and the magistrates should be, from which classes 
and types of people a republic should be populated, with which laws it should be equipped, what 
should be done by the advisor, by the commander, by the soldier, by the worker, by the farmer? 
Since he discovers all these things with great acumen and ingenuity and describes them clearly, fully, 
weightily and with elegance, so that he does not only teach the reader effortlessly but captivates 
them with his zeal and delights them with the greatest charm, will you deny that he has benefited 
his state and all humankind? See what a difference there is between those noble actions of his and 
these divine speculations! For with the former he benefits the state alone, but with the latter he 
teaches all who know Latin. With his actions, which he performed with judgment and prudence, he 
repelled the greatest dangers which were pressing at the time. But the things he set down in writing 
through his intellectual investigations are relevant forever, as he did not only have regard for those 
at hand and those who were then living, but left the tenets of a good and happy way of life both to 
those who have lived through so many intervening centuries thus far and to those who will exist in 
the future. And indeed, if you read over the great works of the leisurely you will discover that, 
through their writings, people were made tractable and humane from being foolish and savage, and 
were brought over into prudence and humanity. For before the wise could attempt to collect 
together the people – who had been wandering scattered through fields and forests before any 
cities had been established – and educate those they had assembled about laws, it was necessary that 
they diligently investigate those things which would be of use and, in particular, those related to 
human nature. 
So from these things we can extrapolate a general argument. Those who are devoted to action 
can certainly be of benefit, but only for the present or for a brief time, while those who bring forth 
into the light for us the nature of things concealed in obscurity will be of benefit forever. For 
actions are fixed in their limits along with human beings. But, by surviving over all centuries, 
speculations endure immortal and become equal with eternity. For this reason, when your sage, 
sitting at the gate, examines those about to enter, he will admit the senator, the orator, the soldier, 
the lawyer and then the rest of the crowd, whom you listed in more detail a little earlier. And he will 
not admit them without good reason, because the city needs all of these people as a body needs its 
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limbs, without which it will be crippled and, to some degree, useless. But when my sage goes to 
enter, having been asked what he offers to the benefit of communal life, he will respond that he 
intends to cease all active occupation so that he will not undertake either private or public duties, 
but will instead devote himself to the investigation of the most important things in such a way that 
he can discover best what is useful, what is honourable, and what is in accordance with nature, and 
that he will put down the things he discovers in writing. Does your sage exclude him, I ask? Or 
rather, rising up in veneration as though to some mortal god, does he proceed all the way to the 
middle of the city and, giving my sage the best and most distinguished house, take care to support 
him at the public expense? Indeed, he will declare my sage an example to all citizens, from whom 
each person will learn to execute the role demanded of them in the state and from whom, as if 
from an oracle, each will receive advice in their own doubtful situations. Will anyone deny that such 
a man offers any value to the state, when there is no one else who is able to properly perform their 
role without first having received his advice? 
And so I was laughing to myself a little earlier at the ostentation of your words when you were 
comparing the state to a ship and to an animated body, and I tacitly approved of your opinion 
because I understood the sense in which you were talking. But I believe that the ship which is best 
crewed is that in which my sage is present, as well as those who you mentioned earlier. He, exempt 
from all occupation, speculates only on those things which are conducive to navigation, and offers 
advice to those asking what would be the best things to do. And, in the animated body, the only 
time the senses will pass proper judgement and the appetite be undisturbed is when the mind is 
present, which, free from activity itself, nonetheless helps with its advice whatever entreats it. 
You were saying the republic would suffer great harm because when the most excellent minds 
are occupied in the cognition of the truth it will be governed by worse ones. In fact, the sage will 
never rest, but will always offer good advice to those consulting him on difficult questions, and so 
he will benefit the state with his counsel if not with his deeds. But believe me, those who can be 
alone, fleeing human society, will be very rare. For it is only possible for a human being who, 
having already surpassed human nature, flies to more divine things. So, as I said, there will be very 
few of them. We see how remarkable the scarcity is over so many centuries, and how rarely these 
people appear “swimming in a great sea”, so there is no danger that the republic will be abandoned 
now. But it is precisely those devoted to leisure themselves who provide the greatest benefit to their 
citizens, for they are the most profound example to others that they should not abandon 
themselves to sleep and the belly so as to disregard all learning. If, however, the citizens want to 
appoint them as leaders to govern the republic justly then they will not refuse their service. For it is 
a precept of the divine Plato that if a sage sees that another sage is in charge he will devote himself 
to his leisure, since it is much more pleasant to be ruled than to rule. But if those who lead are 
stupid, he will either take charge in their place, or try to make them better. If he is not allowed to 
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do so, and the rulers do not submit to being made better, then he will return into himself and 
benefit humanity in another way. 
You have also listed many people who have attained divine honours for eminent deeds at home 
and in war. I certainly think that they are worthy of many more, and I do not doubt that they were 
great and admirable human beings. For when I say that those who favour contemplation surpass 
them, I do not mean that those who engage in action are unworthy of esteem. He is a god amongst 
mortals who, as it is in Virgil, “was able to know the causes of things”. And I consider he who 
governs properly as the greatest and most eminent man within the human race. Since he takes care 
of strangers rather than himself (although “he is a man, and will think nothing human alien to 
him”) and since he is roused from leisure to occupation, and from quiet to tumult and danger, and 
since he neglects his own safety while he attends to that of others, it is not wrong that he should be 
rewarded for such efforts. The state honours above all those who it is in its greatest interest to 
honour, and it is in its greatest interest to attract such men with every kind of reward to defend and 
to grow the state, and to amplify its majesty. For although there is great power in virtue, and the 
beauty which it presents to us from everywhere is so great that we are still compelled to attain it for 
its own sake, nonetheless, given human traits such as lack of self-knowledge and corruption and 
perversion of morality, those who want to undertake some great effort or grave danger will be very 
few unless they are promised grand and magnificent honours. You will find many more who strive 
to achieve the trappings of virtue than love virtue stripped of its privileges. So it was wiser to 
establish that, since right reason does not flourish amongst all, we should be inspired towards the 
right and the honourable by such enticements. 
These were things that persuaded me that I should place cognition before action when 
examining the investigation of the truth and right action separately. But when I considered the 
matter as a whole more closely, I saw that, while the human being originates from the mind alone, 
the body must not be neglected, and I saw that a human being is produced in such a way that he is 
tied to others in the bond of charity and, at the same time, burns with the love of understanding 
things. So I will only think him a man who, leading each type of life in the right way, unites them 
both: one who engages in activity as much as the needs of mortal matters and the bond of human 
society demand and as the love of his country compels him; but who devotes himself to speculation 
so that he remembers it is the purpose of humanity, except to the extent that our weakness distracts 
us from it. He will engage in intellectual inquiry so that he becomes a participant in the highest 
good. He will act so that he avoids harm to him and his own. He will duly excel in both ways of life, 
provided that he employs each as much as is necessary. For they are not opposed to each other, 
they are not fighting between themselves in such a way that they cannot somehow unite. They are 
sisters, Mary and Martha living under the same roof. Both please God: Martha because she 
nourishes; Mary because she is nourished. Both are good, but one involves much effort, the other 
involves tranquility, although in such a way that the effort does not bring forth disgrace, nor the 
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tranquility sloth. So we shall remain close to Martha, lest we abandon the duty of humanity. 
However we shall be joined much more closely to Mary in order that our mind is nourished with 
ambrosia and nectar. For with her we gradually ascend towards the understanding of God, and 
whoever does not know that the highest good consists in this is, I firmly believe, ignorant of both 
his true self and his origin. When I consider the various swells and storms of our life, which is very 
similar to a turbulent sea, I think that it is very difficult to attain this goal unless we retire into that 
contemplation of the truth which I spoke about, as though mooring in a tranquil harbour. Because 
even though this has been repeated in the most profound thoughts of all philosophers who are 
worthy of the name, it has nonetheless been depicted more penetratingly in the beautiful images of 
the two wisest poets, Homer and Virgil, in such a way that, for this reason in particular, reading 
their work delights me a great deal. For what did they want to show us – one through Ulysses, the 
other through Aeneas – other than the highest good of humanity? And they did not just want to 
show us the highest good, but also to demonstrate the most direct way which leads to it without 
any error.  
But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that we came to this place not so much for the sake 
of debate as of good health? I think, therefore, that since we have now rested enough we should get 
up and descend to our cells, and not by that path from which we came, but by that nearby hill 
which is more winding but less steep.’ 
‘Certainly,’ says Lorenzo, ‘but on this condition, if it is acceptable to you: that tomorrow and on 
the other days on which we come to this place we might have the pleasure of your company. Since 
you have discussed each type of life, not just with elegance and in detail, but also with precision and 
penetration, continue, I ask, and teach us about what you were just saying about Virgil in such a 
way that you proceed on the subject in an unbroken sequence and with an uninterrupted train of 
thought. And – in order that you understand what I desire – I saw a few passages in Virgil which 
expound different positions on this way of thinking. Since, when you omit the intermediate parts, 
they cannot convey the same thing, what is being conveyed cannot be trusted. But you, through 
your wisdom and, as I have heard from many, your singular genius in interpreting this poet, can 
complete the continued course of disputations from the beginning to the end without any offense 
to the texts. For although, by the testimony of these educated men, there is no kind of learning 
whose topics you cannot explain plainly, eloquently, learnedly and wisely, what could be more in 
keeping with the disputation you just delivered, or more pleasurable to the ears and the minds of all 
these men who honour and respect you a great deal, or – since I know that you are very well-
disposed to me in your benevolence – more relevant to my studies and those of my brother, than 
now, after you have discussed each way of living, to show us what the opinion of such a great man 
is on the same subject through the wanderings and journey to Italy of his Aeneas?’ 
When Lorenzo had said this and we had approved his request, showing our enthusiasm with our 
words and faces, Battista said ‘How much differently it went for me than I had planned! Although I 
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came here to live in the countryside in great leisure, I had to set forth an explanation for things 
which are drawn from the most profound philosophical subjects! But, as it is in the proverb, night 
will advise us very well. Let us now return to the cells, by the path which I mentioned, or another, if 
any seems more convenient to Mariotto.’ ‘That would certainly be better’ said Mariotto and at once 






































Many people seem to complain about the powerlessness of the human condition, most illustrious 
Federico, and not entirely with injustice. For nature has produced us in such a way that there is a 
great desire for knowledge implanted in us, but the faculty through which we attain what we desire 
is, perhaps, imparted ordinarily to a few who are of exceptional intelligence but not granted at all to 
other people. Nature does not, as they say, pour whatever things she can into us liberally and 
obligingly like a kind and indulgent mother. On the contrary, she is like an unfair and hostile 
stepmother. When she has shown us what delights us a great deal and has inflamed us with empty 
hope for it, she then leaves us so entirely ignorant of the path that, wandering in the shadows of 
error, we cannot discern the correct route which guides us. Since our mind is encumbered with 
corporeal mass from the beginning and, as if made drunk, is immersed in that very matter than 
which nothing is inferior, it comes to pass that, with the mind buried in a deep sleep, for a long 
time nothing flourishes in us apart from the bodily senses. The reason is only roused late and at a 
time when the sensual appetite has, like the cruelest tyrant, already seized power over all life: a 
power which does not rightfully belong to it, but to reason. So, finally returning to its reign after a 
long exile, reason is recognised by few and is received by fewer, so either it does not restore its rule 
at all or it has to govern with precarious authority. For a soul corrupted by the worst habits and 
saturated with false opinions – because the senses invaded before it could contemplate the light of 
reason – cannot return to the right or discern the truth except with effort. But if, with difficulty, the 
soul finally identifies truth itself as its safe harbour (if not in clear light, at least in a scant light and 
by an uncertain moon, as it is in Virgil), it is nonetheless tossed by the fickle surges of disturbance 
and thrown back into the sea by the overflowing waves, so that it completely loses sight of the port 
which it thought it had already reached. The shortness of life itself comes as no little inconvenience, 
as they say, with respect to these difficulties. For since nature has concealed the truth in secrecy, as 
Democritus said, and it is therefore buried in such deep shadows that we cannot release and draw 
out the light except with much effort over a long time, we are killed during the race itself before the 
finish line can reached. 
When people say these things, they find many who agree with them. Everyone prefers to accuse 
nature impiously than to frankly acknowledge their own idleness. But it is quite another matter for 
them to refute that there is a manifestly exceptional genius in the most eminent men who, although 
they have not been born in a different condition to other humans, and have not been created in 
another image, have nevertheless through their effort and through much sweat and vigilance 
ascended to the place at which those who arrive are justly considered blessed. In order that I may 
now pass over many who both in our time and in superior ages seem to have drawn near to divinity 
either by acting or by contemplating, can’t you, illustrious Federico, be the best example for us? If 
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anyone recalled to memory your eminent deeds, he should think no time would remain for the 
study of culture. But, on the contrary, when we consider with what learning you are endowed and 
what longstanding and what unremitting effort you have expended on these matters, who should 
not be surprised that the Muses dared to venture into the greatest tumults of wars and the horrible 
clamour of arms? We read that many military leaders were amongst the most learned of the 
ancients. But that must be thought praise of the times rather than of the people, since it would have 
been unseemly for them not to know that in which nearly all others excelled. Our times have 
produced no small number who are distinguished in military matters, out of all of whom you will 
perhaps find some imbued with learning, but as yet I have known no one except you whom you 
could truly say to be learned. So your glory must be considered more illustrious. You, who are not 
confined to those skills that were always held in the greatest honour for their own sake, decided not 
only to follow Mars, in whom all resounds with the sound of arms and the blare of trumpets, but 
showed that you cherished Pallas, who is considered to be the goddess not only of martial matters 
but also of all wisdom, above the others. As if you were another Ulysses instructed by her advice, 
you never lacked her help in the most difficult times and desperate situations. But amidst your 
important and almost innumerable public duties you have also striven, with the same goddess as a 
guide, to attain a degree of learning which many are scarcely able to touch upon when living in the 
highest leisure and with everything in abundance. When could either the fear of an enemy or the 
shouting of your soldiers resounding in your ears ever distract your mind so much that a whole day 
would pass with you being idle, in which you neither read something yourself nor listened 
attentively to the reading or disputation of another? So we are by no means surprised if the most 
erudite men were always held in the highest honour at your court. How many do you also have in 
your court who you have both always supported with your riches and provided honours with much 
dignity? And how many erudite men through the whole of Italy have you either supported with 
your marvellous liberality when poor, or bestowed with a fitting reward for their learning when they 
sustain themselves comfortably with their assets? For this reason I will say (not so much that I 
detract anything from the praises of other princes, but so that I give thanks for your great merits 
with respect to the Muses – if not the thanks I owe, then those which I can give): out of all princes 
in our time of whom I am aware, Federico is alone, I say! He is a haven of health and a unique 
sanctuary for learned men in calamity and offers glory and distinction to those placed in better 
fortune. So the more princes surpass you in magnitude of territory and dominion, the more the 
Greek, the Latin and Florentine Muses will elevate your name to the heavens for future centuries, 
ever with greater praise. For, excluded from the courts of others, they are received with so much 
generous hospitality by you – not as guests, but having already been bestowed with citizenship and 
established in a sanctuary which is exceptionally well-furnished and crowded with all kinds of 
books. This is because you dedicated a library to Pallas, to Apollo and to the nine Muses that is 
wholesome in location, spacious and distinguished in form and celebrated for its abundance of 
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books. For so distinguished, so honourable, and so useful a gift, the state now owes no less to you 
than Athens once owed to Peisistratos, or Alexandria in Egypt owed to Ptolemy (who had the 
cognomen ‘Philadelphus’), or Rome owed to Lucullus, Caesar and finally Asinius Pollio, all of 
whom, we remember, instituted libraries crowded with varied volumes of all types. What tool, what 
apparatus, what treasure, will a man who is worthy of the most holy name of a prince rather 
procure for himself than those things which alone are the best provisions for us on our journey, 
and through which we can attain the highest good? For from them we obtain ambrosia, from them 
we obtain nectar, with which the happy life can be nourished with the highest pleasure. 
When I hear that, at the moment, out of all the almost countless number of your books you 
read those avidly which involve the ends of good and evil, I would like you to know my 
lucubrations on the same matter too. It is not as if they can teach you anything that is unknown to 
you – for I am not so impudent that I might, as the Greeks say, try to enlighten you as the pig tries 
to enlighten Minerva – but if my book might sit among so many works of the most learned men, 
even in the lowest place, I will think its position the greatest kindness to me. For this reason, just as 
I described the speech given by Battista on the first day in the previous book, so I have also 
dedicated the disputation which that divine man performed on the next day, committed in this 
second book, to your name: Federico, both unconquered in war and sole protector of the Muses. 
It had scarcely become fully light on the following day when we were summoned to worship. 
Mariotto, a host who was very pleasant in his liberality and friendship, had urged us to finish these 
things in the morning so that more time would be left for us to listen to Battista. So, with the 
worship completed, he directed our path so that showing themselves to us from all directions were 
many pleasurable things produced by nature and also many places where monuments stood to the 
holiness of ancient men and to the austerity of life. And so great was the pleasure, not only to the 
eyes from the pleasantness of the area, but also to the mind and the soul from the vestiges of 
ancient religion, that we arrived at the spring before we noticed that we had set forth from the 
threshold. When we had sat down and all faces were turned to Battista in great silence, he said: ‘I 
understand that I must speak, but see, Lorenzo, how generous the night has been to me! For not 
only do I intend to honour what I have promised you, but I have something else I want to add. 
You have sought what is fitting for a person fond of liberty to know, and what is both pleasing to 
hear and not without benefit. Since the disputation has been led to this place, though, it will not be 
a departure from the business in hand to discuss the ends of good and evil, separately and taking no 
more time than necessary, before I undertake that task. You say: surely that was in yesterday’s 
speech? It was almost the same but for a different reason. Yesterday we were asking which was the 
most suitable way to lead us to the goal, but now I think we should investigate where it is we want 
to be led. So if we set forth the opinions of almost all the philosophers on this matter, and add to 
them the many thoughts of the Christians, I hope it will be the case that the things we seek in Virgil 
will be altogether more easily ascertained and perceived.’ 
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Since we all enthusiastically agreed with this plan and we had shown that we were ready to listen, 
I remember he began like this: ‘Since it became clear from the things which we discussed yesterday 
that man is not born by accident for the idlest leisure or for listless sensual enjoyment, but is 
produced by immortal God, either for the cognition of great and divine matters or for deeds which 
are noble and beneficial to the human race, it always seems to me that an especially useful 
disputation is that which best lays out what the purpose is, what the end is, what the ultimate goal 
is, to which we should direct all our plans of both living correctly and of thinking properly. 
Although we see that there was extraordinary controversy between the ancient writers on this 
subject I do not doubt that, if all their views are collected together in common and compared with 
each other, it will be easy (even by men endowed with middling intelligence or learning!) to pick out 
which of them appears either most truthful or the most similar to the truth. They did not only agree 
on the name – for they call it the highest good without any disagreement – but also on what they all 
thought to be the same about it: they affirmed that it exists for its own sake alone, but all other 
things must strive towards it. But when they considered what that end actually was, such great 
dissent arose between them and so fierce a dispute was incited that it seemed as though they no 
longer desired to discover the truth, but instead wanted to defend with all tenacity the first 
argument they had seized upon. So while this whole branch of philosophy which concerns life and 
morals flowed from Socrates alone as if from a spring, we nevertheless see what should have been 
one thing rent and dispersed into many parts by the diversity of thought and of human strife. For 
although that blameless man always followed the same belief, on account of his penetrating 
sharpness of the mind in choosing and his firm constancy of spirit in persevering with what he had 
chosen, nonetheless, because he did not always seem to think the same thing, but was thought to 
argue different things in different places as he could dispute with marvellous irony about anything 
on either side of the debate, he granted to those who delighted in human learning a certain handle, 
as it were, so that each followed the view which was most suited to his own inclination and nature, 
as if afforded the best defence by Socrates. This is why we see as many families and schools of 
philosophers among the Greeks as there are opinions on the ends of good and evil. For if we 
believe the most profound of authors, Varro and Cicero, then we should not talk about a separate 
school of philosophy that, even if it differs concerning other subjects, agrees about the ends of 
good and evil, because there is no reason for someone to philosophise other than in order to be 
happy, and they cannot be happy unless they have perceived and acquired the end of the good. And 
so, that which does not pursue an end of the good cannot be said to be a school. 
But I return to the ancients, of whom there were some with such sluggish and debased intellects 
that, although we consist of both body and soul, they were nevertheless unable to pursue the 
divinity of the human mind with their own. And so, concerning themselves with nothing else 
beyond the body and the senses which depend on the body, and thinking that only the body exists, 
they placed the highest good in the things which pertain to it. Since pleasure, which allures the 
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senses, greatly rouses every living creature in its pursuit, it had many adherents who considered it 
supreme. Aristippus is known as the first of all these. He was born in Cyrene in Libya and educated 
in Athens by Socrates, although he nonetheless attributed everything to pleasure. He observed that 
many occasions arose in which people could not enjoy pleasure, and in order that, just as he 
perceived pleasure from an abundance of things, so too would he not fall into distress from 
deprivation, he trained his soul in an extraordinary way, so he could both enjoy what was available 
and despise what was absent with ease. So he was the first of the Socratics to philosophise for pay, 
and he inhabited the palace of the tyrant Dionysius, receiving the best hospitality, so that he duly 
acquired riches for himself to furnish every kind of pleasure. He could endure being treated with 
contempt or suffering loss with such great equanimity that “with his friend amazed because he 
carried himself so modestly when spat at by Dionysius, he responded, ‘Fishermen will suffer to be 
overwhelmed by many waves to catch an ignoble little tiddler. Should I, so sprinkled, not suffer so 
that I can eat the prize catch?’”. I pass over many of the highest indignities to which he willingly 
submitted in order to avoid losing the pleasure through which alone he thought himself happy. 
Diogenes is not being unfair when he calls him the dog of the king. Nichomachus, the son of 
Aristotle, recounted that of the same opinion was Eudoxus of Cnidus, in other respects an 
illustrious man, distinguished in mathematics and medicine and not an unwise lawgiver. Dionysius 
of Heraclea also thought the same. He had learned from Zeno of Citium, the head of the Stoics, to 
be somewhat steadfast and revered virtue as the sole good and abhorred vice as the sole evil on 
account of his teachings. Eventually suffering a disease of the eyes, he sank into sadness and, 
abandoning the Stoa, he deserted to the Cyrenaics, so that he was not afraid to do anything that 
pertained to pleasure, even before the eyes of all. He also very carefully wrote a book about 
pleasure in which he commended it as the highest good.  
I really do not know what I shall say about Epicurus of Athens, than whom there was no fiercer 
advocate in defending pleasure, they say. For when he discusses the highest good in his χυρίαις 
δόξαις (that is, his Principal Doctrines), he asserts that there is nothing he understands as the good 
apart from those things which provide gustatory or sexual pleasures or which charm us by the 
beauty of their form. However in his letter to Hermarchus he considers virtue of such importance 
that in the greatest torments of the body, in which he himself has placed the highest evil, he dares 
to say that he is still happiest in the conscience of good deeds. Sometimes he speaks about pleasure 
in such a way that he seems to understand that the pleasure of the soul is superior to that which is 
from the senses. He does not always consider pleasure as the good, but sometimes freedom from 
pain. If you look to the life and morals of the man, you will find many things deserving of high 
praise. Indeed, if he had felt rightly about God, you would find nothing in his actions which cannot 
be justly praised. For he never did anything, nor persuaded others to do anything, which was 
lacking in justice or equity. No sadness, no torments could cast him down from the highest degree 
of steadfastness. So great was his faithfulness, so great was his charity to people, that he generously 
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fed and taught the children of his deceased friends and, when dying, provided for them in his will 
to be fed and taught by others. It is easy to understand how continent or, rather, temperate he was 
in those pleasures which he so greatly extolled, because he rarely drank wine, and rarely added 
anything to bread apart from a little bit of cheese. He therefore seems to have thought differently 
from the multitude of other people. For most people, even when they live most shamefully, present 
themselves as having the highest continence and sternness in appearance and words. “For,” as it is 
in the writings of the satirist, “what street is not full of sad debauchees?”. But although he said 
things which libertines would not utter without shame, in terms of his life and morals he should not 
be ranked behind Socrates. But so much for Epicurus. 
Hieronymus of Rhodes, a well-learned and agreeable man, but one who could not maintain the 
severity of the Peripatetics, in whose bosom he had been nourished, did not value pleasure but the 
absence of pain as the highest good, following, as many believe, the authority of Periander, tyrant 
of Corinth, whom they are inclined to think was the originator of such opinions. Leucippus the 
Abderite thought the same, and also Theodorus, whom they named atheon because he denied that 
there are gods. All learned people surmise something greater about Democritus. For when a man of 
his surpassing genius says that the highest good is εὖθυμια, he does not only mean an absence of 
those pains which are in the body, but the right and peaceful state of the soul produced by the 
removal of all disturbances. So I believe that the εὖθυμια named by this philosopher is the same as 
what in our sacred writings they call peace, in which the Hebrew poet places the highest good. For 
he says: “Praise the Lord, Jerusalem, praise your God, Zion, because He has strengthened the bars 
of your gates, He has blessed your sons within you, because He has placed peace in your borders”. 
For with the bars of the gates strengthened, nothing will either enter nor depart from therein, 
which is just as if he says that, when the appetite is not moved by anything either external or 
internal which is contrary to reason, the highest tranquility will exist in the soul. If we call this the 
highest good while we live, we will never stray. But about this a little later. 
We have briefly shown, I think, both those who think that the ends of the good are in pleasure 
and those who think they are in freedom from pain. Aside from these people, I see that there were 
some who believed that it is neither of these things separately, but both of them in conjunction, 
that brings about the happy life, amongst whom I would more readily count Epicurus than amongst 
those who adhere to pleasure alone. Likewise, there were those who were of the opinion that not 
even these two things joined together could offer what we seek, but they think that all things which 
they call the “first things of nature” must be sought to achieve such a great task. Although they 
count pleasure and the absence of pain as important among them, there are nevertheless many 
more things which they call the first things of nature, sometimes in the mind, sometimes in the 




So if you think correctly about the opinions of all of these philosophers, you will see that they 
have perceived nothing which can be regarded as excellent, nor do they separate the mind from the 
senses, nor can they understand anything beyond the senses. We can duly disregard them without 
harm. For who has not laughed at that philosopher who, investigating the highest human good, 
supposes that he has discovered it in something which either does not occupy any part of the 
human being or is in its smallest and worst part, so that it now seems that one can rightly call him 
not a philosopher, but a philosarcus? Those discovering this error, who excelled both in dignity of 
soul and intellectual acumen, admired the divinity of the mind so much that they thought that 
nothing beyond it pertained to humans. So they placed the final end, for the sake of which all else 
must be done, in the speculation of divine and mortal matters and in drawing out the secrets of 
nature. They say that the first people of this opinion were Thales of Miletus, one of the Seven 
Sages, and Bias of Priene, of the same group. They also add Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Euclid 
the Socratic. If we were to count Aristotle in this group, we would not appear to be ignorant of 
those things to which he refers in his ten books on ethics, but since the entire school of the 
Peripatetics draws its origin from this man, we will explain a little later the particular opinions 
which are of that sect. Aside from these was another kind of philosophising whose practitioners, 
although they did not wholly adhere to this kind of speculation, nevertheless embraced virtue alone 
in living life and in doing things, to the extent that they dared to say that there is no good besides 
virtue and no evil besides vice. They write that the first among the Greeks who thought this were 
Pittacus of Mytilene, Menedemus of Lampsacus and Bion of Borysthenes, and both the Socratics 
and the Pythagoreans seem to affirm the same. But we can offer the Stoics as those who established 
this view in its entirety with the most numerous and profound arguments. They were truly vigorous 
philosophers and you can perceive in them a firmness of spirit in every type of danger, a 
temperance in the face of all pleasures, such that no snares of fortune seem to be able to cast them 
down from the highest degree of tranquility. If you wanted to group the Cynics together with them 
you could certainly do so, for you would think that their same opinion, their same rigour of spirit, is 
almost the same thing with a different appearance. 
You see what the Stoics attribute to virtue. But the Peripatetics and the ancient Academicians 
thought that the origin of the highest good was to be derived from nature. The Peripatetics deny 
that one can know the final end of a human being when ignorant of its nature, because all things 
which nature produced live good and happy lives if they live in harmony and accordance with their 
nature, as it were. So Varro, a man whom no learned person ever hesitated to consult on the 
greatest men of the Greeks because of the magnitude and variety of his learning, traces out the 
ultimate end in the following way. He thinks that, since one seeks the highest good of the human 
being, one must first seek what it is that we call “a human”. Either “a human” consists of the mind 
and the body, which one can easily doubt because the mind is far superior to the body; or it is the 
mind alone, and the body is not a part of the human being but supports the mind like a horse 
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supports a rider (for a rider is not so named because they consist in a person and a horse, but 
because they are the person alone and are called a rider because they have some relation with 
regards to the horse); or the human being is only the body, so that somehow it holds itself to the 
mind in the same way in which a cup holds itself to a liquid. For a saucer and the liquid which the 
saucer contains is not called a cup at the same time, but only a saucer. It is never called a cup unless 
it is suitable for containing a liquid. Since neither option is satisfactory and Varro does not think 
that a human being is either the body alone or the mind alone, he finally investigates whether man 
can be said to be both at the same time, as we say a chariot is not this horse or that horse, but is 
both, joined at the same time by a yoke. Since he adheres entirely to this opinion, this great man 
thinks that the highest good itself, through which we will be happy, consists in the goods of the 
mind and the body at the same time. So, persuaded by this reasoning, he deduced that the first 
things of nature should be sought for their own sake. For since every creature, by its very nature, is 
committed to its own preservation above all else, it devotes its attention to everything in order that 
it may conserve itself. Nature, the best mother, established this primary appetite in every creature so 
that it wants itself to be safe, and is disposed in such a way that best accords with its nature. So the 
animal values its security, it values the conservation of all its parts, health, integrity of the senses, 
removal of all pain, likewise strength and beauty and other things of the same kind, all of which 
they call the first things of nature in relation to the body. In the same way it values those things in 
the soul which are like the sparks and the seeds of virtue: comprehension and memory, which are 
two things summed up in the single name of “intelligence”. But even though virtue itself, which is 
implanted by learning and which some call the art of living, is the most excellent of all the goods 
which are in the soul, we do not realise this is the case until late in life. So Plato rightly calls 
someone happy who attains it even in old age, because they gain wisdom and true opinions. 
Since virtue (which is the art of living life) recognises the first things of nature (which are all 
present when learning is absent), it strives for them for its own sake, so that it delights in and enjoys 
all of them, this one more, but that one less, to the extent that each is superior or inferior. It 
therefore takes pleasure in all of them, but with the determination that, if necessity so demands, it 
can easily disregard some lesser things so that it can acquire the greater or preserve those already 
acquired. So virtue does not put itself before any of the other goods that are of the soul or of the 
body because it is the leader and the wisest empress and it knows how to best use itself and these 
other goods which make human beings happy. If, however, virtue relinquishes its control of life 
and the first things of nature do not submit to it, they will necessarily be ruined and, having been 
used for evil, cannot in any way be used for good. So the happy life will correspond with virtue 
first, and then with those goods of the mind and the body without which virtue has no reason to 
exist. If to these aforementioned goods are added many of those other goods which do not take 
away virtue even if absent, then life is made even happier from its initial happiness. But if it were 
not simply many goods that were added, as I was just saying, but all goods, what would prevent us 
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calling such a life, with its heaping up of all goods, the happiest? It is easy to distinguish between 
the goods without which virtue cannot exist and, on the other hand, those which cannot remove 
virtue through their absence. The integrity of the senses, memory and reason are those without 
which virtue cannot exist. For through them we attain the learning without which virtue cannot be 
understood. But swiftness, vigour, beauty, nobility and those things which are similar to them are 
not related to virtue. They are nonetheless thought by the Peripatetics to be goods which virtue 
values for its own sake and which the sage rightly enjoys as far as is suitable. 
But the Peripatetics also want this happy life to be situated in society. So the sage values the 
goods of friends for their own sake, and he desires the same for his friend that he desires for 
himself: not for his own sake, but for his friend’s. Yet he will have a careful distinction in 
humankind, so that he best understands in what rank his country, children, parents, blood relations, 
other more distant relatives, citizens, and finally all other mortals should be ordered, until the whole 
race of humanity is encompassed. 
I have summarised, I think, all the thought of the Peripatetics on the highest good. If I have 
spend less time than you wanted on this subject, know that it is no misfortune. For you have these 
Acciaiuoli, you have Alamanno Rinuccini, who, when you wish, can offer a disputation on all these 
matters, on which they are learned and eloquent, with more profundity and detail. And if only our 
Oliviero Arduino were present, a man whom I regard of such importance in all areas of philosophy 
that, in my opinion, he occupies the most honourable place amongst the Aristotelians!’ 
‘He is, as you say,’ said Donato Acciaiuoli, ‘a man eminent in much learning and who, if his 
employment permitted, would not be absent as Lorenzo’s companion in such a sojourn to the 
country. With respect to us Acciaiuoli, since you speak about us in such honourable language, let 
others decide whether you do this justifiably or somewhat excessively, as a friend. But we don’t 
reject such high praise from so great a man as you! For although we have always esteemed virtue 
itself for its own sake, seeking no intended reward, if I am to acknowledge the truth, we have still 
not yet accomplished so much that if some little fame follows virtue as a shadow follows a body we 
are able to flee it. But I am amazed at why, while you count us expressly as Aristotelians, you 
should pass by Ficino in silence.’ 
While looking at Ficino with a smile, Battista said, ‘What else do you think, Donato, stops me 
from doing this apart from envy? For although I do not doubt that he has also drunk abundantly 
from that which has flowed from the spring of the Lyceum, even so, since all acknowledge that he 
is the most accurate interpreter of the mysteries which are uttered by the oracle of the Academy, do 
you think it can be wrenched out from me that I should yield to him in both areas?’ 
Here Alamanno said, ‘You joke, Battista, and in your characteristic manner you wanted to 
sprinkle the profundity of your disputations with some wit. But – if I may speak in earnest – if only 
others suffered envy like you! For there would not be so much envious rivalry roused daily among 
the learned and instead each person who understood the good in another would praise it without 
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deceit, embracing in mutual benevolence, and if there were anything by which he was offended he 
would put a stop to it in a friendly manner. But at present I cannot say I wonder enough about 
some people – and I might be inclined to mention either cruelty, or stupidity, or both – who think 
they can approach that nature which is particular to man while drawing off as much praise for 
themselves as they detract from others through disparagement, and rely on being able to prove 
their own learning to others by charging their rivals with ignorance. I shudder at the barbarised 
minds of these people as if at a monstrosity of nature. For learning often exerts the same impulse 
on humans (if they are not by nature some hideous monster) as they say water does on a wolf. For 
just as those things which, when marinated, lose all bitterness and are furnished with the most 
pleasurable flavours, so does the human mind, when refined with learning, set aside not only 
everything rough and absurd, but also everything disagreeable or barbarous that resides in it. But 
perhaps we deviate too much from what was intended. And so do now return to the undertaking, if 
it seems acceptable to you.’ 
‘O Alamanno,’ said Battista, ‘this digression was a great pleasure. For I very much approve of 
what you said, and acknowledge that you do not philosophise in words alone, as many are 
accustomed to do, but also in life and in morals. In order that the speech is resumed from where we 
left it: the Peripatetics tend to explain the ends of the good according to this formula, more or less. 
But Varro affirmed that the same opinion was also found in the author Antiochus of the old 
Academics, whom we read was the teacher of Varro and of Cicero, although Cicero contends that 
in many ways he is a Stoic rather than an old Academic.  
So you see how varied opinions are on the highest good. But in fact, if we contemplate our 
nature diligently, consider what a wretched condition in which we live this mortal life, and are able 
to pursue what is good in it as if it were the highest good (which embraces the whole person, in that 
it takes account of the dignity of both of the body and the mind at the same time), those who place 
virtue first do not seem to have gone astray, as they also add the remaining goods in the order I 
have described. For we acknowledge it is necessary that, as long as a fiery and fast horse is joined to 
so dull and stupid an ass – that is, the mind is joined to the body – neither concern should be 
neglected. So I think that this is the most complete opinion of all those which have been discussed 
so far. There are those who, in order that they seemed to contribute something new, broke off 
some small part from this philosophy as if from a whole and undiminished body. Herillus, the pupil 
of Zeno the Stoic, strove to prove that the highest good was knowledge alone, because he had 
often seen knowledge praised by Aristotle and Theophrastus for its own sake. But Aristo of Chios, 
charmed by the magnificence and beauty of words and driven by the love of virtue, and having read 
what had been written by the ancients on the disdain of human affairs, ventured to affirm that, 
apart from virtue and vice, there is nothing else which should either be sought or avoided. Because 
Aristo neglects the things in the middle between virtue and vice in such a way that he thinks no 
delight can be gained from them, and regards all things as equal, and thinks that there is no 
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difference between extreme poverty and the highest riches, no difference between vigorous health 
and the greatest sickness, he completely exalts the very virtue which he loves so much, whose 
particular characteristic is to choose between those things which are in accordance with nature. For 
he takes away the possibility of recognising duty, and by removing this from life I do not see what 
differs between us and animals. Still lesser is Hieronymus of Rhodes who departed very much from 
his teacher Aristotle. When he saw that many natural things are counted as goods, out of all of 
them he chose freedom from pain alone and, as I have already said, bestowed upon it the principle 
of the highest good. Somewhat more noble are Calliphon and Diodorus, for although the first 
valued pleasure as the highest good, and the second the absence of pain that I just discussed, 
nonetheless, neither excluded moral character. But Polemo, content with the first things of nature, 
neglects virtue in such a way that he thinks the happy life can be achieved by the first things of 
nature alone, without moral character. 
So when we regard the opinions of all these philosophers, we understand them to be like a limb 
torn off from the body which the Peripatetics had described to us in its entirety. Since we are 
exposed to blows of fortune which are so numerous, so varied, and so horrible, we will never 
declare a man happy unless virtue is at hand, into whose well-fortified stronghold, as it were, he 
withdraws himself from the the fierce enemies raging at him and attacking him on all sides. For the 
battle of the appetite against reason is so fierce and unremitting, the tempests rise up so horrible 
and numerous from the changeable winds of fortune, and so many disturbances are aroused from it 
that, unless some true and, as it were, divine wisdom is present at hand that “free from the mist of 
error, distinguishes the true good”, as it is in Juvenal, what shall we be able to seek or to flee when 
we use our reason? For wisdom is that which, having cut off worthless and countless desires and 
having removed empty terrors, alone knows the truth and, bringing justice, weighs and distributes 
everything on the same scale. It establishes fortitude against the greatest and most compelling 
dangers as an adamantine and unbreakable shield and, for the sake of honour and moral character, 
impels the soul with the spurs of magnanimity and steadfastness to endure every burden. But, on 
the other hand, lest it slip into too much lust and desire through excessive lasciviousness, confines 
it with the reins of temperance. It therefore comes to pass that, just as the firmest rock remains 
immobile in the middle of the waves and is not moved from its place by any swell or storm, so too 
does our mind endure in the highest tranquility with every surge of disturbance broken on its 
steadfastness. It forever enjoys that peace, which is not granted by the human condition, but which 
Jesus bequeathed to his own as his final testament and, as long as it endures our weakness, it lives 
happily. And indeed, what can harm that person who is never impressed by what the crowd thinks 
is the greatest, and scarcely counts poverty, exile, sickness, loss of children, indeed death itself, 
among the number of evils? 
Even though these things are set out in this way, the Christians nonetheless deny that men can 
be truly called happy while living such a life. For if you say that virtue alone is good, don’t you leave 
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the body, companion of the soul and a part of us, without any good? If you are of the opinion that 
the body is not a part of us, I would readily allow this argument. But if such sicknesses rise up in it 
that the senses are corrupted and memory and judgment taken away, where, I ask you, is virtue 
established? By what faculty is it acquired? If, on the other hand, we call the useful things of the 
body good, the detrimental things will be evil, and they will be able to inflict such troubles that they 
either divert us from all the duties of life or diminish them so far that death is to be preferred to 
life. So they force us to desist from that without which we are not human, because it is the first 
demand of nature that the human being preserves itself and therefore escapes its death. While we 
wander through life as a mortal, we will not therefore be happy expect in the sole hope of that 
which is the coming and immortal life. Hence this is in the letter of Paul: “For we were saved in 
hope”. For the Christians say that God is the highest good, which is also established as being what 
Plato knew before Christ was born as a man. You can easily learn his opinion when you wish, either 
in those commentaries which Marsilio wrote (not only with great profundity, but also with the 
foremost clarity and plainness) on the Philebus of Plato or, if you cannot wait any longer he can take 
my place in this disputation, as I am tired, and he can satisfy your wish while I take a little breath.’ 
‘Since we are on the road,’ said Lorenzo, ‘I certainly do not want us to stop here, as if damaged 
by potholes. So, now that the business is being conducted according to Greek honesty, it does not 
matter to me whether the debt should be owed by you or by Marsilio. Neither of you will be 
compelled to emigrate or to borrow a loan for a down payment, because each of you has so much 
hoarded in the safe that you would not default on the debt were it even for a much greater sum. 
But I am surprised, since you have conducted the disputation all the way to this point and did not 
attempt in either yesterday’s or today’s speech to substitute a proxy, that you now want to interrupt 
an oration delivered thus far on a continuous thread.’ 
‘Particularly since,’ said Marsilio, ‘in the sight of so many eminent Aristotelians, he recounted 
the entire teaching of that school without attempting to be relieved of so great a burden by any of 
them.’ 
‘Many are present, as you say,’ said Battista, ‘who would have been of service to me in that task 
and, if they had been, would have done me a favour. So why did I not request it? Because, as you 
saw, since there are many who could excel at it, while each one pushes the task on to another, 
eventually all will reject the responsibility. I am not afraid of the same thing with you. For although 
the Academy is not forbidden to these men, nor the Lyceum to you, I nonetheless prefer to call 
them Aristotelians but you a Platonist. So, since I see that you are the only Platonist standing here, I 
ask you, can you be equal to me with your fragile health, if we have to engage in single combat? 
Nor should you rely too much on your age. For, if you were to do that, the duel of Dares and 
Entellus should be a warning to you. So you will, if you have good sense, acquiesce and discharge 
with indulgence the trifling burden which has been imposed on you.’ 
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After this was said by Leon in witty jest, Marsilio replied: ‘Very well, I stretch out on the grass 
and surrender with equanimity. For although I hope that all who are present will pardon me for the 
vice of rashness, and that they can absolve an obedient pupil of the crime of impudence to his 
teacher, how can I be reluctant to speak, when I can do so for my own benefit and without 
detriment to Lorenzo? If by some chance there are things which I express correctly I will think it 
no small benefit. Because from now on I will consider those things of which I think you approve as 
being beyond doubt since, having too little faith in myself, I have not so far dared to do it. If I 
should err in this task, what could be of greater benefit and pleasure to me than to return from 
error to the true path under your guidance. But lest the beginning be drawn out longer than is 
necessary on a subject which will be very brief, we now approach the matter in hand. 
As Leon said a little earlier, the divine Plato thought that God is the highest good. He did not 
only say the highest good was God alone, but also taught this fact with the most profound 
arguments. But this is not questioned in the present disputation. Unless I am mistaken, he 
establishes what the highest good is with the following argument. The highest good is so called by 
the agreement of all philosophers because we both strive toward it for its own sake before it is 
acquired and, when we have attained it, one remains tranquil in it in such a way that one desires 
nothing beyond it. But since, as most people agree, there are three types of good, we shall consider 
carefully which of them is the highest good which we seek. Is it the goods called “external”? No. 
They do not strive for their own sake, but for the sake of the body. For whatever depends on an 
accident of fortune – wealth, honours and things similar to them – is either for pleasure or for the 
use of the body, so they are better called “uses” than “goods”. Nor do the goods of the body seem 
to strive for their own sake. For we seek them on account of the soul. Add too that it does not 
seem as though they should even be called goods. For if we call “good” that which, by its own 
nature, is always the same for everyone, how can things be goods which are invariably bad when 
badly used? What does the form of the body confer to the libertine, what do riches confer to the 
spendthrift, what do toughness and strength confer to the gladiator, to the murderer, to the robber 
except that it makes them worse in their evil? For when such instruments of the passions present 
themselves to a soul already sickening, what window do you think it opens to every kind of 
wickedness? But this is even more wretched: make the same men good and extremely temperate. 
However much they made use of the bodily goods – which the stupid do not only regard as goods, 
but even as the greatest goods – with the utmost prudence and temperance, nonetheless, rushing 
into the offensive conduct that bad people exhibit, into envy, cruelty, avarice, and finally into the 
licentiousness of wanton women, haven’t many of them experienced extreme ruin? Orators 
describe these more comprehensively. For us, however, it will be enough to have shown that what 
we seek can be found in neither the goods of fortune nor in the goods of the body. So the highest 
good will be in the goods of the soul or it will be nowhere. The latter is absurd, so the former is 
true. The ultimate end we seek will not, however, be in those goods from nature, in which kind we 
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count intelligence, memory, bravery and the rest, and which are called the first things of nature by 
the Aristotelians. For we do not rest in those things as if at the ultimate finishing line of the race 
but, supported by them, we hasten to something greater. So the virtues acquired from the first 
things of nature can show us what we seek. Not those virtues which are devoted to life and morals, 
for they are full of toil and are devoted to purging the soul like certain propitiatory rites, but rather 
those virtues with which we duly speculate. But, you might ask, the virtues devoted to the cognition 
of earthly things too? This cognition certainly strives to make us happy, but it is not able to do 
enough for our minds. Nothing is more eager than our minds, which never rest, never set aside the 
carefulness of investigation, unless they attain that highest good – incorporeal, uncreated, 
dependent on nothing – on which everything depends, which we call the cause, the origin, the 
fount and beginning of everything. Since the cognition of the highest good, filled with darkness, 
with obscurity, with ambiguity, and finally with apprehension, offers itself to our souls while they 
are confined in the blind prison of the body, Plato denies that we can be happy unless, after having 
been unfettered from terrestrial chains, we have returned free into our true nature. For how could 
the highest good be where there is no clear understanding of things, nor any rest in the soul? 
Gradually, if I am not mistaken, a case has been made that the highest good is proven 
incontestably to rest in God alone. Even if this is clear and obvious to those considering the matter 
more carefully, the Platonists were nonetheless accustomed to prove it with plentiful and powerful 
arguments. Since I understand that, a little later, Battista will come to the Christian theologians 
having abandoned the philosophers (he already hastens along the route on which he knew to 
proceed), I will pass over them all. For everything he adduces to explain their Christian view on the 
ends of the good flows from this one source. I think in general that the opinions of the Platonists 
and the Christians on this matter, and the proof of these opinions, are the same. For who out of all 
the Greeks thinks more divinely about divine power? So although everywhere they call Plato θειον, 
they do not call Aristotle θειον, but δαιμονιον, because he was turned most keenly to natural 
philosophy. The divine Augustine says it was mainly for this reason that he chose the Platonists for 
himself out of all philosophers because he thought that they should be considered superior to the 
others to the extent that their opinions were more correct about God. So our souls will finally be 
happiest when, free from the bodily contagion of all things, they contemplate God alone. For this 
reason, when, in the book titled Phaedrus, Plato speaks about the happy life which the souls enjoy in 
heaven, he affirms that they are nourished by the contemplation of truth, from which they obtain a 
kind of unparalleled joy. He thinks that the truth is like a fertile and abundant pasture and that, if 
well cultivated, it will produce contemplation itself as the best crop, so to speak, and that the joy by 
which souls are sustained flows eternally from the two of them. “In fact,” he says, “there is a great 
impulse to consider where the field of truth is. For food suitable for the soul grows from it and the 
nature of the wings by which the soul is elevated is nourished by it”. For Plato thinks that our souls 
return to the heavens by means of a twofold class of virtues as if by two wings: the virtues which 
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consist in action and those which consist in investigation. When they have returned to the heavens, 
two rewards are given: one the contemplation of the truth like the sweetest ambrosia; the other a 
joy absolute in its perfection, in which they are saturated as if in nectar. These are his words in the 
same book, unless memory fails us: “But when the chariot has returned, leading the horses to the 
stable he holds forth ambrosia and, in addition to that, nectar to drink”. Do you see through such a 
great philosophical author that our souls will finally be happy when, returned to heaven, they are 
permitted to enjoy God? Not to enjoy Him in such a way that the soul enjoys its own body for 
itself (for they are joined not only by their position in space, but also as a whole) nor, on the 
contrary, like a friend enjoys a friend. For although in a true friendship a great and perpetual 
harmony flourishes, and the will of the friends should appear to be entirely the same, friends are 
still neither the same nor circumscribed in the same place. But the soul clings to God in such a way 
that, although it is not the same in essence, it is not separated from him by any distance. So, just as 
the eye enjoys the light by which it can see everything, and it enjoys it in such a way that, although 
the the eye is something different from light, it is nevertheless not separated from the light by any 
interval, so too do our souls enjoy God, always clinging to Him. 
Since, at the same time, we will see God and we will perceive from that vision (so to speak) the 
joy which, as I said a little earlier, is the greatest of all, many have questioned which of the two is of 
more importance to the happy life. The more brilliant Platonists are of the opinion that the vision 
takes precedence over the joy. For who doubts that the ultimate end always corresponds to the 
Prime Mover? And who, again, cannot see that the Prime Mover in the soul is the intellect? For the 
will is moved by the intellect. So the highest good will be in the intellect, rather than in joy. Add to 
these things that, when the human highest good is sought, it will be better placed in the part of the 
soul which is common to us with the incorporeal and divine minds, than in that which almost 
makes us equal to other minds. Reason renders us most similar to the angels, but in our appetite we 
do not differ from beasts. So the highest good should not be located in the will, but in reason. If 
you like, add this too. Since all motion is toward the good, and that the nature which carries us 
toward future good is the same nature in the good which is already present and which rests having 
attained what it sought, as if in its particular place, it follows that, just as motion holds itself to the 
future good, so too does rest hold itself to the good which is already present. We do not call 
something good because our nature is moved toward it but, on the contrary, we call it our nature to 
be moved to the good, because it is already established to be good. For no object, no end, no cause 
depends on the power which provokes movement, but the opposite. The reasoning is the same 
about present good too. For who will be so dull in judgment that he concludes: “This must be a 
good, because I am resting in it?”. Rather: because right reason decided that this is already a good, 
the mind itself therefore rests in it calmly and with pleasure. Fire flies up into its own higher nature 
and, having reached this boundary it rests, since it has now conformed to its its good. This is not 
fire’s peculiar good because it was carried up to it, but because it is moved by its nature to pursue it. 
272 
 
All these things lead us to conclude that it is not rest itself – whether you would prefer to call it 
either joy or pleasure – that is the highest good, but something else, which compels us to unite with 
it because it is good and grants us rest when it is finally reached.  
This is roughly what the Platonists think about the highest good, but they do so with far more 
evidence. But since all this happens in such an exalted height, there are some who question whether 
mortals can ascend all the way to such sublimity. Plato answers this question easily. For he proves 
that nothing is more characteristic of nature than to permeate everything it creates and to impart 
itself to the things that share in it, to the extent that they are receptive. For water does not 
transform air into itself to destroy air. If it were to strive for the destruction of things nature would 
not be the best, as all acknowledge, but rather the worst. Water does not therefore intend to destroy 
the air, but to draw the air to itself so that it assumes the form of water. So since it is characteristic 
of nature that it pours itself out abundantly and pervades everything, it will surely be the duty of the 
good that, following nature’s lead, it imparts itself to everything that shares in it. So while he still 
praises that good which touches one person, Aristotle nevertheless rightly thinks that the good 
which extends to the whole community – or, rather, the race of humanity – is more beautiful and 
divine. What else does prudence want for itself other than to best take care of the many? What does 
justice demand other than that everything is devoted to common benefit? Doesn’t fortitude exhort 
us to certain death for the welfare of others? Last of all, doesn’t temperance deter us lest we enjoy 
desire at the expense of another? So, conclude: that which nature greatly strives for, should be 
thought of as being greatly in accordance with nature. Since nature desires to exercise its faculty for 
others, it will be this faculty that especially conforms with nature. If you grant this, you should also 
concede that, since the first duty of the good is to follow nature unerringly, the good primarily 
exists so that it pours itself abundantly into all. If this is particular to the good, it will be more 
particular to the better, but especially to the best. And God is the best of all. Now you see what 
follows. Moreover, what each thing delivers to others, it must first have it in itself. That which you 
do not have yourself, you will never give to another. But God gave all things a desire to pour 
themselves into other things. So He too will have this quality in Himself, and in just as much a 
greater degree in him as that to which he excels over everything he has brought forth. But since He 
excels infinitely, this same quality is infinite in him, so to speak. 
I seem to have touched upon these things rather than explained them properly, because neither 
the weakness of my intelligence nor the shortness of time allowed them to be discussed more 
broadly and more copiously. So, I have left out and neglected a lot. You understand, Lorenzo, that 
the things I said were recounted more feebly and obscurely than was warranted either by the dignity 
of the subject or by your most patient ears. Ask Leon if you think that anything was lacking on this 
important matter.’ 
‘On the contrary,’ said Battista, ‘you have presented your disputation on these things clearly and 
precisely, Marsilio, and seeing that such a speech needed to be joined together out of many and 
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varied elements, you have progressed in order. So unless Lorenzo thinks otherwise, we shall return 
to the Christians.’ 
‘Yes, to that very point,’ said Lorenzo, ‘for Marsilio both satisfied me with his clear and 
transparent way of speaking and delighted me with his great brevity.’ 
‘So the one opinion of the Christians,’ said Battista, ‘is that God is the ultimate and final of all 
the goods. But in that opinion originates some controversy, because there are those who propose 
that the ends of the good are in divine speculation, among whom it is easy to see that the leaders 
are Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. In the same way there are those who propose that the 
task is not concluded in speculation, but in the love which is felt from it. Scotus, who they call 
Subtilis, and Occam, Alexander too, and Nicolaus of Lyra, think that we are granted happiness in 
this joy, which comes to us from the perception of truth. But lest I should perhaps represent so 
excellent a subject too drily, I will discuss something a little more profound, but in brief until the 
matter is clearly evident (and it nevertheless takes away the tedium of longer disputations). 
So, in the first place, the Christians claim that God is not only good, but also the good of all 
good. Unless I am mistaken, they establish this using the following method. The perfection of every 
single thing is said to be nothing other than its goodness. For if by chance you were to ask me what 
virtue itself is, I would respond (rightly, I think) that virtue is that which renders a thing absolute 
and perfect in what it is. Who doesn’t know that virtue of a horse brings it to pass that the horse is 
good and does its job perfectly? So the virtue of a horse will be the perfection and completion of 
the horse. For we call that which has already attained its own virtue perfect and absolute. So 
whatever we call good, we think it worthy of that name because it has been perfected in every way. 
But since God has been so perfected that he encompasses with His perfection the perfections of 
everything, so too does he encompass all other kinds of goodness, so to speak, with his goodness. 
He is therefore the good of all goods. Moreover, when we say that a thing is like something else, we 
say so, if I am not mistaken, because it bears some likeness to that which is its essence. I ask: what 
sort of wall is this?. You respond: a white one. How so? Because, of course, it possesses something 
similar to that essence which we call whiteness. When you concede this, you must also concede that 
it is God alone who is good in His essence, and all other things are not good in their essence, but to 
the extent that they achieve some similarity with the divine essence called good. So if we conclude 
correctly here, nothing should be called good except that which has some similarity to the divine 
good. So God will be the good of all good. Add too that, if each thing is worthwhile on account of 
no other reason except for its end, for which we strive, and if in the same way the principle of good 
is contained in itself alone, and we strive for it because it is worthwhile, then whatever is called 
good is rightly called good either because it is an end or because it is determined towards an end. 
But if it should be the case that it is not only a particular end but the ultimate end, it will indeed be 
that from which everything else receives the principle of the good. That is God, as I showed a little 
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earlier. God is therefore the good of all goods. So when God promised to show himself to Moses 
He said “I will show all good to you”. 
If you agree that these things are true, I will show that God is the highest good using the same 
method. For the good which extends itself to the whole world surpasses that good which extends 
to just some part. And it has already been demonstrated that this good is God. So God is the 
highest good. Add also this: that which is called something on account of its essence is better 
named than if it is not called something on account of its essence, but rather through a certain 
participation, as I have said. You will find nothing other than God that is called good on account of 
its essence. I will say something else too. That which is the greatest in some class is properly said to 
be the cause of other things which are in the same class but inferior to it. For the cause must 
necessarily be more powerful than the effects of the cause. But who will deny what was proved a 
little earlier by clear arguments and without any difficulty? Who, I say, shall deny that everything 
that exists draws its relationship to the good from God? 
With this, if I am not mistaken, we have conducted our speech so that it is quite clear that the 
highest good of humanity is God. So even if it seems that, in the continuing course of the 
disputation, there are many things on the same subject which are still to be explained, I nonetheless 
think – and it shall only happen with your consent – that, in a brief digression, I should return to 
the things which occupied the place of the highest good in the opinion of various people. Having 
refuted these things and, by righteously engaging them in battle, having expelled them from an 
occupation which they did not claim for themselves fairly, but rather invaded with the greatest 
violence, I will return to the disputation at the place from which I now digress. Lest perhaps these 
things seem to be more numerous than there are, I will use the following division, which abides in 
common parlance. All things which were named good are either called goods of the body, like 
toughness, health, pleasure, beauty; or goods of fortune – since they were situated by an accident of 
fortune – in which number are held nobility, wealth, honours, glory; or finally goods of the soul, 
which is virtue itself. In showing the first two types shown to be false we do not only have fighting 
alongside us the Christian theologians, whom we follow, but every profound thinker from 
philosophy itself. 
Let us begin with pleasure, whose enticements allure the senses so much that in many they 
corrupt the judgment. What school of philosophy do you find – with a few excepted: not in those 
schools of higher breeding, as they say, but in those of the plebs! – that does not declare that the 
battle with it is like the battle against a pernicious plague? With what thunderbolts did Plato drive it 
away just as the second race of Titans were driven to deepest Tartarus! Plato was constantly saying 
that we should remember that pleasures are brief and do not leave anything after themselves other 
than repentance. Pleasure cannot be good, he says, because we hold it in common with the beasts, 
and more wickedness than virtue results from it because pleasure is changeable and in constant 
motion, but good must be stable. Add to these arguments that the good never obstructs the good, 
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but there is nothing which hinders the virtues more than pleasure. For it causes the greatest 
detriment to humans, producing ignorance, disturbance, stupidity, petulance. Whom do you find to 
be so corrupt that they think pleasure worthy either of praise or of other veneration? No one has 
ever been so devoted to pleasures nor has loved them so much that he has not made the greatest 
efforts to conceal them. Why is this? Because pleasures are ugly and disgraceful in the opinion of 
libertines too. But you will find nothing more praiseworthy than good, nothing more honourable. 
So the pleasures are not good. For, by its nature, the good strives for the common benefit of the 
human race, which a little earlier Marsilio showed to be true for the virtues. But pleasure, 
applauding only itself and the senses, does not want to undergo any inconvenience at all for the 
sake of other people. And I beseech you, can we rightly say that anything is good for us that is 
neither innate to our nature nor produced by our effort? Can you say that either of these things 
applies to pleasure? Neither, surely. For the human being is nothing other, if you believe anything 
in the philosopher whose arguments we have advanced, the human being is nothing, I say, in the 
author Plato, beyond mind and reason. You say: what of the body? A prison and fetter of the soul. 
The cruelest attendants of the body are the senses. Immortal god, with what schemes do they attack 
us, what snares do they set up, entangled by which we are hindered from returning to heaven, our 
ancient homeland! Pleasure is neither acquired by our effort nor originates from reason but, having 
appeared in the feebleness of the senses (which a little earlier were shown to be the most fearsome 
enemies to us) it always opposes the highest good. Above all, what is characteristic of the good is 
that it wants to preserve whole and uninjured, according to its nature, that for which it is a good – 
for we see that the moral virtues preserve souls so that they are untainted by everything harmful to 
themselves – and that it inspires that for which it is a good to something greater or more divine – a 
purpose served by the virtues devoted to the cognition of the truth. Pleasure is inimical to both 
tasks. So pleasure should not be counted among the goods. And Socrates shows very wisely that 
the nature of goods and evils is contrary, so that we easily slip into evil. For, as Terence’s Simon 
says, “great is the inclination of all men from labour to lust”. But the road of virtue is difficult, 
steep and rugged and full of toil. So good would be extinguished entirely by evil, if there were not a 
medicine for such a destructive disease: for evils always disagree amongst themselves, they never 
unite, never agree. For fear persuades one, rashness or boldness another. What the wasteful 
pursues, the miser thoroughly dreads. But virtue is the greatest harmony of all. For it is the same 
destination to which prudence leads, justice encourages, fortitude impels, temperance persuades. 
Evils are dissonant, goods harmonise. So into which category should you place pleasures, when you 
will not find anything that fights against itself more than they do? I add this too. It is necessary that 
an efficient cause and the effects which are caused by it are related. But from pleasures come many 
disturbances, which constantly afflict and devour the soul like tortures. So pleasures are not good, 
but the very worst things. Since they violently corrupt judgment and produce ignorance, no one 
should be considered more unlearned than one who thinks that they are not the origin of all evils. 
276 
 
For people are ensnared by them as if they were stuck fixed on a nail and, blinded by such great 
shadows, they cannot escape what they know to be evil. The raving Ovidian Medea is not foolish in 
her lamentation. She suffers because although she sees and values what is better, she is nevertheless 
held back in such a way that she is compelled to strive for what is worse. So these are a few things 
which seemed as though they should be collected from the many powerful arguments of Plato at 
this point. 
But the Aristotelians, and many of the Christian theologians, argue as follows. First they argue 
that pleasure was not invented by nature for its own sake, but for the sake of activities from which 
pleasure itself originates. Someone thirsty drinks with pleasure, someone starving dines with 
pleasure, and sex does not occur without pleasure. Otherwise, if pleasure were removed, we would 
be made indifferent to both the former and the latter activities, and would therefore die from 
pleasure’s absence and leave no one who could take our place. So they declare that if the action of 
pleasure – on account of which nature has established pleasure – does not strive for its own sake 
but for the sake of something else, then it is far less the case that pleasure itself strives for its own 
sake too. But food and drink and, likewise, engaging in venereal matters have not been established 
by nature for their own sake, but for the sake of something else. For the latter has been provided to 
preserve the human race, the former two so that one who feasts lives healthily. So pleasure is not 
sought for its own sake, so it is not the highest good. 
Add this too. When we seek the end of human good, what we propose must be characteristic of 
humanity in such a way that it not in common with other animals. But pleasure is in common with 
everything in which there is sense. I think, however, that we say that the highest good is that which 
is the most perfected and most excellent in human nature. If it is, it cannot by any means be 
situated in anything by which we are joined to the far worse and inferior, because there is no debate 
that the end must be superior to the thing which is directed to that end. But who does not know 
that pleasure is from the senses? And, likewise, who does not know that we have the senses in 
common with the beasts? Understand something that can convince even anyone who is stupid: that 
which is not a good unless it is circumscribed to some extent by certain limits of moderation is not 
a good by its nature, but receives what is good from the limits by which it moderates itself. But no 
one approves of pleasure unless it is moderated. So when Epicurus grants preeminence to 
pleasures, he still does not venture to call them the highest good unless all the virtues accompany 
them as lackeys and maidservants and, as excellent governesses of living, they curtail certain 
boundless desires which are neither necessary nor natural. For he saw that, if the pleasures were to 
proceed freely and with no other restriction present, they would be as sicknesses are to us, leading 
to the greatest detriment and greatest turpitude, then to the gravest dangers, and, ultimately, to 
death. So pleasures are not good according to their own nature. But the highest good must be. For 
what is good of its own accord is greatly and extensively superior to all the other goods which are 
277 
 
not good for themselves, but for the sake of other things. But what about you, Lorenzo? Don’t you 
think that what has been said up to this point has been powerful enough to discount the pleasures?’ 
‘Quite enough,’ said Lorenzo, ‘for there is nothing more powerful than those arguments for 
conquering utterly the ideas of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. And I recently scrutinised Marsilio’s 
book on pleasure that he wrote for Antonio Canigiani when still an adolescent, from which, if I am 
not mistaken, no subject which is often discussed in this debate is missing.’ 
‘Indeed,’ said Antonio, ‘it conscripted venerable learning and an old man’s prudence at a 
youthful age. For, with the question posed incisively in the manner of the Academics, he argues 
each side in such a way that, with battle arranged between the supporters of pleasure and the others 
who disagree with them, he commits the philosophers to the fiercest combat. Although at one 
point it seems that, for the Platonists and the Aristotelians and all who support the portico, the 
army is reduced to its reserves, they still finally throw the ranks of the enemy into disorder and 
force those who were driven from their position to turn their backs in retreat.’670 
‘So,’ said Battista, ‘the battle lines should not be drawn anew against those conquered. Having 
overcome pleasure, we will vanquish honours with a brief skirmish. For who does not understand 
that what is good for the sake of something else and what strives for the sake of something else 
cannot be the highest good? To be specific, no one seeks honour for itself because all acknowledge 
that it is the reward of virtue and is owed to the good alone. But whether people are good or evil, 
they nevertheless want to be affirmed and esteemed as good. Since they want this, they are 
extraordinarily delighted and gladdened that honours follow, because they can present them as 
though they were witnesses of their own virtues. This is the reason that we desire above all to be 
bestowed with honour by those who are in a certain rank and are wise. So Naevius’s Hector did not 
enjoy being praised in itself, but being praised by a man who was praised. Add to this that the 
highest good has been established by nature to be like the truth, such that achieving it has been 
placed within our ability. For, if we had been created in such a way that we should not be allowed 
happiness even when we strive for it with all our vigour, one could imagine nothing more wretched 
than a human being nor anything more hateful than nature. And no one disputes that honours are 
not granted according to the will of those who receive them, but according to the will of those who 
award them. You might also have remembered something else. What is called the highest good 
must surely be perfect and be accumulated from parts which are themselves all perfect. So it admits 
no evil. Evil cannot exist in a person in whom no evil is present. Yet it is very often that someone 
more wicked is bestowed with a greater honour. How many tyrants, when they have placed the 
harshest yoke of servitude on the necks of the nation, do we see honoured with the titles and 
decorations which are owed to a promoter of freedom! How many citizens have attained 
magistracies through the most turbulent uprisings on account of which, if the laws had not been 
                                                          




suppressed by arms, they deserved to have been put to death! What did Sulla, what did Marius do 
to deserve such good treatment from the republic, when the former acquired a seventh consulate 
after a sixth in which he exercised every kind of cruelty on the citizenry, every impiety on the 
nation; and the latter was made eternal dictator after he raged like a savage beast against all order? I 
would be too verbose if I now referred to all those leaders called the Caesars, who still attained 
divine honours beyond the human ones, after they had not only cast off all humanity, but had been 
transformed into some hideous and hitherto unheard-of monsters (by what execrable Circe I know 
not!). Through these examples it is easy to see how far honours are removed from those things we 
seek. 
If honour is not the highest good, then neither is glory. For glory is favourable opinion about 
someone that is frequent and attended with praise. But why do we desire to live with a 
distinguished reputation – that is, to be known by many people or, preferably, by all of them if 
possible – unless we seek honours? People do not see that the thing that knows is worthy of greater 
praise than the thing that is known. For nothing occupies so low and so base a position in the 
scheme of things that it is not known, whether it is animate or inanimate. But the capacity to know is 
possessed only by a certain more noble animal. So glory will not be the highest good, especially 
because we do not seek glory for its own sake, but so that we may gain praise from it. For in those 
things which are not worthy of praise, no one wants to be conspicuous, but to be unknown. 
If honour and glory are not goods, how can we now say that wealth a good? Why should wealth 
be sought unless you put it to use? So it is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of its 
benefit. Moreover, that which is the highest good demands by its nature that it is preserved as much 
as possible and is not allowed to dissipate. But I do not see what riches confer unless they are 
distributed for the use of yourself, your own and – according to one’s inclination – for the benefit 
of others.  
And it will not be difficult for us at this point to discount political power or authority and 
sovereignty. One the one hand these things are subject to the whim of fortune and always in flux, 
and, on the other, they are acquired by sedition, fraud and murder, and are constantly supplanted by 
the same methods. But suppose that they are justly acquired and justly administered. Are they not 
full of anxiety, toils and dangers so that no one, in any way healthy in mind, does not know that it is 
much more agreeable to be well-ruled than to rule well? 
Those things remain which are called the goods of the body. They are of this sort: health, 
strength, speed, beauty and those things obtained which are similar to them. I do not understand at 
all what solidity these things can have – that is, the solidity in which the goods that we seek reside 
pleasantly in peace – because they are fleeting and liable to many misfortunes. Is it not the case that 
whatever powers or dignity the body has are all derived from the soul? So do you think that the 
goods of the soul should not be preferred to the goods of the body? How can these goods be called 
ours, which we do not only have in common with other animals, but in each of which we may be 
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surpassed by many of them: the eagle sees more sharply, the same power is also in the lynx, the 
boar hears further, the dog smells more keenly, as does the vulture? Whoever does not know that 
they are surpassed by many beasts in the powers, speed and stature of the body certainly does not 
know themself. When you ponder all these things diligently, you will conclude that nothing is 
further from the highest good. 
Now, with the rest refuted, we come to the goods of the soul, which have been established by 
us as the third type. We will see what these are clearly if we show that the power of the human 
mind is threefold: for there is the power with which it creates; there is likewise the power with 
which it acts; and finally there is the power with which it speculates. Skill is applied in creating 
things, for this is the right reason of creating things. Prudence is the guide for our actions, from 
which justice, fortitude and temperance learn their functions. In the investigation of the truth, if we 
seek first principles, intelligence is our guide, but if we seek those things which proceed from the first 
principles, scientific knowledge. Finally wisdom, although it embraces both intelligence and science, is yet 
something third.  
If we consider skill, we will conclude that it is certainly not the ultimate end. For what can be an 
end when its cognition is directed towards an end? It is the work which is produced by skill that we 
call the end of skill. For example, the end of that skill which is in the architect Daedalus is the 
labyrinth. I do not understand how such works can be ends of life for us because all of them are 
made for various uses in human life, whereas no human being was produced by nature for the sake 
of creating works.  
Neither will you find the highest good among the virtues of the soul which pertain to life and 
morals. For if the virtues are such ends, they will surely be sought for their own sake and will not be 
directed to another end. This is not the case. Take a moral principle from them and then infer what 
follows! Do you want fortitude, and especially that fortitude which is devoted to war and battle? Do 
they seek it for its own sake? Ask our Federigo da Montefeltro, I beg; ask the commander of his 
divisions; ask whoever gives orders in his army; finally, ask each knight and footsoldier whom he 
leads into battle. None of them says that they seek fortitude because it must be sought for itself, but 
rather they seek it so that victory is obtained against enemies and that one can pass time safely in 
leisure with them conquered. But what of justice, what of temperance? Do they not do the same 
thing, so that we can live in peace, together and with other people? It is therefore clear that they are 
not sought for their own sake, but so that the soul is rendered purified of all sin. Nor is prudence 
able to offer us a highest good, since it dwells not in true investigation, but in governing civil 
actions.’ 
When Battista had said these things, Lorenzo said, ‘I have listened to you most attentively for a 
long time. I have seen that you have not only refuted those things which have been long since 
refuted by the most illustrious philosophers, but also you deny that we are made happy by those 
virtues which the most profound Stoics did not only consider to be the highest but also the only 
280 
 
good. So now that you have cast down the goods both of fortune and of the body and you have 
not entrusted so great a responsibility to the virtues which concern life and morals, proceed, I beg, 
and explain at length where our mind comes to rest, as if at the finishing line.’ 
‘I will resume in the same place, then,’ said Battista, ‘from which the disputation on the highest 
good digressed. Since it is already established that God is the highest good, the rest will be 
explained easily. And this first of all. For since God is the highest good, what kind of difficulty will 
it be to prove that he is also the highest good for a human? For whatever something does, it has 
been demonstrated that it does it for the reason of some good. So do you concede this, lest, as it is 
in the proverb, we open a closed case?’ 
‘Indeed I do’ said Lorenzo. 
‘So,’ said Battista, ‘no one doubts that such a good is humanity’s end. For everything that exists 
and acts directs its own activity to some end. We say that an end is that by which, when it is 
acquired, the appetite is satisfied in such a way that it seeks nothing else. But every appetite is 
satisfied by the good. So if we conclude that it is correctly called an end because if it is absent we 
desire it, and if it is present we delight and find satisfaction in it, then it is easy to see that 
everything has the same end and perfection. For anything that lacks its perfection is carried towards 
that perfection – either by the impulse of unerring nature itself or by its own sense and its reason – 
until it arrives, and when it has arrived, it rests willingly in it. I think, then, that I have shown clearly 
enough that everything strives for its own end and that same end is also the good.’ 
‘Indeed you have,’ said Lorenzo, ‘and I understand plainly from this what you want to 
accomplish. For if the good and the end are the same, who does not see that it is the highest end 
because it is the highest good?’ 
‘Your conclusion is excellent,’ said Battista, ‘but understand this too: when there are many and 
varied ends for the same thing, all other ends must refer to the ultimate end. In order to make this 
clearer I will demonstrate it with a brief example. Philip the doctor puts the health of a sickening 
Alexander as his end. This will be like an ultimate end to which all others are referred, in order that 
the king can be in good health. Philip therefore reads closely the learning which has been handed 
down by Hippocrates. But for what purpose? So that, of course, he can discover which would be 
the best medicine to give him. When this is discovered, the medicine is given to Alexander, with the 
plan being that, by causing the bile in the king to flow out, the medicine purges him. What is the 
purpose of this deed other than that, with the bile drawn off, the heat of the fever can be 
extinguished? Nor is this done for its own sake, but in order that that Alexander may return to his 
former health. If the doctor fulfils this aim, he will have reached the point at which nothing else is 
sought other than for its own sake, and so he rests in it. Do you see that all the other inferior ends 
originate in this ultimate end, so to speak? So, for the same reason, the good is varied and manifold, 
which, dispersed into its different grades as if into many rivulets, flows back to God, the highest 
good, as if to the source and origin of all goods. It does not escape me that those philosophers who 
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have addressed this matter in disputation more precisely have often demonstrated it with numerous 
arguments. But we cannot pursue all of them in an improvised disputation. 
I will not, however, omit one point. For, since we have set God as the ultimate end of 
everything, it is of great interest to many how this fact should be understood. We will not go astray 
if we call God the ultimate end insofar as he is the first cause of all action. For the other ends 
cannot be the first cause of all action, but rather they are what is caused by it, because they are 
brought about through the action of that which acts. So it is wrong to say that the end itself – that 
is, God – is something brought about, but rather it is something which preexists. Moreover, if 
anything acts for the sake of a thing which already exists so that something is brought about by that 
action, it comes to pass that it acquires something of the thing for which it was done. Soldiers who 
achieve victory fighting fiercely at the order of the commander, accomplish that victory for the 
commander. But no work of ours, nor of anything else is acquired by God, since He is so utterly 
complete that nothing else can be added to Him. For work is apportioned to its end to the same 
extent that whatever is acting acts to that end. But God, who is established to be the end of all 
things which already act, does not act in such a way that he acquires anything for himself by the 
action, but in order that he may impart to others. With all of this I have demonstrated that all 
things which are in God are moved to His end, so to speak, not in order that they add something to 
God (which cannot happen) but so that they reach him as the ultimate end of all things. If, 
therefore, everything produced by God is rendered similar to God to the extent by which it 
acquires the divine good, then the ultimate goal of all things will be to render themselves similar to 
God. But since that which has regard for the end must be good, everything will strive to render 
itself similar to God to the extent that it is good. Why am I saying this? So that you understand, of 
course, that if whatever is created flows back to God as though towards its origin, then the mind 
must also do the same, but strive in some more excellent way by virtue of its powers, that is, so that 
it understands Him through its activity. For, in this way, if anything of the essence of God falls into 
our cognition we can draw somewhat closer to it. 
There are those present who could confirm what I have said. For each thing, its end is its 
peculiar activity. To know is the peculiar activity of the human mind. You see what follows. 
Because, if it is, what is most perfect in this activity will be the ultimate end. Since operations 
receive a quality from their objects, the operation will be more excellent than that object, because 
each subject is more excellent than its object. But out of everything which enters the mind, nothing 
is more excellent than God. So the highest good consists in the cognition of God. But listen also to 
this! A little earlier I showed that everything strives for divine similitude as its own end. But the 
human mind is rendered most similar to God by its intelligence. Out of everything, there is nothing 
which is sought more than the highest good, and the human mind delights in nothing so much as 
the cognition of divine things. For although our little intellects, when they are directed towards that 
light, are like owls in the sun, we nonetheless make far more of what we perceive, however small it 
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is, than if we were to hold a complete and precise cognition of all other things. For we desire it, we 
love it, we enjoy it. If even those things lacking reason, even those things lacking sense strive for 
similarity to God as the highest good, then each thing better approaches its own goal the more it is 
rendered similar to God. But nothing is more similar to God in all of creation than the mind. So, 
through the mind we are rendered similar to God. But the mind bears a certain resemblance to God 
not through what it can know on account of its nature, but through what it knows. If you ponder all 
these arguments properly, they lead to this point: that the highest good of humanity is in the 
supreme action of the mind. That is to say, through wisdom itself one can know God, as far as it is 
possible. 
Gradually and in order, unless I am mistaken, our enquiry on the ends of the good has extended 
from a humble and dejected place to heaven itself, where it can rest easily as if in its own natural 
position. For in the lowest depths we left Aristippus, Eudoxus and Epicurus thrown to the ground, 
and not much higher also left Hieronymus of Rhodes, who loved either idleness or the first things 
of nature without virtue. I dared say nothing about the Peripatetics and the Stoics and the Cynics 
that was not respectful. For if the things they teach could not deliver people from great and 
numerous misfortunes, nor from what is distressing, they nonetheless instruct us in such a way that 
we will still proceed a great distance, enduring misery with an unconquered soul even if we cannot 
reach the highest good. But, since they cannot guide us to the place we want to reach, we leave 
them behind. We can do this without any danger. For we have already found the most reliable 
guides, following whom we have now reached the pinnacle of nature, that is, we can rest in God 
Himself. 
Since we do not only reach the divine essence by thinking, but we also strive for it and love it 
and enjoy loving it, all of which are situated in the will, it is rightly asked amongst the theologians 
whether the highest good should be placed in cognition itself or, rather, in the will. So an extensive 
and varied battle is aroused, and is fought by each side with such force that its final outcome would 
seem uncertain. Those theologians who think the highest good is stationed in the will, or love, 
usually try to speak for the defence in the following way. Since the object of the will is the good – 
which, as we have already shown, is the same as our end – but the truth which is presented to the 
mind is not called true because it is our end, but because the good is, it should therefore be clear 
that we do not achieve our ultimate end by the effort of the mind, but by the operation of the will. 
Moreover, we say pleasure is that which most abundantly perfects and completes an activity, just as 
we say youth is perfected by beauty. But a perfected activity is rightly called an end, and we attain it 
because we use our will rather than our mind. They also add this. According to the tacit consensus 
of all people, the ultimate end cannot be attained through any learning, so it is attained by the 
guidance of nature. But many desire pleasure over wisdom by nature. So it seems that the end 
should be called pleasure rather than cognition. Moreover, no one doubts that the supreme end of 
all the powers of the soul is that which seeks the most excellent and most superior. But it appears 
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that the will is the more excellent of these powers, because the intellect is moved towards an end by 
its work. Only when it already strives for something does the intellect reflect on that very act which, 
up to this point, had commanded it with its power. So the will is superior. Moreover, all 
acknowledge that the highest good must be situated in something through whose goodness the 
whole person is called entirely good. But through the volition to good, the whole person is called 
simply good. One can add to these arguments that the highest good seems most to consist in our 
enjoyment of the highest good itself. So Augustine says, in the book he wrote on the Christian 
religion, that the highest reward is that we might enjoy God. But he says “to enjoy” not because we 
think, but because we use the will. 
Those who ascribe the principle of the highest good to the will rely on these arguments and 
many more. Their opponents, who place the highest good in cognition, advance their arguments 
too, but this one foremost. Since we seek the end of the good for the form which is the mind, we 
will surely think that this end is what is most peculiar to it. But how can we say that the appetite is 
peculiar to our mind, since all learned men now share the opinion that the appetite is in all things? 
All things possess it, not in some particular way, but in different ones, seeing that they do not 
perceive in the same way. Those things which lack cognition entirely are said to be carried by this 
appetite, which is called the natural appetite. All heavy things are are carried downward by it, and 
the light things upwards. But the appetite impinges upon the things which make use of the senses 
through the senses alone. It is through this sensual appetite that every living creature both 
appropriates those things which are beneficial to it and escapes those which are harmful. But in 
those things in which reason flourishes as well as the senses, the appetite – unless it wants to be 
hostile – conforms to reason and we call this the will. So since the will is indeed an appetite, how 
far can it be peculiar only to the human mind? But the intellect is peculiar to the human mind by its 
nature, so the highest good of the human mind is in the intellect. Moreover, for all the powers of 
the mind which are activated by their objects, these objects must by nature be prior to any action of 
such powers. A body causes the eye to be sprinkled with colour, and so such colour will be prior to 
the vision produced in the the eye. For a mover is by nature prior to that which agitated by its 
movement. But the will is such a power. For that which is worthy of being desired arouses the 
appetite. So the object of the will precedes the action of the will. If you concede this, you will also 
concede that the act of the will cannot be what we want first of all. But what we want first of all is 
the highest good. So the will shall not be the highest good. Likewise, in all forces which are capable 
of being converted into acts, their act is directed first at its object, through which it is realised itself. 
How will our mind know that it knows, unless it has first known something else? I will only know 
that I know you are my friend after I have first known that you are my friend. To know that the 
intellect knows is itself to know some object. So we arrive at the prime intellect itself, which is not 
the act of knowing, but rather a faculty through which something can be known. For the same 
reason, the first thing to which we direct the will is not itself an act of the will, but some other 
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good. But the first thing to which we direct the will by nature of being endowed with reason is the 
highest good, for we direct the will for the sake of some other object to which we direct the will. So 
the highest good is not in the act of the will. There is also another argument of these theologians. 
Everyone, by their nature, possesses virtue from the things which constitute their essence. How else 
does a corpse differ from a human, other than because it lacks what constitutes the human essence? 
But, as far as the will is concerned, there is no difference between true happiness and false 
happiness. Nor does the will behave any differently when desiring, loving and enjoying that which it 
thinks good, however false it is, than if it is entirely true. What is true or false is already known 
through the intellect, not through the will. So, on account of its essence, the highest good is better 
positioned in the intellect than in the will. They also maintain this too. If the will were to impart the 
highest good to us, it would be in the form of either desire or love or joy, because the will is divided 
into these three things and cannot be anything else. But how can we call desire the end of the good? 
Desire is for something absent, which we ardently wish to be present. For desire drives you towards 
that which you have not yet attained. Just as we would never call someone who had not yet reached 
the finishing line the winner in a chariot competition, even if he were first in the race, so will we not 
call someone happy who has not yet gratified their wish, even if their desire of acquiring it were 
very great. Love would make us no more happy. Often we love that which is absent, for the desire 
of acquiring what has not yet been acquired is aroused by love. And how can we situate the highest 
good in joy, when it must be an end to which all other things are directed, but it is never directed to 
itself? We see that joy is, by its nature, roused for the sake of its own actions, as we have previously 
shown in the refutation of pleasure. Add, if you like, that just as desire seems to drive to attain 
something, so too does joy return itself to quiet and tranquility so that you rest in that which you 
have already attained. We see that heavy things are carried to the lowest point by their nature, at 
which they do not avoid resting. But this rest is not an end, but something in which they want to be 
a participant at what is their end. 
It would take me longer than is necessary for undertaking this speech if I were now to relate all 
the arguments in order through which some assert that the highest good consists in the will for the 
good and others that it consists in the cognition of the truth. But there were some of a third type, 
who did not entrust the whole matter to either the cognition or the will alone, because – as they 
thought – neither could accomplish it separately. Instead, they wanted to render us most 
abundantly happy by joining both of them. This is the argument they advance above all. They say 
that, just as actions are, so to speak, devoted to what makes us happy to the same degree, so too do 
those actions establish happiness in equal measure to each other. The intellect and the will are such 
actions. For we love God to the extent that we perceive Him. So both of them will accomplish the 
highest good at the same time. In the same way they add: if to enjoy God is the highest good, 
cognition is also attendant in that enjoyment. For – and Augustine also testifies this – what things 
do we enjoy apart from those already known, in the delight of which the will then finds rest? 
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Moreover, we can also say we are happy when our mind is united with God, as far as it can happen 
for us. But who cannot see that such a union in the intellect occurs equally in the will? For we are 
joined to God by the will insofar as He Himself is the highest goodness, we are joined to Him by 
the intellect insofar as He is the highest truth. Finally, if you ask them what it is in us from which 
the highest good proceeds, they will respond that, in the learned consensus, it proceeds from the 
fact that we are made in the image and likeness of God. They declare that we attain such an image 
not through either one of the two, but both of them. 
Even when all these arguments are advanced, there is still no shortage of those who venture to 
argue otherwise. Although they acknowledge this equality of the mind and of the will, nonetheless, 
because the mind is more noble, they think that the highest good must be situated in the mind 
above all, as if it were a sovereign. They think that the mind is more noble because if the 
connection between these two things – the mind and the will – could be severed, the mind would 
itself remain a perfect act peculiar to the form of reason. But if the will were abandoned by the 
intellect, what else would remain other than some desire held in common with all living creatures? 
Who does not understand that the act of the will depends on the mind, because we never want 
anything that we first do not either know, or think that we know, to be good? Add to this that the 
act of the mind is purer. For it produces no impurity on account of its object, nor does the soul 
commit a disgraceful act in knowing about evil. So when talking about the old man, Simo, Davus is 
not accurate in saying “evil mind, evil soul”, even if the master knows about the slave’s deceit. In 
comparison the will is easily polluted, so Simo is accurate in saying “evil mind, evil soul” about 
Davus. For the slave has performed evil, not because he understands how he acts wrongly, but 
because he wants to act wrongly. No surprise. For when we either love or want anything, the soul 
itself is inspired towards the thing that is loved. So in some way the lover receives from what is 
loved. But what is received is not received according to its own moral standards, but instead 
according to the standards of what receives it. So when we want the squalid and criminal, the will is 
transformed such that it possesses a squalid nature and is repulsively soiled. We cannot say the 
same thing about the mind. For when something is perceived by the mind, the soul is not moved to 
the object, but the object to the soul. Hence the mind is not impoverished by the insignificance of 
things, but rather those things which are of less worth than it are improved. For these things 
assume a certain spiritual essence in the intellect itself. They also argue this: a power which extends 
itself in many ways is more excellent and more noble than all other powers which reach fewer 
things. So the mind, which is not only extended with respect to the truth, but also in relation to the 
good, far surpasses the will, which does not reach anything except in relation to the good. Likewise 
the power we possess which separates us from those things which lack reason – because we 
ourselves use reason – will be preferable. For this power is particular to us. But who does not know 
that we are not separated from things which lack reason on account of our will, but on account of 
our mind? Moreover, the power which brings us closer to that act by which we are made happy 
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must be more noble than all others. But this is peculiar to the mind. For since the object of the will 
is not the good in and of itself, but rather the perceived good, what will ever be accomplished 
unless the cognition intercedes? Although they say all these things very perceptively, there are 
nonetheless those who try to overthrow their claims, the arguments of whom it would be 
protracted to relate. If I am correct, however, they drive at this. They say that, when something is 
asserted simply, then what is understood must be that which is wholly perfected in it. If someone 
says “animal”, we do not understand a dead or painted animal, but a living one. So, for the same 
reason, if someone says “the soldier engages the enemy by the will of the consul”, the will must be 
understood to be that which, enclosed by fixed rules, obeys the reason. The act of the will shall 
therefore be more perfect than the act of the intellect. 
But what am I doing? For I see that, while I am lingering too much on one thing, I have almost 
abandoned my plan, for which it was enough to state what the highest good is. Since I have shown 
with clear arguments that it is God, it is of no importance at all to one who seeks to attain it 
whether we do so with the mind or the will or both. For we must progress by the same path and 
strive with the same methods. So we should leave all this investigation into how or what it is to 
those who have not only learning in abundance, but also leisure. For the nature of these things is 
that either view can be presented in a disputation by those who are most learned and vigorous in 
intellect such that it seems most similar to the truth. Even if I were to be accepted as the honorary 
arbiter in such a matter, I would still never interpose my opinion and would rather free myself with 
a Virgilian judgment, pronouncing both worthy of a heifer. For since we have already established 
that I know God to be the end of all goods for us, I will maintain it. We – that is, the human 
essence – are blessed in God.’ 
When he had said these things and we had honoured his oration with admiration and applause, 
Lorenzo said: ‘The argument could not have been made any more satisfactory to me in its abundant 
detail than it has been by you. You have brought me over to your opinion in such a way that if 
anyone now wanted to assert anything to the contrary, I would “stuff up my ears with that Ulyssean 
wax” lest I should be compelled to listen unwillingly. For I have a complete definition of what the 
highest good is. Yet one thing remains, and upon having understood it, I will be happy to leave the 
matter – unless, since you are exhausted from your long disputation I will perhaps annoy you by 
asking.’ 
‘No, not at all, for my part,’ said Battista, ‘I will explain what you desire to know immediately. I 
will not let you want for anything.’ 
‘So hear,’ said Lorenzo, ‘what I would like to be made plain to me. I was often present when the 
ends of the good were being discussed, and recognised that, when the subject was brought forth in 
the opinions of some philosopher, two connected things could easily be perceived. When you knew 
what the philosopher established as the end of the good, you could also immediately identify an end 
of the evil with the same reasoning. Epicurus says that the highest good is bodily pleasure. So we 
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could say without trouble that the highest evil is pain. Another philosopher places the highest good 
in wealth, and another in honours. So, vice-versa, the latter establishes the end of evil in ignominy, 
the former in poverty. Nor do the Stoics waver, because they say that the highest good is virtue, 
and affirm that the highest evil is vice. The reasoning is the same for the other philosophers. Now 
when, having refuted everything else, you said that God is the highest good, I wholly understand 
what you mean, and I do not only understand, but also agree. But then, when I consider diligently 
what I could set in opposition to this highest good as being entirely antithetical to it, nothing 
presents itself. There is nothing which, in an equal sense, can properly be called the highest evil in 
such a way that God is called the highest good. So you would be doing me the biggest favour if you 
could explain how or of what kind this is also the “highest” evil.’ 
‘That is a good question,’ said Battista, ‘for this is a matter that lacks neither difficulty, if you 
want to investigate it, nor benefit, if you understand the truth in it. I see many people perplexed by 
it. For when you run your mind over all the philosophers, you find no one, as you say, who does 
not place each highest end in contrast to its opposite. But when you turn to the Christian 
theologians, they indeed set out the highest and ultimate end of the good, but not the highest end 
of evil. Unless I am mistaken, however, we can resolve this contradiction easily if we investigate 
what we call “evil” in such a way that we establish exactly what it is. In order that we attain this 
understanding, there are certain things about the whole matter which I need to go over in a little 
more detail, unless perhaps you think it will be enough for you if, for the sake of brevity, I only 
show what they think, not why they think it.’ 
‘I would like to know both,’ said Lorenzo, ‘for although there may be nothing that I do not 
think should be conceded to the authority of such eminent men, you are nonetheless aware of the 
avidity of my spirits, which is so great in wanting to know things that it will never rest unless the 
reasoning is examined.’ 
‘I will therefore gratify your wish,’ said Battista, ‘but you must suffer with equanimity if I extend 
the speech a little longer in order to indulge you. Out of everything that acts there is nothing that 
does not place some goal for itself in acting. Those who farm, those who wage war, those who 
navigate, those who build, do not each carry out all their labours in order to act, but in order that 
they attain from their actions the goal which they intend to achieve. They call the goal that to which 
those who act are driven. So we endure toil and so many difficulties and inconveniences in vain, 
unless they have some purpose for the sake of which they are undertaken. Virgil therefore advises 
that: 
 
In the new Spring, when the frozen moisture melts from the grizzled mountains, 
And the crumbling soil loosens itself to the zephyrs; then my bull begins 




When he gives this advice, he does not convey it in order that the farmer torments himself by 
ploughing, but in order that, through the diligent cultivation of the field, he might eventually obtain 
a plentiful harvest. What is sought for its own sake can therefore be found in all our actions. All the 
rest is for the sake of that end in such a way that, when we arrive there, we cannot progress any 
further. For unless a particular end is prescribed, an action must proceed towards those things 
which are entirely infinite and, since there are no means to attain such things, we would cease from 
all action. For no one is driven towards that which there is ultimately no hope of attaining. So 
whatever Cicero did for the sake of action, he also did for the sake of persuading people. And in 
that recent war against Bartolomeo of Bergamo [culminating in the battle of Riccardina in 1467], 
whatever our Federico of Urbino did either to marshal his soldiers or to reconnoitre his adversaries 
extensively was aimed at the goal of obtaining a victory, at which he would rest on achieving it. 
Why do we so often return to the same point? Let it be determined beyond question that whatever 
action we perform is performed for the sake of something that is sought for its own sake. But this 
must be the good. If we always direct our actions towards something we are resolved to do, then 
we consider that goal is appropriate to us and in accordance with our nature. For whatever is 
produced by nature preserves itself in such a way that it always strives for what is beneficial to it 
and, for the same reason, avoids anything harmful. So we strive for the good, and we therefore say 
the end is the same as the good. So we can rightly conclude: what people do, they do for the sake of 
what is good. 
From these things this now remains. If something acts it intends the good for itself, certainly, 
but if anything deviates, that error – which is sin and evil – happened contrary to the original 
intention. And the error is not easily distinguished, unless all actions strive for their end. Who can 
say that an archer misses if he does not set out a target at which he aims his arrows? For this 
reason, a doctor also sins when, intending to cure an illness, he exacerbates it in the sufferer. You 
can perceive the same thing in nature. For nature intends that a human is produced from human 
seed. But if a foetus is produced with either a bovine head or the legs of a horse, it will now be 
called an error of nature, since it has deviated from the end to which it had directed itself. From all 
these arguments it will be clear that evil occurs in things contrary to the intention of something 
which performs an act. Something which arises contrary to the actions with which an acting entity 
has directed itself must be acknowledged to have occurred contrary to its intention. But all know 
that evil is completely contrary to the good. Evil therefore occurs contrary to the intention of that 
by which an act is performed. 
Here I will pass over those things which are produced by the power of nature, for which the 
explanation is the same, but we will look at human actions, of which our mind is the foundation. 
There is a certain power in us which is concerned with the judgment of the right and the wicked. It 
grasps the forms of things and is directed to that which has already presented itself as an end. If, 
however, it is deluded by the false appearance of a thing and strives for something else, error now 
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arises, and who can deny that this is contrary to intention? This power determined that King 
Porsena of Clusium should be killed by Mucius, because he was the most hostile of Rome’s 
enemies. So Mucius was directed to perform this murder as the good. Deceived by a similarity of 
dress and appearance to the king, he killed the king’s scribe. This did not happen any more 
contrarily to his intention than if someone about to accept a debt of gold for himself took brass to 
be gold, deceived by the colour of the metal. But we can at last conclude the subject thus, without 
any lack of clarity: when we do not perform any action other than because we have decided that it 
is good, whatever evil arises from an action will be contrary to intention.’ 
‘What you have said so far is pleasing,’ said Lorenzo, ‘for everything seems to proceed in its 
order and has, at the same time, been corroborated by profound arguments. Yet there is one thing I 
would like to be made clearer to me. When you said that evil arises contrary to the intention of 
something which performs an act, the arguments you set forth persuaded me that it is so. But, on 
the other hand, when I considered the matter more carefully it occurred to me that whatever 
happens contrary to intention often happens by chance and by accident, and therefore only rarely. 
How can we say that evil happens by accident, or by chance, or in rare cases? In order that I may 
for the moment set aside natural things – for which privation is present not rarely or by chance, but 
all the time – in human life and morals, don’t you find many more vices than virtues, and these 
vices indulged by our very will? Look carefully, I beg, at what things are done by all the people you 
know. How few people occur to you whose errors you do not perceive to be almost endless? No 
one doubts that these errors were not only undertaken by the will, but also by choice. In order that 
I may now set aside the authority of Aristotle, which is able to move anyone because it represents 
the the highest learning of humanity, I will not now relate this great philosopher’s arguments which 
show vice to be voluntary. Yet never, in a properly administered republic, would those who legislate 
wisely and justly have contrived so many and such serious punishments against evildoers unless 
they knew for sure that people sin voluntarily and are not forced to do so.671 Because in that type of 
philosophy in which life is purified, virtues and vices do not depend on what each person does, but 
on the spirit in which it is done. So when I observe that vice arises frequently in human actions, and 
that it is committed by our will, I do not understand how it can be contrary to the intention of 
whoever commits it.’ 
‘It is indeed justifiable, Lorenzo,’ said Battista, ‘that you ask that question, and is it not easy to 
respond to anything which you have said. Yet I will try, if I can do enough to satisfy you. In order 
that this can be made easier, you should notice that you discuss a twofold evil, such that we should 
consider it either inherent in some essence or in the activity of an essence. But we say that evil is in 
an essence because the essence lacks something in itself which, by its very nature, it should not only 
have, but it should also have by necessity, unless it is defective. So it will not be an evil for you if 
you do not have winged sandals like Mercury has, because the nature of humanity is such that it 
                                                          
671 In Lohe there is a misprint here, reading suas ponte instead of sua sponte. 
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cannot acquire winged sandals. Nor, on the other hand, should it be thought evil if you do not have 
blonde hair, because even if such a colour can occur in human hair, it is nonetheless of no 
detriment to a person if they lack it. But no one can lack a hand without it being to their detriment. 
For wise Nature, when she produced such an excellent animal as a human, understood that it could 
not employ the skills bestowed upon it without the precise assistance of the hands. So if someone 
lacks hands, they will lack an instrument without which they cannot perform many things necessary 
for life. From these things we are led to this point: what we call “evil” is a privation of something 
which is granted by human nature and without which you cannot lead life well and completely. 
Although matter, which the Greeks call hyle, can indeed assume all forms through its innate 
possibility, it is not bound to anything such that it is said to be perfected in one form rather than 
another. You will not, however, find any form which is not bound to something that consists of 
both matter and form. For water cannot endure without the peculiar form of water, nor fire 
without the peculiar form of fire. So such a privation of form, if it is applied to the matter itself, will 
not be evil in nature because matter is no more inclined to one form than another. But if the 
privation is applied to the form that the matter has taken it will be wholly evil. For if fire is deprived 
of its form, who does not see that it is now an evil for the fire? So these are the evils which are said 
to be inherent in some essence. And it is said that evil occurs in actions performed, if the actions 
themselves are lacking in their order and measure, since there is no activity which is not bound to a 
certain measure and order. 
You have what philosophers think to be evil in an essence and what, on the other hand, is evil in 
the activity of a thing. And we will easily refute your argument, in which you thought you could 
prove that whatever happens contrary to the intention of an acting entity happens by chance and 
accident. For although such things happen contrary to your intention, they nonetheless follow 
consequentially what you intended to do, so you will never persuade me that they happen by 
chance. I will demonstrate with a brief example in order to make this clearer. A bibulous glutton 
forms the intention that it is appropriate for him to enjoy the great pleasure of Cretan wine, but 
when he undertakes this intention he is made drunk. Drunkenness therefore comes to him contrary 
to intention, but not by luck, because drunkenness accompanies his glasses of wine, which are so 
numerous as to be either continual or almost continual. You find the same condition in the natural 
world in which, even if procreation does not intend any such thing for itself, corruption 
nevertheless always ensues. For air is never produced from water, unless it destroys that form of 
water. If something happens rarely, it can be by chance and accident, like when a monster is born 
from human seed. For this does not necessarily follow what nature intended to do for itself, but 
rather opposes it, because nature desires to produce the perfect. But evil arises in the actions of 
nature when the power which acts is deficient in acting. Although this is contrary to its intention, it 
is not said to be by accident if it happens frequently, but only if it happens rarely. But, on nature, 
some other time. 
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I will now return to our actions, which my speech concerns. Our intention to the good is not 
directed at something which cannot be contained within a boundary – for universal concepts do 
not incite action – but at something limited and circumscribed in place and time. So if such a good 
is connected to a privation of good – that is, an evil – and draws it along with itself, we can blame 
neither chance nor accident. Suppose you intend that it is good for you if you indulge in venereal 
pleasure with a woman who is married to someone else. Here you do not seek adultery, but sex, 
which nevertheless cannot happen without adultery. Adultery has not been committed by accident, 
although it is contrary to your intention, because it cannot be separated from the sex. Yet we say 
that it is an accident if someone fighting in a battle accidentally kills a citizen whom he desires to 
protect when he strives to drive back the enemy from its position. The striking of the citizen is not 
connected with the battle, which was engaged against an enemy, in such a way that it cannot be 
separated from it. For this reason it will be obvious even to an indifferent onlooker that vices which 
are committed when acting are voluntary even if they are contrary to intention, not because we 
want the vices for their own sake, but because they always accompany that which we do want for its 
own sake, just as a shadow always follows a body. For the will is also correctly said to be something 
we want for the sake of something else, although we do not want it for its own sake and directly. 
For, in the greatest tempest, sailors intend that they are made safe. But when, with a laden vessel, 
they cannot obtain safety, they throw the goods overboard – and, indeed, the expensive ones – 
willingly. So they make a loss willingly: not directly, but for the sake of health. 
If you understand all these arguments correctly, you will also know that, out of everything that 
exists, nothing is entirely evil, but evil itself is justly called a privation, which is explicitly not an 
essence, but a negation in essence. From this it is clearly evident that all that exists is good, because 
everything that exists desires nothing more than to exist. Unless something is good, this shall not be 
desired at all. So no essence is evil and, consequently, nothing evil will be a essence. Add this too, if 
you wish. Whatever exists is said to exist either through its actuality or through its possibility, and 
beyond these you will not find anything else through which something can exist. Actuality will be 
good for the reason that it is the actuality of a thing. For all things are called perfected when they 
exist through an actuality. But a capability itself must also be good. An actuality comes from a 
capability, and the capability adheres to the actuality through a certain resemblance, and it is not 
contrary in any way. Likewise, capability is also of the same class as actuality. So whatever exists 
exists for some reason and, from this, what exists is good. So evil has no existence. Besides, it is 
agreed amongst the metaphysicians that, whatever exists, it is all from God. But since God is the 
highest good, no one of a sound mind says that evil is caused by Him, on which this from Genesis 
is very much appropriate: “God saw every thing that he had made, and it was very good”.672 I think 
that it has now been clearly demonstrated that evil has no essence.’ 
                                                          
672 Here Lohe has sana ementis, which should be sanae mentis. 
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‘It is indeed clear,’ said Lorenzo, ‘and has been demonstrated by arguments which do not only 
persuade the reluctant, but also guide the well-disposed. When I hear them, I surrender myself to 
them entirely. But, on the other hand, when I reflect on the matter, I am not sure if it what you said 
is true: evil does exist in things, by reason of which it is not true to declare that evil has no essence. I 
beseech you, is it not correct to say Appius Claudius is blind? Because if it is correct, isn’t it correct 
to say that something is blind rather than we understand that all is privation?’ 
‘It is correct,’ said Battista, ‘but not directly nor for one and the same reason. We say that 
something exists in two senses: in the sense in which the existence of a thing is signified, which is 
divided in those ten classes of dialectic which they call “categories”; and in the sense by which we 
express the truth of something said. You can therefore say that evil and privation exist in this 
second sense with complete scholarly approval, because on account of that very privation it is 
perfectly true to say that something is deprived. In the first sense, however, you cannot say that at 
all. But so much on the nature of evil. 
Perhaps it will seem absurd to some to say that the cause of evil is not evil, but good. Yet it is so 
true that it cannot be any other way. For if you were to say that evil is the cause of evil, you should 
remember that it has already been demonstrated that no evil can act unless it acts by the power of 
its own good. So we say that the first cause of evil is good. But doesn’t this disturb our argument a 
great deal? If evil is nothing, how can something that is nothing be caused? What shall we say? This, 
if I am not mistaken. If something is a cause of evil, then that cause must be good, but not because 
good intends evil as its end – for things which are opposed to each other can never cause their 
opposite – but because evil occurs contrary to the intended end. For we can see cold as being the 
cause of heat, on which there is “and the piercing chill of the North Wind scorches”, not because 
the power of heating is peculiar to cold, but for some other unintended reason. So evil draws its 
origin from the good not on account of the nature of the good, but on account of a defect. We can 
take an clear example of this from nature. There is a certain power in a living being to which nature 
has entrusted the task of digesting the food which has already slipped down into the stomach. This 
is the end that the power of digestion intends for itself. If it is affected by a weakness and cannot 
complete its function, the digestion is left unfinished and the undigested food sticks in the stomach. 
So the power of digestion errs: not, however, because it is acting according to its intention, but on 
account of its own defect. Something which is acting does not mediate its action according to any 
possible defect, so instead, although it intends to complete its task, it is unable to accomplish its 
action because of the defect. But it sometimes also happens that a power which, in itself, is healthy 
and capable of acting, is nevertheless unable to complete a task because the instrument it possesses 
is unsuitable. The power by which the motion of the legs is stimulated into a forward step can be 
healthy, but that power will never maintain a forward step if the legs, which are used as an 
instrument to direct the step, are deficient. For the motive power of Horatius Cocles, by which he 
could form a forward step, was not deficient, but one of his legs, disfigured by a wound, did not 
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obey him. I think you understand how certain corruptions in actions happen: on the one hand, 
because of a defect through which the power which acts is debilitated, and, on the other, because of 
a corruption in the instrument which renders it unsuitable. 
But just as corruption of action happens, so too can that which arises from action fall into evil. 
In this case, either matter or form is to blame. There is a power in the masculine seed through 
which it can form a person from the blood of a woman. But if the matter in which the human form 
must be impressed is by nature reluctant and wholly unyielding, the power will not now form a 
person, but some monster. Who does not acknowledge that this is a fault arising from matter? For 
the privation of some form must be connected with that form. So when nature strives to create air 
from water, it intends the form of air as its goal, but a privation of the form which is water happens 
contrary to its intention. You also observe the same thing in the arts, for art always imitates the 
nature as far as it can.  
But I do not know how, when we had sought to find out about an evil which is brought about 
in life and morals, I have now slipped back into nature for a second time. And so, having set nature 
aside, we finally return to that evil. First of all, along with all philosophers and Christian authors, we 
do not place it in the consequences of activity, but in activity alone. For they are not concerned 
with what was done, but the state of mind in which it was done. So they establish four states of 
mind as principles. When something presents itself to us, some power of our mind is occasioned by 
that object such that we recognise it and, eventually, determine whether it is something good or 
evil. So when, in the first place, an object presents itself, and then, in the second, a judgment is 
formed about it, in the third place the will is aroused, so that we strive for the good but avoid the 
evil. Finally, in accordance with the will’s command, a movement rises up in the body in such a way 
that the limbs perform what the will has previously determined. We do not observe vice in the first 
two principles, nor in the last one, but in the will, which we placed third in the order. For Verres 
did not sin because the paintings, statues and other precious paraphernalia of the Sicilians presented 
themselves to him, nor because he judged that he would abound in wealth from the acquisition of 
such accoutrements, but, rather, because he wanted to steal. This is because culpability depends on 
the will alone, to such an extent that, even if he had not stolen, he had committed a sin nonetheless 
because he wanted to steal. For the question of guilt is not “has he killed or has he not killed?” but 
“does he want to kill?”. Clodius lacked the strength to kill Annius Milo. If you are looking for fault 
in this matter as far as nature is concerned, then it is the power which has not fulfilled the mind’s 
intention that has sinned. If you turn to morals, however, then it is not the act of physical motion 
but the act of the will that commits the crime, and Clodius is justly called a murderer because he 
wanted to kill Milo. Suppose, however, that he had killed, but when he had not wanted to kill. He 
would at once be absolved of the crime. For someone who has not done such a thing on account 
of the will, but through a weakness of the aforementioned powers or through ignorance, does not 
only lack culpability but is also very often thought to be worthy of compassion. Who, when they 
294 
 
read about what Cephalus did to Procris (even if they think it mythical), does not only acquit 
Cephalus of the crime, but also offers him the greatest compassion, because they understand that, 
out of ignorance, he struck the wife most dear to him when he intended to wound a beast, and her 
death went on to cast him into the greatest grief and sorrow? So you see that vice that arises in 
morality has the act of the will as its origin. 
Since we have already established that the deficiency of an action arises from the weakness of its 
first cause of action, I think that this subject should be explained more detail. So let us see the point 
at which the will fails before it performs the act. The will is not defective by its nature, for the 
defect would always cling to it and it would always fail. Nor, on the other hand, is it defective by 
accident or chance, for the defect would be out of our hands. It is therefore voluntary. But, in order 
that you see where the error comes from, hear this. The power of something which acts is brought 
about by the cause which is prior to it. For as long as that which acts in the second place proceeds 
in order from the first cause, it accomplishes its function perfectly. If, however, it deviates from it, 
there is now no remedy: it will fail either straight away or a little later. A circle which is rotated by a 
human hand turns in a circular motion. If it is abandoned by the same hand it will cease from 
movement. So, to return to the point, I was just saying that there are two principles which precede 
the will: the object that presents itself to us and a certain power which recognises the objects it is 
shown. But since whatever can be moved has something peculiar to it by which it is moved, not 
every power of perception is able to arouse every appetite. The power which perceives sensible 
things can only arouse the appetite which is from the senses. But it is peculiar to reason to arouse 
the will. On the other hand, since reason can perceive different types of good, each of which has its 
particular end, the will must also have an end peculiar to it and a first cause by which it is aroused: 
this is not any good, but a good that is certain and fixed. So if our mind and will are moved by the 
perception of reason, which possesses the correct judgment of good and of evil, correct action will 
originate in them. But if action arises from those things which have been determined to be good by 
the false judgment of the senses when they are not at all good, the will at once fails in regard to life 
and morals. So a perversion of order with regard to reason and its peculiar end produces a fault in 
action. This happens with respect to reason when the will is suddenly driven to perceive with the 
senses something that would not be good if you were to perceive it correctly but, because it allures 
the senses with its enticements, is judged to be good by them. There is, on the other hand, that 
which can genuinely be called good when undeceived reason itself judges that it is good, but at this 
point in time or in this way cannot be called good. The will is driven to it nevertheless, possessing 
no regard for order. Such a perversion of order is voluntary and is therefore not without vice. 
Perhaps I am more talkative than necessary on the nature of evil. But, using the arguments by 
which I have shown that evil is not essence and, on account of this condition, cannot exist for 
itself, I will add that it is easy to understand that evil must always exist in something good. This has 
also been shown because when we say “evil”, we mean “privation”. For I have already proved this. 
295 
 
Privation itself and the form of which something is deprived are the same thing. But that which is 
the subject of a form is such that it is the subject of a form by its native possibility. Who will deny 
this is good, when the possibility or potential itself, and the actuality which comes from it, are of 
the entirely same kind? Moreover, evil is called evil for one reason alone: because it is harmful. But 
it does not harm evil, for if it caused harm to evil it would be good. So it harms good. But, if we 
speak about the form of the thing, evil would not harm good unless it were in it. What blindness 
will harm Polyphemus, unless the blindness is in Polyphemus? “But since evil is opposed to good, 
how can they both be the same subject? For one of the opposites drives out the other.” If you were 
to say this, I will respond thus. Whatever can be called a being, the same thing is also called good. It 
is not irrational that non-being should be in being. For any privation is in some essence, which is a 
being and yet is not in a being opposite to itself. For if I were to say “blindness”, this is certainly 
not a universal non-being that takes away vision everywhere. So blindness does not have vision as 
its subject, but the animal. 
All these arguments proceed to this point: a highest evil cannot be found in such a way that the 
highest good is found. For if there were a highest evil, it could not have any association with 
anything good. But you will find that no evil is entirely separated from good, because, as we showed 
a little earlier, evil extends its roots into good and establishes its foundations in it, so to speak. 
Besides, if you were to grant to me that there was some highest evil, it would be evil in its essence 
in such a way that we see the highest good is good in its essence. But it has already been 
demonstrated that evil has no essence. Furthermore, there can be no cause of the first principle, for 
it would not be the first principle if there were a cause on which it depended. But we have said that 
good is the cause of evil. Add too that a cause which is called a cause on its own account is always 
prior to that which is called a cause for its accidental quality. But evil is not a cause except through 
its accidental quality. So you cannot find a highest evil.’ 
This is what I was able to remember from the many and far more excellent things that Leo 
Battista discussed – off the cuff, and with precision and eloquence – in this assembly of great men. 
Since he had more than satisfied Lorenzo with them, and the sun was already ascending to its 
midday height, we all arose with the encouragement of our most generous host Mariotto and, 
following him, departed to refresh our bodies. 
 
